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Abstract 
This thesis examines the relations between the three Entente powers, Great Britain, 
France and Italy, and Greece, from 1923, the time of the Lausanne conference, until 
the middle of 1926, when the Greek dictator General Pangalos was ousted from 
power. The first part is chiefly concerned with Greek internal affairs, and charts the 
course of Greek politics as the country underwent a painful transition, in the wake of 
the Asia Minor disaster, from monarchy to republic. The second part focuses on 
Greek external affairs, or, more specifically, Greece's relations with Italy over the 
Dodecanese question and during the Corfu crisis, her relations with Bulgaria, 
particularly over the minorities problem, and her relations with Yugoslavia during 
their negotiations for an alliance from 1924-1926, which became subsumed in the 
search for a Balkan Locarno. The attitudes and policies of the Entente powers towards 
all these events are explored, in order to elucidate both the bilateral relationships 
between each of them and Greece, and their relations with each other over Greek 
matters. This in turn illuminates themes which have a relevance extending beyond the 
southern Balkans such as the evolving relationship between the Entente powers in the 
post-war world, the efficacy of the League of Nations in the field of collective 
security, the possibilities and limitations of the international minority protection 
regime established in 1919-1920 and the solidity and durability of the era of 
pacification apparently ushered in by the treaty of Locarno. 
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Notes 
Greece did not adopt the Gregorian calendar until 1 March 1923 (16 February 1923 
according to the Julian calendar previously in force), but all dates are given here in 
the new style. 
I 
As a general rule I have referred to towns, cities and regions by the names in use in 
the 1920s - for example, Salonica rather than Thessaloniki and Smyrna rather than 
Izmir. 
The transliteration of Greek and other Balkan names presents myriad problems and I 
have opted for clarity over consistency, in some cases adopting the forms used by 
contemporary English observers and in others employing modem transliteration. I 
have not anglicised Greek forenames (e. g., Konstan. tinos Rentis), except where 
individuals are better known by the English form (e. g. King Constantine 1). 
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This thesis examines the relations between the three Entente powers, Great Britain, 
France and Italy, and Greece, from 1923, the time of the Lausanne conference, until 
the middle of 1926, when the Greek dictator General Pangalos was ousted from 
power. The first part is chiefly concerned with Greek internal affairs, and charts the 
course of Greek politics as the country underwent a painful transition, in the wake of 
the Asia Minor disaster, from monarchy to republic. The second part focuses on 
Greek external affairs, or, more specifically, Greece's relations with Italy over the 
Dodecanese question and during the Corfu crisis, her relations with Bulgaria, 
particularly over the minorities problem, and her relations with Yugoslavia during 
their negotiations for an alliance ftom 1924-1926, which became subsumed in the 
search for a Balkan Locarno. The attitudes and policies of the Entente powers towards 
all these events are explored, in order to elucidate both the bilateral relationships 
between each of them and Greece, and their relations with each other over Greek 
matters. This in turn illuminates themes which have a relevance extending beyond the 
southern Balkans such as the evolving relationship between the Entente powers in the 
post-war world, the efficacy of the League of Nations in the field of collective 
security, the possibilities and limitations of the international minority protection 
regime established in 1919-1920 and the solidity and durability of the era of 
pacification apparently ushered in by the treaty of Locarno. 
For a long time the 1920s were a neglected decade in international history. In the 
immediate aftermath of the Second World War little attention was paid even to the 
more immediate origins of that conflict: the wickedness of Hitler seemed to be a 
simple and sufficient explanation for its outbreak, and the war itself was 'the great 
subject of interest for reader and writer alike. This was natural, since, at the height of 
the Cold War, current concerns diverted attention to more recent experiences: 'the 
origins of the second World war had little attraction when men were already studying, b 
the ori(iins of the third. 1 The publication in 1961 of A. J. P. Taylor's The Origins of the C) 
I A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (Hannondsworth, Penguin, 1964), pp. 31,34 and 
29-40 passim. 
3 
Second World War, 'probably the most celebrated, notorious and debated historical 
work of the post-war era', shattered this consensus and triggered a new wave of 
popular and academic interest in the war's origins. 2 Initially, however, most of the 
work Taylor's book generated tended to focus on the 1930s and the big issues of 
appeasement and German war guilt: this reflected the depiction of the 1920s in 
Origins as little more than a prelude to the 1930S. 3 It was not until the 1970s, with the 
gradual opening of British and continental archives, that systematic attention came to 
be paid to the 1920s, and now this work fonns quite a substantial corpus. 4Recent 
developments in international relations which have produced a situation, particularly 
in eastern Europe, that at least superficially resembles that of the post-Versailles era, 
should ensure that the 1920s remain in vogue. 
It is perhaps not surprising, given the very long shadow cast by the Second World 
War, that much of this writing on the 1920s is still concerned with identifying the 
antecedents of 1939 in the earlier decade. In particular, it has focused on the 
Versailles settlement and the international system of the 1920s: were these so 
inherently flawed as to be doomed from the start, or could some sort of stable order 
have evolved from them in different circumstances? Much evidence has been 
accumulated to support both propositions and, although it can never be conclusive, 
there is at least now some recognition that later developments were not necessarily 
2 R. J. B. Bosworth, Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima. History Writing and the Second World War 
1945-1990 (London, Routledge, 1993), p. 34 and pp. 31-52 for a fuller examination of how Taylor's 
book 'would encourage an unfreezing of time in British historiography and signal the commencement 0 
of the Sixties in British society'. 
3 The Taylor controversy and subsequent developments in the historiography of the war's origins can 
be traced in E. M. Robertson (ed. ), The Origins of the Second World War. Historical Interpretations 
(London, Macmillan, 1971), G. Martel (ed. ), 'The Origins of the Second World War'Reconsidered. 
The A. J. P. Taylor debate a er twenty-five years (London, Unwin Hyman, 1986) and R. Boyce and Ot 
E. M. Robertson (eds. ), Paths to War. New Essays on the Origins of the Second World War (London, 
Macmillan, 1989). The 1964 Penguin edition of Origins devotes 24 pages to the legacy of the war 
and 22 to the 'post-war decade' out of 336 pages of text. 
4 For a general survey, see J. Jacobson, 'Is there a New International History of the 1920s? ', American 
Historical Review 88 1983 617-45, or S. Marks, '1918 and After: the Postwar Era' in Martel (ed. ), 
'Origins'Reconsidered, pp. 17-48. 
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inevitable. 5No historical inquiry into the narrower period of 1923-1926 can or should 
ignore these two contrasting interpretations of the nature of the decade. On the other 
hand, there seems good cause to agree with the contemporary view that this period 
saw a change for the better where the stability, security and prosperity of the 
international scene were concerned: as the British foreign secretary asserted in 
October 1926, a 'fundamental improvement'had occurred since 1923, 'the darkest 
moment in the history of Western Europe since the conclusion of the war'. 6 The 
period which began with Anglo-French relations at their lowest point since Fashoda, 
with the French embroiled in their desperate attempts to enforce the Versailles 
settlement via the occupation of the Ruhr and inter-Allied wrangles over security and 
reparations seemingly interminable, ended with the reparations question apparently 
settled by the Dawes plan of 1924, security seemingly assured by Locarno and, 
symbolic of the new era of reconciliation and pacification Locarno inaugurated, 
Germany admitted to the League of NationS. 71n the long term this improvement did 
in fact prove to be built on false assumptions, but the architects of Locarno can 
scarcely be blamed for example, for failing to foresee the Depression. 8At any rate, 
regardless of the long term prospects of the system, the atmosphere of this three year 
period was one of problems overcome and faith restored. 
The nature of Great Britain's position and role in the 1920s is also contested 
historiographical ground. As Britain was obviously a state of central importance in 
inter-war European international relations, this argument is in part simply an element 
in the wider debate about the nature of the decade and the possibilities for the 
5 J. R. Ferris, "'The Greatest Power on Earth": Great Britain in the 1920s', International History 
Review 13(4) 1991746-7. The two sides to the argument are mapped out in P. M. H. Bell, The Origins 
of the Second World War in Europe (London, Longman, 1986) pp. 14-38. 
6 [E. L. Woodward, R. Butler, W. N. Medlicott, D. Dakin et al. (eds. ), ] D[ocuments on] B[ritish] 
F[oreign] P[olicy, 1919-1939 (London, HMS0,1947-1986)]/[series] la/[volume] 11/919-20. It goes 
without saying that this was a purely anglocentric view of the previous three years. 0 7 For a general survey of international relations in the 1920s see, E. Wiskemann, Europe of the 
Dictators 1919-1945 (Glasgow, Fontana/Collins, 1982), pp. 9-74, S. Marks, The Illusion of Peace. 
International Relations in Europe 1918-1933 (London, Macmillan, 1976), pp. 1-107 or G. Ross, The 
Great Powers and the Decline of the European States System 1914-1945 (London, Longman, 1983), 
pp. 37-70. 
8 Bell, Origins, pp. 36-8. 
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international system in those years. Equally, however, it forms part of a separate 
debate about Britain's decline from world power status. For a long time, work on 
Britain's position after the First World War was dominated by this theme of decline, 
emphasising economic, military and strategic weaknesses, and postulating a steady 
deterioration in British strength from a mid-Victorian zenith to a late twentieth- 
century nadir. Recently, however, a more nuanced picture has begun to emerge 
which, whilst not denying the intrinsic weaknesses in Britain's position is also alive to 
the persistence of strengths and 'under-utilised potential', and which represents a 
19 healthy corrective to notions of an inexorable 'steady twentieth-century slide . 
In this view, the post-war balance sheet for Britain can be read quite positively. True, 
the war did have adverse effects on Britain's position. The loss of life was 
devastating, as was the economic impact in the shape of lost markets, dissipated 
reserves, weakened infrastructure and a burden of debt - also serious from the point of 
view of a great trading power was the dislocation of the international economic 
system. Moreover, the pressures of war engendered or exacerbated discontent in the 
empire: there was nationalist unrest in India, Egypt, Mesopotamia and Ireland and the 
Dominions were growing increasingly assertive and independent. Combined with this 
were more general problems caused by the disruptive impact of the war: instability in 
Europe, the revolutionary Bolshevik regime in Russia and the transformation of the 
United States into a real international force. On the other hand, after a post-war 
period of readjustment the situation stabilised. By the early 1920s, for example, a 
I relatively orderly' calm had returned to the Near and Nfiddle East, fears of Moscow- 
inspired world revolution had eased and the United States had given notice of its 
intent to withdraw from Europe (except for providing finance and expertise for its 
recovery). Moreover, it was an indisputable fact that when Great Britain had been 
9 D. Reynolds, Britannia Overruled. British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century 
(London, Longman, 199 1), p. 34 and passim for the best exposition of this viewpoint. See also Ferris 
1HR 13 726-50 and G. Martel, 'The Meaning-, of Power: Rethinking the Decline and Fall of Great 
Britain', International History Review 13(4) 1991662-94. 
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tested by war she had emerged victorious, with her prestige immeasurably 
strengthened, 'with an enlarged empire and reduced enemies'. 10 
This view of Britain's post-war position can be placed in the context of a different 
perspective on the ebb and flow of British power in the longer term. Economically, 
Britain had been in decline for decades before 1919, but this did not automatically 
make Britain weak or uninfluential - the relationship between economic strength and 
state power is far from straightforward, and Britain's influence in Europe was 
certainly greater in the 1920s than at times of greater economic strength in the 
previous century. Moreover, despite the damage to British financial power caused by 
the war Britain was still a first rate industrial power: 'during the inter-war years, her 
relative industrial position was scarcely weaker than in the generation before 1914, 
and between 1888 and 1918 the economy had met Great Britain's strategic needs 
adequately, if not spectacularly'. Equally, the war did not hurt only Britain - it also 
severely retarded the challenge of European competitors whose greater population 
and productivity were in the long term to see them outstrip British economic 
perfonnance. 11 
After all, power is relative. It was by no means foreseeable that the three pronged 
revisionist challenge from Germany, Italy and Japan that in the 1930s and in the 
Second World War proved almost too much for Britain should arise. Through the 
1920s British prestige and policy largely kept revisionism in check, and it was only 
later, as a result of contingent factors, that the balance shifted towards powers 
opposed to the status quo. This in turn was largely due to factors external to Britain: 
instability in Europe and general weaknesses in the international political and 
economic system, the rise of extra-European powers and changes in technology such 
as the growth of air power at the expense of Britain's traditional forte, sea power. 
10 Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, pp. 105-11,296; Ferris IHR 13 passim; Martel IHR 13 686-9. For 
this analysis and what follows I have also drawn on an unpublished paper given by Z. Steiner, 'The 
Impact of the First World War Upon Great Britain's World Position', at the Institute for 
Contemporary British History conference at the London School of Economics on 6 July 1992. 
11 Ferris IHR 13 7.30- 1,737-8; Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, pp. I 1- 19. 
7 
Britain's inability to cope with these challenges cannot then be interpreted as due 
simply to British decline, since 'the three power problem of the 1930s might have 
broken Great Britain at her relative peak of power'. Strength and weakness are 
dictated by context and, leaving aside the issue of whether the international system 
was doomed to collapse, it would be dangerous to extrapolate Britain's relative 
weakness in the 1930s back to the previous decade. 12 
Imperial factors must also be included in the equation, not least because 'it was the 
empire which made Britain great' by making her a world power. Recent research has 
illuminated the extent to which British control of overseas possessions was often 
rather informal or loose, and there is also a lively debate about the relative costs and 
benefits of imperialism. Certainly, it seems clear that empire was not an unmixed 
blessing and, for this reason, the British were often reluctant imperialists, keen to 
practise 'cut-price empire', 'getting little out, but putting little in'. 13 It is also apparent 
that in the twentieth century the empire faced very serious challenges from the forces 
of colonial nationalism, Dominion centrifugalism and a loss of confidence at home in 
the morality and utility of imperialism, and that in the long term these problems did 
indeed mean that 'the days of British power were numbered'. 14There was, in fact, 
some truth in the assertion that the empire was 'a brontosaurus with huge, vulnerable 
limbs which the central nervous system had little capacity to protect, direct or 
control'. 15 On the other hand, in the inter-war years and especially in the 1920s the 
British were able to manage these problems by conciliation, concession and 
calculated retreat - the empire was maintained and appeared at least to prosper. 16 
Moreover, in the longer term, the abandonment of empire was as much a symptom as 
12 Ferris IHR 13 729-30,739-47. For a general discussion of how 'rivals' affected British power, see 
Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, pp. 19-25. 
13 Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, pp. 25-33. 
14 Ferris IHR 13 733-7; Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, pp. 31-3. 
15 M. Howard, The Continental Commitment. The Dilemma ofBritish Defence Policy in the Era of the 
Two World Wars (London, Temple Smith, 1972), p. 75. 
16 This process, Nvhere relations between Britain and the Dominions are concerned, can be followed 
in R. F. Holland, Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance 1918-1939 (London, Macmillan, 1981). 
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a cause of British decline, and it seems curious to bemoan withdrawal from untenable 
positions. 
The common theme running through all this is that explanations of long term 
processes are of limited use and can be misleading in assessing the situation at a 
particular point in time. Specifically, in the 1920s, despite what actually came 
afterwards, British power was not necessarily doomed to decline in precisely the way 
it did, and undoubted weaknesses must be seen in the context of definite and palpable 
strengths. Moreover, ' the limits of power were not insuperable', and the way in which 
the British hand was played was as important as the cards it contained. Thus politics 
and policy, the way in which Britain 'tried to consolidate and retain its exposed 
positiont, constituted key contingent factors. 17 It iScertainly arguable that in the 1920s 
British policy-makers were largely successful in achieving their goals, and in 
increasing the stability of the international system: 'whatever the failure of British 
decision-makers during the 1920s, they bequeathed a strong bargaining position to 
their successors' who were more responsible than they for whatever decline 
followed. 18 
Before delineating the principles and outlines of British policy it is necessary to 
consider the process of policy-formulation, for this is another area where careful 
distinction must be made between long term trends and the precise situation at a given 
moment. Governments, rather than the public or pressure groups, still make external 
policy, but the relative influence of the various branches of government is a source of 
great debate. In the longer term, the twentieth century has seen the influence of the t) 
Foreign Office in external policy-making decline, and power pass to other 
departments, such as the Treasury, and more particularly the Cabinet Office. This 
same process has caused a considerable lack of co-ordination in British policy which 
has hardly improved its effectiveness. 19 Lloyd George's premiership, 1916-1922, has 
17 Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, pp. 33-5,295. 
IS Ferris IHR 13 746-50. 
19 Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, pp. 38-50. 
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been identified as a crucial phase in this process: his penchant for personal diplomacy, 
the pressures of policy-making in wartime and the weakness of Curzon, foreign 
secretary from 1919, all contributed to an erosion of Foreign Office influence. This 
was reinforced by structural changes - which excluded the Foreign Office from 
influence over, for example, many international economic issues - and the post-war 
backlash against the practitioners of old diplomacy. 20 On the other hand, these 
changes were not wholly irreversible. When Austen Chamberlain became foreign 
secretary in the second Baldwin government in November 1924, the fortunes of the 
Foreign Office recovered: Chamberlain used his own forceful personality and 
political position together with Baldwin's lack of interest in foreign affairs almost 'to 
exercise complete control over British foreign poliCy'. 21 The evolution of Locarno 
perhaps provides a good illustration of the position and weight of the Foreign Office 
during this period: Chamberlain was unable to achieve his original goal of an Anglo- 
French alliance, but did force through - against serious opposition from cabinet 
colleagues - the idea of a western security pact. 22 
Within this wider question of Foreign Office influence, some assessment must be 
made of the relationship between, and relative influence of, ministers and their 
officials -'a crucial and permanent element in the formulation of British foreign 
poliCy'. 23 The Foreign Office under Curzon was a rather miserable place because of 
20 R. M. Warman, "The Erosion of Foreign Office Influence in the Making of Foreign Policy, 1916- 
1918', Historical Journal 15(l) 1972 133-59; M. L. Dockrill and Z. Steiner, 'The Foreign Office at the 
Paris Peace Conference in 1919', International History Review 2(l) 1980 55-86; A. J. Sharp, 'The 
Foreign Office in Eclipse 1919 - 1922' History 61(2) 1976 198-218. These articles update the earlier 
essay by G. A. Craig, 'The British Foreign Office from Grey to Austen Chamberlain', in G. A. Craig and 
F. Gilbert (eds. ), The Diplomats 1919-1939 Volume I The Twenties (New York, Atheneum, 1968) 15- 
48. A different argument emphasising the strength of Foreign Office influence in policy-making is 
presented in E. Goldstein, Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning and the 
Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920 (Oxford, Clarendon, 1991). 
21 B. J. C. McKercher, 'Austen Chamberlain's Control of British Foreign Policy, 1924-1929', 
International History Review 6(4) 1984 570-91; D. Dutton, Austen Chamberlain. Gentleman in 
Politics (Bolton, Ross Anderson, 1985), pp. 232-7. 
22 A. Orde, Great Britain and International Security 1920-1926 (London, Royal Historical Society, 
1978), pp. 68-98; Dutton, Chamberlain, pp. 238-46; S. E. Crowe, 'Sir Eyre Crowe and the Locarno 
Pact', English Historical Review 87(l) 1972 49-74. Sir Eyre Crowe was permanent under-secretary at 
the Foreign Office from 1919 until his untimely death in April 1925. r.: 1 23 D. C. Watt, Personalities and Policies. Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the 
Twentieth Century (NNIestport, Greenwood Press, 1975), pp. 3-4. 
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the foreign secretary's autocracy, bad temper and feebleness in the face of Lloyd 
George. 21 Although Curzon had his admirers - notably Harold Nicolson 25 he also 
aroused intense enmity: William Tyrrell, assistant under-secretary and from spring 
1925 permanent under- secretary, was alienated enough by October 1923 to become 
involved in an intrigue with the French and the editor of the Morning Post to oust 
Curzon and inaugurate a more francophile policy in London. 26Under Ramsay 
MacDonald, prime minister and foreign secretary in the Labour government of 
January - November 1924, matters improved somewhat. After initial difficulties he 
worked harmoniously with his officials who generally considered him to be a good 
foreign secretary, and after he left office he defended them from radical charges that 
they had sought to frustrate Labour policy. 27 Although officials probably had more 
leeway under him than under Curzon - because he could devote only a limited time to 
foreign affairs - his policy nonetheless seemed to bear his distinctive stamp. 28Under 
Chamberlain, this harmony continued, with mutual respect between minister and 
officials but Chamberlain generally in the ascendant. On the other hand, some 
24 Sharp History 61210-11; L. Mosley, Curzon. The End of an Epoch (London, Longmans, 1961), 
pp. 195,211-12. 
25 J. Lees-Milne, Harold Nicolson. A Biography Volume 11886-1929 (London, Chatto and Windus, 
1980) 173-4,185-90,214. Nicolson was a prominent figure in the Central Department of the Foreign 
Office during these years, and a voluble commentator on Greek affairs. He originally disliked Curzon 
and his 'tumid, caddish and disloyal domination' of the Foreign Office, even once referring to him in 
his diary as 'a shit'. He became an admirer during the Lausanne conference when Curzon was 
maonificent'. A generally sympathetic picture also emerges from the autobiography of Curzon's 
private secretary: R. G. Vansittart, The Mist Procession. The Autobiography of Lord Vansittart 
(London, Hutchinson, 1958). 
26 K. M. Wilson, A Study in the History and Politics of the Morning Post 1905-1926 (Lampeter, 
Edwin Mellen, 1990), pp. 193-223. 
27 D. Marquand, Rarnsay MacDonald (London, Cape, 1977), pp. 299-310,381-8,416-8; Vansittart, 
Mist Procession, pp. 322-3; Lees-Milne, Nicolson 1206,215,220,223 (Nicolson was an exception in 
the Foreign Office who never really took to MacDonald); [Public Record Office, MacDonald Papers] 
PRO 30/69/[volume] 200 MacDonald to Parmoor p [rivate] I[etter] d[ated] 13 Aug. 1924; PRO 
30/69/1170 MacDonald to P. J. Baker p. l. d. 25 May 1925. 
28 A. Cassels, 'Repairing the Entente Cordiale and the New Diplomacy', Historical Journal 23(l) 
1980 133-53. 
II 
contemporary critics saw him as a creature of his officialS, 29 a view echoed in part by 
some historianS. 30 
All this merely confirms the notorious difficulty of unravelling the tangled threads of 
bureaucratic policy-making. It may, however, be misleading to give too much 
credence to the argument that there was necessarily some conflict of interest between 
ministers and officials: after all, in general terms they were of a piece socially and 
intellectually, and they were in the main all members of a generation which had 
reached political maturity before the war. 31 At any rate, continuity seems to have been 
a hallmark of British policy in the 1920s. This was doubtless in part due to the 
influence of a career civil service 'able to guide politicians along established grooves' 
by articulating the structural constraints and traditional interests which limit and 
shape policy. But, equally, it reflects the existence of a general consensus between the 
leaders of the political parties (as opposed to the rank and file) over external poliCy. 32 
Thus it was that even MacDonald, the erstwhile arch-radical, was able to continue 'in 
all essentials the main lines of British poliCy'. 33 True, there were changes of emphasis: 
Curzon's successors, for example, were notably more sympathetic to France than he, 
and MacDonald was determined to re-establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union. In general, however, there was a broad consensus about British interests and 
the means to advance and protect them. 
The influence of public opinion and domestic political considerations on foreign 
policy must also be considered. At first sight, it might seem that the direct influence 
of these factors would be negligible, given the consensus outlined above, the fact that 
in creneral 'the social structure of British political power does not weigh mass Zý 
29 Dutton, Chamberlain, pp. 237,255; Vansittart, Mist Procession, p. 334. 
30 J. R. Ferris, Men, Money and Diplomacy: the Evolution of British Strategic Policy, 1919-1926 (New 
York, Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 1- 14,144-151 argues that in his crucial first months in 
office Chamberlain followed his officials, although he in any case shared their opinions. 
31 Watt, Personalities and Policies, pp. I- 15 is an attempt to identify the 'nature of the foreign - 
policy-making 61ite in Britain'. 
32 Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, pp. 39-40,44-5,49-50. 
33 F. S. Northedge, The Troubled Giant. Britain Among the Great Powers 1916-1939 (London, Bell, 
1966), pp. 234-5. 
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movements of opinion very highly'34and the basic fact that to the general public 
'foreign affairs normally seem complex, remote and unimportant', the only exception 
being when questions of peace or war arise. 350n the other hand, it is possible for 
public opinion to have a more indirect impact on foreign policy. After all, the 1920s 
witnessed the dawning of a new age of mass politics in Britain and considerable 
domestic political turbulence which produced not only the first Labour government 
but also the annihilation of the Liberals as a mass electoral force. 36 The struggle for 
votes in this transitional era of mass politics, it has been argued, produced a rush for 
the centre ground which consisted of retrenchment abroad and social reform and 
expenditure at home that could not but have an effect on foreign policy. 37 
The main lines of this argument are well known. The economic weakness of Britain 
after the war meant that henceforth 'the availability of funds would determine defence 
strategy, and not vice versa'. This was reinforced by the hegemony of the Treasury in 
Whitehall and the notorious 'ten-year rule' of 1919, which meant that service budgets 
were drastically slashed, hampering foreign policy: the Washington naval limitation 
treaties are a prime example of this process. A key reason for the lack of readily 
available funds for the services was public opinion, which was revolted by militarism, 
clarnoured for lower taxation and greater spending on housing, education and welfare 
and, in the politically volatile climate of the 1920s, could not be ignored. 38 This, in 
other words, was the 'parsimonious and pacific electorate' whose 'heavy and ominous 
breathing' Michael Howard detected whilst perusing the minutes and memoranda of 
the Committee of Imperial Defence after 1918.39 
34 Watt, Personalities and Policies, p. 19. 
35 Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, pp. 40-1. 
36 For a general account of British politics in the 1920s, see A. J. P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945 
(Hannondsworth, Penguin, 1977), pp. 216-33 1. 
37 P. M. Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External 
Policy, 1865-1980 (London, Fontana, 1981), pp. 236-40. 
38 Kennedy, Realities, pp. 226-63. 
39 Howard, Continental Commitment, p. 79. 
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This view is now in need of qualification. Recent detailed research into British 
strategic policy in the 1920s has concluded that although finite economic resources, 
social spending and Treasury thrift were influences on policy-making, they were by 
no means dominant. 40 'The demands of the electorate ... did cause the British to 
increase their social spending ... but they did not significantly hamper British strategic 
policy between 1919 and 1929'. 41 The services were not starved of funds but met 
Britain's 'strategic requirements without depleting her economic resources'. 42 In 
particular, in the early 1920s the Treasury view of spending priorities was only 
paramount when the Foreign Office concurred, and it was only in the later 1920s that 
the Treasury won that control over service policies that is often imputed to it for the 
entire decade. The period from 1919-1925 was one of flux and unsettled priorities in 
strategic policy, but after 1925 the British perceived the world as more secure and 
British policy emphasised reconciliation over deterrence: the Foreign Office accepted 
the Treasury line on spending because it felt the plans of the services might otherwise 
compromise diplomacy. 43 
Foreign policy was affected, but not hamstrung, by pressure for economy and social 
spending. The same was true of the other major component of public opinion, 
pacifism or, more accurately, anti-militarism. Such sentiments were intense and 
widespread after the senseless horrors of the Great War, permeated all social classes 
and political parties and were manifested in pressure groups, notably the League of 
Nations Union (LNU). 44Despite their highly organised character, however, these 
lobbying groups were of limited influence. In part this was because of the complexity 
and unpredictability of pacifist thinking, quite able to favour simultaneously 'the 
40 Ferris, Men, Money and Diplomacy, passim. For a summary account, see J. R. Ferris, 'Treasury 
Control, The Ten Year Rule and British Service Policies, 1919-1924', Historical Journal 30(4) 1987 
859-83. 
41 Ferris IHR 13 735. 
42 Ferris IHR 13 738-9. 
43 Ferris, Men, Money and Diplomacy, pp. 43-9,158-85 and passim. 
44 For the history of this organisation, see D. S. Birn, The League of Nations Union 1918-1945 
(Oxford, Clarendon, 1981). 
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strongest navy on earth and reduced spending on the armed forceS'. 45Equally, the 
peace movement was a broad church, divided amongst itself 46: even within the LNU 
there was much muddled thinking about whether the League should use armed force 
or rely on moral persuasion, and many shrank from the conclusion that war might be 
needed to preserve peace. 47Crucially, however, the pacifist movement in fact 
represented 'the mainstream of political opinion in Britain"48and when 'no significant 
body of opinion "wants" war then there is no need for a peace movement', and its 
scope for influence is limited. 49 In other words, pacifist opinion did not directly shape 
policy, but did constrain it by 'setting the broad ideological framework' within which 
foreign policy had to operate and by obliging governments 'to conduct themselves in 
ways that did not seem egregiously at odds with the principles of collective securityl. 
As Britain's League record shows, this certainly did not guarantee a wholehearted Z-1 
commitment. 50 
Policy-making was thus a complex business, but it held the key to whether those long 
term trends pointing to decline would be accelerated or countered, for it was through 
the medium of Policy that resources were translated into power. In the background 
were factors that constrained policy: limited (but still -adequate) economic means, 
widespread imperial commitments and the dictates of domestic politics. It was in this 
context that policy was made by the government: chiefly the Foreign Office 
(especially where Europe was concerned) but also other departments such as the 
India, Dominion and Colonial Offices and the services. Public opinion and the press 
had a limited impact (although it could be greater in times of crisis), chiefly in terms 
45 Ferris IHR 13 735. 
46 K. Robbins, 'European Peace Movements and their Influence on Policy after the First World War', 
in R. Ahmann, A. M. Burke and M. Howard (eds. ), The Questfor Stability. Problems of West European 
Security 1918-1957 (London, German Historical Institute/Oxford University Press, 1993), pp-79-80. 
47 The intertwining strands of utopian idealism and institutional reality embodied in the League and 
the false assumptions and illusions embedded in internationalist opinion were first unpicked by Carr 
as early as 1939: see E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years'Crisis 1919-1939. An Introduction to the Study of 
International Relations (London, Macmillan, 198 1). 
48 M. Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 86. 
49 Robbins, Questfor Stability, p-79. 
50 Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, p. 41. 
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of setting the parameters for rather than determining policy. These then were the chief 
factors affecting the calculations of policy-makers: resources, commitments and the 
vagaries of the policy-making process. At the same time, policy-making could often 
be a chaotic process, with decisions taken at short notice and on the basis of limited 
information. In these circumstances instinct came into play and there was a tendency 
to fall back onto the traditions of British policy: to hang on and appease those with 
grievances, to withdraw from excessive commitments, to defend the empire, to bluff, 
or even simply to try and stand still. Also important was generational mentality: in the 
1920s this constituted chiefly a revulsion against war. 51 On the other hand, British 
policy-makers rightly saw their country not as weak but as powerful (though not 
omnipotent), and mingled with an awareness of limitations was a definite air of 
confidence. 
From this mass of factors a definite British policy emerged, one capable of being 
expressed by the simple equation that, for an imperial trading power, peace and 
stability would equal prosperity. An oft-quoted Foreign Office memorandum of April 
1926 sums up this philosophy of the status quo power. 'We', it ran, 
have no territorial ambitions nor desire for aggrandisement. We have got all 
that we want - perhaps more. Our sole object is to keep what we have and live 
in peace. ... The 
fact is that war and rumours of war, quarrels and friction in 
any comer of the world spell loss and harm to British commercial and financial 
interests. It is for the sake of these interests that we endeavour to pour oil on 
troubled waters. 52 
Or, to put it another way, Britons were used 
to being called a nation of shopkeepers, and that was in fact the literal truth. t) Our chief preoccupation was that peace and stability should be maintained 
throughout the world, in order that our trade might flourish and proceed 
without disturbance. 53 
51 Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, pp. 38-63. 
52 DBFPIIaII1846. 
53 [Public Record Office] F[oreign] Offfice Papers series] 421/[volume]310 Chamberlain (Geneva) to 
F[oreign] O[ffice] [despatch] no. 19 d. 17 Mar. 1926 and encl[osure]. C. 
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This was the essential basis of British policy: as a powerful state with global interests 
Britain naturally identified her own interest with that of the stability of the 
international system and the perpetuation of the status quo. This identification meant 
that while British policy appeared to be (or was presented as) idealistic, altruistic and 
disinterested, it was, in fact, also quite selfish. Moreover, 'British aims were defined 
and pursued in a hard-headed fashion, and her statesmen were quite capable of 
exhibiting 'cynicism, perfidy, selfishness, calculation, ruthlessness - all those 
characteristics which have made Great Britain what it is'. 54 
Although Britain was in broad terms a status quo power, this did not preclude the use 
of revisionist tactics. 'In order to establish a stable and balanced world order, [the 
British] endeavoured simultaneously to bolster and to alter the international system'. 
This involved buttressing and consolidating the strength of the status quo powers, and 
attempting to 'foster a new concert of powers' to manage the problems of the system. 
At the same time, they hoped to control the evolution of the system to preserve its 
stability; that is to make 'changes in some of its details - so long as the changes did I 
not threaten specifically British interests'. During the 1920s, British efforts in these 
directions were generally successful. British power and the empire were maintained, 
revisionism was held in check, the system was bolstered by agreements like the 
Washington treaties and Locamo, and stability was established in some key areas 
(such as the Middle East) if not in others (such as eastern Europe). On the other hand, 
no really predictable balance was established between the powers, and some British 
policy decisions - for example, those concerning the Soviet Union - arguably reduced t) 
the stability of the system. 55 
The way in which the British employed these strategies can be seen between 1923 and 
1926. After the war the British were wary of commitments in Europe, because of the 
fear of entanglements and the primacy of imperial concerns. At the same time, they 4: ý 
wanted to see Germany - now shorn of her colonies and navy - return to prosperity 
54 Ferris IHR 133 727,735-6,743,747. 
55 Ferris IHR 13 748-50. 
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and stability return to Europe. These complex and expansive priorities clashed with 
the more narrowly focused and single-minded French desire for absolute security 
from Germany. With the Ruhr crisis, this divergence threatened international stability 
to such an extent that the British felt obliged to come forward and take a leading role 
in reconciling France and Germany via the Dawes reparations settlement and then 
Locarno. In other words, the British were prepared to intervene in Europe, and to 
make a commitment (albeit a carefully limited one) at Locarno, in order to bring the 
stability they needed for the sake of their global interests, and they were also prepared 
to modify the 1919 settlement. The Dawes-Locarno settlement promised both to 
reinforce the Anglo-French entente and to draw Germany into the community of Z: ) 
satisfied nations: the 'Locarno-cabal' which henceforth met regularly could even be 
construed as an informal reformed concert of the powers. 
In the Balkans, a region of much less direct interest, the British were unwilling to 
play such a prominent role. As a memorandum of December 1925 made clear, they 
hoped that the leading part in containing conflicts and managing disputes there could 
be taken by the League of Nations. (This indicated their conception of the League as a 
potentially useful instrument that would take some of the burden of managing the 
system off British shoulders, although it rather begged the question of how far the 
League was autonomous from its constituent powers. ) Britain had 'no purely political 
motive in the Balkans other than the preservation of peace', and so British policy 
should grenerally consist only of acting as a 'benevolent and disinterested observer'. As 
far as the status quo was concemed, it was recognised that the peace treaties had tp 
established a condition of 'unstable peace' in the region, but that this did 'at least 
conform to political realities'. Consequently, 'the only practical policy to pursue is one 
of insisting on the fulfilment of the present treaties - at least in spirit. But not only 
were the British prepared to be flexible about the letter of the treaties, there was also 
an unspoken assumption that peaceful change in the region, in accordance with new 
political realities, should not be obstructed. This partly reflected an inability to 
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prevent such change, but also showed an awareness that for the system to remain 
56 stable it might have to evolve. 
Britain and decline apart, the principal focus of much recent scholarship on the post- 
war period has been French policy and policy-making, and in particular the crucial 
relationship between France and Germany. The central issues in this historiographical 
debate have been whether French policy should be interpreted as essentially defensive 
or as motivated by a search for hegemony in Europe, and whether French reparations 
policy should be seen as basically moderate and reasonable or as designed to 
perpetuate German economic subjugation. The outcome has been to render extremely 
problematic an area of international history which was once viewed as 
straightforward, and to cast new light on the nature of international relations in the 
1920s. 57 
In the traditional account of this period, policy-making in France was seen as a 
relatively straightforward procesS. 58The Quai d'Orsay suffered none of the reverses 
that the Foreign Office did, and French officials continued to be influential and 
respected - indeed, their influence was strengthened in order to ensure continuity of 
policy during a decade of rapidly succeeding ministries. There was some 
parliamentary control over the broad outlines of policy, but this rather reflected a 
national consensus and was in any case not insuperable. The nature of French policy 
was also seen as unproblematic. At first, the French nation, racked by economic, 
political and moral crisis, was united around the imperative of establishing security 
from Germany and trying to perpetuate the artificial French dominance of 1919. This 
determination manifested itself in the policy of Raymond Poincare, foreign minister 
between 1922 and 1924 and a harsh, legalistic Lorrainer who could'neither forget in 
56 DBFPllalll203-1'-'). 
57 Jacobson AmHR 88 617-45; J. Jacobson, 'Strategies of French Foreign Policy after World War F, C) 
Journal q Modern History 55(l) 1983 78-95; K. Hovi, 'Security before Disarmament, or Hegemony? f 
The French Alliance Policy 1917-1927'in Ahmann, Birke and Howard (eds. ), Questfor Stability, 
pp. 115-26. 
58 Unless otherwise indicated, this paragraph is based on R. D. Challener, 'The French Foreign Office: 0 
the Era of Philippe Berthelot', in Craig and Gilbert (eds. ), Diplomats 149-85. 
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defeat nor forgive in victory'. 59 Poincare was determined to impose the treaty of 
Versailles on Germany, and this culminated in the occupation of the Ruhr during 
1923. This policy alarmed the British, who by tradition opposed the domination of the 
continent by any one power, and this in turn contributed to the failure of the 
occupation which showed Poincare's policy to be untenable - the reparations question 
was passed on to the Dawes committee and Poincare was ejected from office in the 
midst of an economic crisis in the spring of 1924. Edouard Herriot, foreign minister 
of the succeeding Cartel des Gauches administration, symbolised the new mood of 
conciliation in the French people, and his presence contributed to the success of the 
London conference on reparations and to faltering progress on the security question, 
evidenced by the evolution of the Geneva protocol. Herriot was succeeded in April 
1925 by Aristide Briand, dedicated to international conciliation and determined to 
achieve security for France through entente with Britain, co-operation with the 
League and rapprochement with Gen-nany. His pacific spirit contributed to the 
success of the Locarno treaties which settled the security question and created a new 
atmosphere in Europe, even though this also signified a failure by France to enforce 
Versailles that would redound to her peril in the 1930S. 60 
This picture has now been substantially modified by works which reveal the complex 
and multi-faceted nature of French policy, whilst accepting that the German problem 
was of course its chief preoccupation. Policy-making was by no means the sole 
preserve of the Quai d'Orsay, but also involved a huge number of official and private 
institutions which competed to influence the economic and political decisions at the 
heart of the reparations- security problem, with the result that policy was often 
incoherent and confused. Between 1919 and 1924 various different policies were at 
work, often simultaneously: some aimed at the fulfilment of Versailles and the 
stabilisation of Germany, others at the revision of Versailles in France's favour which 
would involve the permanent destabilisation of Germany. These policies conflicted 
59 Sir A. Chamberlain, Down the Years (London, Cassell, 1935), p. 190. 
60 For single volume biographies of Briand and Poincar6, see B. Oudin, Aristide Briand. La Paix: une 
Idie Neuve en Europe (Paris. Laffont, 1987) and P. Miquel, Poincare (Paris, Fayard, 1984). 
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and ultimately failed, causing France to be forced to accept the Anglo-American 
imposed defeat that was the London reparations settlement. At the same time, 
however, new emphasis has been placed on the conciliatory aspects of French policy 
towards Germany and the potential for the creation of a stable and peaceful Europe 
which that policy offered - in stark contrast to the traditional view that French policy 
was the major obstacle to pacification. In particular, the various projects for bilateral 
economic co-operation put forward by the French in the 1920s have been seen as 
attempts to transcend the limits of national sovereignty for the common good which 
very much foreshadowed the way Europe was to be stabilised after the Second World 
War. This in turn permits a novel interpretation of the 1920s as a crucial decade when 
the conditions for international stability were defined. The limitations of a 
return to the pre-World War I international system were reached, and the plans 
were drawn and the first efforts made toward what became the post-World War 
11 settlement. 61 
Nevertheless, there is general agreement that the 1924 reparations settlement was a 
defeat for France. It meant the end of the Versailles system of 'coerced German 
compliance' and victory for the Anglo-American conception of the post-war world, a 
vision of stabilisation based on 'international competition, conciliation of Germany, 
and peaceful change rather than on Allied solidarity, coercion of Germany, and the 4: 1 
status quo'. France henceforth faced a choice between 'dependency on the Anglo- 
Americans or domination by Germany'. 62This view rather tends to support the notion 
that 1924 was the time when 'the potentialities of the settlement of 1919 were 
exhausted'. 630n the other hand, it can be argued that it did not set the pattern for 
subsequent developments and that French diplomacy soon recovered. Thus Anglo- 
'C-- 
FjLench solidarity against Germany was a salient feature during 1924-1925 and the 
French retained the capacity to enforce compliance of aspects of Versailles after 
1925: the entente was never broken and within it the French preserved a good deal of 
61 Jacobson AmHR 88 623 and passim. For the influence of the Quai d'Orsay in policy-making, see 
also R. J. Young, French Foreign Policy, 1918-1945. A Guide to Research and Research Materials 
(Wilmington, Scholarly Resources, 1991), pp. 1-42. 
62 Jacobson JMH 55 93-5. 
63 Jacobson AmHR 88 64 1. 
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diplomatic independence. Although between 1924 and 1926financial duress did 
compel a tactical change in foreign policy from confrontation to d9tente', French 
policy generally after 1924 was 'an impressive holding action'. The corollary of this 
view is to emphasise the limited successes of German foreign policy in the same 
period and the numerous restrictions under which Germany still chafed. The net result 
of these re-interpretations is to point to the real degree of stabilisation that was 
achieved in Europe in the mid-1920s, even though the implications of this for the 
broader controversy about the nature of the decade have yet to be drawnoUt. 64 
Moreover, although Franco-German relations have thus been illuminated in a new 
complexity, the same cannot be said for French policy in other areas, for example 
eastern Europe. The picture of French alliance policy as a remorseless drive for 
hegemony may now be extinCt, 65but much work on it remains to be done. 
Italy is but a peripheral figure in the debates about British and French policy and the 
international system in the 1920s, reflecting a perception that Italy was not a key 
player in European affairs at the time. Just as Italy had been semi-detached from her 
Entente partners in the war - joining late, fighting essentially separate battles and 
overlooked at the peace conference - so, even after Mussolini's assumption of power 
in October 1922, did she plough her own furrow in the 1920s, participating in the war 
debt and reparations settlements and Locarno, but being rather more concerned with 
her own parochial intereStS. 660n the other hand, the relative longevity of the fascist 
regime and the greater importance Italy assumed in international relations in the run- 
up to the Second World War provides a link between the 1920s and 1930s and meant 
that work was done on Italy in the 1920s - on the nature of the regime and its foreign 
policy - at a time when the decade was otherwise little studied. This work does not 
64 Jacobson AmHR 88 639-45. 
65 Hovi, Questfor Stability, p. 1 15. 
66 The standard work on Italian policy in the 1920s, based on published documents and not archival 
material but generally reliable nonetheless, is A. Cassels, Mussolini's Early Diplomacy (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1970), which covers 1922-1927. 
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directly connect with the larger questions more recently posed about the 1920s, but it 
is substantial and has generated lively debate and unresolved problems. 67 
The main point at issue regarding fascist foreign policy is that of its coherence: was 
there a consistent motive behind Mussolini's conduct of foreign relations? Early anti- 
fascist writers attacked his policy as not only ineffective and immoral but as lacking 
any logic or purpose. This view seemed to be justified by the ignominious collapse of 
the fascist regime in 1943 and was echoed by, amongst others, A. J. P. Taylor, who in a 
famous passage declared that 'everything about Fascism was a fraud' and that 
Mussolini himself was 'a vain blundering boaster without either ideas or aims'. 68 
According to these historians there were no long term goals in fascist policy, which 
was improvised solely for domestic propaganda purposes to shore"up a regime beset 
by economic and political fragility - an argument for a Primat der Innenpolitik which 
precluded external consistency. Gradually, however, this view was challenged by 
historians who detected in Mussolini's policy a fairly consistent pursuit of two aims: 
revisionism and imperialism. Cassels, in Mussolini's Early Diplomacy, thus argued 
that after an initial period of tentative diplomacy, Mussolini embarked on a revisionist 
spell between 1923 and 1924 - characterised by the Corfu crisis and the Pact of Rome 
- before the Matteotti murder enforced a lull in this activity. Then, after the 
consolidation of the regime in 1925 , he resumed a policy of imperialism and 
adventure. Work on fascist imperialism, especially as regards Ethiopia, seemed to 
confirm that Mussolini did indeed have clearly defined long term goals. 69 
The other main historiographical problem with fascist foreign policy is the question 
of continuity - that is to say continuity between the 1920s and the 1930s and between 
the fascist regime and its liberal predecessor. The original picture of the 1920s as a 
decade of good behaviour was demolished by Cassels; but even he admitted that in 
67 Critical surveys of this literature include A. Cassels, 'Was there a Fascist Foreign Policy? Tradition 
and Novelty', International History Review 5(2) 1983 255-68, A. Cassels, 'Switching Partners: Italy in 
A. J. P. Taylor's Origins of the Second World War, in Martel (ed. ), 'Origins'Reconsidered, pp. 73-96 
and S. C. Azzi, 'The Historiography of Fascist Foreign Policy, Historical Journal 36(l) 1993 187-203. 
68 Taylor, Origins, p-85. 
69 Unless otherwise indicated, this paragraph is based on Azzi HJ 36 187-94. 
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the 1930s, as the regime ran out of steam on the domestic front amidst great economic 
troubles, Mussolini embarked on a revisionist policy that was more thoroughly 
planned and pursued than hitherto. 70 At the same time, historians detected a marked 
similarity between early fascist foreign policy and that of liberal Italy: this was 
especially true of work that attempted to trace the interaction between Mussolini and 
the career diplomats of the Palazzo Chigi, traditional Italian nationalists who in the 
early years concurred in the aims (if not the methods) of Mussolini's policy. The 
resignation of Contarini, secretary general of the Palazzo Chigi, in 1926 marked a 
realisation that perhaps Mussolini would not be so easily tamed by his officials, but 
the ascendancy thereafter of Dino Grandi, fascist hierarch turned diplomat, ensured 
that the Palazzo Chigi would still retain some influence over the Duce, even though 
he was ultimately in control of poliCy. 71 Other work placed the roots of fascist foreign 
policy even more firmly in pre-war Italy, in terms of both aims and methods. 
Particular attention was drawn to the disparity between the actual power of Italy - 
always the least of the great powers - and the exaggerated expectations of its 
population, fuelled by the grandiose nationalist myths which bound the country 
tenuously together. Successive disappointments in foreign affairs from unification 
onwards produced tremendous feelings of resentment and gave Italian foreign policy 
its perennial tone of desperate neurosiS. 72 
A broad consensus has now emerged that the basic aim of Mussolini's policy was 
simply to increase Italian power and prestige and 'to make Italy a great power like 
Britain and France'. 73 This was not, however, easy to achieve. The old association 
with Britain and France could help to some extent, but it was those powers which had 
denied Italy the fruits of victory in 1919. At the same time, Italy was too weak to 
strike out on a wholly independent course in the face of Anglo-French opposition. A 
third option was co-operation with other revisionist states, but the international 
70 Cassels IHR 5 255-68; Cassels, Early Diplomacy, pp. 393-4; Azzi HJ 36 194-6. 
71 H. S. Hughes, 7he Early Diplomacy of Italian Fascism: 1922-1932, in Craig and Gilbert (eds. ), Z- Diplomats 1210-33. 
72 Azzi HJ 36 196-7. 
73 Azzi HJ 36 197. 
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climate was not conducive to satisfying the voracious demands of Italian public 
opinion by this means. Consequently, since none of these strategies alone was 
sufficient, Mussolini's policy was a combination of all three. Since he could both pose 
as the 'good European' of Locarno whilst also acting as a 'trafficker in revisionism and 
spokesman for discontented, aggressive nationalism', it was not surprising that he was 
accused of inconsistency. 74His policy may have been ineffective and ruinous to Italy, 
but there was consistency in his pursuit of great power status, the trappings of 
colonies and a European sphere of influence. The tone of fascist Policy - the use of 
violence and intimidation - may have been distinctive, but this was largely because of 
the dilemma that confronted a social Darwinist'who believed in "survival of the 
fittest" ... when he was not the fittest' and who thus had to resort to bluff and bluster. 
His rhetoric magnified the usual Italian problem of grasp outstripping reach and has 
obscured the similarity between his policy and that of his predecessors. 75 
The dominant theme in Greek historiography for many years was that of foreign 
interference. This was not surprising, for the Greek peninsula is a borderline area with 
an international significance out of all proportion to its size where, throughout the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the strategic interests of the great powers 
continually came into confliCt. 76Moreover, Greece's small size, economic weakness 
and 'exposed geographical location made her more easily amenable to coercion than 
any other country in Europel. 77This combination of motive and opportunity induced 
the powers to intervene frequently and persistently in Greece throughout the 
nineteenth century: indeed, this interference was institutionalised - and Greek 
sovereignty compromised - from the birth of the Greek state when Britain, France and 
Russia became 'protecting powers', charged with guaranteeing Greece's constitution 
74 Cassels, Early Diplomacy, pp. 390-7 and passim. 
75 Azzi HJ 36 194,196-7,202-3. 
76 K. R. Legg, Politics in Modern Greece (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 62-78. 
77 N. Kaltchas, Introduction to the Constitutional History of Modern Greece (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1940), p. 4. 
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and independence. 78This interference was intensified by the central importance in 
Greece of the Great Idea (Mp-, y(xkil Mux), the aspiration to encompass all Hellenes - 
and all territories inhabited by Hellenes - within the boundaries of the Greek state. 
This was the great legitimating national myth of the nascent Greece, endorsed by all 
Greeks even though there was intense disagreement as to the means to attain the ideal. 
It was always apparent, however, that given Greece's weakness the fulfilment of the 
Great Idea would depend on propitious international circumstances and the goodwill 
of the powers. Thus the sympathy of the powers secured the Ionian islands for Greece 
in 1864 and Thessaly and Arta in 188 1, but when Greece struck out on her own in 
defiance of the powers and attacked the Ottoman empire in 1897, the result was a 
shattering and costly defeat. Foreign interference was still in evidence here, however, 
since the powers stepped in to preserve Greece's territorial integrity (even though the 
Greeks had been the aggressors) whilst at the same time imposing an International 
Financial Commission (IFC) to control Greek financeS. 791n these circumstances, the 
interests of the Greek political elite and of the powers combined to give those powers 
a measure of control over the success of Greek foreign policy and, indirectly, over 
Greek domestic politics and economic affairs. 
Foreign interference was intermittently an important motif in Greek politics in the 
twentieth century as well, for instance during the civil war in the 1940S. 80 Of late, 
78 For overviews of the development of Greece in the nineteenth century, see D. Dakin, The 
Unification of Greece 1770-1923 (London, Ernest Benn, 1972), pp. 1-179 and R. Clogg, A Concise 
History of Greece ý(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1 -76. The rights of the 
protecting powers derived from the treaties of London of May 1832, November 1863 and March 
1864: see Sir James Headlam-Morley, Studies in Diplomatic History (London, Methuen, 1930), 
pp. 126-45. 
79 T. A. Couloumbis, J. A. Petropoulos and H. J. Psomiades, Foreign Interference in Greek Politics. An 
Historical Perspective (New York, Pella, 1976), pp. 15 -73. For recent reflections on the nature and 
importance of the Great Idea for Greek national identity, see P. Kitromilides, "'Imagined 
Communities" and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans', European History Quarterly 
19(2) 1989 149-94. For the great powers and Greek finances, including the establishment of the IFC, 
see J. A. Levandis, The Greek Foreign Debt and the Great Powers 1821-1898 (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1944). 
80 There is a great deal of literature on this period in Greek history, not least because of the 
connexion between the civil war and the origins of the Cold War. For an introduction to the subject, 
see Couloumbis, Petropoulos and Psomiades, Foreign Interference, pp. 103-46, and, for an analysis of 
the literature up to 19 89, M. Sarafis, 'Contemporary Greek History for English Readers: an Attempt at 
26 
however, it has become a much less salient feature, and this has coincided with 
something of a revolution in Greek historiography: after the fall of the Colonels'junta 
in 1974, historical studies in Greece gradually escaped from the conservative - 
stranglehold which for decades had prohibited any critical engagement with the recent 
past and began to flourish. Historians turned away from analysis of foreign influences 
and began to study the activities of the domestic political elite with new vigour. 
Social and economic history also flowered and, for the first time, 'the writing of 
Greek history in Greece itself ... undeniably seized the initiative from the writing of 
Greek history outside Greece'. 81 
Muiýh of this work has focused on the first three decades of the twentieth century, and 
in particular the period following the rise to power in 19 10 of the Cretan, Eleutherios 
Venizelos, indisputably the foremost Greek statesman of his generation. 82Venizelos 
was a consummate politician, opportunistic, eloquent and inspiring, who was 
considered a messiah by one half of Greece and Satan by the other. 83The triumph of 
his Liberal party in 19 10 swept away the old Greek political parties and inaugurated 
the modem age in Greek politics. During his first administration (1910-1915) he 
instituted a host of reforms to modernise the Greek political system and economy, 
established good relations with Britain and France (who sent technical missions to 
develop the Greek army and navy) and engineered a huge expansion of the Greek 
state with victories in the Balkan wars (1912-1913) that secured Epirus, Macedonia, 
Crete and numerous Aegean islands. 84 Venizelos'rise was once seen as signifying 
simply the triumph of the Greek bourgeoisie over an old aristocratic landowning elite, 
but it is more accurate to characterise it as marking the victory of a new 
a Critical Analysis', in M. Sarafis and M. Eve (eds. ), Background to Contemporary Greece (2 volumes, 
London, Merlin, 1990) 1123-52. 
81 A. Kitroeff, 'Continuity and Change in Contemporary Greek Historiography', European History 
Quarterly 19(2) 1989 269-298; M. Mazower, Greece and the Inter-War Economic Crisis (Oxford, 
Clarendon, 1991), pp-3-5. 
82 The least inadequate of the few biographies of Venizelos is D. Alastos, Venizelos: Patriot, 0 
Statesman, Revolutionary (London, Lund Humphries, 1942). 
83 Dakin, Unification, p. 183; Clogg, Concise History, pp. 104-5. 1.5 fication, pp. 180-200; Clogg, Concise History, pp. 75-85. 84 Dak-in, Uni ozý- 
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'entrepreneurial bourgeoisie' over the established 'state bourgeoisie' (the military and 
bureaucratic elite) which had been in entrenched command of political power for 
decadeS. 85Recent work has even questioned the utility of seeking the key to 
Venizelos'rise in social or economic forces, and has emphasised instead the 
significance of his populist style and rhetoric of national regeneration which struck a 
chord in a people desperate to lift Greece from the doldrums in which she had 
languished since 1897.86 
The First World War precipitated a collision between the forces Venizelos 
championed and those of Old Greece '87focused on the Greek king, Constantine I. 
Essentially, Venizelos, impressed by British naval power and dreaming of expansion 
at Turkish expense, favoured intervention on the side of the Entente, whilst the king, 
German-educated, married to the Kaiser's sister and in awe of the German army, 
advocated continuing the policy of strict neutrality Greece had declared at the 
outbreak of the war. On the surface, this was a dispute over foreign political strategy 
and a clash between two forceful and antagonistic personalities, but it also reflected a 
whole host of divisions within Greek society that were to split the country in two in 
the so-called 'national schism'. At stake were two radically different hegemonic 
projects and visions of Greece's future. On the one side stood Venizelos and his 
constituency - the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, landless peasants and the Greeks of the 
new lands - and their vision of parliamentary democracy and'pragmatic irredentism': 
the expansion of the state and of Greek economic power in the Near East. On the 
other stood Constantine and his supporters (known as Anti-Venizelists or royalists): 
the old elites in the army and bureaucracy, the petty bourgeoisie, landed peasants, 
most of Old Greece and all those whose interests were most threatened by economic, 
85 G. T. Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic. Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922- 
1936, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1983), pp. 121-7. This pioneering and brilliant work 
is the best guide in English to Greek politics between the wars. 
86 M. Mazower, 'The Messiah and the Bourgeoisie: Venizelos and Politics in Greece, 1909-1912', 
Historical Journal 35(4) 1992 885-904. 
87 In a geographical sense this term refers to Greece in its nineteenth century boundaries (the 'new 0 
lands'bein those gained in and after 1912). It also connotes the political, economic and social values 9 ZD 
of the dominant 61ites in those territories. Whatever else the schism may have been, it was certainly a 
split in geographical terms between Old Greece and the new lands. 0 
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social and political change. Their vision involved 'the establishment of a traditionalist 
military-bureaucratic regime under the monarchy' (on the Prussian model) that would 
espouse a cautious, defensive patriotism and which 'projected into some unspecified 
future a romantic, utopian irredentism. In 19 10 Venizelos had set his face against the 
hidebound, parochial conservatism of Old Greece, but during the war the old elites 
and their allies hit back. 88 
The schism, which was also to cause a recrudescence of foreign interference in 
Greece, erupted in 1915 when, unable to persuade Constantine to join the war, 
Venizelos resigned. The Allies were drawn into the domestic political quarrel 
because, shortly before Venizelos left office and at his invitation, they had despatched 
an expeditionary force to Salonica. This army was now menaced by the Germans and 
Bulgarians in the north and by a government of uncertain sympathies in the south; 
consequently during 1916 London and Paris intervened continually at Athens in order 
to try and secure its safety and to persuade the Greeks to join the war. The British 
were rather half-hearted about this, and it was the French, dreaming of a post-war 
domination of the Levant, who made the running in Allied policy. In September 1916 
Venizelos, encouraged by the French, established a revolutionary provisional 
government at Salonica which, with the help of Allied troops, soon asserted its 
control over the north of the country. The British were not entirely enthusiastic about 
this, since they were fearful of France's far-reaching designs and did not consider 
Venizelos entirely trustworthy; but they acquiesced in French policy out of lassitude 
and a concern for Allied solidarity. During the winter of 1916-1917 Allied policy 
became increasingly oppressive, and the fall of the Russian monarchy and American 
entry into the war reduced still further Allied scruples about coercing neutral Greece. 
Eventually in June the Allies forcibly deposed Constantine and installed Venizelos in 
power. Constantine was succeeded by his second son, Alexander (the Crown Prince 
88 Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, pp. 26-8,120-30,180-1,282-5 and passim. The best account of 0 
Greece's r6le in the diplomacy and military campaigns of the war is G. B. Leon, Greece and the Great 
Powers 1914-1917 (Thessaloniki, Institute for Balk-an Studies, 1974). 
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George being considered too pro-German), the administration and army were purged 
of royalist sympathisers, and on 27 June 1917 Greece entered the war. 89 
The Greeks made a small but significant contribution to the Allied war effort in the 
southern Balkans, 90 and Venizelos approached the Paris peace conference confident 
of realising his vision of a Greater Greece: in February 1919 he laid claim to the 
whole of Thrace and a sizeable zone in Asia Minor around Smyrna, the chief city of 
the Greek population of Anatolia. 91 Venizelos used all his diplomatic skill and 
charisma to woo the conference, and succeeded in becoming in the process that rara 
avis, a Balkan statesman admired in western Europe. The British delegation was 
broadly sympathetic to his claims: it was packed with philhellenes like Nicolson; and 
Lloyd George hoped to use a strengthened Greece as a British proxy in the eastern 
Mediterranean. 92The chief opponents of Greek aggrandisement, on the other hand, 
were the Italians, who feared the expansion of a regional rival. 93 Progress on the 
Turkish settlement was slow: although many experts doubted the wisdom of partition, 
extensive territorial revision was contemplated and there were numerous conflicting 
claims to consider. This proved time-consuming; and the settlement was in any case 
accorded a low priority in the work of the conference as a whole. In May 1919, 
however, the Italians - who had antagonised everyone by their truculence over Fiume 
- began to land troops in Asia Minor in order to lay claim to a zone of influence, and 
in response the Allies permitted the Greeks to occupy Smyrna. Ostensibly this was 
89 Leon, Greece and the Great Powers, passim; Dakin, Unification, pp. 201-16; M. Llewellyn Smith, 
Ionian Vision. Greece in Asia Minor 1919-1922 (London, Allen Lane, 1973), pp. 35-61. 
90 Dakin, Unification, pp. 217-20. 
91 For Venizelos'r6le in peacemaking in 1919, see N. Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece at the Paris Peace r) 
Conference (1919) (Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1978). 
92 E. Goldstein, 'Great Britain and Greater Greece, 1917-1920', Historical Journal 32(2) 1989 339-56. 
Nicolson later wrote to his wife of Venizelos: 'he is my hero, dear old man in his skull cap and his 
charming Christ-like smile' (Lees-Milne, Nic, olson 1155 and 109-140). 
93 This is a persistent theme in Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece at the Paris Peace Conference. Italian 
opposition blocked Greek claims in Epirus and delayed the transfer of western Thrace to Greece from 
Bulcyaria. 0 
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purely provisional, but it was in fact understood to be a precursor to the award of 
Smyrna to Greece in the final settlement. 94 
The peace settlement drafted during the spring of 1920 was finally signed at Sevres 
on 10 AugUSt. 95 The terms were extremely severe on the Turks. They kept 
Constantinople, but the Straits were internationalised and Greece was awarded the 
whole of Thrace to the Chatalja lines, some strategically important Aegean islands 
and a large zone around Smyrna. Strict military and financial controls were imposed 
and by a separate tripartite agreement France and Italy gained extensive spheres of 
influence in Cilicia and Adalia respectively. The treaty was a triumph for Lloyd 
George, who secured his two main aims of opening the Straits and strengthening 
Greece. The French were less happy with the settlement but acquiesced for the sake 
of Allied solidarity and because they had made gains elsewhere in the Middle East; 
the Italians were dissatisfied but were largely ignored. In the event, however, Lloyd 
George's victory proved illusory: a harsh imperialist peace could have been imposed 
on Turkey in May 1919, but the Greek landings in Anatolia - and the conduct of 
Greek troops there - had stimulated a nationalist movement under Mustafa Kemal 
which had rapidly become the real power in Turkey and which vowed never to accept 
such a humiliating treaty. In these circumstances, although Venizelos had created his zn 
Greater Greece, its foundations were far from secure, as was perceived by the many 
in the Entente capitals who had questioned the wisdom of the treaty. A peace had now 
been signed, but it remained to enforce it on the nationalists, and this would depend 
94 M. L. Dockrill and J. D. Goold, Peace without Promise. Britain and the Peace Conferences, 1919- 
1923 (London, Batsford, 1981), pp. 181-99. This is the best general account of the peacemaking 
process. See also Llewellyn Smith, Ionian Vision, pp. 62-101 and Goldstein, Winning the Peace, 
pp. 242-51. 
95 P. C. Helmreich, From Paris to Sevres. The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919-1920 (Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1974), passim; A. E. Montgomery, 
'The Making of the Treaty of Sývres of 10 August 1920', Historical Journal 15(4) 1972 775-87. For 
the text of the treaty, see B[ritish and] F[oreign] S[tate] P[apers (London, HMSO, 1841- )]/113/652- 
776. 
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on future Allied solidarity, the continued ascendancy of Lloyd George and Venizelos 
and, ultimately, the strength of the Greek army. 96 
Over the next two years the settlement collapsed since all these factors proved 
lacking. In October 1920 King Alexander died from blood poisoning after being 
bitten by a pet monkey. The following month Venizelos was resoundingly defeated in 
a general election - victim of his preoccupation with foreign affairs and the dictatorial 
tendencies of his lieutenants - and the new royalist government recalled Constantine 
to the throne. The French and Italians, increasingly impressed by the power of Kemal 
and disillusioned with Greek subservience to the British, took the return of the 
dreaded Tino as the last straw and henceforth considered themselves absolved of any 
obligations to AthenS. 97From now on, although the royalist Greek government 
continued Venizelos' policy of imposing Sevres by force, it did so without any real 
assistance from the Allies and found the task increasingly beyond its means. The 
French and Italians, to the consternation of the British, gravitated more and more 
towards Kemal - supplying him with arms, for example, in the hope of securing 
economic concessions - whilst British policy was desperately confused: Lloyd George 
gave the Greeks some verbal encouragement but there was no consensus in London 
and in those circumstances no concrete assistance was forthcoming. The Turks, 
meanwhile, grew increasingly confident and resistant to Curzon's frantic attempts at 
mediation. Eventually, the Greeks were routed -and on 9 September 1922 the Turks 
entered Smyrna, putting a great many of its inhabitants to the sword. The Chanak 
crisis which followed soon afterwards marked the final collapse of the Allied position 
96 Dockrill and Goold, Peace without Promise, pp. 199-214; Llewellyn Smith, Ionian Vision, pp. 102- 
29. 
97 Llewellyn Smith, Ionian Vision, pp. 129-79. It is a moot point whether the return of Constantine 
was the cause or merely the occasion of the Franco-Italian change of policy. Llewellyn Smith 
inclines to the latter view, whereas Churchill, for one, believed that it was 'perhaps no exaggeration 
to remark that a quarter of a million persons died of this monkey's bite: W. S. Churchill, The World 
Crisis. The Aftermath (London, Butterworth, 1929) 385-90. At the time it was certainly believed that 
Constantine's return was the key factor (DBFP/I/XVIII/287-8) and the French were keen to maintain 
this impression: [Archives du] M[inistýre des] Afffaires] E[trangýres Sdrie Z Europe 1918-1940 Sous- 
s6rie] Gr&e [volume] 78 Marcilly (minister in Athens) to Q[uai d'] 0[rsayl no. 214 d. 22 Sept. 1924, 
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32 
in the Near East sealing at one and the same time the fate of Greater Greece and of its 
last remaining architect, Lloyd George. 98 
Peace was established in the Near East by the conference of Lausanne, which met in 
two phases, the first between 23 November 1922 and 5 February 1923 and the second 
from 23 April until the signature of the treaty on 24 July 1923.99 The terms were 
much more realistic than those of Sevres, since they took account of the actual 
balance of power in the region. Vansittart concluded of Curzon that at the conference 
'he played a Yarboro with dignity - some said brilliance - while Turkey took the 
tricks', 100 but in fact, although the treaty certainly was a triumph for the Turks, it also 
suited British interests. Anatolia was restored to Turkey in its entirety, as was eastern 
Thrace, but Curzon secured the opening of the Straits, had the question of Mosul 
deferred to the League and split the Turks from their erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union. 
The fact that the young Turkish republic also joined the League indicated that it 
would develop into a force for stability in the region, which also accorded with 
British interests. The French and Italians, chiefly interested in economic and financial 
matters, were most disappointed with the treaty - perhaps understandably given their 
pro-Turkish attitude over the last two years. Curzon managed the conference so that 
these issues were dealt with last, and the Turks, extremely sensitive about their 
sovereignty in these respects, proved remarkably unyielding. Of course, this did 
nothing to improve Anglo-French relations which were deeply scarred by 
disagreements over the Near East. 101 The treaty itself, however, proved to be a 
98 Dockrill and Goold, Peace without Promise, pp. 214-36; Llewellyn Smith, Ionian Vision, pp. 179- 
311. For the Chanak crisis, see D. Walder, The Chanak Affair (London, Macmillan, 1969), 
A. L. Macfie, 'The Chanak Affair (September-October 1922)', Balkan Studies 20(2) 1979 309-41 and 
J. G. Darwin, 'The Chanak Crisis and the British Cabinet, History 65(l) 1980 32-48. 
99 This period is fully documented in DBFP/1/XVIII. The proceedings of the first session of the 
conference and the draft treaty presented to the Turks at the end of it can be found in [Parliamentary] 
C[omjm[an]d [Paper] 1814 [Turkey No. ] (1923) Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 
1922-1923. Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace (London, HMSO, 1923)]. The Turks 
refused to sign this treaty but produced counter-proposals in March that were considered reasonable 
and which formed the basis for further discussion. The two drafts can be compared in 
DBFP/I/XVIII/990-1064. For the text of the final treaty, see BFSP11 17/543-639. 
100 Vansittart, Mist Procession, p. 298. 
101 Dockrill and Goold, Peace without Promise, pp. 236-52. The view of the conference as a triumph 
for Curzon is most forcibly advanced in H. Nicolson, Curzon: the Last Phase 1919-1925. A Study in 
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genuine accommodation between conflicting interests and laid the foundation for 
enduring peace in the region-102 
For the Greeks, the treaty set the seal on a resounding and catastrophic defeat - not a 
temporary setback, but the permanent collapse of the century-old Great Idea. This 
defeat was extremely hard for the Greeks to swallow, as their sometimes truculent 
attitude during the conference demonstrated, 103 but it was nevertheless final. By an 
agreement signed at Lausanne in January 1923 the Greek minority in Asia Minor was 
compulsorily exchanged with the Muslim Turkish population of Greece - this meant a 
net influx of almost a million souls to a country with a population of barely five 
millions. This exchange may well have been inevitable, since the conflict'had 
destroyed beyond repair the possibility of the peaceful symbiosis of Greek and 
Turk', 104and in the long term it contributed to stabilising relations between Greece 
and Turkey. In the short term, however, the collapse of Greek irredentism which it 
entailed, by making nation co-terminous with state, was a huge psychological blow 
and the settlement and integration of the refugees was a massive economic and social 
problem for a country weakened by a decade of war. Although the League of Nations 
assisted in this process - by establishing a Refugee Settlement Commission (RSC) in 
Greece and facilitating the raising of two foreign loans - it was a tremendous struggle 
for an underdeveloped country burdened with debt and it provoked great social., 
economic and political tensions. This was a wholly novel situation for Greek policy- 
Post-war Diplomacy (London, Constable, 1934), pp. 282-350. For the Straits question, see 
A. L. Macfie, 'The Straits Question: the Conference of Lausanne (November 1922 - July 1923)', 
Middle Eastern Studies 15(2) 1979 211-38. For the French, Lausanne was a'peace of lassitude, since 
they had little enthusiasm for a prolonged diplomatic struggle. The irony was that it 'signified the 4ý 
wisdom' but 'not the victory' of French policy, and it left French prestige in the Near East at a very 
low ebb: H. H. Cumming, Franco-British Rivalry in the Post War Near East. The Decline of French 
Influence (London, Oxford University Press, 193 8), pp. 186-213. 
102 H. J. Psomiades, The Eastern Question: the Last Phase. A Study in Greek-Turkish Diplomacy 
(Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1968), pp. 106-9 and passim. 
103 D. Dakin, The Importance of the Greek Army in Thrace during the Conference of Lausanne 1922- 
1923', Institute for Balkan Studies (ed. ), Greece and Great Britain during World War I (Thessaloniki, 
Institute for Balkan Studies, 1985), pp. 211-32. For the British, this army was both a useful means of 
pressure on the Turks and a perpetual headache, lest the Greeks unleash it on Constantinople. 
104 Clooa, Concise History, p. 101. cc 
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makers who in the economic field faced problems of construction and development at 
least as great as those of reconstruction. 105 
The defeat in Asia Minor also had a profound political impact on Greece. It utterly 
discredited the royalists, and a revolution in September 1922 inaugurated over a 
decade of Venizelist hegemony that was reinforced by the overwhelmingly Venizelist 
sympathies of the refugees. 106This was not to say that the period was one of stability: 
royalist sentiment remained strong in Old Greece , and the Venizelist bloc dissipated a 
great deal of its energy in internecine feuding, particularly over the nature of the 
constitution, which resulted in the establishment of a precarious republic in 1924. 
Politics was also plagued by persistent interventions from the military, even if these 
represented the continuation of factional disputes by other means rather than serious 
attempts to supersede politics and establish dictatorship. 107 This instability obviously 
had its roots in the profound divisions within Greek society that had caused the 
schism: even if some divisions, such as those over irredentist policy, were no longer 
relevant, others had been exacerbated by the war and the violent swings of the 
political pendulum since 1915. Equally, it was intensified by the lack of any 
commanding political presences once Constantine died in 1923 and Venizelos 
adopted a low profile in domestic politics. The collapse of the Great Idea meant that 
this period was one where domestic politics were primary: foreign policy was now 
almost unanimously agreed to be simply a matter of ensuring security, territorial 
105 For the Greek economy in the inter-war period, see the excellent Mazower, Greece and the Inter- 
War Economic Crisis, pp. 41-112. For the exchange of populations and refugee settlement, see 
D. Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact Upon Greece (Paris, Mouton, 
1962) and S. P. Ladas, The Exchange ofMinorities. Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey (New York, 
Macmillan, 1932). 
106 Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, pp. 182-225. 0 107 For divisions between Old Greece and the new lands, see Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, 
pp. 273-302. For military intervention, see Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, pp. 304-9, 
N. P. Mouzelis, Modern Greece. Facets of Underdevelopment (London, Macmillan, 1978), pp. 105-14 
and T. Veremis, 'Some Observations on the Greek Military in the Inter-War Period, 1918-1935', 
Armed Forces and Society 4(3) 1978 527-4 1. 
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integrity, good relations with neighbours and facilitating reconstruction. There was no 
such consensus, however, where domestic politics were concerned. 108 
The period from 1923 onwards was also marked by a very low level of great power 
interference in Greek politics: symbolic of this was the abolition of the rights of the 
protecting powers at Lausanne. 109 The reason for this was simply that, after Lausanne, 
the vital interests of the great powers were no longer engaged in the region. The 
abortive British attempt to use Greece as a regional proxy amounted more to a last 
spasm of war imperialism than a first crisis of decolonisation, 110 and now Britain's 
imperial lifeline simply shifted southwards to run through Suez, Palestine and Iraq. 
The French, too, now had their interests focused to the north5 in Danubian Europe, 
and in the south, in the Middle East. Italy, however, was a special case among the 
great powers since she was a regional rival of Greece, and, in fact, Italian ambitions 
alongside those of Greece's Balkan neighbours constituted a source of external 
interference which in part offset British and French detachment from Greece. ' II 
Even so, there was nothing like the direct external interference in Greek affairs which 
there had been in previous years, and this too was a function of the collapse of the 
Great Idea and Greek weakness: for Britain and France Greece was a 'normal' country 
in a peripheral area, albeit one that had been of great strategic importance in the past 
and miaht be acain in the future. The British would not gratuitously neglect their Zýp Zý 
influence or their economic interests there, and they had a general concern for Greek 
stability, but their interest in the country was limited. In London there was residual 
philhellenic sympathy, but this was coupled with an awareness that the average 
contemporary Greek statesman was no Pericles. Equally, the tradition of Anglo-Greek 
108 It is true that it took some time for the Greeks to adjust to the idea of a more limited foreign 
policy, and some mavericks, particularly in the military, still hankered after expansion. Moreover, 
some terra irredenta still remained, in the shape of northern Epirus, Cyprus and the Dodecanese, 
even if great power interests stood in the way of Greece acquiring them. 
109 DBFP/I/XVIII/972-3. The French were, however, reluctant to abandon their rights in the summer 
of 1923 because they were not sure that the Venizelist triumph would prove durable: MAE Gr&e 78 
pp. 6-34. 
I 10 Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, p. 108. 
111 Couloumbis, Petropoulos and Psomiades, Foreign Interference, pp. 77-9,150. 
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co-operation could not gainsay the sound political reasons for steering clear of 
entanglements in Greece. The same was broadly true of the French who set great store 
by traditional ties and political, economic and cultural interests, although their 
exertions in or on behalf of Greece were always likely to be limited. Despite this, the 
Greeks, for their part, sought to retain the sympathy of all the great powers. This 
reflected the influence those states still had over Greece in the sense that as the 
dominant ones in the international system they could set the parameters of Greek 
policy, for example where the search for funds for reconstruction was concerned. The 
whole of Greek history, especially recent history, had also taught the Greeks the 
critical importance &f great power support. 
This study does not claim to be a comprehensive account of Greek internal politics 
between 1923 and 1926 - amongst other things, such an account would now need to 
draw on a huge corpus of material in Greek which has recently appeared. Rather, this 
is an examination of the perceptions of British, French and Italian policy-makers of 
events in Greece (although rather more attention is given to the views and policy of 
London than those of Paris or Rome). Equally, this is not a comprehensive account of 
Greek external policy. The most notable omission is any detailed examination of 
Greco-Turkish relations. These were crucially important for Greece but rather 
troubled, as the two powers sought to negotiate the many problems arising from the 
implementation of the Lausanne agreements. These problems, however, and the 
gradual rapprochement between the two countries during the 1920s, have already 
been examined elsewhere. 112The focus here is on Greece's relations with Italy, 
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and the responses these evoked ftom the powers (again Z-1 
giving prominence to Britain). These three case studies not only deal with some 
particularly knotty problems in the Balkans, but also set out to illuminate key issues 
in the international system of the 1920s, all of which touch on the central problem of 
its potential for stability and durability. This, then, is a study of relations between 
great powers and a small state in normal times, but may be, in its way, as illuminating 
112 See, for example, Psomiades, The Eastern Question: the Last Phase, passim. 
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of wider issues as studies concentrating on times of crisis and cardinal relationships. 
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Defeat and Revolution 
September - December 1922 
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Lloyd George's policy of using the Greeks as Great Britain's proxy in the eastern 
Mediterranean was always opposed by Churchill, not least on the grounds that'a little 
weak people like [the Greeks] kept all these years at full tension are definitely bound 
to break down under the load'. ' When this breakdown occurred with the collapse of 
the Greek front in Asia Minor, it had serious political repercussions in Athens. Key 
figures in the defeated Greek army crossed the Aegean and forced the abdication of 
Constantine on 27 September 1922. The next day a revolutionary committee 
comprised of Colonels Plastiras and Gonatas and the naval captain Fokas 'definitely 
assumed control in the capital', supported by the rump of the Greek army which had 
reached Athens, and ordered the arrest of a large number of prominent royalists. A 
puppet civilian government was formed under the temporary leadership of Soteris 
Krokidas and Crown Prince George was installed as king in his father's place. 2 
Although the revolutionary movement was not simply Venizelist, since it also 
encompassed many Anti-Venizelists who for patriotic reasons supported Constantine's 
removal (Gonatas, for example, was 'a capable Royalist officer'), it soon came to be 
dominated by leaders of Venizelist sympathieS. 3Venizelos himself, whose influence 
clearly counted for much with the revolutionaries, was appointed as the head of the 
Greek delegation to the impending Lausanne conference and as the representative of 
the regime's interests abroad. 4The revolutionary government had high hopes that with 
Constantine gone and Venizelos as their ambassador, the British and French would 
immediately adopt a more favourable attitude towards Greece at Lausanne. 5 
These hopes were soon dashed, partly because Allied Greek policy between 1920 and 
1922 had not been wholly dictated by hostility to Constantine, but also because the 
Allies intended to judge the revolutionaries by their deeds. In the realm of domestic 
politics these were far from pleasing to the Allies, for events moved rapidly towards a 
crisis as the revolutionaries began to avenge the last two years of Anti-Venizelist 
1 M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill Volume IV (London, Heinemann, 1975) 498. 
2 DBFPIIIXVIIIII 27-3 1; Dakin, Unification, pp. 23 7-8. 
3 DBFPIIIXVIIIII 27; MAE Grýce 57 Marcilly to QO no. 180 d. 25 Oct. 1922. 
4 FO 3 71/75 86 min. by Crowe d. 11 Oct. 1922. 
5 DBFP/I/XVIII/130-1; Dakin, Unification, p. 238. 
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oppression and to punish those deemed responsible for the national humiliation in 
Asia Minor. On 13 November a special military court began to try numerous royalist 
ex-imnisters and military leaders on charges of high treason for having allowed 
Turkish troops to invade Greek territory (i. e. the Smyrna zone). 6 The charges were a 
legal nonsense since the accused were guilty of nothing more than incompetence and 
political errors of judgement, but though the proceedings soon degenerated into a 
farcical show trial they were seen by the revolutionaries as a political necessity. 7 It 
soon became clear that the revolutionaries intended to execute the accused in order to 
prevent their possible future return to power and to prove the serious nature of the 
revolution. 8Six men, ex-premier Gounaris, ex-ministers Stratos, Protopapadakis, 
Baltazzis and Theotokis and the late commander-in-chief of Greek forces in Asia 
Minor General Hadjianesti, were condemned to death on 28 November and shot by 
firing squad that same day. 9 
The British reaction to the revolution was one of extreme caution: there was no desire 
to interfere or to assume any responsibility for events in Athens, ostensibly because 
Greek internal politics were entirely the concern of the Greek people. 10 Curzon stuck 
resolutely to this line despite pressure from Athens and London in favour of a more 
interventionist approach. The British minister in Athens, Francis Lindley, consistently 
advocated recognition of George 11 as king on the grounds that this would tame the 
revolution by prompting a coalition of moderate elements which would marginalise 
the influence of both republicans and extreme Anti-Venizelists. This, together with 
the elections which the revolutionaries were promising, would help stabilise the 
situation and prevent the establishment of a republic which would 'quickly fall into 
6 DBFP/l/XV111/287-91; Llewellyn Smith, Ionian Vision, pp. 323ff. 
7 A. F. Frangulis, La Grece. Son Statut International. Son Histoire Diplomatique (2 volumes, Paris, 
[no publisher] 1934) 11461-558 presents the Anti-Venizelist case against the executions. For British 
assessments see FO 371/7589 Bentinck to FO no. 690 d. 1 Dec. 1922 and DBFP/I/XVIII/377-9. 
8 FO 37117586 Lindley to FO tel. 665 d. 8 Nov. 1922. 
9 DBFP/i/XVIII/342; Dakin, Unification, pp. 238-9. 
10 FO 37 Ifl585 FO to Lindley unno. tel. d. 26 Sept. 1922. 
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the condition of Portugal, or even Mexico' and leave Greece prey to aggression by her 
neighbours. 11 
In London these arguments were repeated by the Greek minister, Kaklamanos, and 
also by senior figures in the Foreign Office. 12Crowe, the permanent under- secretary, 
and Nicolson both favoured recognition, partly for the same reasons but also to avert 
chaos in Greece in case the Lausanne conference collapsed and the Kernalists 
renewed the offensive in Thrace. 13 All this, however, was to no avail. Curzon was 
sceptical about the danger of a republican coup and in any case distrusted the advice 
of Lindley who seemed to have a predilection for Greek monarchs in general and who 
had in particular urged recognition of Constantine when he was on the throne. 14 
Lindley was permitted to enter into personal relations with George II, to show that 
Britain was not personally hostile to him, but Curzon was adamant that formal 
recognition must wait until the situation was clearer, in particular until after the new 
regime had adopted a satisfactory attitude over Thrace at Lausanne and held 
elections. 15 Premature recognition of a sovereign who might be toppled, or whose 
government might pursue an aggressive policy, would only entangle Great Britain in 
the mess of Greek internal politics. 
Despite this detachment from the broad development of events in Greece, the British 
did take steps to try and prevent the execution of the six, which it was felt would 
render internal pacification impossible and irreparably damage Greece's international 
standing and reputation as a civilised state. 161mmediately after the arrest of Gounaris 
and the others in September, only the energetic intervention of Lindley and the 
U-- 
F. Lench minister Marcilly prevented their summary execution by the revolutionaries 
11 FO 371/7585 Lindley to FO tel. 497 d. 27 Sept. 1922; FO 371/7586 Lindley to FO no. 598 d. 21 
Oct. 1922, tel. 632 d. 28 Oct. 1922. 
12 FO 371/7586 mins. by Crowe and Curzon d. 9 Oct. 1922. 
13 FO 371/7586 mins. by Crowe d. 30 Oct. 1922, Nicolson d. 6 Nov. 1922; FO 371/7587 min. by 
Nicolson d. 14 Nov. 1922. 
14 FO 371f7586 mins. by Curzon UO Oct. 1922,8 Nov. 1922. 
15 FO 371/7585 Lindley to FO tel. 516 d. 29 Sept. 1922, min. by Curzon d. 29 Sept. 1922, FO to Lindley 
tel. 273 d. 30 Sept. 1922; FO 371/7586 mins. by Crowe and Curzon d. 9 Oct. 1922. 
16 FO 371/7586 Lindley to FO tel. 623 d. 24 Oct. 1922, tel. 628 d. 27 Oct. 1922, min. by Nicolson d. 9 
Nov. 1922; DBFP1I /XVIII/288. 
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and secured a promise that the prisoners would be tried in a civil court. 17 On 23 
October, however, in breach of this undertaking the revolutionary committee 
established a special court martial to conduct the trials and Lindley made a series of 
further representations to Politis, the ad interim foreign minister, stressing the 
deplorable effect such a trial would have in Greece and the dangerous precedent that 
would be set by executing ex-ministers in response to a clamour for vengeance from 
the army. Politis reassured Lindley that the civilian government would resign rather 
than see executions carried out, but there was, as Lindley told Curzon, no knowing 
what the military would do. 18 
Lindley's apprehensions proved well founded: on 8 November he reported that the 
decree establishing the military tribunal suspended the constitutional provisions which 
forbade the imposition of the death penalty for political offences. 19 Curzon thereupon 
instructed Lindley to demand written assurances from the Greeks that capital 
punishment would not be inflicted, failing which London would invite the French 
government to join Britain in enforcing observance of the Greek constitution. 20 
Although there was some doubt as to the continuing validity of Allied rights of 
guarantee over the Greek constitution, Lindley presented his official note to Politis on 
14 November. 21 His task was complicated, however, by confusion as to where power 
really lay at Athens: at one point Politis told Lindley that the revolutionary committee 
was the key to the whole situation, at another he warned Lindley that British 
insistence on written guarantees would provoke the real power in the land, the mass 
of extremist officers, to sweep both government and committee away and simply 
murder the prisoners. 22 
17 DBFP/I/XVIII/129-30. 
18 FO 371/7586 Lindley to FO tel. 623 d. 24 Oct. 1922, tel. 628 d. 27 Oct. 1922; DBFP/I/XVIII/223-5. 
19 FO 371/7586 Lindley to FO tel. 665 d. 8 Nov. 1922. 
20 DBFP/1/XVIII/288. 
21 DBFP/I/XVIII/289. The guarantee is discussed in FO 371/7588 'Memorandum on the Rights and 
Obligations of H. M. G. respecting the guarantee of the Greek Constitution', various authors and dates. 
Nicolson warned Kaklamanos that if the Greeks were so foolish as to provoke British intervention its 
basis 'would be, as far as they were concerned, a perfectly incidental and academic matter' (FO 
371/7586 min. by Nicolson d. II Nov. 1922). 
22 DBFP/I/XVIII/288-9. 
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Meanwhile, Politis asked Lindley whether, to counter the fears of the revolutionaries 
that unless the accused were executed they might one day return to power and take 
revenge, the British government would undertake to guarantee that once exiled they 
would never return to Greece. This proposal was given short shrift in the Foreign 
Office since it was not clear how such a guarantee could in practice be given. 23 
Further, in response to a warning from Politis of the grave consequences that might 
follow any intervention by London in Greek politics, Curzon told Kaklamanos that 
executions would adversely affect Greece's interests at Lausanne and even threatened 
to break off diplomatic relations. This last threat, superseding the one to enforce the 
Greek constitution, was expected to prove more effective than the guarantee proposed 
bypolitiS. 24 
At Athens the crisis deepened. The government was quite unable to deliver the 
written assurances demanded despite Curzon's threats, and Politis told Lindley that 
the government would have to resign unless the friction with Britain could be 
resolved. 25AIthough Lindley continued to recommend some British guarantee against 
the return of the ex-ministers, London remained adamant, simply repeating that the 
Greeks had been given, through Kaklamanos, an 'unequivocal warning' of the likely 
consequences of executionS. 26This hard line attitude had an immediate effect, though 
not perhaps the one intended. On 23 November the Greek government resigned and a 
new cabinet was formed, composed almost entirely of extreme Venizelists and 
members of the revolutionary committee, with only Plastiras staying outside as self- 
styled 'Leader of the Revolution'. 27When on 24 November the revolutionary 
committee truculently told Lindley that the six must be punished and warned Great 
Britain not to interfere, things looked very black indeed for the prisoners; on 27 
November Lindley reported that the military were determined to carry out executions 
23 DBFP/I/XVIII/290-1,308. 
24 FO 371/7587 note by Kaklamanos d. 15 Nov. 1922; DBFP/I/XVIII/308. 
25 DBFP/I/XVIII/318-9. 
26 DBFP/I/XVIII/326. 
27 DBFP/i/XVIII/329; Dakin, Unification, p. 239. 
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and that the end was very near. 28Curzon, now at Lausanne, authorised. Lindley to 
obtain from the six an undertaking that they would in future abstain from involvement 
in politics or live in exile outside Greece - whichever would save their lives -, but his 
change of heart came too late: by the time his telegram reached Athens the six were 
already dead. 291n response to this judicial murder Lindley left Greece that same day, 
entrusting British interests to Charles Bentinck as charge, and having informed the 
Greeks that his departure 'signified a breach of diplomatic relations between Great 
Britain and Greece'. 30 
This strenuous British intervention to secure clemency for the six might be thought 
surprising given Curzon's general attitude of reserve about involvement in Greek 
internal politics, but this was a special case since London felt executions would be 
both a blunder and a crime, with consequences prejudicial to British as well as to 
Greek interests. Nevertheless, despite the threat to sever diplomatic relations, British 
policy failed. This did not mean that British influence in Greece counted for nothing; 
it was simply that British influence alone could not determine the policy of the Greek 
government against certain countervailing forces. In a long despatch written after his 
departure from Greece, Lindley identified three main factors as the cause of his 
failure: the implacability of those in Greece who desired executions, the role played 
by Venizelos and the attitude of the French. 31 
The immense and perhaps irresistible pressure within Greece for the death penalty 
was probably the most significant factor in Lindley's list. This pressure must be seen 
in the context of Greek history since the rise of Venizelism in 1910, since when 
Greek politics had become a struggle between two diametrically opposed blocs, 
fighting to gain control of government and to realise their own vision and conception 






given, and the persecution and repression of opponents practised by both blocs when 
in power only added to the bitterness of the schism. 
Although at first the revolutionaries proclaimed their aim of uniting the country, 
gradually, in accordance with what Marcilly called a'normal revolutionary 
phenomenon', the movement came to be dominated by its extremists, and assumed the 
character of a simple Venizelist backlash after two years of royalist 
maladministration. 32As Lindley observed a propos the trials: 'the Venizelists have 
obtained control of the machine and mean to use it to destroy their enemieSI. 33 
Political pressure from the Venizelists for the executions was motivated by fear of 
possible royalist revanche in the future and by a desire to secure their own political 
superiority by removing the chief Anti-Venizelist leaders. Although the more 
perceptive amongst them began to have doubts once the likely international 
consequences of executions became clear, it was by then 'too late to damp down the 
fire they had helped to light'. 34 
Pressure also came from the military as a whole. The officer corps wanted to lay the 
blame for the disaster on the heads of the politicians, both to 'wipe out the memory of 
their own disgraceful conduct in the field' and to make an example of "'les grands 
coupables"' in order to enforce discipline in the army. 35The key group in procuring 
the execution of the six was undoubtedly the extremist officers whom Politis claimed 
would sweep the revolutionary committee away and plunge the nation into anarchy 
unless their demands were met. 36PIastiras and his colleagues did not feel strong 
enough to resist these elements, exemplified and organised by General Theodoros 
Pangalos, the chief prosecutor at the trial, and so were forced to acquiesce in the 
executions. Given this internal momentum behind the trials it is at least doubtful 
32 MAE Gr6ce 57 Marcilly to QO no. 180 d. 25 Oct. 1922. 
33 DBFpll /XVIII/29 1. 
34 DBFP/1/XVIII/. '342-3; Dakin, Unification, p. 239. 
35 DBFPIIIXVIIII'- 343. 
36 DBFP/I/XVIII/357. 
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whether, even if all other things had been equal, British efforts to save the six could 
have succeeded. 37 
Lindley's despatch identified a second factor obstructing British policy, namely 
Venizelos' refusal to intervene to prevent the executions. Venizelos had been 
entrusted with managing Greece's interests abroad by the new regime, and could 
obviously have influenced events at home given the political sympathies of the 
revolutionaries. On several occasions Lindley urged London to persuade Venizelos to 
speak out, but the latter always refused, insisting that he had no responsibility for the 
internal affairs of Greece and, indeed, - perhaps somewhat disingenuously - that he 
wished to dissociate himself entirely from Greek politiCS. 38 Venizelos subsequently 
refused to warn the Greek government of the possible extemal consequences of their 
actions, even when they asked his advice, which was indeed odd in view of his 
responsibilities as their external representative. This reticence certainly influenced 
events at Athens. Lindley reported that the Greeks interpreted Venizelos' silence as 
meaning that there would be no adverse international reaction to the executions and 
that the Allies were bluffing and would in any case continue to support Greece. 39 
Admittedly, Venizelos, under extreme pressure from Curzon at Lausanne, did 
eventually send a warning to Athens, but only after the sentences had been 
pronounced, and it was anyway 'lukewarm' and arrived too late to have any effect. 10 It 
may be that once the civilian cabinet had resigned on 24 November and the 
revolutionary committee had assumed full control even Venizelos could have done 
37 Llewellyn Smith, Ionian Vision, p. 321. In his memoirs Pangalos wrote that the six, though 
innocent of the crimes of which they were accused, were 'inevitable and necessary sacrifices on the 
altar of the motherland during those critical times' (quoted in L. P. Cassimatis, American Influence in 
Greece 1917-1929 (Kent, Kent State University Press, 1988), p. 88). 
38 DBFP/I/XVIII/193-4,329,340; MAE Grece 57 St. Aulaire (ambassador in London) to QO no. [? ] 
d. 23 Oct. 1922. S t. Aulaire wrote how even as Venizelos spoke of his determination not to return to 
Greek politics 'as if to convince himself', his voice and eyes 'betrayed his incurable nostalgia for 
power ... '. 39 DBFP/I/XVIII/342,357; Cassimatis, American Influence, p. 84. 
40 DBFP/I/XVIII/347-8; Llewellyn Smith, Ionian Vision, p. 329. 
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little to influence events; but by his refusal to speak out before that date he brought 
upon himself a share of the guilt for the murder of his political opponents-41 
Venizelos' motive for keeping silent was the subject of some debate amongst the 
British. The Foreign Office was surprised by his attitude: he usually talked so frankly 
about internal affairs that his reluctance even to comment upon them, and his dark 
warnings that Britain had better not intervene, seemed curiouS. 42Lindley attributed 
his silence to a desire to encourage the republicans amongst the revolutionaries, 
perhaps even to the point of another coup d'gtat, since it was doubtful whether free 
elections would produce a Venizelist majority. 43 It was also true that Venizelos told 
the French ambassador in London, St. Aulaire, on 22 October that he believed'the 
days of the monarchy are numbered'and that'his preferences were now moving 
towards a republic'. 44Furthermore, Poincare affected to have learnt from secret 
sources that contrary to his public declarations Venizelos was urging the executions 
of three out of the six accused. 15 
On the other hand, Venizelos gave no overt encouragement to the leading Venizelists 
who declared for a republic in late October, and the Athens press published telegrams, 
purporting to be from him, repudiating allegations of republican sympathieS. 46 
Whether Venizelos had in fact been converted to republicanism is unclear - he 
certainly tailored his language to suit his audience and was at heart a relatively 
unprincipled opportunist (rather than- an ideologue) who shifted his position to suit the 
changing balance of forces within Greece. 471t would hardly be warranted to accuse 
41 DBFP/I/XVIII/342. 
42 FO 371/7586 mins. by Lindsay d. 25 Oct. 1922, Nicolson d. 9 Nov. 1922. 
43 FO 371/7586 Lindley to Crowe p[rivate] tel. d. 27 Oct. 1922. 
44 MAE Gr&e 57 St. Aulaire to QO noj? ] d. 23 Oct. 1922. 
45 MAE Gr&e 57 QO to French Delegation Lausanne tel. 46 d. 29 Nov. 1922. 
46 FO 371/7586 Lindley to FO tel. 604 d. 20 Oct. 1922, min. by Curzon d. 8 Nov. 1922, but cf. Lindley 
to FO tel. 663 d. 8 Nov. 1922. Dakin, Unification, p. 238. 
47 Dakin describes Venizelos as being 'totally devoid' of principles (Unification, p. 183), and the 
Cretan certainly took no consistent line on the constitutional question. During the First World War, 
for example, he at various times advocated a republic or a change of dynasty according to 
circumstances. Although he told St. Aulaire here that it was recent events which had convinced him of 
the need for a republic in Greece, as early as 1917 he had written that it might be necessary to 
institute a republic, 'for which the Greek people, in my opinion, is already mature' (Leon, Greece and 
the Great Powers, p. 478). For further details, see S. V. Papacosma, 'The Republicanism of Eleftherios 
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him of encouraging a republican coup and the deaths of the six on the basis of an 
uncorroborated French secret service report, for his silence could simply have been 
due to the confusion reigning in Greece. In any event, Dakin argues that his aloofness 
from party conflict helped him as Greece Is external representative to salvage as much 
as he could from the Asia Minor disaster. 48 
The third factor which in Lindley's view had contributed to his failure was the attitude 
of the French. Almost all the foreign representatives at Athens had attempted to 
dissuade the Greeks from imposing death penalties on the six. The American charge 
Caffrey had exploited the government's desire to win American friendship and 
financial assistance for the refugees by warning the Greeks that executions might 
cause 'the springs of charity' in the United States to dry Up. 49 The Italian 
representative, Giulio Montagna, also made strong representations, warning that 
reprisals might produce 'extremely unpleasant' results for Greece at the Lausanne 
Conference. 50 
Conspicuous by the absence of their protests, however, were the French. An attempt 
to produce a petition for mercy signed by the whole diplomatic corps at Athens was 
frustrated by the refusal of Marcilly to participate in it. 51 Although he had joined 
energetically in the earliest remonstrances to Athens in favour of the ex-ministers and 
was personally opposed to any reprisals, he soon received instructions from the Quai 
d'Orsay restraining him from further action. 52 Worse, other French representatives, 
chiefly the head of the French military mission, General Gramat, were rumoured to 
have actually encouraged the executionS. 53 The Greeks naturally took note of France's 
Venizelos: Ideology or Tactics? ', Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies 7 1981 169-202, which is an C, 
account of the transition to a republic paying special attention to the r6le and attitude of Venizelos. 
48 Dakin, Unification, p. 238. 
49 DBFP/I/XVIII/343; Cassimatis, American Influence, pp. 81,85. For documents on United States 
policy towards the revolution in Greece and American relief efforts, see [Papers Relating to the] 
F[oreign] R[elations of the] U[nited] S[tates (Washington, United States Government Printing 






I complete reserve regarding [the] prisoners', which was interpreted - wrongly in 
Lindley's view - as meaning that the French government desired the executionS. 54 
Certainly this policy was popular with French public opinion: the Parisian press shed 
no tears for the ex-ministers and applauded the Quai d'Orsay's policy of non- 
intervention. 55 All in all Lindley argued that French policy had represented a major 
obstacle to his aims and a considerable encouragement to the Greek extremists. 
Lindley's analysis of French policy was quite in line with the general Foreign Office 
perception of France's attitude towards Greece. Before the revolution London had 
believed that French policy was aiming at the reduction of Greece to impotence and 
chaos, using encouragement of the Venizelist opposition to this end. This was a 
natural complement to France's pro-Turkish Eastern policy, but was also motivated by 
hatred of Constantine and the royalists and by a desire to weaken what was seen as a 
British client state. When Lindley argued in July 1922 that the French were 
promoting the Venizelists in order to force Constantine out of Greece and to facilitate 
the establishment of a republic which France could then dominate, the Foreign Office 
did not dissent. 56After the revolution Lindley again reported that Paris was working 
for a republic and a conspicuous refusal to intervene on behalf of the ex-ministers was 
certainly one very effective means of encouraging the republicanS. 57The prospect of 
a French dominated republic did not cause any panic in the Foreign Office; for one 
thing it was seen as a very distant possibility and for another there was confidence 
that any influence lost by Britain in the short term would eventually be regained. 58 
However, the British did believe that France was in fact seeking to establish a 
republic in Greece and that French policy had been one of the chief reasons for the 
failure to prevent the execution of the six. 
54 DBFP/I/XVIII/'-3'29. 
55 FO 371/7587 Hardinge (Paris) to FO tel. 631 d. 29 Nov. 1922, tel. 634 d. 30 Nov. 1922. 
56 FO 371/7585 Lindley to FO no. 340 d. 1 Jul. 1922, Bentinck to FO no. 417 d. 8 Aug. 1922 and mins. 
57 FO 371/75 86 Lindley to FO no. 598 d. 21 Oct. 1922. 
58 FO 371/7586 Lindley to FO tel. 604 d. 20 Oct. 1922 and mins., min. by Nicolson d. 6 Nov. 1922. 
50 
In reality, Poincare's policy was not that dissimilar to Curzon's, except that he 
extended the policy of non-intervention to encompass the trial of the ex-ministers. 
Poincare laid down this policy in late September after Marcilly had on his own 
initiative joined Lindley in making representations to prevent the summary execution 
of the ex-ministers and of Constantine. He instructed Marcilly that, while this purely 
humanitarian action was permissible, he must not intervene in Greek internal affairs 
nor do anything 'which could be interpreted as designed to hinder normal judicial 
inquiries'. 59 Even once it became clear that the trial was not normal and was likely to 
end with executions, Poincare refused to let Marcilly make further representations, 
insisting that France must 'remain completely outside this affair'. 60 This did not, 
however, mean that Poincare wanted the ex-ministers killed. On the contrary, he 
made much of the warning given him by the Greek minister in Paris, Romanos, that 
protests from the great powers would be counter-productive by making it harder for 
the Greek government to show clemency. 61 This view was echoed by Marcilly, who 
sympathised with Politis' argument that if the Greeks conceded leniency under British 
pressure the royalists, feeling themselves to be under British protection, would be 
greatly heartened. 62Later, Marcilly went so far as to argue that without the very 
public intervention of the British only two or three of the ex-ministers would have 
been killed. 63 After the executions, when rumours were flourishing that the French 
had encouraged them, Poincare reiterated that French policy had been motivated 
solely by a desire not to intervene in an internal matter, seeing that as the best way to 
save theSiX. 64 
Whatever the British may have thought, Poincare's adherence to this policy was not 
part of a scheme to establish a republic in Greece. True, he was not prepared to 
recognise George II and was reluctant to allow Marcilly to enter into even personal 
59 MAE Gr&e 57 Marcilly to QO tels. 439-43 d. 29 Sept. 1922, QO to Marcilly tel. 548 d. 29 Sept. 1922. 
60 MAE Grece 57 QO to Marcilly tel. 715 d. 18 Nov. 1922. 
61 MAE Grýce 57 QO to Marcilly tel. 712 d. 17 Nov. 1922. 
62 MAE Gr&e 57 Marcilly to QO no. 201 d. 22 Nov. 1922. 
63 MAE Gr&e 58 Marcilly to QO no. 207 d-3 Dec. 1922, note by Peretti de la Rocca (director of 
political affairs at the Quai d'Orsay) d. 2 Dec. 1922. 
64 MAE Grece 57 QO to French Delegation Lausanne tel. 46 d. 29 Nov. 1922. 
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relations with him, but this was more or less Curzon's position too. 65 Although the 
French looked on, the prospect of a republic with more equanimity than the British, 
especially if the transition could be effected constitutionally as Venizelos assured the 
Quai d'Orsay it could., the official line was that it was not for France to interfere nor 
to recommend the establishment of a particular form of government in Greece. 66 
Marcilly agreed that this even-handed policy was the correct one: even though most 
Greek republicans were ardent francophiles, France should certainly not encourage 
their schemes, but equally should not disavow them altogether by recognising the 
king. If a republic was established, so be it, but in the meantime the French should 
keep in step with their Allies and await the result of elections (and the internal 
settlement of the constitutional question) before committing themselves. 67 
Despite pressure from the Greek queen's relatives at Bucharest and the Romanian 
government, Poincare stuck steadfastly to his policy of reserving judgement on the 
king and government. 68This policy, far from encouraging moves towards a republic, 
was probably decisive in hindering them. Many of the revolutionaries were sorely 
tempted to institute a republic by force in order to safeguard themselves against the 
electoral revanche of the Constantinists and to confound (essentially monarchical) 
public opinion. So great was this internal pressure that any hint of interference from 
France would probably have tipped the balance. 69As it was, French policy (and 
Greece's precarious international position) helped avert for the moment this 
constitutional upheaval. 
In French eyes it was not they, but the British who were pursuing a self interested and 
partial Greek policy, departing from an attitude of non-intervention to support one 
faction in Greek politics. In discussing the motives behind British efforts to save the 
65 MAE Grke 57 Marcilly to QO tels. 452-4 d. I Oct. 1922, QO to Marcilly tel. 559 d. 2 Oct. 1922, QO 
to Barr6re (Rome) tel. 1660 d. 5 Oct. 1922. 
66 MAE Gr6ce 57 QO to Marcilly tel. 548 d. 29 Sept. 1922, tel. 582 d. 6 Oct. 1922, no. [? ] d. 7 Nov. 1922. 
67 MAE Grýce 83 Marcilly to QO no. 186 d. 30 Oct. 1922. 
68 MAE Gr6ce 83 Daeschner (Bucharest) to QO no. 228 d. 21 Oct. 1922. King George was married to 
Princess Elizabeth of Romania. 
69 MAE Grýce 57 Marcilly to QO no. 180 d. 25 Oct. 1922, no. 200 d. 20 Nov. 1922. 
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six, Marcilly wrote that, whilst it was impossible to discount altogether considerations 
of legality and fairness, the British had more personal reasons for interesting 
themselves in the fate of the members of the Gounaris cabinet: 
as has been seen for the last two years, and as is shown even more by the facts 
cited during the trial, the Foreign Office encouraged the Greek ministry in its 
military venture in Asia Minor. It is conceivable that it seeks now to render this 
70 last service to the men whom it drove to... disaster. 
Another French observer, the military attache, Captain de Colombel, speculated that 
the British, apart from feeling guilty at having egged on the Gounarists without 
adequately supporting them materially, feared that if driven into a comer Gounaris 
might make 'extremely compromising' revelations about British engagements towards 
Greece. 71 Lateý, whilst reviewing the whole course of the trial, Marcilly argued that 
as guilty verdicts would have implicated the British indirectly in a criminal act, 'the 
honour of British policy was at stake'. 72 Further, he believed that London was 
motivated by monarchical considerations, dreading the prospect of a republic, which 
was growing daily as Greece plunged into chaos, since it would mean the collapse of 
British influence in Greece. 73British policy did not even have the saving grace of 
effectiveness: the tactic used by Curzon of taking an intransigent public stand left no 
room for compromise and sealed the fate of all six prisoners. 74 
The accusation that British policy was motivated by monarchical considerations was 
given colour by British efforts to safeguard the Greek royal family; efforts which in 
contrast to the case of the six were successful. On two occasions, in September and in 
November, Curzon reluctantly offered first Constantine and then George 11 protection 
on board British warships and in the legation when their lives appeared threatened by 
the rising tide of republicanism within Greece. In both instances the precautions 
70 MAE Gr6ce 57 Marcilly to QO no. 201 d. 22 Nov. 1922. 
71 MAE Grece 154 De Colombel report no. 989 d. [? ]. 
72 MAE Grýce 58 Marcilly to QO no. 207 d. 3 Dec. 1922. 
73 MAE Grece 83 Marcilly to QO no. 186 d. 30 Oct. 1922. 
74 MAE Gr&e 58 Marcilly to QO no. 207 d. 3 Dec. 1922. 
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proved unnecessary since the threats receded before the offers were taken Up. 75 More 
vigorous action was taken in the case of Prince Andrew, George 11's uncle, who had 
been arrested in mid-October on a specious charge of disobeying orders in the field in 
Asia Minor. As the determination of the revolutionary committee to execute the six 
became apparent, fears grew that the prince might share their fate. 
Accordingly, the British delegation at Lausanne sent Gerald Talbot, a former British 
naval officer, a philhellene and friend of Venizelos, to Athens to try and save all those 
at risk because of 
_their 
alleged complicity in the Asia Minor disaster. 76He arrived in 
Athens on 28 November, too late to save the six whose execution was in fact hurried 
on to anticipate his arrival, but by careful negotiation (or, if the French were to be 
believed, by offering financial inducements) he saved Prince Andrew from the firing 
squad. The prince instead was sentenced to perpetual banishment and left Greece on 
board HMS Calypso on 3 December. 77Talbot secured from the revolutionaries a 
promise that there would be no more political executions, and British efforts were 
further rewarded when Plastiras, and even Pangalos, assured Bentinck that they had 
every intention of retaining the monarchy in Greece. 78 
The idea that Curzon's policy towards the Greek royal family was designed to buttress 
the institution of monarchy was somewhat wide of the mark. True, George V took an 
active interest in the fate of his Greek relatives (mindful no doubt of the precedent of 
his Romanov cousins and his inaction over them) but he only ever acted through the 
correct constitutional channel of the Foreign Office and his suggestions only 
75 FO 371/7585 Lindley to FO tel. 489 d. 26 Sept. 1922, FO to Lindley tel. 258 d. 27 Sept. 1922, tel. 266 
d. 29 Sept. 1922, Lindley to FO tel. 530 d. I Oct. 1922; DBFP/I/XVIII/127,154,348-9; Llewellyn Smith, 
Ionian Vision, p. 315. 
76 FO 371f7587 Lindley to Crowe p. tel. d. 23 Nov. 1922; DBFP/I/XVIII/346-7; Llewellyn Smith, 
Ionian Vision, p. 329. It is not clear who exactly sent Talbot to Athens. Venizelos subequently tried to 
claim credit for the mission (FO 371/7590 min. by Lampson d. 29 Dec. 1922; DBFPIIIXVI111347), 
although Talbot told Graham, the British ambassador in Rome, that Tyrrell had sent him from 
Lausanne (FO 371/7589 Graham to FO no. 1121 d. 7 Dec. 1922). Nicolson's biographer claims that it 
was Harold Nicolson himself who was responsible, since Tyrrell, assistant under-secretary at the 
Foreign Office, was incapacitated in an 'alcoholic stupor' (Lees-Milne, Nicolson, 1187-8). At any 
event the decision was probably taken without Curzon's knowledge (H. Nicolson, King George the 
Fifth. His Life and Reign (London, Constable, 1952), p. 372). 
77 MAE Gr&e 154 De Colombel report no. 989 d. [? ]; DBFP/1/XVIII/349,358. 
78 DBFP/1/XVIII/366-8 
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reinforced and never dictated the direction of British poliCy. 79 For Curzon's part, his 
very determination not to recognise George II, lest his actions be interpreted as 
interference, gives ample proof of his cautious position vis d vis the Greek monarchy. 
He was prepared to act only to protect the royal family as individuals, not as political 
figures, and even this he did with some reluctance. 800f course, British policy was not 
simply altruistic: the murder of any members of this family would only have 
envenomed Greece's internal disputes, which would be in neither Greek nor British 
interests; 81 and after all, as Lindley had observed in July, British interests demanded 
'imperatively a stable and prosperous Greece'. 82 
Normal conditions were certainly not restored in Greece before the end of the year. 
Admittedly, the shock of the executions had had a sobering effect and allowed the 
revolutionary committee to assert its control over the extremist officers. 83The 
revolutionaries were even showing contrition over the murders, even if, as Bentinck 
noted, 'as in the case of Judas repentance has come too latel. 840n the other hand, 
there was no immediate prospect of either elections or the formation of a civilian 
government and the only bulwark against anarchy was the revolutionary committee. 85 
Prospects for the future were indeed uncertain. From afar Venizelos was urging that 
'the revolution must make way for political democracy'but Plastiras and his 
colleagues were contemplating a lengthy dictatorship. 86 There was even the 
possibility of a resumption of the war against Turkey: the ruthless Pangalos had taken 
charge of the reorganisation of the army in Thrace and many of the revolutionaries 
79 FO 800/154 George V to Curzon unno-tel. d. 30 Sept. 1922, Curzon to George V unno. tel. d. 30 
Sept. 1922; see also the interesting minutes in FO 371/7589 by Cadogan d. 8 Dec. 1922 and Lampson 
d. 9 Dec. 1922. This is also the verdict of George V's most recent biographer ( K. Rose, King George V 
(London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983), p. 347). 
80 FO 371/7585 FO to Lindley tel. 258 d. 27 Sept. 1922, tel. 273 d. 30 Sept. 1922. 
81 DBFP/I/XVIII/288. 
82 FO 371/7585 Lindley to FO no. 340 d. I Jul. 1922. 
83 MAE Gr&e 58 Marcilly to QO no. 217 d. 7 Dec. 1922; R. Clogg, A Short History of Modern Greece 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 119-20. 
84 DBFP/I/XVIII/368. 
85 FO 371/7589 Bentinck to FO no. 690 d. 1 Dec. 1922; FO 371/7590 Bentinck to FO no. 723 d. 14 
Dec. 1922. 
86 Llewellyn Smith, Ionian Vision, pp. 330-4. 
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believed an attempt on Constantinople might strengthen their position. 87This 
disastrous policy was checked by the combined pressure of the Allies and Venizelos, 
although it remained a danger over the next eight months. 88 
But there was no end to the revolutionary regime. Although elections were often 
mooted the likelihood of their taking place was slim since there was no guarantee that 
they would produce a Venizelist majority. 89 Perhaps the best hope for a return to 
civilian government lay with Alexandros Zaimis, a veteran moderate politician, who 
told Bentinck he might be able to persuade the revolutionaries to cede power to a 
civilian cabinet under his premiership if he could assure them that he had the support 
of the three Entente powers. This idea was in the air for some time but came to 
nothing since the powers were unwilling to give Zaimis the political and economic 
support, including recognition of George II, on which he insisted as a precondition of 
his forming a government. 90 
Curzon refused to support Zaimis, which was not surprising as the wisdom of the 
cautious policy adopted in October had only been confirmed by events since. It was 
clearly impossible, he told Bentinck, for Britain to recognise a sovereign 'with whose 
existing government [we] have just been obliged to suspend relations because of a 
series of atrocious judicial murders'. 91 Testinare lente'was the policy prescribed by 
Miles Lampson, head of the Foreign Office Central Department: recognition and a 
resumption of diplomatic relations could not be considered until elections had been 
held and a stable government established. 92 It was therefore of little comfort to the 
Greeks that Curzon now declared, despite his refusal to receive a Greek minister in 
87 MAE Gr&e 57 Marcilly to QO tels. 444-6 d. 29 Sept. 1922; MAE Gr&e 58 Marcilly to QO no. 221 
d. 15 Dec. 1922; DBFPII /XVIII/420- 1. 
88 Dakin, Greece and Great Britain, pp. 211-32. 
89 MAE Gr&e 58 Marcilly to QO no. 207 d. 3 Dec. 1922. 
90 DBFP/I/XVIII/393-5; Dakin, Unification, p. 240. Zaimis continued his negotiations with the 
revolutionaries for almost a year, but things were rendered difficult by his tendency to discuss half a 
question then 'suddenly withdraw to fish at Aegina for weeks at a time' (FO 371/9896 Annual Report, 
Greece, 1923 [enclosed in Bentinck to FO no. 555 d. 30 Aug. 19241 p. 10. Page references for Annual 
Reports are from the Confidential Print copies filed in the FO 371 series). 
91 DBFPIIIXV1111424-5. 
92 FO 371/7590 mins. by Lampson d. 20 Sept. 1922 and 29 Sept. 1922. 
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London, that relations had not in fact been broken off. Rather, Lindley had been 
withdrawn 'as a mark of our displeasure' and Bentinck remained charge d'affaires 
though without having official intercourse with cabinet ministers. 93 
A measure of excitement in British public opinion was a further factor reinforcing 
Curzon's decision to adopt a wait-and-see policy. During his trial Gounaris had 
claimed in his defence that his policy of continuing the war in Asia Minor had been 
endorsed and encouraged by the British government, and in an attempt to prove it had 
produced papers, including a letter from Curzon. Curzon's domestic opponents seized 
on this alleged encouragement, questions were asked in both Houses and the press 
was alive with comment, speculation and demands for the publication of papers. 94 
The furore died down after it had been shown that Curzon's letters to Gounaris had 
been approved by the cabinet; but his notorious sensitivity had been very wounded by 
the attacks. 95 On top of this controversy came a dispute about the government's role in 
the rescue of Prince Andrew and much comment about the decision to withdraw 
Lindley. 96 In these circumstances, 'when affairs of Greece are much discussed in [the] 
press and parliamentary questioners are particularly active', the Foreign Office was 
determined to do nothing to fan the flames of public intereSt. 97 Although the voice of 
93 FO 371/75 88 mins. by Crowe d. 7 Dec. 1922, Curzon d. 8 Dec. 1922; FO 371/75 89 min. by 
Troutbeck d. 18 Dec. 1922; DBFP/I/XVIII/386. 
94 Cassimatis, American Influence, pp. 85-6; The Earl of Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord Curzon. Being 
the Authorized Biography of George Nathaniel Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, KG, Volume III 
(London, Ernest Berm [no date]) 329-3 1; Mosley, Curzon, pp. 247-8. For the text of this letter of 6 
March 1922 see DBFP/I/XVII/646-9 and also 640-2. 
95 FO 800/154 Vansittart to Tyrrell p. tel. d. 9 Dec. 1922; DBFP/1/XVIII/351-2,358-9,382-5; 
[Hansard. Volume] 159 H[ouse op Ctommons Official Report. Parliamentary] Deb[ates] 5[th] 
s[eries (London, HMSO, 1909-198 1) columns] 105ff., 1182-4,1989,2366-8,2376; [Hansard. Volume] 
52 Hfouse oJ7 L[ords Official Report. Parliamentary] Deb[ates] 5 [th] s [eries (London, HMS 0,1909- 
1981) columns] 337-47,349-56. 
96 FO 371/7588 Bentinck to FO tel. 730 d. 5 Dec. 1922; FO 371/7590 Bentinck to FO no. 709 d. 9 
Dec. 1922; 159H. C. Deb. 5s. 1180-2,1727-8,2365-8. 
97 FO 37 V7588 min. by Lampson U Dec. 1922; FO 371/7589 Crowe to Hardinge p. tel. d. 8 
Dec. 1922. This telegram was an attempt to prevent Prince Andrew travelling to England until the 
press was less agitated. 
57 
public opinion was not coherent, there were definite calls for non-intervention in 
Greek affairs, with which the Foreign Office was only too happy to CoMply. 98 
French policy was in fact very similar. Poincare laid down that recognition of George 
11 must wait until he could be judged by his actions, and should in any case be 
postponed until after the conclusion of the Lausanne conference. Marcilly agreed that 
given the instability in Greece this policy was appropriate. Only if Poincare wanted to 
flatter Romania, or promote French economic interests in Greece, should he deviate 
from his policy of 'systematic indifference'. 99 Marcilly told a Romanian 
representative, anxious about the fate of the monarchy, that although the French 
'strongly desired' the restoration of tranquillity at Athens, it was vital to maintain an 
attitude of strict reserve until the party political conflict was over. 100 
Although some British officials still suspected that the French were backing the 
republican extremists, this was not the case. 101 Marcilly was at pains to reassure Paris 
that contrary to the many rumours circulating he had never encouraged the Greeks to 
proclaim a republic . 
102The French were also frank with the British over the 
intelligence they had received from Venizelos. The latter had told Paris that the 
question of a republic was bound to be raised after the elections and that, if there was 
an overwhelming majority in favour, a republic would have to be set up. (However, 
Venizelos personally felt that if there was a substantial minority still in favour of the 
monarchy, it would have to be retained). With this in mind both governments agreed 
that they would look foolish if they recognised George only to see him immediately 
dethroned by a popular vote, and that recognition must be delayed. 103 
98 [Ministero degli Affari Esteri, I] D[ocumenti] D[iplomaticij I[taliani (Rome, Libreria dello Stato, 
1952- )1/7/l/125. 
99 MAE Gr&e 83 Marcilly to QO no. 186 d. 30 Oct. 1922, no. 220 d. 15 Dec. 1922, tels. 544-5 d. 17 
Dec. 1922, QO to Marcilly tel. 300 d. 22 Dec. 1922, Marcilly to [? ] p. l. Ul Dec. 1922. 
100 MAE Grece 58 Marcilly to QO no. 216 d. 7 Dec. 1922. 
101 FO 371/75910 min. by Troutbeck d. 29 Dec. 1922. 
102 MAE Grece 83 Marcilly to QO tels. 544-5 d. 17 Dec. 1922. 
103 MAE Grece 83 St. Aulaire to QO no. 536 d. 22 Dec. 1922; DBFP/i/XVIII/424-5. 
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The upshot of the whole affair had nevertheless been an increase of French influence 
within Greece relative to that of Britain, at least in the short term. The Greeks had 
learnt from experience over the decades that their country could not flourish without 
foreign support, and the revolutionaries had hoped that with the removal of 
Constantine political and economic assistance from the powers would be 
forthcoming. 104This was not the case, for the motives behind great power policies 
were more complex than the Greeks realised. The French, for example, were still 
intent on winning the favours of Kemal at Lausanne, and this if nothing else would 
prevent them from pursuing a whole-heartedly pro-Greek policy. However, the 
Greeks felt that they needed the support of a great power and as Britain had broken 
off relations they concentrated on France, whom the inspired Athenian press flattered 
unceasingly. 105 This alarmed Bentinck, who was something of a francophobe, and 
indeed somewhat paranoid about the danger to British influence in Greece. He 
warned London that French influence, which had been nil in the summer, was 
steadily growing and that French representatives were making capital out of the 
contrast between French abstention and British intervention over the SiX. 106 
This did not upset the Foreign Office. There, Lampson felt that the withdrawal of 
Lindley had had the desired effect of bringing the revolutionaries to their senses over 
executions, and in any case it was ac(ýepted as a general principle that British 
influence would ultimately prevail in Greece because of naval and geographical 
factors. Furthermore, while Britain's own Near Eastern interests were being discussed 
at Lausanne, decisions about Greece should be postponed until the situation was more 
stable. 107 
104 DBFP111XVIIIII 30: 'The whole idea of the Revolution was to be friendly to the Entente; FO 
371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 pp. 3-4. 
105 FO 371/7590 Bentinck to FO no. 723 d. 14 Dec. 1922; DBFP/I/XVIII/394. Bentinck pointed out 
another consideration: 'While at heart ... the Greeks mistrust the French, they openly flatter them, and in many ways they take more trouble to please France than England. They consider that while the 
latter is, and always will be, their friend, the former must be placated, as she has a habit of making 
herself very disagreeable to her enemies' (FO 371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 p. 40). 
106 FO 371/7589 Bentinck to FO no. 683 d. 1 Dec. 1922. 
107 FO 371/7589 min. by Lampson d. 14 Dec. 1922; FO 371/7590 mins. by Troutheck d. 19 Dec. 1922, 
29 Dec. 1922. 
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Italian policy during this whole crisis followed a middle course, less interventionist 
than the British but more active than the French. That Rome followed this moderate 
policy was not surprising, since Mussolini only came to power on 29 October, just a 
month after the Greek revolution, and was still finding his feet. Already Montagna, 
the aggressive and irascible Italian minister at Athens, had been making 
representations to the Greeks about the possibility of executions, and he continued 
these on Mussolini's instructions. 108 In mid-November Mussolini proposed to London 
and Paris that the three powers should make a joint d9marche at Athens, but this 
initiative came to nothing as the British had already made their own representations 
and as the French were determined to do nothing'to hinder the Greek government's 
efforts to prevent the executions of the accused'. 109 
Mussolini's motives were clear enough, and were perceived by the French: Italian 
interests demanded the prevention of the revival of Greece that the return of the 
Venizelists to power was likely to produce. 110 Given the geographical proximity and 
conflicting ambitions of Italy and Greece their interests were bound to clash, and the 
Venizelists had always been more active and successful in pursuing Greek interests 
than the royalists. Consequently the return of the Venizelist system must be impeded 
at all costs. III To the same end Montagna advocated the recognition of George 11 to 
prevent Greece becoming a Venizelist republic and 'docile instrument of France. ' 12 
Mussolini, however, though conceding the strength of Montagna's argument, was 
reluctant to recognise a regime which had not yet consolidated itself, and in any case 
did not dare break ranks with France and Britain on this question. 1131n the end, 
Mussolini's attempts to protect the Greek royalists were counter-productive given 
Italy's unpopularity in Greece, the widespread belief that Rome was financing the 
108 MAE Grýce 57 Marcilly to QO no. 182 d. 26 Oct. 1922, no. 201 d. 22 Nov. 1922. 
109 MAE Gr6ce 57 note by Peretti de la Rocca d. 17 Nov. 1922; FO 3 71/758 7 min. by Osborne d. 18 
Nov. 1922. 
I 10 MAE Gr&e 83 Marcilly to QO no. 186 d. 30 Oct. 1922; MAE Grýce 154 De Colombel report 
no. 989 d. [? ]. 
III DDInIIII508-1 1; MAE Gr6ce 58 Charles-Roux (Rome) to QO tel. 1454 d. 2 Dec. 1922. 
112 DDI/7/I/28. 
113 DDInIII43. 
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extreme royalist party of General Metaxas and Montagna's own 'violently anti- 
Venizelist' sympathies. 114 
In the aftermath of the executions and Lindley's withdrawal, Mussolini pursued a 
cautious but opportunistic policy. He asked his ambassador in London, Della Torretta, 
and the head of the Italian delegation at Lausanne, Garroni, whether in their opinion 
Britain's attitude towards Greece had substantially changed or whether Curzon had 
merely broken off relations to appease public opinion. Upon this point depended 
Italian policy, for if the Anglo-Greek entente, which since the war had created a very 
unfavourable situation for Italy, was really finished, then great opportunities might 
open up in the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean. ' 15 He received conflicting 
answers. On the one hand, Della Torretta, always anxious to please his superiors, 
reported that according to his Foreign Office contacts there was an anti-Greek sea- 
change in British policy which would indeed create favourable conditions for Italy. 
On the other hand, Garroni, in touch with Curzon and Tyrrell at Lausanne, reported 
that recent events would make no real difference to Britain's line of conduct in the 
Near East. 116 
In view of this difference of opinion, Mussolini seems to have decided to take no 
further action beyond the instructions sent previously to his charge in Greece to make 
his attitude conform to Bentinck's and to have no official relations with the Greek 
govemment. 117True, tension persisted between Italy and Greece: the revolutionaries, 
'intoxicated with customary Venizelist Italophobia', used the inspired press to brand 
Italy as the 'sworn enemy' of Greece and the Italians responded in kind, furious at the 
114 MAE Grýce 57 Marcilly to QO no. 201 d. 22 Nov. 1922; MAE Grýce 154 De Colombel report 
no. 989 d. [? ]; FO 371/7586 Lindley to FO no. 598 d. 21 Oct. 1922; DBFP/I/XVIII/128,224. 
115 DDI/7/l/111-2. 
116 DDI/7/j/1 17,124-5. 
117 FO 371/7587 Bentinck to FO tel. 714 d. 30 Nov. 1922; FO 371/7588 Graham to FO no. 1109 d. 1 
Dec. 1922; DDI/7/11/53-4. 
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self-abasement of the Greek press before France. ' 18 For the time being, however, 
official Italian policy continued to be restrained. 
118 DDI/7/l/152,508-1 1; DDI/7/II/*-? 87-8. This quietness was also partly due to Montagna's absence 
from Greece while he was representing Italy at Lausanne. 
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In the first half of 1923 the Greek political scene continued to be in a state of flux as 
the various Venizelist factions and military leaders struggled to gain ascendancy. ' 
New political groupings coalesced and disintegrated, rumours of imminent republican 
coups flourished and a flood of refugees poured in from Asia Minor, especially after 
the signature in January of the Greco-Turkish exchange convention at Lausanne. 2 
Complementing this internal instability, Greece's problems with her neighbours were 
compounded by her isolation. Until the signature of the treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 
1923, there was a real possibility of a resumption of the war against Turkey in 
Thrace, eith er as a result of Greek frustration at the unsatisfactory proceedings of the 
conference or through the actions of Pangalos, commander of the Greek army in 
western Thrace. Elsewhere, Greece was at odds with Yugoslavia over the vexed 
question of facilities for Yugoslav trade at Salonica and with Bulgaria over a range of 
political and economic issues. 3 The Yugoslav-Bulgarian rapprochement symbolised 
by the Nis agreements published in May caused much anxiety in Athens, which 
abated only slightly with the fall of the Stamboliiski government in Sofia after the 
Tsankoff coup in June . 4Meanwhile, the continuing failure of the Greeks to realise 
FO 371/8826 Bentinck to FO no. 11 d. 9 Jan. 1923; MAE Grýce 58 Marcilly to QO no. 22 d. 3 
Feb. 1923. 
2 Dakin, Unification, pp. 242-5; Pentzopoulos, Balkan Exchange, pp. 51-71; Ladas, Exchange, pp. 335- 
52. 
3 Greece's relations with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia are examined in chapters 9- 12 below. Bulgaria 
was a traditional rival of Greece who now had additional grievances deriving from the 1919 peace 
settlement. Friction existed between the two on a whole host of issues, including the Bulgarian 
demand for an outlet on the Aegean, the status and treatment of the Slav minority in northern Greece 
and the activities of the Macedonian committees. Greece had been an ally of Serbia since 1913, but 
the alliance was in abeyance because the Yugoslavs felt the Greeks had betrayed them by not coming 
to their assistance in 1915 and that the terms were no longer appropriate now that Serbia had been 
transformed into Yugoslavia. The question of Yugoslav commercial interests at Salonica was the 
chief issue of contention between the two states, and it was serious enough to give rise to persistent 
rumours that the Yugoslavs might seize the port. It should be noted that until 1929 the official name 
of the Yugoslav state was the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. This was hardly 
euphonious: as Crowe observed in 1919, it was 'a national calamity for a new state to be burdened 
with such an elephantine designation'(FO 608/42 [? min. ] by Crowe d. 9 May 1919, quoted in 
A. Sharp, The Versailles Settlement. Peacemaking in Paris, 1919 (London, Macmillan, 1991), p. 210). 
During the 1920s British policy-makers referred indiscriminately to the state as either Yugoslavia, the 
SCS Kingdom or even Serbia, but I have consistently used Yugoslavia. 
4 DBFP/I/XXIV/561-2,593-4,639-41,701-3,707-9,713-8,764-5. 
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their'enduring and chimerical dream' of gaining admission to the Little Entente only 
underlined their isolation. 5 
True, the revolutionary government tried to consolidate its position internally, 
creating 'Leagues of National Safety' in January and vowing to bring about the 
political and economic revival of Greece. As the government seemed in practice 
incapable of solving Greece's pressing external and economic problems, however, 
public opinion grew increasingly disillusioned withit. 6Under pressure from liberal 
politicians who urged a return to democracy, Colonel Plastiras eventually found it 
politic to profess a desire to see Greece returned to normal democratic life under a 
constitutional monarchy. 7The threat persisted, however, from a substantial number of 
die-hard republicans. Led by the ambitious and unscrupulous Pangalos, who had 
much support in the army, they were unwilling to abandon their plans even in the face 
8 of public opinion, which was clearly not on the whole republican. Even when in 
April several prominent republican politicians had indicated their willingness 
temporarily to support George 11 in the interests of stability, the possibility of a coup 
from the left remained. 9 
Despite Plastiras' declarations of intent, no elections were forthcoming - chiefly 
because they would have returned a royalist majority which might have cost the 
revolutionaries their heads. 10 In June an intended republican coup, prompted in part 
by developments at Lausanne, was only narrowly averted when its architect, 
Pangalos, fell ill at the crucial moment. 11 This left Plastiras in control, and, alarmed 
by Greece's parlous financial position and diplomatic isolation, he again began to 
consider handing over to a civilian government by means of elections. These plans 
5 MAE Gr&e 59 Marcilly to QO no. 232 d. 27 Dec. 1923; DBFPII /XXIV/692-3,707-9,73 I- 
2,734,781,784,814-5. 





11 FO 371/8827 Bentinck to FO tel. 225 d. 5 Jun. 1923, tel. 230 d. 8 Jun. 1923, no. 501 d. 27 Jun. 1923; 
DBFP/i/XVIII/763,843-5,861. 
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again came to nothing, partly because Zaimis dithered and refused to form an interim 
cabinet, and partly because of the rising popularity of Metaxas'Anti-Venizelist 
party. 12 Metaxas had been Constantine's chief of staff in the war and his party, 
composed largely of ultra-Constantinists, had been boosted by the death of the ex- 
king in January and the yearning of the Greek people for new political personalifies. 
In addition, the royalists maintained intact the formidable electoral machine built up 
after the return of Constantine in 1920.13But if the rise of Metaxas made the 
revolutionaries afraid to risk an election, the fact that the unconstitutional position 
was boosting his popularity provided a strong counter-argument for regularising the 
situation. 14Throughout the summer moderate opinion gained ground and the 
conclusion of peace at Lausanne seemed to open the way for the holding of 
elections. 15 Debate as to the nature and timing of these elections was in full flow 
when the eruption of the Corfu crisis caused their further postponement. 16 
In these circumstances, with the situation in Greece still unstable and constitutional 
government still in abeyance, the Foreign Office saw no reason to change its policy 
on recognition. In January Bentinck, assailed in Athens by Greeks who felt their 
isolation keenly, and concerned at the reduction in his own and Britain's influence, 
suggested that Curzon should set conditions for the resumption of relations and 
recognition. 17Curzon angrily rejected this 'preposterous suggestion' which would 
'involve an altogether unwarrantable interference' in Greek politics, and added that he 
was 'at a loss to understand the fatal miasma that overtakes every representative 
whom we send to Athens', causing them to continually advocate recognition. 18 It was 
still too early to consider this question which could not be deemed urgent since 'the 
12 DBFP/I/XVIII/674,684,844,861-2. 
13 FO 371/8826 Bentinck to FO no. 745 d. 27 Dec. 1922; FO 371/12175 Loraine (Athens) to FO no. 80 
d. 26 Feb. 1927; MAE Grýce 58 Marcilly to FO no. 22 d. 3 Feb. 1923; DBFPII /WII/862. 
14 DBFP/I/XVIII/862. 
15 FO 371/8827 Bentinck to FO no. 585 d. 25 Jul. 1923; DBFP/1/XVIII/520. 
16 FO 371/8827 Bentinck to FO no. 630 d. 10 Aug. 1923, no. 723 d. 13 Sept. 1923. The Corfu crisis is 
discussed in chapter 7 below. 
17 FO 371/8823 Bentinck to FO tel. 8 d. 4 Jan. 1923, tel. 10 d. 5 Jan. 1923; FO 371/8826 Bentinck to 
Nicolson P. I. d-24 Jan. 1923. 
18 FO 371/8823 min. by Curzon d. 7 Jan. 1923. 
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very fact that the Greeks are so anxious to resume relations proves the efficacy of the 
policy adopted by His Majesty's Government'. Recognition could only follow 
confirmation of both king and government by popular election, and the removal from 
power of those responsible for the execution of the six. 19 The onus was thus placed 
firmly on Athens. As Ronald McNeill, parliamentary under-secretary for foreign 
affairs, told the House on 11 April, the British government was not prepared to 
promise to resume relations with Greece on any particular terms: 'such resumption 
must rather await proof by experience of the stability and good faith of the Greek 
20 Government'. 
This attitude was maintained throughout the summer. After Pangalos' abortive coup 
Bentinck again urged positive action to stabilise the situation, but he was rebuffed. 
Lampson felt that the policy of non-recognition had 'proved effective' and was 
'proving increasingly so' since Greece's isolation was forcing Plastiras to consider 
holding elections soon; and Crowe and Curzon agreed that there was no need for any 
spontaneous declaration about conditions for recognition. 21 To the Foreign Office the 
internal situation seemed to be improving, especially as the danger of a coup was now 
quite distant. All this moved Nicolson to grudging praise: 'apart from the initial 
blunder of the executions it must be admitted that the Revolutionary Government 
have acted with firmness and moderation'. 22 
In fact the apparent improvement in the situation concealed the truth that a return to 
parliamentary government was still some way off. Although the revolutionaries 
wanted elections for external reasons they were still afraid that a fair poll would bring 
Metaxas and his Free Opinion party to power. 23Consequently, they sought to 
19 FO 371/8823 Curzon (Lausanne) to Bentinck tel. 22 U Jan. 1923; DBFPIIIXV1111444-5; 
DBFP/1/XXIW81 1. 
20 162 H. C. Deb. 5s. 1177. This statement was perhaps slightly disingenuous as Curzon's stipulations 
about elections and a constitutional government amounted to conditions, but they were never 
explicitly or officially stated to the Greeks since that would have amounted to interference (FO 
371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 p. 27). 
21 FO 371/8827 mins. by Nicolson d. 8[? Jun. ] 1923, Lampson, Crowe and Curzon d. 27 Jun. 1923. 
22 FO 371/8827 min. by Nicolson d. 9 Aug. 1923 
23 FO 371/8827 Bentinck to FO no. 630 d. 10 Aug. 1923, min. by Nicolson d. 22 Aug. 1923. The literal, 
but misleading, translation of the name was 'Party of the Free Thinkers'. 
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manipulate the elections, firstly by vainly trying to persuade Zaimis to form a puppet 
interim cabinet through which they could control the ballot; then by devising new 
electoral districts so structured as to maximise the influence of Venizelist voteS. 24 
This gerrymandering, together with the very fragmented nature of the Greek parties, 
put the outcome of any election in some doubt. 
The Foreign Office, however, continued to be unperturbed. Even the prospect of a 
victory for Metaxas, pro-German and neutralist during the war, was viewed with 
equanimity: Troutbeck argued that Britain should recognise a Metaxas government if 
it had been constitutionally elected. 25 What was important to Britain was the fact of 
the election, rather than its outcome. With Venizelos hors de combat there was little 
to choose between the Greek politicians who were, in Nicolson's view, 'one as bad as 
the other'. 26 The Foreign Office was still primarily concerned to see stable 
government established in Greece to stop it drifting into civil war; but a suggestion 
from Nicolson that Britain should perhaps adopt a more positive approach to the 
elections in order to ensure a constitutional outcome was not taken up by his 
superiors. The moment to abandon non-intervention had not yet arrived, Tyrrell 
wrote, and when it did 'let us think twice before we leap into the Greek mesS'. 27This 
attitude seemed even more prudent when the elections, which had been scheduled for 
28 October, were postponed because of the Corfu criSiS. 28 
In contrast to the British, the French had decided by this point to take a positive step: 
in August Poincare informed London that he was ready to recognise George 11 (even 
24 FO 371/8827 Bentinck to FO no. 630 d. 10 Aug. 1923, no. 723 d. 13 Sept. 1923, no. 733 d. 15 
Sept. 1923, no. 751 d. 20 Sept. 1923. The various voting systems used in Greece between the wars are 
discussed in Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, pp. 351-3. See also pp. 30-1 and Cassimatis, 
American Influence, pp. 92-3. 
25 FO 371/8 827 Bentinck to FO no. 531 d. 4 Jul. 1923, min. by Troutbeck d. 18 Jul. 1923. According to 
one authority, during the war Metaxas played a'most sinister r6le'as one of Constantine's chief 
advisers and was 'fanatically attached to Gen-nan ideals' all his life (Leon, Greece and the Great 
Powers, pp. 61,68). 
26 FO 371/8827 min. by Nicolson d. 22 Aug. 1923. 
27 FO 371/8827 min. by Tyrrell d. 23 Aug. 1923. 
28 FO 371/8827 Bentinck to FO no. 723 d. 13 Sept. 1923. 
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though the Corfu crisis in fact caused this recognition to be postponed). 29 French 
policy was not, however, all that dissimilar to Britain's. In February Poincare had told 
Marcilly that as France sought a stable peace in the Near East as much as in Europe 
he was not prepared to encourage either the republicans or the Metaxists, who were 
both seeking French support, and was determined to stay out of Greek internal affairs. 
On principle, however, he favoured the retention of the monarchy in Greece since it 
was the legal regime there, liable to prove the most stable and because the dynastic 
ties binding the Greek to the Romanian and Yugoslav royal houses were likely to 
push Greek policy in a direction sympathetic to the Entente. 30 
Over the next few months Marcilly supplied his own views on why France should 
recognise George after the conclusion of peace. Although Greece's political 
importance would be negligible for quite some time, France had important economic 
and moral interests there which could only be harmed by prolonging the 
unconstitutional situation. Furthermore there was no longer any reason to dread a 
hostile policy from the Greek royal family since all Greeks had learnt from recent 
events that they could achieve nothing in opposition to France and Britain. Lastly, 
recognition, as well as serving French interests, would prevent the republicans 
making political capital out of France's alleged hostility towards the monarchy. 31 
Poincare's own inclination to recognise at a suitable opportunity was further 
reinforced by persistent pressure from the court at Bucharest in the same sense. 32- 
Accordingly, on 14 August, using a text drafted by Marcilly himself, Poincare 
explained his intentions to St. Aulaire. He stressed how the Allies now had nothing to 
fear from the Greek monarchy (especially with Constantine dead), how Greece was 
predominantly monarchist and how the revolutionaries seemed to be striving for 
29 FO 371/8824 Phipps (Paris) to FO no. 771 d. 20 Aug. 1923; MAE G'e 83 note by Peretti de la rec 
Rocca d. 13 Aug. 1923, QO to S t. Aulaire tel. 2326 d. 17 Oct. 1923. 
30 MAE Grece 58 QO to Marcilly no. [? ] d. 7 Feb. 1923. 
31 MAE Grke 58 Marcilly to QO no. 48 d. 22 Mar. 1923, no. 55 d. 8 Apr. 1923, no. 77 d-10 May 1923. 
32 MAE Gr6ce 83 notes by Peretti de la Rocca d. 13 Aug. 1923 and 20 Aug. 1923. It is also possible 
that French disappointment at the outcome of the Lausanne conference was a factor in this decision 
(Cassimatis, American Influence, p. 9 1). 
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stability and a return to constitutional government. He was especially anxious that 
Britain should not be offended by the decision, and told St. Aulaire to emphasise to 
the Foreign Office how France had always acted loyally towards Britain in the Near 
East and how this present action was intended to make an eventual resumption of 
Anglo-Greek relations easier rather than more difficult. The British could obviously 
not recognise George until the revolutionaries had fallen from power, but the French, 
who had not broken off relations with Greece, were in a different position, and by 
recognising now could exert a pacifying influence and thus pave the way for eventual 
British recognition. In a postscript, Poincare told St. Aulaire a further reason for 
recognition which was not for British consumption: the restoration of normal 
relations with Greece would allow the French to use their influence to prevent the 
return to power of those most obviously compromised by their attitude towards the 
Allies in the war. Given the recent rise of Metaxas and the growing likelihood that the 
elections would produce a royalist majority, this consideration may well have been 
uppermost in Poincare's mind. 33 
In the event, Poincare's communication caused neither surprise nor offence in 
London. 34Bentinck had reported as long ago as April that the French were resolved 
in principle to recognise once the Lausanne treaty was signed, and their motives had 
seemed eminently reasonable to him: despite his habitual mistrust of French policy, 
he had calmly declared that he had always found the French legation itself 'perfectly 
loyal' and opposed to a republic in Greece. 35 There, he said now, Poincare's decision 
was welcomed, and it seemed likely to strengthen not only George's position but also 
that of the government against hot-heads like Panualos, which was in British and Zý 
French interests alike. 36 
33 MAE Grýce 83 Marcilly to [? ] p. l. d. 6 Aug. 1923, QO to S tAulaire no. 1839 d. 14 Aug. 1923. The 
reference to compromised politicians must be to the Metaxists, elsewhere referred to as 'notorious 
Germanophiles' (MAE Gr6ce 83 note by Peretti de la Rocca d. 10 Jul. 1924). 
34 MAE Grece 83 Montille (London) to QO tel. 643 d. 21 Aug. 1923. 
35 DBFP/i/XVIII/672-3. 
36 FO 371/8824 Bentinck to FO tel. 293 d. 23 Aug. 1923, no. 660 d. 24 Aug. 1923. C) 
70 
In London, Poincare's motives were correctly perceived, as was the fact that Britain's 
position was different: as Curzon said, Britain's attitude was based 'on grounds that do 
not affect France'. 37There was certainly no call for Britain to follow suit, for the 
Foreign Office was still averse to any competition for influence with France in 
Greece. 38 This had been reiterated earlier in the year when Nicolson had gently 
warned Bentinck that his frantic warnings about the growth of French influence in 
Greece were out of place. Bentinck, who was perhaps over-influenced by the Greeks' 
own estimate of their significance in international affairs, was grateful to have been 
put straight: 'it is no good, as you say, talking about French influence becoming 
paramount, if nobody minds if it does'. 39 
The calming effect of the French decision to recognise was in fact rather shortlived. 
On 20 September Bentinck warned London that there was no guarantee that the 
elections, if eventually held, would lead to greater stability. Indeed, they now looked 
like a straight fight between the Metaxists and the revolutionaries led by Gonatas, the 
success of either of whom could only lead to a perpetuation of the schism and 
renewed internal strife. 40 These ominous warnings were justified within a few weeks. 
In early October Plastiras fell ill - reportedly with consumption - and this, in 
conjunction with a cabinet crisis, plunged the government into turmoil leading to 
renewed rumours of a possible COUp. 41 The movement when it came was from the 
Anti-Venizelist right. Metaxas, alarmed by the dubious electoral regulations 
introduced by the government, took advantage of Plastiras' illness to attempt a coup 
on 21 October, starting with military risings in the Peloponnese and Macedonia. 42Not 
all the rebels were Metaxist partisans; many were simply opposed to the economic 
incompetence of the government and the overweening influence of extreme 
37 FO 371/8824 Phipps to FO no. 771 d. 20 Aug. 1923, min. by Tyrrell d. 21 Aug. 1923, Bentinck to FO 
no. 660 d. 24 Auo,. 1923, FO to Bentinck tel-133 d. 28 Aug. 1923. 
38 FO 371/8824 mins. by Nicolson and Lampson d. 21 Aug. 1923, Curzon d. 22 Aug. 1923. 
39 FO 371/8826 Bentinck to Nicolson p. l. d. 24 Jan. 1923. 
40 FO 371/8827 Benfinck to FO no. 751 d. 20 Sept. 1923, mins. by Nicolson d. 26 Sept. 1923 and 
Troutbeck d. 3 Oct. 1923. 
41 FO 371/8828 Bentinck to FO no. 789 d. 6 Oct. 1923, tel. 454 d. 15 Oct. 1923, no. 831 d. 20 Oct. 1923. 
42 FO 371/8828 Bentinck to FO no. 831 d. 20 Oct. 1923, no. 848 d. 26 Oct. 1923. 
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republicans, especially Pangalos, at Athens, but Metaxas was the leading light of the 
revolt. 43The declared aim of the rebels was to implement Metaxas'programme, 
namely the elimination of the revolutionary government and the holding of elections 
according to the pre-1922 electoral system. 44However, the movement was easily 
suppressed by the forces of the government, led by Generals Georgios Kondylis and 
Pangalos, the army was purged of royalist officers and Metaxas fled to Italy. 45 
The consequences of the coup were far reaching. The Metaxists, previously the only 
real opposition to the government, were crushed as a military and discredited as a 
political force, while radical republicans like Pangalos and Kondylis, whose influence 
had been on the wane, made a startling recovery. 46 Furthermore, by removing the 
common threat, the failed coup exacerbated the centrifugal tendencies within the 
Venizelist bloc and precipitated renewed conflicts over the nature of the regime. 47 
Immediately after the suppression of the coup, republicans both civilian and military 
began a sustained campaign of agitation in favour of the immediate abolition of the 
monarchy, aided by persistent rumours that George 11 had sympathised and 
collaborated with the rebels, and by the almost open support given to the Metaxists by 
the hated Italian legation at AthenS. 48The king's position had seemed to improve 
during the summer, but now the coup provided the pretext the republicans had been 
looking for to put an end to his reign. 49 
Almost the only restraint upon the extremists was Plastiras. Now a relative moderate 
and still loyal to the monarch he insisted that the elections - for a constituent assembly 
43 FO 371/8828 Bentinck to FO no. 848 d. 26 Oct. 1923; MAE Grece 58 Marcilly to QO no. 196 d. 30 
Oct. 1923, De Colombel report no. 463 d. 7 Nov. 1923; FO 371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 
pp. 16-18. See also Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, p. 30: 'despite the heterogeneity of [their] 
participants and their motives, [the risings] essentially represented an Antivenizelist 
counteroffensive'. 
44 FO 371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 p. 16. 
45 FO 371/8828 Bentinck to FO no. 848 d. 26 Oct. 1923, tel. 484 d. 27 Oct. 1923; FO 371/9896 Annual 
Report, Greece, 1923 pp. 17-18. 
46 FO 371/8828 Bentinck to FO no. 848 d. 26 Oct. 1923, min. by Troutbeck d. 31 Oct. 1923; MAE 
Grece 58 Marcilly to QO no. 194 d. 5 Nov. 1923. 
47 Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, p. 30. 
48 FO 371/8828 Bentinck to FO tel. 473 d. 25 Oct. 1923, no. 848 d. 26 Oct. 1923, tel. 483 d. 27 Oct. 1923, 
tel. 492 d. 3 0 Oct. 1923. 
49 MAE Grýce 58 Marcilly to QO no. 22 d. 3 Feb. 1923. 
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and now set for 2 December - would take place as planned and that any transition to a 
republic must be along democratic lines. 50 His position was strengthened by a 
communication from Venizelos (who in August had had published an incautious 
telegram stating that Greece was not 'unripe for a republic') warning that a republic 
founded on force would bring neither stability internally nor the foreign recognition 
and assistance that was vital for Greece. 51 Plastiras, who enjoyed considerable 
personal popularity, rallied the moderate politicians and soldiers and staved off the 
danger of a coup. The republicans, however, were increasingly confident of victory 
without violence, and, putting all their energies into a propaganda campaign, struck a 
chord with public opinion. The mass of the people perhaps above all simply desired 
an end to internal strife; but in the aftermath of the counter-revolution public opinion 
had - albeit temporarily - become virulently anti-monarchical. At any rate at the end 
of November the debate centred more on how rather than whether a republic should 
be established. 52 
The reactions of Bentinck and London to this crisis were very much of a piece with 
what had gone before. Bentinck reported the now real threat to the monarchy in a 
'shower' of 'rather hysterical' telegrams, arguing that the preservation of the monarchy 
was the key to stability in Greece . 
530n 30 October he urged Curzon to state 
authoritatively that after the Greek elections Britain would recognise George II and 
give the Greeks economic assistance. 54The Foreign Office, however, was not 
interested in Bentinck's recipe for averting a republican coup, feeling that it was 'no 
business of ours if Greece overthrows the dynasty or not'. 55 Any move towards 
recognition now would clearly be interference in Greek internal affairs, and 
50 FO 371/8828 Bentinck to FO no. 831 d. 20 OcL1923, tel. 472 d. 25 Oct. 1923, tel. 497 d. 31 Oct. 1923. 
51 FO 371/8828 Bentinck to FO tel. 506 d. 1 Nov. 1923; FO 371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 
p. 14. 
52 MAE Gr&e 58 Marcilly to QO tels. 245-7 d. 31 Oct. 1923, no. 194 d. 5 Nov. 1923; Cassimatis, 
American Influence, pp. 96-8. 
53 FO 371/8828 mins. by Lampson and Nicolson d. 2 Nov. 1923. 
54 FO 371/8828 Bentinck to FO tel. 492 d-30 Oct. 1923, tel. 494 d. 30 Oct. 1923. 
55 FO 371/8828 min. by Troutbeck d. 30 Oct. 1923. 
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consequently Bentinck was authorised to give only the mildest of warnings about 
Britain's attitude towards a further Greek revolution. 56 
The Foreign Office maintained this standpoint even in the face of intervention from 
George V who suggested that recognising George II before the elections would surely 
strengthen his position. 57Curzon felt that such 'hasty recognition' would only play 
into the hands of the extremists, and he was supported by Crowe who said that 
it would ... be contrary to one of the most fundamental principles of traditional 
British policy for H. M. G. to intervene in the internal affairs of another 
government on the ground that the monarchical Principle must be vindicated. 
However strongly H. M. G. hold the view that the maintenance of the monarchy 
in Greece is desirable, they cannot go so far as to prescribe the acceptance of 
this view to the Greek nation. The latter must settle that question for itself. 58 
Consequently the king was placated with a letter from Curzon which dwelt on the 
wickedness of the revolutionary government, recognition of whom would be implied 
in any recognition of their sovereign. 59 
The reluctance of the Foreign Office to intervene in Greece was not surprising. After 
all, Britain had secured her strategic interests in the Near East at Lausanne, and 
meddling in Greek affairs was unlikely to bring much profit. When Bentinck repeated 
his calls for a 'definite and unequivocal statement' that Britain would renew her 
former friendly relations with Greece provided there was no revolution there, 
Nicolson pointed out how Bentinck had forgotten that 'public opinion in this country 
is now passionately anti-Greek and that any such pronouncement would give Lords 
Rothermere and Beaverbrook the chance of their liveSI. 
60 The only small concession 
made to Bentinck was that he was allowed to act to remove false impressions about 
Britain's attitude, for example to make it known that Britain was not, as the 
56 FO 371/8828 FO to Bentinck tel. 194 d. 30 Oct. 1923., min. by Lampson d. 30 Oct. 1923. 
57 FO 371/8828 Stamfordham to Crowe p. l. d. 29 Oct. 1923. 
58 FO 371/8828 min-s. by Curzon d. 29 Oct. 1923, Crowe d. 30 Oct. 1923. Greeks on the left of the 
political spectrum would find this ironic, since they believe that Britain did indeed act contrary to 
this 'fundamental principle' in the Second World War. See Sarafis, Background To Contemporary 
Greece 1130. 
59 FO 371/8828 Curzon to Stamfordharn p. l. d. 30 Oct. 1923. 
60 FO 371/8828 Bentinck to FO tel. 504 d. 31 Oct. 1923, tel. 511 d. I Nov. 1923, min. by Nicolson d. 2 
Nov. 1923. 
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republicans claimed in their propaganda, personally hostile to George 11.61 This might 
count for something in view of the continuing anglophilia of many Greeks (who also 
realised that Britain was the only likely source of economic assistance) but it was very 
far from what Bentinck wanted. 62 
At the Quai d'Orsay Poincare, though as sensitive as Curzon to the possibility of an 
accusation of interference, did what he could to exert a calming influence. 
Recognition was clearly inappropriate in the midst of such a crisis, but Marcilly was 
authorised to tell the Greeks that France was opposed to the establishment of a 
republic by force, and could only view with grave concern the prospect of a 
revolution which would compromise French economic interests and the peace of the 
BalkanS. 630n 2 November, when the position of George 11 was most precarious, 
Marcilly allowed Plastiras to publish these views, which, together with a similar 
statement from Bentinck, did much to ease the situation. 64 
Poincare also exercised restraint at Belgrade. The Yugoslavs had been dropping 
menacing hints that if a revolution broke out and produced disorders in Macedonia, 
they might have to intervene to protect their interests at Salonica. On 3 November 
Poincare drew Belgrade's attention to the more reassuring news from Athens and 
pointed out that external pressure would only excite nationalist sentiment and make a 
revolution more likely. 65Marcilly felt that France had earned the gratitude of her 
Allies in this crisis, since the least word from Paris in favour of a republic would 
probably have been decisive in ushering in a new revolution. In fact, even though the 
61 FO 371/8828 FO to Bentinck tel. 199 d. 3 Nov. 1923. 
62 FO 371/8828 Bentinck to FO tel. 509 d. 1 Nov. 1923 and mins., FO to Bentinck tel. 198 d. 2 
Nov. 1923. 
63 MAE Grke 58 Marcilly to QO tels. 223-6 d. 12 Oct. 1923, QO to Marcilly tel. 322 d. 14 Oct. 1923, 
tel. 328 d. [? 2] Nov. 1923. 
64 FO 371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 pp. 5,18-19. 
65 MAE Gr&e 58 Marcilly to QO tels. 243-5 d. 30 Oct. 1923, Japy (Bucharest) to QO tel. 100 d. 31 
Oct. 1923, QO to Clement Simon (Belgrade) tels. 288-90 d. 3 Nov. 1923. 
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French press was less circumspect, and continually gave succour to the extren-fiStS, 66 
the British Foreign Office was quite satisfied with French policy at this stage. 
It was far less satisfied with Italian policy. Relations between Athens and Rome had 
been poor since Mussolini's seizure of power, and Greece was the natural target for 
the Duce as he began to flex his diplomatic muscles. 67An Italian move on Corfu had 
been foreseen in the Foreign Office as early as April 1923, and there were also 
persistent rumours, which caused disquiet in London, that Mussolini planned formally 
to annex the Dodecanese, contrary to several international undertakings. 68Even after 
the Corfu crisis proper was over these rumours continued, to Curzon's concern, and 
exacerbated the hostility between Greece and Italy. 69 
Given this mutual antagonism and conflicts of interest it is not surprising that Italy 
supported the Metaxas coup attempt, or that this support helped precipitate the 
dynastic crisis in Greece. 70 The arch-villain of this piece was Montagna, with his 
'rabid hatred of the existing Greek regime'. 71 Rumours were rife in Greece that 
Montagna, either with or without the connivance of Rome, had aided the Metaxists 
financially, and his incautious outbursts about the need to reduce Greece to nothing 
did little to stabilise the situation at AthenS. 72 
Montagna's evident desire to topple the Greek revolutionary government caused some 
consternation in London. 73Lampson felt it was a scandal that 'such a fire-brand' 
66 MAE Gr6ce 58 Marcilly to QO tels. 245-7 d. 31 Oct. 1923, no. 194 d. 5 Nov. 1923; FO 371/9896 
Annual Report, Greece, 1923 p. 5. 
67 J. Barros, The Corfu Incident of 1923. Mussolini and the League offations (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1965), pp. 297ff.; Cassels, Early Diplomacy, pp. 22-44,88-126. 
68 FO 371/8824 min. by Nicolson d. 25 Apr. 1923; DBFP/I/XXIV/770-1,779- 
81,788,792,798,800,804-6; DDI/7/11/106-7. The Dodecanese question is discussed in chapters 6 and 8 
below. 
69 [India Office Library and Records, Curzon Papers] MSS EUR F1 12/232 Curzon to Graham p. l. d. 9 
Oct. 1923. 
70 FO 371/8828 min. by [? ] d. 29 Oct. 1923. 
71 FO 371/8828 min. by Crowe d. 24 Oct. 1923; Barros, Corfu, pp. 35-7. 
72 FO 371/8828 SIS no. CX/2155/IA d. 24 Oct. 1923, Bentinck to FO tel. 473 d. 25 Oct. 1923, tel. 486 
d. 29 Oct. 1923. 
73 FO 371/8828 Bentinck to FO tel. 473 d. 25 Oct. 1923; DDI/7/11/288. Montagna felt that the 
revolutionary government should have resigned straight after the murder of 'our brave officer', 
Tellini. 
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should be in Greece at this moment, and suggested that Mussolini should be given a 
hint that'these pernicious activities ... should be curbed'. Crowe, however, mindful of 
Mussolini's notorious propensity to take offence, vetoed this: the Duce was probably 
encouraging Montagna, and Crowe was I not in favour of our giving advice to M. 
Mussolinil. 74Bentinck was also concerned. From Athens he reported the widespread 
fear that another Italian cou , analogous to the Corfu occupation, was imminent, and P 
suggested the despatch of a 'fairly powerful' British naval squadron to Greek waters to 
I serve as a gentle and tactful reminder at Rome'. 75 
This proposal went too far for the Foreign Office. On the one hand, it was doubtful 
that a fresh Italian move was planned; although Mussolini had been boasting about 
defying the League, it was unlikely that he would try and do so again so soon 
afterwards, especially as he had'now read the Covenant which he had not done a 
couple of months ago'. On the other hand, the despatch of a squadron might only 
encourage Mussolini to act, counting on Britain doing nothing, in order thereby to 
gain 'a first class diplomatic success over Great Britain'. Unless Britain was prepared 
to use force, the fleet should be kept away, and in any case if a conflict arose Britain 
would have plenty of time to act, in the first instance at Geneva. 76Curzon felt 
Bentinck's idea to be a 'little wild', and told him that the despatch of a squadron would 
be simply an unjustified and ineffective political demonstration . 
77This whole 
episode, however, reinforced the apparent lesson of the Corfu crisis, that Britain was 
unwilling or unable to control the intrigues of a revitalised Italy in the eastern 
Mediterranean. 
Within Greece Plastiras and the government had regained control of the situation to 
the extent that by 3 November a republican coup seemed unlikely. 78The new tactic of 
the 'immediate republicans', such as Pangalos and Papanastasiou, the leader of the 
74 FO 371/8828 mins. by Lampson d. 31 Oct. 1923, Crowe d. 31 Oct. 1923. 
75 FO 371/8828 Bentinck to FO tels. 493 UO Oct. 1923, tel. 500 d. 31 Oct. 1923. 
76 FO 371/8828 min. by Troutbeck d. 31 Oct. 1923. 
77 FO 371/8828 min. by Curzon d. 31 Oct. 1923, FO to Bentinck tel. 202 dA Nov. 1923. 
78 FO 371/8829 Bentinck to Lampson p. l. dA Nov. 1923. 
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Republican Union, was to demand a plebiscite on the issue of a republic immediately, 
before the passions aroused by the counter-revolution cooled. Plastiras and the 
moderates opposed this scheme, and insisted that free elections must be held before 
any decision on the nature of the regime. 79This broad division in fact concealed a 
great fragmentation in Greek politics, which for lack of any commanding 
personalities or coherent parties, was producing in effect a chaotic, anarchical 
situation. 
It was in these circumstances that Venizelos, now in Paris, began to exert a greater 
influence on Greek politics. In early November he confirmed to Nicolson that he had 
lost all confidence in the institution of monarchy in Greece and now favoured a 
republic. However, because sympathy for the monarchy was so deep-rooted there 
would probably only be a small majority for a republic now, and it would be fatal to 
introduce so grave a constitutional change on such a slender basis. Consequently, he 
favoured postponing any decision until after the death of King George. 80 
Venizelos'views had already filtered back to Greece and strengthened Plastiras' 
resolve to maintain the status quo until after the electionS. 81 The government sent an 
official emissary to Paris to ascertain Venizelos' definitive opinions, and on 17 
November these were published in the Athens presS. 82AIthough he reiterated his 
decision never to return to Greek politics, he laid out a clear programme, stating his 
opposition to any forcible change of regime or plebiscite before the elections (since, 
being held under a revolutionary government, it would be 'pure comedy'). He stressed 
that such developments would ruin Greece's hopes of western assistance and 
adversely affect her security. His message was not, however, free from ambiguity: 
79 FO 371/8829 Bentinck to FO no. 874 d. 5 Nov. 1923; FO 371/8830 Bentinck to FO no. 914 d. 16 
Nov. 1923. The Republican Union was the main republican political party, founded In 1922 as a left 
wino, off-shoot of the Venizelist Liberal Party (Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, pp. 29-30,88-90). 0 80 FO 371/8829 min. by Nicolson d. 6 Nov. 1923. See also Papacosma Byzantine and Modern Greek 
Studies 7 187-8 for more details of Venizelos' views. 
81 FO 371/8829 Bentinck to FO tel. 543 d. 10 Nov. 1923. 
8" FO 371/8829 Bentinck to FO tel. 553 d. 16 Nov. 1923. 
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although he attacked the idea of undemocratic change he again confirmed that 
personally he was now a republican. 83 
The publication of Venizelos' message, susceptible as it was to various 
interpretations, had an immediate effect. Although the government was apparently 
strengthened, the Liberal party was split: yielding to the demands of the officers, and 
in apparent accord with Venizelos'views about the redundancy of the monarchy, 
Plastiras insisted that the Liberals should adopt a definite republican programme at 
the forthcoming elections. 84This plunged moderate Venizelists into despair, and 
produced precisely the disarray in the Liberal camp which Venizelos had hoped to 
avert. He hastened to explain that he had not intended his followers to make an issue 
of the republic at the elections, but Plastiras, claiming to conform absolutely to 
85 Venizelos' views, had now become an out-and-out republican. 
The situation was indeed confused. Plastiras was still promising that the elections 
would be free, but the institution of a republic was now proclaimed to be government 
policy and the elections were again postponed until 16 December. Meanwhile, the 
bulk of the Liberals had decided to follow Venizelos' advice and not make an issue of 
the regime, although a significant minority remained in the 'immediate republican I- 
camp. 86The Anti -Venizelists, for their part, had chosen to use the traditional tactic of 
Greek political parties suffering from mass unpopularity, and to abstain from the 
elections claiming that they would be rigged. 87 The result of the elections, if indeed 
they were held, seemed likely therefore only to lead to further constitutional strife. 
83 FO 371/8829 Bentinck to FO tel. 556 d. 17 Nov. 1923. 
84 FO 371/8829 Bentinck to FO tel. 557 d. 17 Nov. 1923, tel. 559 d. 18 Nov. 1923; FO 371/8830 
Bentinck to FO no. 921 d. 19 Nov. 1923. 
85 FO 371/8829 Bentinck to FO tel. 560 d. 19 Nov. 1923, tel. 562 d. 20 Nov. 1923, tel. 564 d. 21 
Nov. 1923; FO 371/8830 Bentinck to FO no. 930 d. 24 Nov. 1923; FO 371/9896 Annual Report, 
Greece, 1923 pp. 20-1. 
86 FO 371/8829 Bentinck to FO tel. 567 d. 22 Nov. 1923; FO 371/8830 min. by Nicolson d. 5 Dec. 1923. 
87 MAE Grke 58 Marcilly to FO no. 199 d. 19 Nov. 1923; FO 371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 
pp. 21-2. The Venizelists had used this tactic in December 1915. On this occasion there was some 
justification for it given the new electoral regulations and Plastiras' professed republican sympathies 
(FO 371/8829 Bentinck to FO tel. 564 d. 21 Nov. 1923; FO 371/8830 Bentinck to FO no. 909 d. 16 
Nov. 1923, no. 930 d. 24 Nov. 1923). 
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With Greek politics assuming an ever more labyrinthine complexity, the Foreign 
Office did not deviate from its policy of detachment. Curzon saw no need for positive 
action, especially now that a coup had been averted, and would only issue a vague 
warning to the Greeks, which he caused to be inserted into a speech by prime minister 
Baldwin on 9 November, that revolutions or changes of dynasty were not the way for 
states to find internal stability or, therefore, foreign financial assistance. 88 When 
Bentinck reported that the desire of the 'immediate republicans' to expel the king 
before holding any plebiscite might place George's life in danger, Curzon arranged 
with the Admiralty for a ship to be held ready to rescue him if necessary, but this, as 
in 1922, was a purely humanitarian gesture without political connotationS. 89The 
Foreign Office's desire to steer clear of potential entanglements in Greek politics was 
also demonstrated by a refusal to accord Prince Andrew an interview in London, 
efforts to prevent the fugitive Metaxas entering Britain, and the rebuffing of attempts 
by Greek legitimists in English royal circles to elicit some official action over the 
electoral regulations introduced by the revolutionary government. 90 
At the centre of the maelstrom, Bentinck was perplexed as to the motives which led 
London to pour cold water on all his suggestions for action. On 10 November he 
privately informed Lampson that he had hitherto assumed that the British government 
would regret the expulsion of the dynasty, but would accept it if it was clearly the will 
of the majority of the Greek people. In conclusion he asked to be informed whether 
after all the government's interest in the maintenance of the dynasty was 'more than 
88 FO 371/8829 mins. by Nicolson d. 6 Nov. 1923, Curzon d. 7 Nov. 1923; Bentinck to FO tel. 549 d. 14 
Nov. 1923 and mins.; Times, 10 Nov. 1923. Baldwin's comments were also made with an eye to recent 
upheavals in Germany. 
89 FO 371/8829 Bentinck to FO tel. 530 d. 5 Nov. 1923; FO 371/8830 Admiralty to FO no. MO/1401/23 
UO Nov. 1923 and encls. and mins. Earlier in the year George V had apparently assured 
Constantine's anxious widow that a British ship could always rescue her sons from Athens if needs be 
(FO 800/156 Dering to Vansittart p. l. d. 21 Mar. 1923). 
90 FO 371/8829 Keff to Crowe p. l. d. 31 Oct. 1923, Crowe to Keff p. l. U Nov. 1923, Bentinck to FO 
tel. 526 d. 4 Nov. 1923 and mins., min by Crowe d. 6 Nov. 1923, Stamfordham to Crowe p. l. d. 21 
Nov. 1923 and encl. and mins., Stamfordham to Crowe p. l. d. 22 Nov. 1923, Crowe to Stamfordham 
p. l. d. 24 Nov. 1923; FO 371/8830 Stamfordham to Crowe p. l. d. 26 Nov. 1923. Metaxas had taken 
refuge in Paris, where he was being kept under police surveillance (MAE Gr6ce 58 note by Perettl de 
la Rocca d. 24 Nov. 1923). 
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acadernic'. 91 Nicolson sympathised with Bentinck's plight and identified the cause of 
his discontent with the Foreign Office: 'Anglo-Hellenic relations loom so very large at 
Athens, that it is difficult for him to realise that they are of very third-rate importance 
in London'. 92 
In an effort to enlighten Bentinck, a lengthy telegram was sent to him on 13 
November, setting out Britain's attitude. (This telegram was also intended to enlighten 
the Greeks: it was encoded in a simple cypher so that they might read it). In this, 
Curzon stated that the creation of a republic would be a very great misfortune for 
Greece and would ruin her political and financial credit abroad. However, as British 
public opinion would not countenance interference in Greek affairs, all Bentinck was 
authorised to do was to warn the republicans of the likely consequences of their 
policy, for which they alone would be responsible. 'If Greece chooses to bring 
iI solation upon her own head, we cannot stop it. But let her do it with her eyes open'. 
Finally, Bentinck was told to stop advocating any positive steps by Britain, since such 
measures were 'really out of the picture'. 93 This policy was quite in accord with 
Britain's interests, since if a republic was established and proved disastrous (a septic 
tangle' as Nicolson had earlier put it) Britain would be free from responsibility for it, 
but if a republic evolved in a constitutional manner and flourished, there would be 
nothing to stop Britain recognising it 'should altered circumstances render such a 
94 course politically expedient'. 
The French, too, were unwilling to commit themselves in this confusing situation. At 
Athens Marcilly made no further statements of France's attitude, and the Greek charge 
in Paris, Melas, was told that Poincare could make no promises as to his attitude 
towards any future Greek republic. 95 The shrewd observations of Marcilly must have 
91 FO 371/8829 Bentinck to Lampson p. tel. d. 10 Nov. 1923. 
92 FO 371/8829 min. by Nicolson d. 12 Nov. 1923. In contrast, Marcilly was always aware of Greece's 
relative unimportance (MAE Gr&e 78 Marcilly to [? Du Sault] p. l. d. 18 Mar. 1924). 
93 FO 371/8829 FO to Bentinck tel. 208 d. 13 Nov. 1923. 
94 FO 371/8829 mins. by Nicolson d. 12 Nov. 1923 [quoted] and 22 Nov. 1923, and Selby d. 22 
Nov. 1923 [quoted]. 
95 MAE Grece 58 Marcilly to QO tels. 255-6 d. 10 Nov. 1923, notes by Peretti de la Rocca d. 28 
Nov. 1923 and 29 Nov. 1923. 
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contributed to this reserve in Paris: he reported that the lack of political courage in 
Greece meant that any show of force was guaranteed at least a temporary success, and 
that whilst it would be easy to overthrow the dynasty, it would be much harder to 
create a viable republic. It was this which explained the dithering of the Venizelists: 
at heart they were all republican, like their mentor, but they were afraid to come out 
openly as such for fear of either alienating public opinion or playing into the hands of 
the militaiy extremiStS. 96 
Unfortunately for the Quai d'Orsay, the policy of detachment born of its grim 
prophecies was undermined by the attitude of the French press. This was vociferously 
pro-republican, and continually encouraged the Greek extremists: an example was the 
scare which eruptedearly in November when an article appeared in Le Temps 
disavowing Marcilly's published views and claiming that France would never help 
George II against the republicanS. 97Such articles only undid the work of the legation 
in dispelling the illusion that France was intriguing for a republic. 98 
British Foreign Office officials were on the whole little exercised by such press 
scares; not least because secret service intercepts of communications between Melas 
and Athens seemed to confirm that the French were not meddling in Greece and were 
encouraging only constitutional, democratic change. 99 The one exception at this point 
was Nicolson: he believed there were many in France who would like to see a 
republic in Greece, 'knowing that it would mean the end of that unfortunate country 
and the disappearance of our last foothold on the continent'. Moreover, the collapse of 
Greece 'would lead eventually to a Serbian descent upon Salonica, a development 
96 MAE Gr&e 58 Marcilly to QO no. 194 d. 5 Nov. 1923, Marcilly to [? ] p. l. d. 9 Nov. 1923, Marcilly 
to QO no. 199 d. 19 Nov. 1923. 
97 Le Temps, 6 Nov. 1923; FO 371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 p. 19. Successive Greek 
governments in the inter-war years tried to influence the French press, including Le Temps, mainly by 
financial subsidies. See D. Kitsikis, 'Les Rapports du "Temps" avec le Gouvemement Grec dans 
L'Entre-Deux-Guerres', Revue dHistoire Moderne et Contemporaine 15(3) 1968 512-34. 
98 MAE Gr&e 58 Marcilly to QO no. 206 d. 28 Nov. 1923; FO 371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 
p. 41. One reason advanced by Marcilly for the tone of the French press was that the Agence Havas 
was supplied by the Agence d'Athenes, and had its views coloured by that source. In addition, many C, 
French journalists were inspired by phillhellenic and republican convictions (MAE Grece 59 Marcilly 
to QO no. 217 d. 13 Dec. 1923). 
99 FO 371/8830 S IS report no. 0 15140 d. 25 Nov. 1923, report no. 0 15116 d. 29 Nov. 1923. 
82 
which the French would encourage and we be unable to oppose'. 100 This was strong 
stuff, but Nicolson was rather over-fond of these wide-ranging, apocalyptic 
predictions, and in this instance he was certainly out of line with his colleagues, both 
as regards his estimate of Greece's importance to Britain and his assessment of the 
threatening intentions of France. 101 
The fact was that although, as in 1922, Britain and France were following roughly 
similar policies, elements on both sides were capable of imputing quite Machiavellian 
intentions to the other. In this respect Nicolson's counterpart was the French military 
attache, Captain de Colombel. His opinions were closer to those of Le Temps than to 
those of Marcilly, and his reports provide an interesting sidelight on French semi- 
official and military views. On this occasion he wrote to Paris with his explanation of 
why the British were so anxious about the Greek situation - so anxious, indeed, that 
despite France's reserved policy, one British diplomat 'very prominent at Athens' 
roundly blamed the French for the rise in Greek republicanism. The British 
disapproved of dictators who did not respect tradition, and London watched with 
displeasure 'this blooming of condottieri who, from Madrid, Rome, Sofia and 
elsewhere, threaten to convert the whole of Europe little by little to democratic ideast. 
This was, of course, hardly the basis of the Foreign Office's dislike of the prospect of 
a Greek republic under the presidency of General Pangalos. De Colombel was 
perhaps nearer the mark when he argued that Britain's hostility to a republic was 
rooted in her economic interests: obviously Britain had 'an interest in seeing calm re- 
established in that Hellas whose political instability threatens at every moment the 
successful outcome of English financial and commercial endeavours'. 102 British 
economic interests in Greece were not all that substantial, but the restoration of 
100 FO 371/8829 min. by Nicolson d. 7 Nov. 1923. 
101 FO 371/8829 min. by Lampson d. II Nov. 1923. Nicolson was, as noted earlier, a confirmed 
philhellene. Although his opinions were somewhat flexible (or even erratic), between 1920 and 1921 
he wrote several memoranda urging the support of Greece against the Turks and the upholding in 
essence of the treaty of S6vres as the best means of maintaining Britain's position in the eastern 
Mediterranean. He clearly took longer to abandon this idea than the rest of the Foreign Office (Lees- 
Milne, Nicolson 1155,157-60; and for examples of the memoranda, DBFPIIIXIII514-9,550-3 and 
DBFP1I1XVIIf7-9, l3-l9). 
102 MAE Gr6ce 58 De Colombel report no. 463 d. 7 Nov. 1923. 
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stability to facilitate economic prosperity was of course one of the key aims of British 
foreign policy in general in this period. 
The Italians meanwhile seemed to be abstaining from muddying the waters in Greece; 
although this was probably a reflection of how low their influence had sunk after the 
failure of the counter-revolution rather than of any change of heart on the part of 
Mussolini. The British ambassador in Rome, Sir Ronald Graham, informed the 
Foreign Office in November that there was no proof of any Italian involvement with 
Metaxas, and that Italians on the whole seemed indifferent to events in Greece. 103 
Graham, however, was always inclined to put the best possible gloss on Italian 
actions, and was decidedly pro-fascist in his sympathies. In fact, Italy's inactivity was 
probably due simply to the fact that Montagna had been hospitalised with phlebitis. 104 
At the start of December the situation in Greece was still obscure. The elections were 
now a straight fight between the Venizelists and the republicans, but it was difficult to 
determine quite what each side stood for, as the conflict was as much about 
personalities and the struggle for power as ideologies. 105 Certainly, a main aim of the 
Venizelists was to persuade their chief to return to Greece, and he, while still insisting 
that he would not re-enter the political arena, began to intimate that he might change 
his mind if the Greek people overwhelmingly desired his retum. 1061t was at this 
juncture that a new element flitted briefly across the scene, namely the idea of a 
change of dynasty rather than the introduction of a republic. But this movement, 
which really aimed at the accession of an English prince (Prince Arthur, the Duke of 
Connaught and even the Duke of York were the names improbably canvassed), was 
of course totally out of tune with British policy and never amounted to much. 107 
103 FO 371/8829 Graham to FO no. 968 d. 2 Nov. 1923. 
104 FO 371/8831 Bentinck to Lampson p. l. d. 8 Dec. 1923. 
105 MAE Grýce 59 Marcilly to QO no. 210 d. 5 Dec. 1923 
106 FO 371/8830 Bentinck to FO no. 944 UO Nov. 1923; FO 371/8831 Bentinck to FO no. 981 d. 13 
Dec. 1923. 
107 FO 371/8830 Bentinck to FO no. 944 UO Nov. 1923, min. by Nicolson d. 12 Dec. 1923; FO 
371/883 1 Bentinck to Lampson p. l. d-8 Dec. 1923; FO 371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 p. 5. 
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As election day (16 December) approached, the position of King George became ever 
more precarious, especially after government troops opened fire on a well attended 
Anti-Venizelist rally in Athens, killing several people. 108 In a last desperate throw on 
the very eve of the elections, the king attempted to telegraph to Venizelos, imploring 
him to return to Greece and save the dynasty and the country; but it was now too 
late. 109 The telegram was held up by republican military officers, and the elections 
were held as planned, passing off 'with absolute order for the first time within 
memory'. 110 
The election results reflected the fact that despite government intimidation, republican 
sympathy was not that widespread in Greece: only 127 out of the 398 members 
returned were avowed republicans, and the vast majority (250) belonged to that 
section of the Liberal party which had not made an issue of the regime at the 
elections. III Even so, the republicans had done better than many observers had 
anticipated, and at first the meaning of the results was obscure. 112Pressure from the 
military again proved the decisive factor: Plastiras felt compelled to yield to the 
clamour of the republican officers for the departure of the king, and on 17 December 
he asked George to leave Greece while the constitutional question was settled. 113 
Plastiras explained to Bentinck that he had been compelled to make this request: the 
officers were ready to oust George by force, and would certainly have prevented any 
orderly or peaceful debate on the future of the monarchy, and had he refused and 
resigned his restraining influence would have beenjoSt. 1 140n 19 December, the third 
108 FO 371/8830 Bentinck to FO tel. 586 d. 10 Dec. 1923; FO 371/8831 Bentinck to FO no. 981 d. 13 
Dec. 1923; MAE Grýce 59 Marcilly to QO no. 217 d. 13 Dec. 1923. 
109 FO 371/8830 Bentinck to FO tel. 597 d. 16 Dec. 1923. 
110FO 371/8830 Bentinck to FO tel. 599d. 17 Dec. 1923; FO 371/8831 Colonial Office to FO 
no. [? 61376/22] d. 22 Dec. 1923. 
III Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, p. 3 1, cf. Dakin, Unification, p. 240. 
112 FO 371/8830 min. by Nicolson d. 18 Dec. 1923. Marcilly advanced several reasons for the 
unexpected success of the republicans: firstly, they had exploited the joint lists with the Venizelists 
which were formed in many areas and secondly they had won a large proportion of the refugee vote; 
thirdly, many republicans were returned in Macedonia and Thrace, areas under the military rule of 
Pangalos and Kondylis (MAE Gr6ce 59 Marcilly to QO no. 223 d. 20 Dec. 1923, no. 232 d. 27 
Dec. 1923) 
113 FO 371/8830 Bentinck to FO tel. 600 d. 17 Dec. 1923, tel. 602 d. 17 Dec. 1923. 
114 FO 371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 p. 23. 
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anniversary of Constantine's return to Athens, the king left Greece for Romania 
aboard a Greek yacht and under a government guarantee of safe passage, ostensibly 
on leave. ' 15 The next day, to the chagrin of the republicans who wanted no further 
debate on the constitutional ýquestion, a regent was sworn in. 116The post was 
entrusted, as in 1920, to Admiral Pavlos Koundouriotis, a veteran Venizelist who was 
well respected but widely believed to be suffering from senile decay. 117The situation 
was now finely balanced: the outcome of the elections was still unclear and the threat 
of a republican coup was ever present. ' 18 
In this bewildering situation the Greek people once again turned to Venizelos. On 21 
December the revolutionary government invited him to return to Greece, at first on 
condition that he accept the deposition of the GlUcksburg dynasty and then, when he 
refused those tenns, unconditionally. ' 19 Further pleas and invitations were sent by 
numerous military and civilian figures from most parts of the political spectrum, and 
the widespread feeling in Greece that Venizelos alone could save the nation was 
reflected by his election in absentia in nineteen separate constituencies. 120Venizelos 
announced that although he had intended not to return lest he prove unable to restrain 
the extremists from imposing a republic by force, Plastiras' appeal, sent in the name 
of the army, had persuaded him to return and that he would leave for Greece on 29 
December. 121 
In Paris, Venizelos set out his programme to the representatives of the powers. He 
planned to return to Greece for just a few months, and would seek to dissolve the 
115 FO 371/8830 Bentinck to FO tel. 600 d. 17 Dec. 1923, tel. 605 d. 18 Dec. 1923, tel. 612 d. 19 
Dec. 1923. 
116 FO 371/8830 Bentinck to FO tel. 616 d. 20 Dec. 1923. 
117 FO 371/8830 Bentinck to FO tel. 609 d. 19 Dec. 1923, tels. 616-7 d. 20 Dec. 1923 ('Admiral is 
generally reported to be gaga. '); Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, p. 319. 
118 MAE Grece 59 Marcilly to QO no. 232 d. 27 Dec. 1923. Various groupings were claiming a 
majority in the Assembly, and the government was very slow to release actual voting figures. 
119 FO 371/8830 Bentinck to FO tel. 621 d. 21 Dec. 1923, tel. 622 d. 22 Dec. 1923, tel. 623 d. 24 
Dec. 1923; Dakin, Unification, pp. 240- 1; Cassimatis, American Influence, pp. 99 - 100. 
120 FO 371/8830 Bentinck to FO tel. 624 d. 24 Dec. 1923. This figure is disputed but comes from the 
Athens press. Venizelos had specifically asked not to be nominated as a candidate (FO 371/8830 SIS 
report no. 0 15 156 d. 11 Dec. 1923). 
121 FO 371/8831 memorandum by Sir G. Talbot d. 23 Dec. 1923; FO 371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 
1923 pp. 24-5. 
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military leagues and form a civilian government from the majority party in the 
Constituent Assembly. He was determined to accept neither the premiership nor the 
leadership of the Liberal party, but wanted to persuade his followers to elect a new 
leader to form a government in which he would take a temporary portfolio. As 
regards the vital question of the nature of the regime, he hoped to hold a plebiscite a 
few months after the abolition of military rule, and to involve all parties in the 
organisation of it so as to ensure universal acceptance of its outcome. The plebiscite 
was to offer three options: the maintenance of the existing dynasty, the substitution of 
a new one or the creation of a republic. Venizelos was adamant that unless he could 
guarantee a fair plebiscite, carried out by a civilian administration, he would wash his 
hands of the situation and withdraw from, Greece. 122 
This plan was ambitious, aiming as it did at reconciling all the forces in Greek 
political life to a final settlement of the issue of the regime, and it was by no means 
assured of success. Venizelos had hesitated about returning to Greece, aware that, 
given the intractable hatreds existing there, his presence might do more harm than 
good unless there was an all-party consensus behind his programme. 123 Although the 
many invitations he had received seemed to indicate that this existed, the majority of 
republicans did not welcome his return, since they wanted power for themselves and 
were ready to attain it by any means p ossible. 124Venizelos apparently realised that 
the transition to a republic must be effected constitutionally if the new regime was to 
win the support of the powers. This was 'an indispensable condition for the security 
and existence' of the Greek state; for financial assistance from Britain and diplomatic 
support from France (especially as regards influencing the attitude of Yugoslavia and 
Romania towards the new regime) would be desperately needed. 125 The crux of 
Venizelos' task would be to remove the military from the political arena and to fend 
122 FO 371/8831 memorandum by Sir G. Talbot d. 23 Dec. 1923; MAE Grýce 59 note by Peretti de la 
Rocca d. 24 Dec. 1923. Venizelos told the English and the French much the same thing, except that he 
emphasised to the French his conviction that the plebiscite would produce a republic. 
123 MAE Grece 58 Marcilly to QO no. 200 d. 20 Nov. 1923, no. 206 d. 28 Nov. 1923; MAE Grke 59 
Marcilly to QO no. 224 d. 20 Dec. 1923. 
124 MAE Gr&e 59 Marcilly to QO no. 224 d. 20 Dec. 1923. 
125 MAE Gr&e 59 Marcilly to QO no. 219 d. 14 Dec. 1923. 
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off the demands of the'immediate republicans'for long enough to ensure a transition 
to a republic which was sufficiently legal and democratic to be acceptable to the 
powers. 126 In principle he was a republican, but not so blinded by fanaticism as the 
likes of Pangalos; and he could not ignore the external dangers a republic based on 
shaky foundations would face. 
The views of the Foreign Office as the elections approached would not have given 
Venizelos any comfort. On 12 December Curzon had gloomily predicted: 'I suppose 
the sequence will be: plebiscite. Vote for a republic. Expulsion of the king. Chaos'. 127 
When the crisis broke on 16-17 December the Foreign Office as usual authorised the 
despatch of a warship to ensure George 11's safety if necessary, but was not prepared 
to give him any political help whatsoever. 1280n 16 December the young king, by 
now in something of a panic, had begged the British government to use its influence 
to induce Venizelos to return to save the situation, but this request had been rebuffed. 
It was impossible, Nicolson had argued, for London to intercede with Venizelos: 'He 
saved the Greek dynasty in 1908 [sic] and may possibly do so again. But whatever 
happens the responsibility for his actions must be his alone: if we beg him to go back 
we shall be obliged to back him if he does so'. 129Personal considerations also played 
a part in this policy; Crowe wrote acidly on 18 December: 'the King is showing such 
pusillanimity that it is difficult to retain much sympathy with him'. 130 
126 MAE Grke 59 Marcilly to QO no. 224 d. 20 Dec. 1923, no. 232 d. 27 Dec. 1923. This account of 
Venizelos' thinking is based on Marcilly's analysis, which subsequently proved to be correct. 
127 FO 371/8830 min. by Curzon d. 12 Dec. 1923. 
128 FO 371/8830 Bentinck to FO tel. 593 d. 15 Dec. 1923, tel. 595 d. 16 Dec. 1923, memorandum by 
Shone d. 16 Dec. 1923, mins. by Lampson d. 16 Dec. 1923, Bentinck to FO tel. 601 d. 17 Dec. 1923, FO 
to Bentinck unno. tel. d. 17 Dec. 1923. George 11's marshal of court asked Bentinck to have a ship 
made ready, and George V prompted the Foreign Office in the same sense. In the event it was not 
needed and nor was the Foreign Office called upon to put into practice the decision taken in principle 
to let George reside in England. 
129 FO 371/8830 Bentinck to FO unno. tel. d. 16 Dec. 1923, min. by Nicolson d. 17 Dec. 1923. 
Nicolson's was referring to the events of 1909-1910 which had marked the beginning of Venizelos' 
involvement in mainland Greek politics. A military revolt with distinctly anti-monarchical overtones 
had broken out in Athens demanding reform, and Venizelos had placed himself at the head of this 
movement and tamed it before becoming prime minister. See Dakin, Unification, pp. 180-6. 
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French and Italians policies around the time of the elections were similarly cautious. 
Poincare was determined to make no comment about the Greek situation until the 
constitutional question was settled. 131When Venizelos came to the Quai d'Orsay on 
24 December, angling for support for his plans, Emmanuel Peretti de la Rocca, the 
director of political and commercial affairs, told him that France would probably be 
sympathetic to a republic in Greece. Poincare, who did not trust Venizelos to keep 
such information to himself, angrily over-ruled Peretti de la Rocca and told Venizelos 
that France had no opinions on questions affecting Greek internal sovereignty. 132The 
Italians stuck to the same line. Although their ambassador in Paris, Romano 
Avezzana, momentarily perturbed at the prospect of an English prince being put on 
the Greek throne, had earlier in December talked of Italy and France having to 
support George 11 in order to forestall this, their avowed policy was to watch events 
closely but take no action. 133 
The return of Venizelos to Greece made no difference to the attitudes of Poincare and 
Mussolini, but it did herald a significant change in Curzon's policy. At first, after the 
elections, the official British line was that they did not reflect the will of the people, 
and Bentinck was instructed to continue to abstain from official contact with 
whatever government came to power. 134However, once it became clear that 
Venizelos might take charge in Greece, the British attitude changed. True, Venizelos 
was no longer held in such high esteem in London as he had been during the war, and 
his faults were recognised - Curzon for one felt that in his efforts to dictate the policy 
of the Liberal party by telegram from Paris he had not exercised either a'wise or a 
pacifying influence'. 135Nevertheless, London realised how influential he was, and 
perceived that he was the one man who might be able to produce a government with 
131 MAE Grýce 59 note by Peretti de la Rocca d. 8 Dec. 1923, Barr6re (Rome) to QO tel. 1083 d. 19 
Dec. 1923, QO to Barrýre teI. 2266 d. 20 Dec. 1923, Marcilly to QO no. 224 d. 20 Dec. 1923 
132 MAE Gr6ce 59 note by Peretti de la Rocca d. 24 Dec. 1923, min. by Poincard d. 24 Dec. 1923, min. 
by [? Peretti de la Rocca] d. 24 Dec. 1923, QO to Marcilly no. 384 d. 31 Dec. 1923. 
133 MAE Gr&e 59 note by Peretti de la Rocca d. II Dec. 1923, Baff6re to QO tel. 25 d. 7 Jan. 1924. 
134 FO 371/8830 Bentinck to FO tel. 612 d. 19 Dec. 1923, FO to Bentinck tel. 238 d. 24 Dec. 1923; FO 
371/8831 Colonial Office to FO no. [? 61376/22] d. 22 Dec. 1923. 
135 FO 371/8830 min. by Curzon d. 5 Dec. 1923 ('What a wretched country! '). 
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w ic Britain could do business and prevent a Greek republic from collapsing into 
anarchy. 136 
Once it was announced that Venizelos was to return to Greece, the Foreign Office, 
while remaining wary of making any commitment, was keen to learn of his plans,, 137 
and these in fact received a very enthusiastic reception. Nicolson termed them 
I admirable', but argued that as they might be very difficult to put into practice Britain 
should strengthen Venizelos' hand by resuming official relations with Greece. Crowe 
heartily endorsed this suggestion: 'I agree that we ought to seize a really favourable 
moment for recognition of a properly constituted Greek government'. Consequently, 
Curzon told Bentinck on 29 December that he sympathised with Venizelos' intentions 
and was ready to recognise any government representing a majority in the assembly 
and containing none of those responsible for the 1922 executions. Bentinck was thus 
authorised to confer with Venizelos on the delicate question of when would be the 
right moment to resume relations. 138 
This was a significant development, but its importance should not be over- 
emphasised; after all Britain was simply putting relations with Greece back on a 
normal footing and not making any great positive commitment. Venizelos' policy was 
to form a government which met the conditions for recognition which Curzon had 
formulated in 1922, and it also seemed that he might recreate stable, normal 
conditions in Greece which would suit Britain's economic interests in Greece and 
general European policy. Recognition was therefore natural. However, although a 
measure of political support for Venizelos might be forthcoming, the financial 
assistance which Venizelos had earlier hinted might be a pre-requisite for his 
returning to Greece was not. 139London felt that financial aid to Greece was out of the Z: ý 
136 FO 371/8829, mins. by Nicolson d. 7 Nov. 1923 and 22 Nov. 1923. 
137 FO 371/8830 min. by Nicolson d. 22 Dec. 1923. Sir Gerald Talbot went to Paris to confer with 
Venizelos and Nicolson asked Talbot to inform him privately of exactly what was said, and warned 
him not to give Venizelos any hint as to Britain's attitude. 
138 FO 371/8831 mins. by Nicolson and Crowe d. 27 Dec. 1923, FO to Bentinck tel. 239 d. 29 Dec. 1923 
139 FO 371/8830 Bentinck to FO tel. 621 d. 21 Dec. 1923, tel. 623 d. 24 Dec. 1923. To the annoyance of 
London various other powers insisted that it was up to Britain to give Venizelos the wherewithal (in 
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question, given her instability, and Bentinck was instructed, in the event of Venizelos 
raising the issue, to adopt an 'absolutely non-committal attitude' and to speak only of 
the primary importance of the refugee stabilisation loan being organised by the 
League of Nations. 1401n sum, although Britain was prepared to do something to 
bolster Venizelos' position, there was no overwhelming commitment either to him or 
to Greece, and this, given the expectations of the Greeks, was bound to affect 
Venizelos' chances of success. 
The British attitude towards financial assistance to Greece was of a piece with British 
policy towards the economic reconstruction of Europe as a whole. Whereas the 
Greeks felt that reconstruction could only come about with massive financial 
assistance from the powers, the British believed that it was first up to the Greeks to 
put their financial affairs in order. The attitude of the Greeks was natural given their 
traditional dependence on the powers in political and economic affairs, but London 
felt that reconstruction ought not to be financed by governments; rather 'private 
finance had not only the resources but greater expertise' for this task. 141Consequently, 
it was up to the Greeks to balance their budget and restore their international credit 
and thereby attract private capital for reconstruction. Throughout 1923 this had 
caused friction between Britain and Greece, for given the lamentable state of Greek 
finances and Athens' notorious profligacy with borrowed money, there was very little 
chance of a market loan being raised for Greece; and yet the Greeks, who could not 
really understand the motives behind British policy, still believed that salvation lay 
not in putting their own house in order but in winning the political and with it the 
economic support of Britain. 142 
the shape of financial assistance) to complete his task (FO 371/8831 Bentinck to FO tel. 627 d. 26 
Dec. 1923). 
140 FO 371/8830 min. by Selby d. 26 Dec-1923; FO 371/8831 FO to Bentinck tel. 239 d-29 Dec. 1923. 
141 A. Orde, British Policy and European Reconstruction after the First World War (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 325 and passim. 
142 Orde, Reconstruction, pp. 284-5; FO 371/8834 file 732 passim. 
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The British, for their part, were by no means prepared to loan the Greeks money: as 
one Foreign Office official observed 'the Chancellor would rather commit suicidel. 143 
In fact, the British were most insistent on the need to increase international control 
over Greek finances in order to enforce strict budgetary discipline on Athens. In their 
view it was the lack of such discipline which was the chief cause of Greece's 
economic plight, and a restoration of discipline would help both to stabilise the 
Balkans and facilitate the eventual repayment of Greece's war debt to Britain. 144 
Apart from the control the EFC at Athens had over many Greek revenues, Britain, 
France and the United States also had a veto by virtue of an agreement with the 
Greeks in 1918 on the assignment of any security by the Greeks to an external loan. 145 
A further set of controls on the Greek economy had been introduced in September 
1923 when a protocol was signed at Geneva under the auspices of the League 
establishing the autonomous Refugee Settlement Commission (RSC) which was to 
control the practical work of settlement in Greece. This protocol also provided for the 
eventual raising by the Greek government of a refugee loan, the proceeds of which 
were to be placed at the disposal of the RSC; and it bound the Greeks not only to 
refrain from creating any charge on their revenues by way of security for any loans 
not intended for productive purposes, but to undertake to balance their budget as soon 
as possible. 146Similar conditions had been imposed when the Bank of England 
advanced the Greeks E1,000,000 in November strictlY for the purposes of refugee 
settlement - in fact to allow the RSC to begin its work. 147British involvement in this 
143 FO 371/8834 min. by Lindsay d. 10 Feb. 1923. 
144 There were also many outstanding claims against the Greek government from British firms and 
private individuals who had had goods requisitioned during the war. See FO 371/8833 file 635 
passim. 
145 The text of the 1918 agreement is printed in Cassimatis, American Influence, pp. 213-5; see also 
pp. 33-43. The continued validity of this veto was disputed by the Greeks, who claimed that due to a 
subsequent agreement with Britain in 1921 London's veto at least had been cancelled (FO 371/8834 
Melas to Vansittart p. l. d. 30 Jan. 1923; Orde, Reconstruction, p. 285). 
146 For the text of this protocol see [League of Nationsj L[eague o N[a ions 0 cial] J[ournal f7 tI Iffi 
(Geneva, League of Nations, 1920-1940)] 1923 1506-8. There is a great deal of literature on the 
evolution of the RSC. See, for example, Cassimatis, American Influence, pp. 135-49; Pentzopoulos, 
Balkan Exchange, pp. 75-92; Ladas, Exchange, pp. 618-28; C. A. Macartney et al., Survey of 
International Affairs 1925 Volume II (London, Oxford University Press/Humphrey Milford, 1928) 
272-5. For the r6le of the United States, see FRUS/1923/Il/318-80. 
147 FO 371/8840 FO memorandum by Central Department d. 6 Dec. 1923. 
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loan ran counter to general economic policy, but it was seen as a special case: both a 
pressing humanitarian necessity and a problem 'so large as to affect the financial 
stability of the country' which it was clearly beyond Greece's resources to SolVe. 148 
Furthermore, Britain's strong influence over the Financial Committee of the League 
which oversaw the scheme had ensured that these strict controls on expenditure were 
indeed introduced. 149 
Some aspects of these financial questions throw a particularly interesting light on 
relations between the Allies themselves. In November, as the Bank of England 
advance was being negotiated, news had reached London of an ambitious Greek naval 
programme, for which contracts were to be placed either in Britain or France, 
whichever would provide the most generous credit terms. 150 The Treasury and 
Foreign Office had seen immediate objections to this scheme: it was unnecessary 
from a naval point of view, since Greece had parity with the Turks and could never 
hope to attain it with the Italians; financially extravagant and inexcusable when 
Greece still owed large sums to the British govemment and British firms; and likely 
to wreck the whole refugee settlement scheme since it contravened the terms of the 
Geneva protocol. On the other hand, if the Greeks were detennined to press on with 
the programme and Britain held aloof the contracts would go to France. In the 
Admiralty view this was undesirable, and at least one cabinet minister felt that given 
the state of British unemployment and the imminent election, news that the contracts 
had gone to France would be politically damaging. 151 Curzon had taken a very critical 
view of the attitude of the French, who had apparently encouraged the Greeks to 
develop the scheme and were prepared to offer generous credit terms for the 
148 Orde, Reconstruction, pp. 284-7. 
149 Orde, Reconstruction, p. 3 10: 'by 1927 it was widely believed in Europe that Britain controlled the 
Financial Committee and used it to further its own financial imperialism in Europe'. 
150 FO 371/8832 Bentinck to FO no. 891 d. 12 Nov. 1923; DBFP/I/XXIV/879; Orde, Reconstruction, 
pp. 286-7. 
151 FO 371/8832 min. by Nicolson d. 12 Nov. 1923, Treasury to FO no. F6172/3 d. 13 Nov. 1923, 
Joynson-Hicks to Curzon p. l. d. 20 Nov. 1923, min. by Nicolson d. 21 Nov. 1923; 
DBFP/l/Y. XIV/879,890-2. The Admiralty believed Britain must obtain the orders to maintain her 
predominance in Greek naval affairs (FO 371/8832 Admiralty to FO no. [? ] d. 19 Nov., no. [? ] d. 5 
Dec. 1923). 
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contracts. 152He was 'opposed to the methods by which the French are now arming 
Central Europe', both because this 'frantic armament' of small countries was a threat 
to peace and because it ill behoved the French to lavish money on their 'protectorates' 
when their own debts to Britain were unsettled. 153The French, however, despite the 
obvious political connotations of such arms contracts, had professed to see the whole 
affair as a purely business transaction. 154 
In the event the scheme had come to nothing. Both the 1918 agreement and the 
refugee settlement protocol in fact prevented the Greeks contracting any external 
indebtedness for this purpose, and it turned out that the whole programme had been 
little more than, in Nicolson's words, a 'try-on'. 155 It had been evolved by the Greek 
soldiers and sailors behind the back of the finance minister and was really designed to 
tempt Britain and France into recognising the Greek revolutionary regime. The 
Foreign Office had all along suspected that this might be the case, and congratulated 
itself on having avoided falling into the trap. 156 As Nicolson wrote, Hadjikyriakos, the 
extreme republican minister of marine, 'by the bird lime of naval contracts, wants to 
catch us and attach us to his Republic. We won't be caught'. 157The programme had 
been drastically reduced, and some small orders, to be paid for out of the normal 
budget, were placed with British firMS. 158 Nevertheless, the strenuous efforts made by 
the Foreign Office to prevent the French funding the Greek programme are 
illustrative both of the government's sensitivity to the general climate of hardship, and 
of the sometimes difficult nature of political and economic relations within the 
Entente. 
152 DBFP/I/XXIV/880,886,898-90. 
153 FO 371/8832 min. by Curzon d. 21 Nov. 1923; DBFP/I/XXIV/890-2. 
154 MAE Grece 50 passim; DBFP/I/XXIV/928-9. 
155 FO 371/8832 mins. by Nicolson d. 21 Nov. 1923 and 27 Nov. 1913; DBFP/I/XXIV/892,898- 
900,928-9. The matter was discussed by the Cabinet on 13 November, when it was decided to press 
the Greeks to abandon the programme and, failing that, to try and ensure that the orders all went to 
British firms (Cab[inet Papers series] 23/46/54(23)). 
156 FO 3 71/883 2m ins. by Nicolson d. 12 Nov. 1923 and 12 Dec. 1923; DBFPII /XXIV/900. 
157 FO 37 1 /11-345 Extract from Nicolson to [? ] p. l. d. [? ] 1923 enclosed in Dept. of Overseas Trade to 
FO no. 14901 FE d. 25 May 1926. 
158 FO 371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 pp. 61,68; FO 371/10771 Annual Report, Greece, 1924 
[enclosed in Cheetham to FO no. 153 d. 15 May 1925] p. 43; DBFP/1/XXIV/892. 
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The Greek constituent assembly met on 2 January 1924, and Plastiras officially 
dissolved the revolutionary government before making a valedictory speech justifying 
and praising its policy and achievements. Venizelos returned to Greece two days later, 
was elected president of the chamber on 5 January, and laid out his plans for 
constitutional reform and a plebiscite to be held in three months time. ' The attempts 
of his lieutenants Roussos and DangliS2 to form cabinets, however, foundered owing 
to the unwillingness of either wing of the Liberal party to accept the leadership of the 
other; and Venizelos was reluctantly compelled to form a cabinet under his own 
leadership which took office on 12 January. 3 He soon reiterated his position: though 
personally a confirmed republican, he wanted the constitutional question settled by an 
impartial plebiscite so that reconciliation between the parties could be achieved and 
the nature of the regime would no longer be a cause of conflict. 41n order to promote 
reconciliation Venizelos consulted both royalist and republican leaders to secure their 
co-operation in the organisation of the plebiscite. However, he met strong opposition: - 
the fact that he had declared himself a republican made him too extreme (and too 
biased) for the royalists, while his determination to hold a plebiscite made him too 
timid for the republicans. Certainly, he was, as in 1920, out of touch with Greek party 
politics; 5and he was constantly heckled and attacked by the republicans in the 
chamber. In the event the pressure of these stormy scenes proved too much for 
Venizelos, who had for some time been suffering from heart trouble. 60n 4 February 
he resigned. 
Venizelos was succeeded, amid growing rumours of an imminent military coup, by 
one of his proteges, Georgios Kafandaris, leader of the 'Progressive', centre-right 
I FO 371/9878 Bentinck to FO tel. 8 d. 7 Jan. 1924, no. 21 d. 10 Jan. 1924; Dakin, Unification, p. 241. 
2 Roussos was the leader of the liberal republicans, the most extreme faction still within the Liberal 
party, Danglis belonged to the most moderate. t$ 
3 FO 371/9878 Bentinck to FO tel. 10 d. 1 I Jan. 1924, no. 32 d. 14 Jan. 1924, tel. 25 d. 19 Jan. 1924, min. 
by Nicolson d. 23 Jan. 1924; MAE Grece 59 Marcilly to QQ no, 15 d, 16 Jan. 1924, 
4 DBFp/I/XXVI/60. 
5 FO 371/9878 Bentinck to FO no. 50 d. 24 Jan-1924; MAE Gr6ce 59 Marcilly to QO no. 29 d. 31 
Jan. 1924, no. 40 d. 10 Feb. 1924; FO 371/10771 Annual Report, Greece, 1924 pp. 4-5. 
6 MAE Gr&e 59 Marcilly to QO no. 29 d. 31 Jan. 1924; FO 371/9878 Bentinck to FO no. 25 d. 10 
Jan. 1924; FO 371/9879 Bentinck to FO no. 101 d. 9 Feb. 1924. 
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faction of the LiberalS. 7Kafandaris was considered honest and intelligent, and 
declared his intention to adhere absolutely as regards the plebiscite to the programme 
of Venizelos, who continued to exercise much influence behind the sceneS. 8 The new 
premier faced the same problem as his patron: although he personally believed in the 
necessity of a republic, he knew that it must be legally established in order to be 
credible to the outside world. For this reason he opposed the insistent demands of the 
republicans for the proclamation of a republic by decree. 9 As February wore on 
Kafandaris' position appeared to be strengthening when he won a vote of confidence 
and secured the defeat of several republican motions. 10 Venizelos, meanwhile, was 
adopting an increasingly ambiguous attitude. On the one hand, he attacked the 
republicans in the press, arguing that a republic instituted on the basis of force would 
be a'still-bom republic'that would leave Greece prey to internal dissent and the 
external dangers consequent upon isolation. " On the other hand, he began privately 
to press Kafandaris to concede the idea of the proclamation of a republic before a 
plebiscite in order to retain control of the situation and tame the extremists. 
Kafandaris refused to do this, but Venizelos' intervention had only confused the 
situation further and given encouragement to the republicans. 12Exasperated with 
Kafandaris the military republicans began to assert themselves, and put pressure on 
the regent Koundouriotis to dismiss him. The upshot was the precipitate resignation 
of the premier, who declared the situation to be 'the negation of the parliamentary 
system', as the minority in the assembly had called in the army to defeat the 
government. 13 
7 FO 371/9878 Bentinck to FO tel. 36 d. 4 Feb. 1924; Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, p. 32- 
8FO 371/9879 Benfinck to FO tel. 41 d-6 Feb. 1924, tel-50d. 8 Feb. 1924, tel. 53 d. 12 Feb. 1924; FO 
371/12175 Loraine to FO no. 80 d. 26 Feb. 1927. 
9 FO 371/9879 Bentinck to FO tel. 57 d. 16 Feb. 1924, no. 101 d. 9 Feb. 1924. 
10 FO 371/9879 Bentinck to FO tel. 66 d. 27 Feb. 1924, tel. 67 d. 28 Feb. 1924. 
11 FO 371/9879 Bentinck to FO tel. 60 d. 21 Feb. 1924, no. 127 d. 21 Feb. 1924. 
12 MAE Gr&e 59 Marcilly to QO no. 52 d. 29 Feb. 1924, no. 55 d. 6 Mar. 1924, no. 62 d. 14 Mar. 1924; 
FO 3 71/10771 Annual Report, Greece, 1924 p. 6; Papacosma Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies 7 
198-9. 
13 FO 371/9879 Cheetham to FO tel. 71 d. 7 Mar. 1924, tel. 73 d. 8 Mar. 19. '14, no. 170 d. 7 Mar. 1924; 
MAE Grýce 59 Marc illy to QO no. 62 d. 14 Mar. 1924. 
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The only politician willing or able to form a government in these circumstances was 
Alexandros Papanastasiou, the leader of the Republican Union. 14He was an 
ideologue and thinker, sometimes out of touch with political reality but always 
prepared to suffer for his beliefs. 15 As Venizelos pointed out, however, his 
government rested on no real majority and was ultimately dependent on a military 
clique determined to impose a republic by force if necessary. On 10 March, while 
Papanastasiou was still forming his cabinet, Venizelos left the country, vowing never 
again to return to Greek politics, as he had threatened the previous December to do if 
the military again interfered in politiCS. 16 He had been able neither to reconcile the 
parties nor to unite the Venizelist bloc and had in fact weakened the moderate cause 
at a crucial moment. 17As news of his departure reached London, Ramsay 
MacDonald, since 22 January British foreign secretary, minuted somewhat 
cryptically: 'thus ends a shadow to whom we tried in vain to give substance'. 18 
Perhaps this was an allusion to Britain's recent attempts to bolster up Venizelos' 
government by resuming normal diplomatic relations with Greece. On 10 January 
Bentinck was instructed to renew his consultations with Venizelos about a possible 
resumption, and Venizelos in turn had indicated that he would be very disappointed if 
London showed any hesitation on this issue. 19 Bentinck himself, certainly no 
Venizelist partisan, urged that a resumption of relations would buoy up Venizelos., 
who was now Greece's last hope of salvation, as well as strengthening British 
influence there. 20 When Venizelos formed a cabinet in accord with Curzon's 
conditions which held out hope for a return to stable government in Greece the last 
14 MAE Gr6ce 59 Marcilly to QO tel. 15 d. 8 Mar. 1924. 
15 MAE Grýce 59 Marcilly to QO no. 210 d. 5 Dec. 1923; FO 371/12175 Loraine to FO no. 80 d. 26 
Feb. 1927. Papanastasiou was imprisoned by the Constantinists in 1921 for his republican views, and 
later deported by General Pangalos in 1926. 
16 FO 371/9879 Cheetham to FO no. 170 d. 7 Mar. 1924; DBFP/I/XXVI/137-8. 
17 F0.371/10771 Annual Report, Greece, 1924 p. 6; Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, p. 32. 
18 FO 371/9879 min. by MacDonald d. 21 Mar. 1924. Elections had been held in Britain on 6 
December 1923 and the first Labour government was formed on 22 January. 
19 FO 371/9878 FO to Bentinck tel. 2 d. 10 Jan. 1924, Bentinck to FO tel. 14 d. 13 Jan. 1924. 
20 FO 371/9878 Bentinck to FO tel. 16 d. 14 Jan. 1924. In 1923 Bentinck had written to Nicolson: 'You 
call yourself ... a Venizelist. That 
I can call myself no longer' (FO 371/8826 Bentinck to Nicolson p. l. 
d. 24 Jan. 1923). 
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obstacle was removed. Bentinck was authorised to tell him that Britain had every 
confidence in his person and his government and was ready to resume normal 
diplomatic relations at once. 21 On 15 January this was done, to the delight of 
Venizelos, the Greek foreign ministry and almost the whole Greek press, although it 
was ominous that each political faction interpreted Britain's action as approval of its 
own particular poliCy. 22 Sir Milne Cheetham, formerly charge in Paris and minister at 
Berne, was sent to Athens as minister and arrived in late February, while Kaklamanos 
was reappointed Greek minister in London. 23 Despite the growth of republican feeling 
in Greece, London insisted that Cheetharn should be formally accredited to George II 
and that Kaklamanos should be given letters of credence drawn up in that monarch's 
name. 24 
Marcilly saw this as significant, since it would clearly be interpreted as 'a 
demonstration in favour of maintaining the monarchy. 25Indeed, his view of the 
British resumption of relations was that it was something of a confidence trick 
perpetrated by Venizelos on the Foreign Office. 26 Marcilly knew that Venizelos used 
very different language in the French and British legations: in the former he 
emphasised his own republican convictions and belief the plebiscite would produce a 
republic, in the latter he stressed how the plebiscite would be completely fair. 27 
Assuming the Foreign Office to be motivated by monarchical considerations, 
Marcilly suggested that Venizelos had exploited these feelings (and the British 
21 DBFP/I/XXVI/48-50. 
22 FO 371/9878 Bentinck to FO tel. 20 d. 16 Jan. 1924; DBFP/I/XXVI/48-50. 
23 DBFP/I/XXVI/47; Times, 7 Jan. 1938. 
24 FO 371/9878 Bentinck to FO tel. 17 d. 14 Jan. 1924, mins. by Nicolson d. 15 Jan. 1924, Bland d. 15 
Jan. 1924, Crowe d. 15 Jan. 1924; Kollas (Greek charg6 in London) to FO no. 190 d. 16 Jan. 1924, mins. 
by Nicolson d. 17 Jan. 1924, Lampson d. 17 Jan. 1924, Crowe d. 17 Jan. 1924, Curzon d. 17 Jan. 1924, 
Kaklamanos to Nicolson p. l. d. 21 Jan. 1924; DBFP/l/Y. XVI/47. Bentinck had pointed out that it 
would be embarrassing if Cheetham was accredited to the regent and the plebiscite then resulted in 
the establishment of a republic. Nevertheless the Foreign Office and George V felt that Greece was 
still a monarchy and George Il was still its sovereign. The Greeks, desperate for recognition, were 
happy to comply with Britain's condition. Ironically, Cheetham presented his letters of credence to 
the regent on the very day the republican government took office. 
25 MAE Grýce 59 Marcilly to QO tels. 5 -6 d. 15 Jan. 1924. 26 MAE Grýce 78 Marcilly to QO no. 92 d. 24 Apr. 1924. 
27 MAE Grece 59 Marcilly to QO no. 15 d. 16 Jan. 1924, no. 40 d. 10 Feb. 1924, MAE Grece 83 
Marcilly to QO no. 14 d. 16 Jan. 1924. 
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concern that their economic interests were suffering in Greece) to win recognition by 
promising to do all he could to maintain the monarchy, although he had no intention 
of doingSo. 28Marcilly speculated that Venizelos' recent public declarations of 
republican faith would therefore have depressed London since they would have 
dispelled any illusions about the i=inence of a republic. 29Venizelos' published 
programme, which the British supported, in fact concealed a hidden agenda, namely 
the establishment of a republic by sufficiently legal means to ensure that it would 
have the support of Britain. 30 
In this instance the Italian interpretation of British motives was nearer the truth. In 
London, Della Torretta argued that although the British, and especially Curzon, 
wanted the Greek monarchy maintained, they were not prepared to intervene to 
achieve this. Rather the British would support whatever solution to the constitutional 
question was achieved by Venizelos, to whom they were still very sympathetic. This 
was the best way to achieve a stable regime in Greece, which was London's real 
desire; and in any case Greece would continue to be the foundation stone of British 
policy in the eastern Mediterranean, whatever her internal situation, because of her 
geographical position. 31 Despite its over-estimation of the importance of Greece in 
British policy, this analysis was essentially correct. In any event, after the British 
resumption of relations, Mussolini, who had previously taken his cue from London in 
these matters, decided that Italy should follow suit, and Italian representatives in 
Athens resumed official contact with the Greek government. 32Venizelos and 
Kafandaris, who were keen to improve relations with Italy, welcomed this 
28 MAE Gr6ce 83 Marcilly to QO no. 14 d. 16 Jan. 1924. Marcilly's analysis is understandable: he was 
probably impressed by Bentinck's passionate support for the Greek monarchy and perhaps 
understandably found it strange that Britain should recognise a government resulting from elections 
which London knew did not reflect the will of the people (MAE Gr&e 59 Marcilly to QO no. 22 d. 22 
Jan. 1924). Other French observers really believed that Venizelos had returned to Greece to do 
Britain's bidding and avert a republic (MAE Gr6ce 59 Army Intelligence report no. 789 d. 24 
Jan. 1924). 
29 MAE Gr&e 59 Marcilly to QO no. 22 d. 22 Jan. 1924. 




development, but despite mutual expressions of cordiality, political differences 
between the two countries were still too great to allow for any real rapprochement. 33 
The fall of Venizelos showed that the kudos he gained from securing British 
recognition could not enable him to prevail over the internal forces working to 
frustrate his plans. The Foreign Office was dismayed by this turn of events, not so 
much because the monarchy now seemed doomed, but because a military dictatorship 
and anarchy now seemed imminent. 34Given this pessimism, it was unlikely that 
London would deviate from Curzon's policy of non-intervention, especially now that 
MacDonald, the great internationalist, was at the helm of the Foreign Office. Indeed, 
in Greece the republicans rejoiced at the advent of a Labour government which 
seemed to them to guarantee that there would be no pressure from Britain to retain the 
monarchy. 35 That MacDonald did indeed have strong objections to the notion of 
interfering in the internal affairs of another state was demonstrated by his attitude 
towards a dispute that arose at this time between Bentinck and Henry Morgenthau, the 
American president of the RSC. 
Morgenthau, an ex-ambassador at Constantinople and inveterate self-publicist, had 
arrived in Greece in November 1923.36He had immediately perceived that without 
political stability subscriptions would not be forthcoming for the big refugee loan 
which was to be negotiated to provide funds for settlement once the Bank of England 
advance had been used Up. 37 However, although Morgenthau. had told the Foreign 
Office in October that he would consider the establishment of a republic in Greece to 
be aTundamental blunder, as soon as he reached Athens he set out, by his own 
account, to'give sympathetic co-operation to the liberal elements in their evolution 
33 MAE Grke 78 Marcilly to QO no. 48 d-22 Feb. 1924; DDI/7/II/400-1,442-3; DBFP111XXVII60. 
34 FO 371/9879 mins. by Nicolson d-2 Feb. 1924, McEwen d. 5 Feb. 1924, Nicolson d. 4 Mar. 1924, 
McEwen d. II Mar. 1924. 
35 MAE Grke 78 Nlarcilly to QO no. 48 d. 22 Feb. 1924. 
36 Cassimatis, American Influence, p. 104, H. Morgenthau, An International Drama (London, Jarrolds, 
1930), pp. 104-9. An earlier edition of these memoirs had the title 'I Was Sent to Athens', giving a 
flavour of Morcgenthau's egocentricity. 
37 Cassimatis, American Influence, pp. 10 1 -2; Morgenthau, International Drama, pp. 113-4. 
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from monarchy to republic'. 38 Morgenthau was sincere - he believed that the Greek -o 
people wanted a republic - but he was also naive, and his co-operation in fact 
amounted to gross interference in Greek politiCS. 39 Bentinck soon developed a 
personal animus against Morgenthau, and was outraged that his control over the 
distribution of the British advance meant that it led not to a growth of British 
influence but to 'the glorification of an American JeW'. 40 Bentinck persistently 
reported Morgenthau's pro-republican public statements and activities, and argued 
that his actions could only frustrate the plans of the moderateS. 41 The Foreign Office 
at first disregarded these complaints on the grounds that although Morgenthau was 
indiscreet, he had been appointed in order to attract American investors to the refugee 
loan, in which respect he was 'a great asset'. 42 
Morgenthau's intrigues continued, however, and soon involved Britain directly. At the 
end of January, he was persuaded by the leading extremists (by whom he was 
charmed and manipulated) that Greek public opinion overwhelmingly desired the 
immediate declaration of a republic, and that the only doubt about this course of 
action concerned the likely response of the powers, since if it were hostile the whole 
refugee settlement scheme might collapse. At the instigation of the Greeks 
Morgenthau therefore sounded the British government unofficially through his 
personal friend, Montagu Norman, the governor of the Bank of England. On 30 
January he telegraphed Norman to ask what the British government's attitude would 
be towards the promulgation of a Greek republic by decree, for which public opinion 
was clamouring. Somewhat rashly, and without consulting the Foreign Office, 
Norman - doubtless misled by Morgenthau. as to the strength of republican opinion in 
Greece - replied the next day that assuming such action I would insure domestic r) 
settlement and political stability, we consider you may expect sympathy here'. 43These 
38F0371/8842 min. by Selby d. 31 Oct. 1923; Morgenthau, International Drama, p. 113. 
39 Cassimatis, American Influence, pp. 10 1 -2; Morgenthau, International Drama, pp. 113-27. 40 FO 371/9887 Bentinck to Lampson p. l. d. 19 Jan. 1924. 
41 FO 371/9878 Bentinck to FO tel. 24 d. 18 Jan. 1924, no. 40 d. 19 Jan. 1924. 
42 FO 371/9878 mins. by Nicolson d. 19 Jan. 1924 and 4 Feb. 1924. 
43 Cassimatis, American Influence, pp. 102-3; Morgenthau, International Drama, pp. 128-33. 
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telegrams were published in the Athens press on 6 February and caused a storm. As 
they seemed to show British support for the extremists , they removed one of the 
chief objections to a republic and gravely weakened the moderate Kafandaris 
govemment. 44 
Bentinck was furious that Britain was being dragged into Greek internal affairs 
because of Morgenthau's inability to refrain from meddling. The Foreign Office did 
not share this anger and bitterness towards Morgenthau, however, and instructed 
Bentinck to co-operate loyally with him in implementing the League's scheme. But 
MacDonald had been made uncomfortable by the episode, and his own convictions 
were highlighted in the emphatic telegram he sent Bentinck on 8 February as a 
general restatement of Britain's attitude. 
Our desire is to adopt an attitude of absolute neutrality and in no way to 
intervene in [the] internal affairs of Greece. Greek public men must study their 
own public opinion and be responsible to it for their policy. You should give 
no advice whatsoever to present Greek govemment regarding internal affairs. 
You can say that the only wish of His Majesty's Government is to see Greece 
regaining her former stability. 
Bentinck disavowed Norman's views to Kafandaris, and reiterated Britain's neutral 
attitude, but by then, he reported, the damage had been done. 45 
The advent of the Papanastasiou government signalled the triumph of the 'immediate 
republicans' who were determined that the nature of the regime should be settled by 
the assembly rather than the people. They claimed that the December elections had 
given them a mandate to introduce a republic; the truth was that public opinion was 
still a very uncertain factor . 
46The manner of Kafandaris'fall had shown that real 
power now lay with the military triumvirate of Pangalos, Kondylis and 
Hadjikyriakos, all of whom were in Papanastasiou's cabinet. The other ministers were 
44 FO 371/9879 Bentinck to FO tel. 40 d. 6 Feb. 1924, tel. 43 d. 6 Feb. 1924; DBFP/1/XXVI/74; 
Morgenthau, International Drama, pp. 133-7. 
45 FO 371/10771 Annual Report, Greece, 1924 p. 5; DBFP/1/XXVI/74-5; Cassimatis, American 
Influence, p. 103. The second- Sentence in the above quote was added by MacDonald himself to the 
draft version, now filed in FO 371/9879. 
46 FO 371/9879 Bentinck to FO tel. 41 d. 6 Feb. 1924; MAE Grýce 59 Marcilly to QO no. 62 d. 14 
Mar. 1924, 
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all nonentities, extreme republicans new to office and little known. 470n the morning 
of 12 March these men took the oath in the presence of the regent' to to country" but 
not to king', and marked their attitude by refusing to wear the high hats customary on 
this occasion. 48 
This, however, was merely a point of style, and the substance of Papanastasiou's 
actions seemed initially more reassuring. First, he declared that he would govern by 
parliamentary methods, asking the assembly to declare the establishment of a republic 
which would then be ratified by plebiscite. 49Secondly, the government made a 
conciliatory gesture to the royalists which seemed to indicate that contrary to 
Venizelos' dire warnings the republicans were seeking a national rather than a party 
basis for the republic. Papanastasiou announced that if George 11 would abdicate, the 
government would give him a generous financial settlement, promulgate a general 
amnesty and guarantee royalist participation in the government of the republic with 
the prospect of free elections before the end of the year-50 In the circumstances, this 
offer was as generous as it was unexpected and caused a frenzied debate in the 
royalist camp. 51 
In the end, however, the tentative negotiations between government and royalists 
were broken off when, just days later, the government announced that it would pursue 
its republican policy without royalist co-operation, that-there would be no concessions 
and that measures would be taken against the king. Cheetharn believed that 
Papanastasiou had withdrawn his offer under pressure from the military extremists 
who would brook no compromise. 52 Be that as it may, and even if Papanastasiou 
himself was sincere in wanting all party co-operation and a generous settlement with 
47 FO 371/9879 Cheetham to FO tel. 82 d. 12 Mar. 1924; MAE Grke 59 Marcilly to QO no. 62 d. 4 
Mar. 1924; DBFP/I/XXVI/143-4. At first Pangalos was ýexcluded from the cabinet, perhaps as a sop 
to Britain, but soon he was given the newly created post of minister for legal order (FO 371/10771 
Annual Report, Greece, 1924 p. 7). 
48 FO 371/9879 Cheetham to FO no. 197 d. 19 Mar. 1924; DBFPII /XXVI/143-4. 
49 FO 371/9879 Cheetham to FO tel. 75 UO Mar. 1924. 
50 FO 371/9879 Cheetharn to FO tel. 85 d. 17 Mar. 1924. 
51 MAE Grýce 59 Marcilly to QO no. 68 d. 22 Mar. 1924; FO 371/10771 Annual Report, Greece, 1924 
pp. 6-7. 
52 FO 371/9879 Cheetham to FO tel. 91 d. 21 Mar. 1924. 
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the royalists, the actual effect of his offer had been to split the royalist opposition. 53 
Moderates had been tempted by the prospect of a return to office, whilst the die-hards 
continued to insist that the question must be settled by the people. 54As for the 
republicans, they exploited the failure of the negotiations to claim that George II had 
now put himself completely out of court and that a vote for constitutional monarchy 
at the plebiscite would mean the establishment of a new dynasty. 55 
With the opposition divided the government pressed on. On 24 March a motion was 
put to the assembly constituting Greece as a parliamentary republic (subject to later 
ratification by plebiscite), providing for the expropriation of royal property and 
appointing Koundouriotis as 'arbitrator of the regime' until the elaboration of a 
republican constitution. On 25 March, the anniversary of the outbreak of the Greek 
war of independence, the motion was passed overwhelmingly: among the Venizelists, 
most supported it in the interests of avoiding civil strife and only Kafandaris I 
supporters abstained. 56Despite natural suspicions that the republicans would avoid 
putting the issue to the people a plebiscite was scheduled for 13 April, and it was 
apparent that the royalists had not altogether given up hope. 57 From Romania George 
11 issued a manifesto to the Greek people reserving his rights as constitutional 
monarch, and there was even an attempted royalist coup, although this was a counter- 
productive fiasco. 58Meanwhile, Metaxas, given an amnesty by the government,, 
returned to Greece on 8 April, and announced that the royalists would contest the 
plebiscite in order to establish the sovereignty of the people. 59 This was done when 
the plebiscite was held 'in perfect order' on 13 April, giving victory to the republicans 
53 FO 371/9879 Cheetham to FO no. 21 I d. 22 Mar. 1924., no. 216 d. 22 Mar. 1924. 
54 FO 371/9879 Cheetham to FO no. 216 d. 22 Mar. 1924; MAE Grke 59 MarcIlly to QO no. 68 d. 22 
Mar. 1924; FO 3 71/10771 Annual Report, Greece, 1924 pp. 6-7. 
55 FO 371/9879 Cheetham to FO no. 249 d. 5 Apr. 1924. 
56 FO 371/9879 Cheetham to FO tel. 99 d. 25 Mar. 1924; FO 371/10771 Annual Report, Greece, 1924 
p. 7. 
57 FO 371/9879 Cheetham to FO no. 249 d. 5 Apr. 1924. 
58FO 371/9879 Dering (Bucharest) to FO tel. [? 39] d. 8 Apr. 1924, Cheetham to FO tel. 119 d. 10 
Apr. 1924, tels. 123-4 d. 12 Apr. 1924. 
59 FO 371/9879 Cheetham to FO no. 249 d-5 Apr. 1924; FO 371/10771 Annual Report, Greece, 1924 
p. 7. 
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who secured almost seventy per cent of the votes cast. 60 Consequently on 15 April the 
Greek government officially declared the end of the monarchy and the creation of a 
paTliamentary republic. 61 
The plebiscite result was 'undoubtedly valid' and was generally accepted in Greece. 62 
The polling was considered fair, by Balkan standards, and even Metaxas admitted that 
the republican majority was too large to have been wholly due to fraud. The royalists 
attributed their defeat rather to their own lack of initiative and organisation, and to a 
lack of enthusiasm for George II, who had done little to make himself popular. 
Another important, if not decisive, factor, especially in the new lands, was the refugee 
vote which was overwhelmingly republican and which swamped the small royalist 
majority in Old Greece. 63Finally, many moderates voted for the republic because - 
they believed that any other decision would mean disaster, as the military chiefs 
would impose their will by force if necessary. Most Greeks now simply yearned for 
an end to internal dissension, and voting for the republic - which after 25 March 
meant the status quo - seemed the most likely way to secure it. Papanastasiou had 
undoubtedly done well to restrain the military extremists thus far and moderates 
hoped that with the republic secure he would continue to prevail over unconstitutional 
forces and even give effect to his promises to involve all parties in the government. 64 
These developments in Greece produced pessimism in the Foreign Office. In the first 
place, the very existence of the Papanastasiou government was an embarrassment for 
Britain since it was hardly representative of a majority in the assembly and contained 
at least two individuals with direct responsibility for the 1922 executionS. 65 No-one in 
the Foreign Office, however, felt that this fresh violation of Curzon's conditions 
60 FO 371/9879 Cheetham to FO tel. 127 d. 14 Apr. 1924. Mavrogordatos gives the voting figures as 
758,742 (69.99%) for the motion and 325,322 (30.01%) against it Stillborn Republic, p. 32. 
61 DBFP/I/XXVI/186. 
62 Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, p. 32; FO 371/9879 Cheetham to FO tel. 131 d. 16 Apr. 1924. 
63 FO 371/9880 Cheetham to FO no. 267 d. 19 Apr. 1924, no. 303 d. 3 May 1924; FO 371/10771 Annual 
Report, Greece, 1924 p. 9. 
64 FO 371/9879 Cheetham to FO no. 249 d. 5 Apr. 1924; FO 371/9880 Cheetham to FO no. 267 d. 19 
Apr. 1924, no. 303 d. 3 May 1924; MAE Grýce 59 Marcilly to QO no. 89 d. 16 Apr. 1924. 
65 FO 371/9879 Cheetham to FO tel. 75 d. 10 Mar. 1924, min. by Nicolson d. 13 Mar. 1924. 
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should occasion any action by Britain. As Crowe bluntly explained in reply to an 
inquiry from George V as to the Foreign Office's attitude towards such a government, 
continual intervention in Greek affairs was 'highly undesirable on grounds of general 
poliCy'. 66 Nicolson supported him, arguing that 'we cannot play fast and loose with 
Greek internal politics... . Greece is entering upon a prolonged period of civil war 
and foreign danger. The less we intervene the better'. 67 Ramsay MacDonald endorsed 
this view, and on 14 March defined British policy for Cheetham: Britain could not, 
now that relations were restored, contend that the Greeks had to maintain the 
fulfilment of Curzon's conditions in perpetuity. The British government intended 'to 
assume no responsibility, even of the most indirect nature, for Greek party jealousies'. 
In future Cheetham should stress British indifference to the composition of the Greek 
cabinet and say only that, although the existing British government shared the 
abhorrence of its predecessors for the judicial murderers of 1922, 'all that His 
Majesty's Government feel now is that if the Greek people desire to be governed by 
68 men of these antecedents it is their affair. 
Nor was London impressed by the policy of the Papanastasiou government. Its 
conciliatory overtures to the royalists, for example, were seen not as hopeful signs of 
possible future stability but rather as utterly futile gestures: 'offers such as these are of 
little use as neither side believes a word the other says'. And Nicolson, who 
nevertheless thought that 'the king would be well advised to accept them'had to admit tý 
that 'unfortunately now that he is at Bucharest, he is not well advised'. 69 The Central 
Department accurately perceived that the schism in Greece was so profound that mere 
expressions of goodwill would not be sufficient to heal it. In this atmosphere it was 
hardly surprising that MacDonald should wish to abstain not only from interference in 
Greek affairs but even from commenting on them. 70 
66 FO 371/9879 Crowe to Stamfordham p. l. d. 13 Mar. 1924. 
67 FO 371/9879 min. by Nicolson d. 13 Mar. 1924. 
68 FO 371/9879 min. by MacDonald d. 13 Mar. 1924; DBFPII /XXVI/143-4. 
69 FO 371/9879 mins. by McEwen d. 18 Mar. 1924, Nicolson d. 18 Mar. 1924. 
70 FO 371/9879 Cheetham to FO tel. 90 d. 21 Mar. 1924, FO to Cheetham tel. 29 d. 24 Mar. 1924, min. 
by McEwen d. 27 Mar. 1924. 
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With the holding of the plebiscite, the mood in the Foreign Office improved 
somewhat, and this was reflected by its decision to recognise the republican regime. 
This was partly due to surprise that a plebiscite had been held at all; in March it had 
seemed that the republicans would let the idea 'die away gradually through a series of 
postponements'. 71 The actual holding of the plebiscite, however, together with its 
overwhelming result that was apparently little disputed by the royalists, persuaded 
London that the republic might indeed prove relatively stable. 72Nicolson argued that 
most Greeks had voted for a republic out of a desire for 'peace at any price' and that 
Britain should 'accept this verdict in the spirit in which it is given, - and help the 
Greek people towards their hope of seeing stable internal conditions established in 
their country'. Any delay would only 'encourage the Greek royalists (who are apt to 
1 73 grasp at straws) to imagine that the Republic is being cold-shouldered in London. 
MacDonald agreed with this view, and was anyway inclined'to regard the whole 
thing as a purely Greek matter which does not concernUSI. 74 Accordingly, on 23 April 
Cheetham. was instructed to inform the Greeks that Britain recognised the new regime 
as representing the will of the people, although the issuing of new letters of credence 
was to be deferred pending the passing of a new constitution and the election of a 
president. 75 This decision was taken with no great enthusiasm but it reflected both a 
belief that the republic could be durable and a fear that in the circumstances refusing 
recognition would be a greater act of interference than granting it. The decision was 
also reinforced by French recognition of the new republic. 76 
71 FO 371/9879 min. by McEwen d. 26 Mar. 1924. 
72 The apathy of the general public towards the result seemed to indicate acceptance, and clearly 
royalist acquiescence in the outcome was likely to be an important factor promoting the stability of 
the new regime. However, although Metaxas accepted the result, Tsaldares, the leader of the People's 
party, the major royalist faction, did not follow suit until 1932 (FO 371/9879 Cheetharn to FO tel. 128 
d. 15 Apr. 1924; Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, pp. 32-3). 
73 FO 371/9880 min. by Nicolson d. 16 Apr. 1924; FO 371/9879 min. by Nicolson d. 17 Apr. 1924. 74 FO 371/9880 min. by MacDonald d. 18 Apr. 1924. At the senior level MacDonald and Tyrrell both 
favoured recognition given the apparent stability of the regime, and Lampson, who advocated a wait- ZýI 
and-see policy, was the sole dissenter (FO 371/9880 min. by Lampson d. 16 Apr. 1924; FO 371/9879 




French recognition came promptly after the plebiscite result became known. In the 
early months of 1924 Marcilly had been told that there could be no question of his 
presenting letters of credence until the constitutional question was settled, and 
Poincare was also unwilling to recognise the republic until after the plebiscite. 77 
Marcilly concurred, on the grounds that Papanastasiou's government, even if it was 
continually lauded by the Parisian press, was dominated by the military and very 
undemocratic. " However, on 16 April when the republican victory in the plebiscite 
was clear, Poincare' urgently instructed Marcilly to recognise the new regime 
immediately, adding that it was desirable that France should be the first power to take 
this step. 79 The French also took the lead in the question of letters of credence, since 
they were the first power to give their representative credentials made out to the 
provisional president of the republic, Koundouriotis, without waiting for the passing 
of a new constitution. 80 Marcilly presented these credentials on 15 May in an 
atmosphere of great Franco-Greek cordiality, and the general impression was that 
France's haste to recognise the new republic had greatly improved her standing in 
Greece. 81 
The motives for this haste on the part of the French seem to have been more 
economic than political. France had certainly done little in 1924 to encourage the 
republicans. True, Papanastasiou had made political capital out of the fact that 
Poincare had refused to see Venizelos before he left Paris for Greece, claiming that it 
proved France favoured an 'immediate republic', but Poincare's action was open to a 
variety of interpretations. 82 The most likely was that Venizelos had not actually 
77 MAE Grke 83 QO to Marcilly no. 84 d. 14 Mar. 1924, tel. 14 d. 24 Mar. 1924; FO 371/9878 Bentinck 
to FO tel. 32 d. 31 Jan. 1924. 
78 MAE Grýce 59 Marcilly to QO tel. 17 d. 23 Mar. 1924, no. 79 U Apr. 1924, no. 80 U Apr. 1924; 
MAE Grece 78 Marcilly to [? Du Sault] p. l. d. 18 Mar. 1924. 
79 MAE Gr6ce 59 QO to Marcilly tel. 23 d. 16 Apr. 1924. 
80 FO 371/9880 Cheetham to FO tel. 149 d. 16 May 1924. 
81 MAE Gr&e 78 Marcilly to QO no. 108 d. 16 May 1924; MAE Grýce 83 QO to Marcilly no. 165 
d-30 Apr. 1924, note by Du Sault d. 4 Jun. 1924. 
82 FO 371/8831 Bentinck to FO tel. 631 d. 29 Dec. 1923; FO 371/9891 Bentinck to FO no. 97 d. 9 
Feb. 1924. Other interpretations were that the French had altogether lost interest in Greece or that 
Poincar6 supported Venizelos but did not want him to appear as a French puppet (FO 371/9878 
Bentinck to FO no. 22 d. 10 Jan. 1924). Papanastasiou, like the majority of the republicans, was very 
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sought an interview with him, not for political reasons but because of some personal 
animosity between the two men dating from a heated argument over suspended Greek 
credits some years previously. 83Throughout the spring of 1924, although they were 
less reluctant than their British counterparts to accept that the balance of forces within 
Greece meant that a republic would be established, the French took a quite neutral 
and passive line on the constitutional question. 84 
The French were more active, however, in consolidating and extending their 
economic influence in Greece. After the Papanastasiou government came to power, 
Marcilly told the premier, who was angling for some expression of sympathy, that 
French support for him would not be automatic, but would depend rather on 
satisfaction being given to the many outstanding claims of French subjects against the 
Greek government. 85 At the same time he urged on his home government that, even 
though the republicans were francophiles, these old claims should be settled as proofs 
of goodwill before French political support was forthcoming, especially as the Greek 
government was so undemocratic. 86Poincare entirely agreed, and authorised Marcilly 
both to make some progress on the settlement of these claims a condition of French 
recognition of the new regime, and to indicate to Papanastasiou that the award of 
government contracts to French firms could only improve Franco-Greek relationS. 87 
Whether Marcilly did this is unclear, but*on 17 May, two days after he presented his 
credentials and stressed the traditional friendship between France and Greece, the 
Greek government awarded a contract to build two submarines to Schneider-Creusot. 
Marcilly noted that this was concrete evidence of Papanastasiou's desire to reciprocate 
the goodwill shown by the French over recognition. 18 
much a francophile and sensitive to the opinion of France (FO 371/8831 Bentinck to FO no. 976 d-14 
Dec. 1923). 
83 FO 371/9891 Bentinck to FO no. 97 d. 9 Feb. 1924; MAE Grke 59 note by Peretti de la Rocca 
(where it is stated that Venizelos turned up at the Quai d'Orsay unexpectedly) d. 24 Dec. 1923- 
84 MAE Grýce 59 Marcilly to QO no. 29 d. 31 Jan. 1924, no. 79 d. 3 Apr. 1924. 
85 MAE Grece 78 Marcilly to QO no. 69 d. 24 Mar. 1924. 
86 MAE Grece 59 Marcilly to QO no. 80 d. 3 Apr. 1924. 
87 MAE Grece 78 QO to Marcilly no. 13 8 d. II Apr. 1924. 
88 MAE Grke 78 Marcilly to QO no. 108 d. 16 May 1924, no. 129 d. 6 Jun. 1924. The contract was one 
of the few left over from the now truncated Greek naval programme of November 1923. Marcilly 
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In the competition for this submarine contract the unsuccessful tenders had been 
submitted by British firms, and London was very annoyed at the success of 
Schneider-Creusot. Indeed, Cheetham had been told to insist that in view of 'the close 
relations which had existed for so long between the Greek and British navies, and the 
financial obligations of the Greek government' to Britain, the contract should be 
awarded to a British firm, but the instructions arrived too late to prevent the 
acceptance of the French tender, which was by far the JoWeSt. 89 The French were not, 
however, attempting to use their political muscle to exclude the British from all such 
contracts. In January Marcilly had argued that one motive behind British recognition 
had been a fear that Britain's aloof attitude was leaving the field free for French firms. 
British influence would now increase, but it was unlikely that any Greek government 
would be blind to the lesson of history that Greece needed the support of both Britain 
and France to flourish. 90 Later, he advocated a policy of continued loyal co-operation 
with Britain in Greece: Britain and France had separate and distinct interests there, 
and a public entente would prevent the Greeks from playing the one power off against 
the other. 91 In the Foreign Office, although the loss of the submarine contract rankled, 
French policy was not at the moment seen as threatening. The French were clearly 
trying 'to regain some of their prestige in Greece' which was 'now suffering an eclipse' 
by giving Marcilly new credentials, but they were 'doubtless actuated more by 
commercial than by political considerations' and British policy need not be altered-92 
The very fact that the British made such a distinction between commercial and 
political considerations was only contributing to French success in the matter of 
lamented, however, that despite this award the Greeks were reluctant to give satisfaction over the 
claims. He found, as British representatives did, that the Greeks viewed promises as a substitute for 
action. 
89 FO 371/10771 Annual Report, Greece, 1924 p. 43. The French tender was E108,000 lower than the 
cheapest British one. 
90 MAE Grýce 83 Marcilly to QO no. 14 d. 16 Jan. 1924. See also MAE Gr&e 78 Marcilly to QO 
no. 48 d. 22 Feb. 1924: '... the memory of recent years where Greek policy had to be based solely on 
England and the mediocre benefits gained from this experience confirm the principle that Greece 
must have two protectors in agreement to assist her'. 
91 MAE Grýce 78 Marcilly to [? Du Sault] p. l. d-18 Mar. 1924. 
92 FO 371/9880 mins. by Howard Smith d. 13 May 1924, Nicolson d. 13 May 1924; 
DBFP/I/XXVI/187. 
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contracts in Greece. Whereas the British saw commercial and economic matters as 
relatively autonomous and the concern of business, the French, as Orde argues, 'took 
it for granted that finance was used for political ends'. British political influence in 
east-central Europe was genuinely disinterested, and was rarely used to further British 
economic interests; 93 and whereas British representatives in Greece were hamstrung 
by the lack of any coherent commercial policy, the French were extremely energetic 
in pushing the interests of FrenchfrMS, 94at the expense of the British, and seizing 
the opportunity offered by the rise to power of francophile republicans. All this went 
hand in hand with an increase in political influence and closer relations with Greece, a 
development which perhaps only really became possible, given French public 
opinion, with the creation of a republic. Indeed the French were at this time trying to 
reinforce their influence in the Balkans generally, partly, perhaps, in response to 
wider European considerations, such as a desire after the failure of the Ruhr 
occupation to strengthen ties with allies and potential clients in eastern Europe, and a 
fear that the Pact of Rome of January 1924 might transform Yugoslavia into a 
stalking horse for Italian ambitions in the Balkans. 95 
Italian policy towards Greece in fact continued much as before. On the positive side, 
Mussolini replaced the obnoxious Montagna and swiftly recognised the outcome of 
the plebiscite and the new Greek regime; 96 and he followed the French line and 
accredited Italy's representatives to the provisional president in May without waiting 
93 Orde, Reconstruction, pp. 310-2 and 329: 'British financial and commercial policy in the 1920S was 
possibly too internationalist for the good of the British economy: a greater effort [to facilitate 
reconstruction] in Europe might have led to an even earlier decline. The use made by the French of 
economic levers (and military missions) to extend their political influence in potential allied states in 
eastern Europe, especially Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the relation between private commercial 
interests and the Quai d'Orsay, are discussed in P. S. Wandycz, The Twilight of French Eastern 
Alliances, 1926-1936. Franco -Cze choslo vak-Po lish Relationsfrom Locarno to the Remilitarization of 
the Rhineland (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 5-8. 
94 FO 371/10771 Annual Report, Greece, 1924 pp. 30-1,38-45. Cheetham complained that because 
the Greek assembly controlled naval contracts, superior British products were rejected against the 
advice of the relevant technical advisers. The Greeks can hardly be blamed, however, for preferring 
the French products which, because of the exchange rate, were significantly cheaper. 
95 W. I. Shorrock, From Ally to Enemy. The Enigma of Fascist Italy in French Diplomacy, 1920-1940 
(Kent, Kent State University Press, 1988), pp. 41-6. France's relations with the Little Entente powers 
had been damaged by her cynical support of Italy in the Corfu crisis which seemed to threaten the 
security of all small states which relied on the League. 
96 FO 371/10771 Annual Report, Greece, 1924 pp. 19-20; DDI/7/III/96,99. 
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for the passing of a new constitution. 97 By June, however, the aftermath of the 
Matteotti murder was to paralyse Italian diplomacy for some months, and altogether 
conflicting political interests and intense mutual suspicion continued to preclude 
really cordial relations between Italy and Greece. The Dodecanese question remained 
an obstacle and Athens suspected the Italians of supporting the Greek royalists and of 
intriguing with the Yugoslavs for a possible advance on Salonica and seizure of the 
Ionian islands in the event of disorder in Greece. 98 
97 FO 371/9880 Cheetham to FO tel. 149 d. 16 May 1924, Graham to FO no. 452 d. 14 May 1924. 98 MAE Gr&e 78 Marcilly to QO no. 48 d. 22 Feb. 1924; MAE Grýce 59 note by Laroche (from mid- 
1924 director of political affairs) d. 7 Feb. 1924, notes by Peretti de la Rocca d. 13 Feb. 1924 and 1 
Apr. 1924; FO 3 71/10771 Annual Report, Greece, 1924 p. 19; Cassels, Early D iplornacy, pp. 228-30 
(Cassels here surely over-estimates the supposed readiness of the Greeks to join in an attack on 
Turkey and, indeed, the extent of Mussolini's plans at this time). 
Chapter Four 
Stillborn Republic 
April 1924 - June 1925 
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After April 1924 Greek internal politics were marked by great instability and by the 
very conflicts between civilian and military authorities which Venizelos and the 
Foreign Office had predicted would follow the establishment of a republic by decree. 
For example, when Papanastasiou, in an effort to reduce military influence in the 
government, attempted to replace Admiral Koundouriotis, the ad interim president, 
with the veteran Zaimis, he was vigorously opposed by the 'extremist triad' of 
Pangalos, Kondylis and Hadjikyriakos. 1 Papanastasiou's manoeuvres eventually 
failed, not least because the majority which had brought him into office and the 
republic into being was starting to disintegrate. 2This was largely because after the 
resolution of the constitutional question the personal and ideological differences 
between the left and right wings of the Venizelist bloc, exacerbated by economic 
difficulties and social unrest, became more acute. 3Now many politicians who would 
normally have supported the premier against the military appeared more afraid of 
Papanastasiou's supposedly advanced socialist views and radical plans for the 
economy than of a renewed military dictatorship. 4 
In these circumstances, the government, far from being able to forge a consensus 
against militarism, was assailed from all sides by the attacks of various interest 
groups. Within the assembly Papanastasiou came under fire from a group of Epirote 
deputies, complaining at the government's acquiescence in unfavourable decisions of 
the Paris Ambassadors' conference regarding the delimitation of the Greco-Albanian 
border; and from the refugee deputies who felt that the government was not tackling 
their problems with sufficient vigour. 50utside the assembly the government was 
challenged by an upsurge of industrial unrest, sparked off by the seamen of Athens, 
and the subsequent possibility of a general strike. Although Papanastasiou forced the 
I FO 371/9880 Cheetham to FO tel. 142 d. 28 Apr. 1924 and mins., no. 300 d. 2 May 1924 and mins. 
2 FO 371/9880 Cheetham to FO no. 373 d. 31 May 1924. 
3 Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, p. 33. 
4 FO 371/9880 Cheetharn to FO no. 399 d. 14 Jun. 1924; J. K. Campbell and P. O. A. Sherrard, Modern 
Greece (London, Ernest Benn, 1968), p. 133. 
5 FO 371/9880 Cheetham to FO no. 373 d. 31 May, no. 399 d. 14 Jun. 1924, Benfinck to FO no. 457 d. II 
Jul. 1924. For the Albanian border question see DBFP/I/XXVI/107,213-5,218-20,237-9,241-3,276- 
7,281,287-8,360-4. 
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strikers back to work, his nonchalance about the whole affair precipitated a crisis 
when Kondylis seized on the general atmosphere of discontent to bring the military's 
quarrel with the prime minister to a head by resigning as minister of war on 9 June. 6 
This triggered a cabinet crisis when the foreign and finance ministers also resigned 
and for a while it looked as if the government would fall. 7 
Even when, after several anxious days, Papanastasiou succeeded in constructing a 
new cabinet - the key appointment being that of Konstantinos Rentis as foreign 
minister - it seemed unlikely that it would last. Although there was a chance that, 
Kondylis 'having shot his bolt', the military would remain quiet for a time and 
although there was no obvious successor to Papanastasiou, the difficulty he had had 
completing his cabinet had illustrated the disunity of the Venizelists. The government 
limped on into July but was soon faced with a new threat, namely a strike by naval 
officers. This movement was entirely independent of general politics, being directed 
rather against the favouritism of Hadjikyriakos, the minister of marine, in the matter 
of promotions. Although the minister was compelled to resign - which of itself was 
not displeasing to Papanastasiou - the officers made further demands to which the 
government could not yield. 8This crisis, compounded by continuing attacks by 
Epirote and refugee deputies and a heat wave in Athens, led to the defeat of the 
government on a motion of confidence on 20 July amidst tumultuous scenes in the 
chamber - including fist fights between deputies. On the following day Papanastasiou 
resigned. 9 
Papanastasiou was succeeded by the archaeologist Thernistokles Sofoulis, a centrist 
Venizelist, who eventually constructed a cabinet of concentration, excluding only the 
6 FO 371/9880 Cheetharn to FO no. 399 d. 14 Jun. 1924, tel. 160 d. 10 Jun. 1924; FO 371/9891 
Cheetharn to FO no. 401 d. 14 Jun. 1924. 
7 MAE Grýce 59 Marcilly to QO no. 151 d. 26 Jun. 1924. 
8 FO 371/9880 Cheetharn to FO no. 399 d. 14 Jun. 1924 [quoted], tels. 166-7 d. 19 Jun. 1924, no. 422 
d-28 Jun. 1924, Bentinck to FO no. 457 d. II Jul. 1924, tel. 180 d. 16 Jul. 1924. 
9 FO 371/9880 Bentinck to FO tel. 184 d. 21 Jul. 1924, no. 481 d. 26 Jul. 1924. 
116 
Republican Union and including five military figures. '() Although his avowed policy 
was cautious and pragmatic - economy at home and moderation in foreign affairs - 
and won general assent in the assembly, his position was always tenuous. " He solved 
the problem of the naval strike by conceding the officers' demands and allowing them 
to resume their posts without punishment; but this display of weakness only provoked 
a backlash from the minority of non-striking naval officers led by Captain Kolialexis, 
commander of the Greek flagship Averoff. 12By 21 August this section of the navy 
was in open mutiny, and for some time it looked as though all the larger ships would 
join the revolt. Sofoulis now panicked and called in Hadjikyriakos, protector of the 
rebels, to mediate. 13 The admiral managed to persuade the mutineers to submit to the 
government's authority, largely by promising them leave, but Sofoulis' position had 
been weakened. It was now clear that he owed his survival only to the army leaders, 
who had chosen to remain loyal, and to Hadjikyriakos himself - an impression which 
was confirmed by the exceptionally mild punishments handed out to the mutineers in 
September. 14The obvious inadequacy of Sofoulis' government in the face of these 
problems led to demands within the Venizelist bloc for an all-party government to 
settle the fundamental problems of the Greek economy and administration, confronted 
with which Sofoulis resigned on 1 October. 15 
-16 
With the question of recognition settled, British and French diplomats in Athens had 
only to observe the course of Greek politics in these months. Both Cheetham and 
Marcilly had hoped at first that the new republic might prove stable; the 
disappearance of iconic figures like Venizelos and Constantine, who had always 
impeded reconciliation, might make possible a general entente of all political factions 
10 FO 371/9880 Bentinck to FO no. 482 d. 26 Jul. 1924; Llewellyn Smith, Ionian Vision, p. 342; 
Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, pp. 26,33. Marcilly states that there were only four military 
members (MAE Grece 59 Marcilly to QO no. 173 d. I Aug. 1924). 
11 FO 3 71/9880 Bentinck to FO no. 513 d. 8 Aug. 1924. 
12 FO 371/9880 Bentinck to FO no. 513 d. 8 Aug. 1924, no. 534 d. 20 Aug. 1924. 
13 FO 371/9880 Dunbar (Athens) to FO tels. 199-201 d. 23 Aug. 1924 and mins., Knight (consul at rý C$ Corfu) to FO tel. 8 d. 23 Aug. 1924, tel. 9 d. 24 Aug. 1924, Bentinck to FO no. 545 d. 25 Aug. 1924. 
14 FO 371/9880 Bentinck to FO no. 545 d. 25 Aug. 1924, no. 578 d. 6 Sept. 1924; MAE Gr6rce 59 
Marcilly to QO no. 193 d. 25 Aug. 1924. 
15 FO 371/9880 Cheetham to FO no. 632 d. I Oct. 1924. 
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based on acceptance of and participation in the new regime. 16However, these hopes 
were soon dashed, and both men reported with gloom the failure of the politicians to 
emancipate themselves from the influence of the military and to create a legitimate 
foundation for the republic. Papanastasiou's majority was so uncertain, given the 
squabbles of the factions in the assembly, that no progress could be made towards 
elaborating a constitution or holding elections, and the cabinet seemed only to follow 
events rather than govern. 17Worse, it was clear that Pangalos and Kondylis, far from 
having abandoned political intrigue, were both scheming to wrest power from the 
politicians when an opportunity aroSe. 18 Marcilly identified a deeper malaise: the 
naval strike had arisen purely because of the officers' concern for their personal 
advantage, and pointed to a total absence of any public or civic spirit in Greek 
society. 19 
The naval mutiny had provided an illustration of another Greek characteristic: 
dependence on foreigners. At the height of the crisis, with Kolialexis threatening to 
turn the Averoffs guns on Athens, the Greeks approached both the British and French 
legations separately, asking them to send warships to Phaleron bay to disarm the 
mutineers and arrest Kolialexis by force. Naturally, this request was refused, but it 
seemed to London to demonstrate how the military was making 'any political 
government impossible'. 20 When Sofoulis was later attacked in the press for these 
actions he saw fit to issue an official dgmenti which confirmed Bentinck's impression 
that the government had 'completely lost their heads' and 'in true Greek style foreign 
and especially British interventioft was requested to settle an entirely internal affair'. 21 
16 FO 371/9880 Cheetham to FO no. 422 d. 28 Jun. 1924; MAE Grýce 59 Marcilly to QO no. 89 d. 16 
Apr. 1924. 
17 FO 371/9880 Cheetham to FO no. 300 d. 2 May 1924; MAE Grýce 59 Marcilly to QO no. 95 d. 24 
Apr. 1924, no. 151 d. 26 Jun. 1924, no. 171 d. 30 Jul. 1924; FO 371/10771 Annual Report, Greece, 1924 
pp. 9-10. 
18 MAE Gr6ce 59 Marcilly to QO no. 208 d. 16 Sept. 1924; FO 371/9880 Bentinck to FO tel. 178 d. 14 
Jul. 1924. 
19 MAE Gr&e 59 Marcilly to QO no. 193 d. 25 Aug. 1924. 
20 FO 371/9880 Bentinck to FO no. 578 d. 6 Sept. 1924, Dunbar to FO tels. 199-200 d. 23 Aug. 1924, FO 
to Bentinck tel. 86 d. 23 Aug. 1924, min. by Nicolson d. 23 Aug. 1924 [quoted]; MAE Gr&e 59 
Marcilly to QO no. 193 d. 25 Augy. 1924. C 21 FO 371/9880 Bentinck to FO no. 578 d. 6 Sept. 1924. 
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None of these proceedings fostered optimism in the Foreign Office about the future of 
Greece. 
Despite the political chaos in Greece, and general Allied indifference to it, there was 
still a certain amount of manoeuvring for influence between the British and the 
French. In July, Bentinck, acting as charge while Cheetham was on leave'22 reported 
his fears that the Greek government was about to ask Paris to send a new military 
mission to Greece. The previous foreign missions to Greece had been terminated by 
the revolutionaries in 1923 as an economy measure, and Bentinck believed the 
request for a mission might portend a re-orientation of Greek foreign policy. 
Although recent Greek governments had sought to maintain a balance between 
Britain and France, he recalled the strenuous efforts made by the revolutionaries to 
win back the friendship of France ('whose hostility was a more potent factor than 
British friendship') and pointed to the recent appointments to key positions of notable 
francophiles (such as the new minister in Paris and new director general of the foreign 
ministry) as signs that the Greeks might throw Britain over altogether. 23 
Bentinck's fears perhaps arose from his own francophobia, and his despatch caused no 
undue alarm in the Foreign Office. Nicolson did not think it mattered 'overmuch to us 
whether the French do or do not flirt with Greece'. He trusted 
that we shall not be inveigled into any competitive action. The Greeks would 
dearly love to play off France against ourselves and thereby to receive 
increased attention and assistance from both. But Greece, during the next few 
years, will remain in a very unstable and nervous condition and no harm will 
be done if the close relations which have so long existed between us are 
temporarily, and pending Greece's revival, relaxed. In the last resort she will, 
as a maritime nation, pay more attention to us than she will to France. 
Meanwhile we can wait and watch. 24 
22 Cheetham was on leave from 1 July to 14 September 1924. 
23 FO 371/9891 Bentinck to FO no. 468 d. 17 Jul-1924. The new Greek minister in Paris was said by 
Bentinck to be'more French than Greek'. 
24 FO 3 )71/9891 min. by Nicolson d. 6 Aug. 1924. This minute was approved by Crowe. 
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This confidence in Britain's position was all the more striking as it was expressed by 
Nicolson, who in 1923 had been the most concerned in the Foreign Office at 
supposed French intrigues in Greece. 
This policy prescription was on the whole consistently pursued, but it soon transpired 
that in certain circumstances, especially where wider policy considerations were 
involved, the British would act to exert their influence in Greece. In September, the 
Greeks asked London to send a British admiral to Athens to report on the condition of 
the Hellenic navy and to prepare the way for a permanent naval mission, and made an 
analogous request in Paris regarding the Greek army. 25The response of the Foreign 
Office was entirely favourable, and in a memorandum to the cabinet of 30 September 
Crowe set out the arguments for meeting the Greek request. In general terms, such 
missions brought a 'considerable advantage to British political and strategic interests', 
but in this instance there were more powerful considerations. The French 
government, who were 'endeavouring to bring [Greece] within their own orbit'had 
already agreed to the Greek request, and if Britain refused the Greeks would turn to 
them for help in reorganising their navy also. This would be both 'generally 
undesirable' and 
particularly inconvenient at a moment when we are endeavouring to 
discourage these small states from all unnecessary armament programmes. 
The French have already managed to induce the Greek government, in spite of 
our opposition, to purchase two submarines, and it is to be feared that if our 
influence in Greek naval matters is to be superseded by French influence, the 
Greek government will be encouraged to place further orders in France and 
build up a navy in excess of their actual needS. 26 
In other words this was a special case, where Nicolson's policy prescription did not 
apply. The presence of a British naval mission was desirable not to win contracts for 
British firms or to block French influence, but rather to hinder the militarism which 
25 FO '371/9891 Kak-lamanos to FO no. 2737.1.24 d. 24 Sept. 1924; MAE Grece 26 Melas (Paris) to QO 
no. 4231 d. 8 Sept. 1924. 
26 FO 371/9891 draft memorandum by Crowe UO Sept. 1924 enclosed in Nicolson to Hankey p. l. d. 2 
Oct. 1924. Crowe's contention that the British opposed the Greek plan to buy two submarines was 
extremely disingenuous. 
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French influence would have encouraged. In this instance, intervention was more 
likely to secure Britain's long term goals of peace and stability than abstention. 
In Athens Cheetham. had his own rather more parochial reasons for supporting the 
idea of a new naval mission. Recently he had found the promotion of British trading 
interests in Greece an increasingly difficult task; throughout 1924 British firms, and 
especially armament firms, had been very unsuccessful in winning orders, almost all 
of which went to French finns whose prices were lower owing to government 
subsidies and the depreciation of the franc. 271t was particularly galling that the 
'C-- 
Fiemch were now even securing naval contracts, which had hitherto been a British 
preserve. For Cheetham this was a matter of prestige as much as anything else, but he 
felt that a British naval mission would ensure that the contracts would go to British 
firms, even if their tenders were not the loweSt. 28The Foreign Office accepted 
Cheetham's arguments that a French monopoly of such contracts was undesirable, and 
agreed that unless a naval mission was sent it would be difficult to persuade the 
Greeks to buy British mat6riel against pressure from their French advisers. 29 
Although Crowe had emphasised broader considerations of principle to the cabinet, 
these rather more self-interested motives pointed in the same direction. 
The cabinet discussed the matter on 6 October and agreed, in view of the unanimous 
opinion of the Foreign Office and Admiralty, to grant the Greek request, with the 
proviso that the admiral selected should be careful to stress the importance of 
financial stringency to the Greeks. 30 Eventually, Vice-Admiral Sir Richard Webb was 
selected as the British adviser, and he arrived in Athens on 8 December to prepare the 
way for the permanent naval mission which was sent the next year. 31 
27 FO 371/10764 Cheetham, to FO no. 740 d. 19 Dec. 1924 and mins. 
28 FO 371/9891 Cheetham to FO no. 613 d. 22 Sept. 1924. 
29 FO 371/9891 mins. by Bateman, Howard Smith and Nicolson d. 30 Sept. 1924. 
30 CAB 2'-'5/48/52(24). 
31 FO 371/9891 Admiralty to FO no. M. 01 848/24 d. 7 Nov. 1924, Cheetham to FO no. 729 d. 8 
Dec. 1924. 
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In fact, the ultimate aim of French policy was not all that inimical to British interests. 
True, the French hoped to use a new military mission to increase their political and 
economic influence: even though earlier in the year they had begun to use political 
pressure over contracts they were as exasperated as the British over financial matters - 
although many important orders had been placed with French firms, Marcilly had had 
no more luck than Cheetham in persuading the Greeks to settle outstanding claims, 
and it was hoped that the presence of the mission might help to remedy this. For 
Marcilly, however, the essential point was that the Greek army was in such a pitiful 
state as actually to constitute a threat to Balkan peace, since Greece was a standing 
temptation to her powerful and ambitious neighbours. It was therefore essential that 
the army be reorganised, if only as a means of consolidating that peace in the Balkans 
which French interests demanded. 32A military mission was eventually sent early in 
1925 under General Girard, and although it did aim at expanding French economic 
and political influence in Greece'33 in so far as it also aimed at promoting stability, it 
was not in conflict with British interests. 
In the event, the British continued to fall behind in the competition for arms contracts, 
even after the naval mission was sent. The Greeks continued to award contracts to the 
more competitive French firms, which were also strongly supported by Paris. In 
contrast, the Department of Overseas Trade discouraged British firms from investing 
in Greece, because of the high risk involved, and the Trade Facilities Act was 
inapplicable to arms contractS. 34 In Athens, too, whereas French representatives 
aggressively promoted their national firms, sometimes by rather underhand methods, 
British policy was hamstrung by conflicting considerations. On the one hand, London Z: ý 
32 MAE Grýce 59 Marcilly to QO no. 173 d. I Aug. 1924; MAE Gr&e 26 Marcilly to QO no. 4 d. 9 
Jan. 1924. The French had heard rumours in January that the Greeks would seek another military 
mission, and it was then that Marcilly had made these comments. Paris took steps in settling the 
details of the new military mission to ensure that it should not end up entangling the French in Greek 
internal politics, which was felt to be a real danger given the political activities of many Greek 
generals (MAE Gr&e 26 note by Laroche d. 8 Sept. 1924, QO to Ministýre de Guerre no. 1811 d. 9 
Sept. 1924, note by Laroche d. 16 Sept. 1924). 
33 MAE Gr6ce 27 note by Du Sault d. 22 Jan. 1925, Chambrun to QO tel. 23 d. 19 Feb. 1925. 
34 FO 371/10764 Cheetham to FO no. 740 d. 19 Dec. 1924 and mins.; FO 371/11345 FO to Cheetharn 
no. 387 U Jun. 19. 16. 
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deprecated Greece buying arms at all, because of the effect on the feeble Greek 
economy and the dangers of militarism; on the other hand, the prospect of lucrative 
contracts was tempting given economic conditions at home. This led to 
inconsistencies, which were seized on by the French. For example, Cheetharn might 
one day be enjoining strict economy on the Greeks, and the next urging them to buy 
British torpedoes. London swung between wanting to prevent the Greeks purchasing 
any arms, and trying to ensure that if they were determined to buy them they should 
do so from Britain. The net result was that British policy fell between two stools and 
French firms stepped in and won the majority of arms contracts. In 1926 Foreign 
Office officials debated this issue and tried to lay down a coherent policy on anns 
sales to Greece, but in the face of these conflicting considerations resigned themselves 
to continuing to treat each case on its own merits. 35 
In the case of contracts for reconstruction and development work, the British were 
slightly more successful, even though here they faced stiff competition also from 
American firmS. 36For instance, in 1925 a group of British firms won a contract for 
the supply of electric power and light to Athens and its environs, and it was 
significant that this group was given political support by the British government and 
backed financially by the Trade Facilities Committee. 37 However, all such contracts 
could be affected by the vagaries of Greek internal politics, as successive 
governments sought to cancel or amend contracts awarded by their predecessors. 38 
One notorious case occurred in 1923 when the contract to rebuild Piraeus harbour, 
which had been promised to a British firm, was eventually awarded to a French one. 39 
35 For this debate see FO 371/11345 Dept. of Overseas Trade to FO no. 14901FE d. 25 May 1926 and 
encls. and mins., FO to Cheetham. no. 387 d. 3 Jun. 1926. See also FO 371/11351 mins. by Harvey d. 7 
May 1926, Howard Smith d. 7 May 1926. 
36 The r6le of American capital in Greece is discussed in Cassimatis, Anwrican Influence, pp. 150- 
200. See also FO 371/10771 Annual Report, Greece, 1924 pp. 41-5 and FO 371/11357 Annual Report, 
Greece, 1925 [enclosed in Cheetham to FO no. 183 d. 6 May 19261 pp. 45-6,54-6. 
37 FO 371/11357 Annual Report, Greece, 1925 pp. 54-5. The British Treasury were guarantors of the 
bond capital of this project. 
38 This in fact happened to the electrical contract in 1926 when the Pangalos government fell from 
power: FO 371/12178 Annual Report, Greece, 1926 [enclosed in Loraine to FO no. 155 d. 14 
Apr. 1927] pp. 10- 11. 
39 FO 371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 pp. 60-1. 
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In the questions of outstanding claims and legislation adversely affecting foreign 
subjects in Greece, the British had less cause for complaint, if only because the 
Greeks treated every other state in an equally shabby manner. Ceaseless 
representations were made by British, French and Italian diplomats regarding these 
matters, but although the Greeks always received them sympathetically little progress 
was apparent. In part this could be explained by a genuine lack of funds, but British 
diplomats were always amazed that given their weak and isolated situation the Greeks 
were so unwilling to give satisfaction on these points. 40 
In a sense it was the very even-handedness and fairness of British policy which led to 
disappointments in the economic field. As one Foreign Office official wrote early in 
1925, it was precisely because the British had proved so helpful over organising and 
funding the refugee loan that the Greeks 'felt assured ... that we love them & so they 
concentrate their energies on attempting to convert others, of whose feelings they are 
less certain, to the same happy state'. 41 This conviction that British goodwill could be 
taken for granted made the Greeks more susceptible to the blandishments and 
inducements offered by the French, 42especially when the British were sometimes 
reluctant to use the levers they did possess. In 1925, for example, the Greeks sought 
British consent, under the 1918 financial agreement, to the assignment of security to a 
loan for the development of the Athens water supply. The Treasury wanted to make 
this consent dependent upon the early settlement of the Greek war debt and 
outstanding British claims, but the Foreign Office refused to agree to this 'blackmail', 
not least because of the obvious humanitarian necessity of the water scheme. 43 
Similarly, in 1927, when a second refugee loan was mooted, the Treasury proposed 
40 FO 371/10764 Cheetham to FO no. 740 d. 19 Dec. 1924 and mins.; FO 371/10771 Annual Report, 
Greece, 1924 pp. 38-9,44-5; FO 371/11357 Annual Report, Greece, 1925 p. 5; FO 371/12178 Annual 
Report, Greece, 1926 pp. 47-8. An example of such legislation was a decree expropriating without 
indemnity land held by foreign subjects upon which refugees were then settled. 
41 FO 371/10764 min. by McEwen d. 7 Jan. 1925. 
42 FO 371/10764 Cheetham to FO no. 740 d. 19 Dec. 1924. 
43 FO 371/10764 Treasury to FO no. F. 6172 d. 28 May 1925 and mins., min. by Nicolson d. 5 Jun. 1925 
[quoted], Nicolson to Leith-Ross (Treasury) no. (C7241/114/19) d. 15 Jun. 1925. The Foreign Office 
was also nervous about blocking this loan because of doubts over the continuing validity of the 1918 
agreement and because the loan was to be made by an American firm who would doubtless be 
supported by the State Department. This was indeed the case: FRUS/1925/II/286-93. 
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holding it up until after a war debt settlement, but Chamberlain again demurred. 440n 
all these occasions Britain's desire to see Greece reconstructed, stable and prosperous 
- in line with Britain's long term policy aims - over-rode more short term, self- 
interested considerations and produced frustration. 45 
By the time Vice-Admiral Webb arrived in Greece, Sofoulis' successor, Andreas 
Michalakopoulos had been in power for just two months. Michalakopoulos, a lawyer 
from Patras, leader of the conservative republicans and the most articulate figure of 
the Venizelist right, had formed his cabinet on 7 October, excluding only the 
Republican Union. 46 Of all Venizelos' possible heirs, he was the least objectionable to 
the royalists and the most likely to achieve some measure of reconciliation. Initially 
he was well received by the Greek press, which argued that his experience as Greece's 
delegate to the League had inculcated him with western values and a regard for the 
constitution. His declared programme was limited and gave cause for optimism: he 
sought to complete the drafting of the republican constitution and then to hold 
electionS. 47 
Michalakopoulos' position soon deteriorated, however. On 19 November a projected 
military coup was thwarted before it began but it served as an ominous reminder of 
the continuing threat to civil government. 48 Worse, the debates in the assembly on the 
constitution proceeded very slowly, hampered by interminable quarrels between the 
various republican factionS. 49Further threats to the government came from abroad. In 
September the Greeks signed a protocol with the Bulgarians at Geneva, intended to 
reduce the friction caused by the perennial problems of refugees, minorities and 
terrorist bands. However, the Yugoslavs seized on this as a pretext to press on the ZID 
44 Orde, Reconstruction, pp. 287-8,297-8. 
45 In this context one could perhaps qualify the characterisation of British policy as disinterested - 
this seems rather to be a case of long-term goals taking precedence over short-term advantage, not 
pure disinterest. 
46 FO 371/9880 Cheetharn to FO no. 652 d. 15 Oct. 1924, no. 660 d. 16 Oct. 1924. 
47 FO 371/9880 Cheetharn to FO no. 660 d. 16 Oct. 1924; MAE Gr6ce 59 Marcilly to QO no. 224 d. 9 
Oct. 1924. 
48 FO 371/9880 Cheetharn to FO tel. 251 d. 21 Nov. 1924, no. 712 d. 25 Nov. 1924. 
49 FO 371/98 80 Cheetharn to FO no. 704 d. 14 Nov. 1924, no. 713 d. 25 Nov. 1924, no. 727 d. 5 
Dec. 1924. 
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Greeks a whole host of issues relating to their free zone at Salonica and in November 
denounced the Greco-Yugoslav alliance. This only made Greece's diplomatic 
isolation more acute. 50 
True, Michalakopoulos could claim some successes. In December the League refugee 
loan was finally raised, providing E12,300,000 for long term settlement. This scheme 
had nearly come to grief earlier in the year when political instability and rumours that 
Papanastasiou, under pressure from the military, was to embark on extravagant 
armament expenditure had alarmed the international financiers. However, because of 
the obvious humanitarian need for the loan and thanks to the tireless work of 
Morgenthau, a second Bank of England advance was secured in May, and after 
lengthy negotiations between the powers and at Geneva the loan was offered to the 
public in December. Unfortunately for Michalakopoulos even this achievement did 
not help his position. The terms of the loan were considered onerous and began to 
attract much criticism in the Greek press, where the alien presence of the RSC was 
also resented. 51 Consequently, by the end of the year Michalakopoulos had still not 
really established himself in office, nor made much progress with his limited 
programme for the consolidation of the republic, and his government's majority in the 
assembly was distinctly unstable. 52 
In London, too, there had been a change of government when Baldwin's second 
cabinet took office in November, with Austen Chamberlain as foreign secretary. This 
did not, however, herald any change of policy towards lowly Greece, just as the 
advent of Edouard Herriot's government in France in June had not affected French 
Greek policy. The mood in the Foreign Office was generally one of pessimism - in 
December it was clear that 'we are yet a long way from solid government in Greece' - 
50 DBFP/I/XXVI/85-6,289,292-4,310,322-6,330,349-50,376-7,398-404,409-14,422-3,433-6,445,461- 
3,466-8. These subjects are dealt with in more detail in chapters 9- 11 below. 
51 For this whole issue, see FO 371/9887 file 545 passim, and FO 371/9888-9890 file 1900 passim; 
Morgenthau, International Drama, pp. 161-211; Cassimatis, American Influence, pp. 135-65; 
Pentzopoulos, Balkan Exchange, pp. 85-92; Ladas, Exchange, pp. 633-5; League of Nations, Greek 
Refugee Settlement (Translation) 1I Economic and Financial 1926 H 32 (Geneva, League of Nations, 
1926) pp. 7-12,198-200. 
52 FO 371/9880 CheeEham to FO no. 713 d. 25 Nov. 1924. 
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and French observers agreed that the government was still not very democratic but 
that all foreign governments could do was watch and Wait. 53 The British and French 
were at least on reasonably good terms with Greece, whereas Italo-Greek relations 
were still frosty. The concrete political issue of the Dodecanese remained as an 
obstacle to rapprochement, and all the overtures of the Italian minister Brambilla 
were rebuffed. 54 
One problem which caused some concern in the Foreign Office at this time was the 
, apparent spread of communism in Greece. Industrial unrest, the handmaiden of 
economic dislocation, had been widespread in Greece ever since the Asia Minor 
disaster but in the latter part of 1924 such unrest, according to Cheetham's reports, 
seemed to be increasingly communist-inspired. 55Activists of the Greek communist 
party, the KKE, were apparently agitating with much success amongst the trade 
unions, reservist leagues and the refugee communities, and there was a suspicion that 
their activity was being co-ordinated by the Soviet legation in Athens, established 
after diplomatic relations were restored in June 1924.56The legation, with a staff of 
seventy-eight, 'entirely out of proportion to the ordinary diplomatic interests of 
Russia', could in Cheetham's eyes 'only be regarded as a Soviet centre for the 
conversion of Greece'. 57There was some truth in this, for in 1924 the Comintern did 
indeed redouble its efforts in the Balkans, and the KKE was purged of dissidents and 
subjected to thorough 'bolshevisation'. The Comintem's efforts met with most success 
in Bulgaria, but also had some effect in Greece. 58 
53 FO 371/9880 min. by McEwen d. 9 Dec. 1924; MAE Grýce 78 Marcilly to QO no. 216 d. 27 
Sept. 1924. 
54 FO 371/10771 Annual Report, Greece, 1924 pp. 19-20. 
55 FO 371/9891 Cheetharn to FO no. 700 d. 12 Nov. 1924. See also the sections devoted to communism 
in FO 371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 pp. 25-6 and FO 371/10771 Annual Report, Greece, 
1924 pp. 21-2. 
56 FO 371/9891 Cheetharn to FO no. 734 d. 1 I Dec. 1924. For the history of the KKE in this period see 
D. G. Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat. The Story of the Greek Communist Party (London, Oxford 
University Press, 1965), pp. 1-72. On the question of Greco-S oviet relations, see B. Kondis, The Re- 
establishment of Greek-Soviet Relations in 1924', Balkan Studies 26(l) 1985 151-7 and 
A. L. Zapands, Greek-Soviet Relations, 1917-1941 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1982), 
pp. I- 146. 
57 FO 371/9891 Cheetharn to FO no. 700 d. 12 Nov. 1924. 
58 Kousoulas, Revo littion, pp. 12-2 1; Zapantis, Greek-Soviet Relations, pp. 140-80. 
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At first the Foreign Office discounted Cheetham's warnings on the grounds that 
Greece, as a nation of rabid individualists, would never be a fertile field for Soviet 
propaganda; but by November information from Russian sources indicated that 'the 
Bolsheviks have more or less abandoned their activities in Germany (as unprofitable) 
and are now concentrating on the Balkans'. 59 By December the rumours had reached 
the proportions of a scare, and Crowe conceded that the situation in Greece was 
'getting serious'. 60 Although Greece was not herself ripe for a communist take-over, 
activists there would probably paralyse the bourgeois government in the event of a 
communist rising in Bulgaria. 61 
The problem for London was that, although on one level the threat of communist 
subversion seemed serious, the Balkan governments were always ready to use the 
communist bogey as a cover for ulterior motives. For example, the Bulgarians 
throughout 1924 tried to persuade the powers to sanction an increase in the size of 
their army (strictly limited by the treaty of Neuilly) in order to meet the threat of a 
supposedly imminent communist uprising. Despite evidence of the growth of 
communism in Bulgaria, London always responded sceptically and in the event the 
revolt never materialised. 62 Another danger was that Balkan statesmen would use 
communism as an excuse to oppress their political opponents or ethnic minorities. 
During the scare in December itself, Chamberlain noted that the Yugoslav foreign 
minister, Nincic, was 'greatly concerned about Bolshevik activities in the Balkans', 
but that he seemed 'to find a Bolshevik wherever he saw an opponent; Radic, the 
leader of the Croatians, was often tarred with this brush. 63 All in all, London was 
disinclined to take any action about these troubles in the Balkans, beyond instructions 
to all British legations there to observe carefully and report any developments. 64 
59 FO 371/9891 mins. by McEwen d. 1 Oct. 1924, Lampson d. 27 Nov. 1924 [quoted], Howard Smith 
d-19 Dec. 1924. 
60 FO 371/9891 min. by Crowe d. 20 Dec. 1924. 
61 FO 371/10771 Annual Report, Greece, 1924 p. 22. 
62 For Bulgarian efforts in this direction, see chapter 9 below. They raised the issue again during this 




As far as Greece was concerned, Lampson was correct in his view that the 
government there had I the situation in hand' . 
650ver the next few years, thanks partly 
to government repression (Pangalos was to outlaw the KKE in 1926) and partly to the 
organisational. deficiencies of the KKE itself, communism remained a very minor 
political force in Greece. 661ndeed, its real significance was that for governments it 
was 'a good dog to beat': government repression was really aimed at working up a 
scare about communist subversion to rally bourgeois elements, and in private 
politicians admitted that the communist threat was negligible. 67 
Meanwhile, as 1925 started, Michalakopoulos' position remained uncertain. In 
January Roussos, the foreign minister, resigned as a scapegoat for the Bulgarian 
minorities protocol which had caused so much trouble with Belgrade. 
Michalakopoulos offered the post to Athos Romanos, a noted royalist, in a move 
interpreted as an advance towards moderate opinion. Romanos, however, refused the 
post and the premier temporarily assumed the portfolio himself in view of the 
impending negotiations with Yugoslavia for the renewal of the alliance. It was not 
until March that Michalakopoulos succeeded in forming his first complete cabinet, 
and only then did his position begin to look reasonably secure. 68 
Unfortunately, Michalakopoulos' attempts to deal with Greece's internal and external 
problems in a spirit of moderation were obstructed by vested interests and the chronic 
weakness of the Greek economy and political system. The negotiations with 
Yugoslavia, begun in February, soon became deadlocked because the Yugoslavs 
advanced exorbitant demands concerning access to Salonica. Indeed, these demands 
65 FO 371/9891 min. by Lampson d. 26 Dec. 1924. 
66 FO 371/11357 Annual Report, Greece, 1925 pp. 26-8; FO 371/12178 Annual Report, Greece, 1926 
pp. 20-2; Kousoulas, Revolution, pp. 17-22,50-3,62-3. Kousoulas puts the relative failure of the KKE 
in the 1920s down to its stand on the Macedonian question (where it supported Macedonian 
autonomy) and a 'blind attachment to communist slogans forced on [it] by the Comintern' 
(Revolution, p. 40). 
67 FO 371/11346 Cheetham to FO no. 10 d. 7 Jan. 1926, min. by Harvey d. 19 Jan. 1926 [quoted], 
Cheetham to FO no. 120 d. 23 Mar. 1926. 
68 FO 371/10768 Cheetham to FO no. 31 d. 19 Jan. 1925, no. 92 d. 9 Mar. 1925; FO 371/11357 Annual 
Report, Greece, 1925 p. 2. Romanos had been Greek minister in Paris in 1924 but had resigned when 
the plebiscite result became known (MAE Grece 59 note by Peretti de la Rocca d. I Apr. 1924). 
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aroused fears that Belgrade aspired to annex Salonica and much of Greek Macedonia, 
and negotiations were adjourned sine die on 1 June, leaving Greco-Yugoslav relations 
in a state of some tension. 69Relations with Turkey were equally problematical: earlier 
in the year a long standing dispute over the status of the Greek Patriarchate at 
Constantinople had plunged Greco-Turkish relations to a newloW. 70 At the same 
time, Mich alakopoulos' attempts to cope with the nation's economic ills were 
provoking internal opposition. His prudent attempts, following British advice, to cut 
military expenditure and to direct funds to reconstruction were annoying the army, 
whilst continuing financial dislocation was alienating middle class opinion which 
increasingly began to lay the blame for Greece's economic troubles on the 
parliamentary system itself. 71 There was some justice in this, since the constituent 
assembly had now been sitting since January 1924 but had still not devised a new 
constitution; and the fact that the prime minister could not secure the passing of even 
such vital legislation reflected both inter-factional squabbling and his own lack of 
authority. 72 
These circumstances, together with continuing industrial unrest, combined to produce 
the perfect climate for a military CoUp. 73 On 10 June the resignation from the cabinet 
of the republican strongman Kondylis fatally weakened the premier's position; and on 
24 June, in a not unexpected move, General Pangalos took control of Athens with the 
69 DBFP/I/XXVII/27-31,52-4,113,138-9,176-8,189-92,196-200,205-9. See also chapter II below. 
70 For this question in general, see FO 371/11357 Annual Report, Greece, 1925 pp. 14-23; 
A. P. Alexandris, 'The Expulsion of Constantine VI: the Ecumenical Patriarchate and Greek-Turkish 
Relations, 1924-1925', Balkan Studies 22(2) 1981333-63; Psomiades, The Eastern Question: the Last 
Phase, pp. 87-105. According to the convention of 1923, Greek inhabitants of Constantinople were to 
be exempted from the exchange of minorities, provided that they had been resident there since before 
1918. The Turks tried to argue that almost all the members of the synod of the Patriarchate did not 
come into this category and were therefore liable to be exchanged: in January 1925 the Patriarch 
himself was expelled from Turkey on this basis. For a while afterwards the situation was very tense, 
and in February the Greeks appealed to the League. By June, however, a compromise agreement was 
reached, a new Patriarch - less objectionable to the Turks - was elected and the threat to the Patriarchate receded. 
71 FO 371/10768 Colonial Office to FO no. 6417/25 d. 2 Jul. 1925; Campbell and Sherrard, Modern 
Greece, pp. 13 3 -4. 72 FO 371/10768 Cheetham to FO no. 214 d. 8 Jul. 1925; MAE Gr6ce 60 Chambrun to QO no. 56 d. 8 
May 1925. 
73 H. J. Psomiades, 'The Diplomacy of Theodoros Pangalos, 1925-1926', Balkan Studies 13 (1) 1972 1- 
2. 
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assistance of Hadjikyriakos and the navy, on the next day compelling the government 
to resign. 74So inured were the Greek people to military intervention in politics and so 
discredited had the politicians become that the coup, though 'confessedly a military 
pronunciamento'and in no sense a popular revolution, was quietly accepted 
throughout Greece. 75 
The British mourned Michalakopoulos' passing, if only, as Cheetham argued, because 
his government had been in power a comparatively long time. He had acted with 
moderation in internal politics and had also looked likely to gain the confidence of 
Europe. 76By the same token, Nicolson was concerned at'the low moral and 
intellectual quality'of the men now likely to come to power: Pangalos had'for long 
been a thorn in the side of civil government', Kondylis was 'ignorant, violent and 
unscrupulous' and Hadjikyriakos was 'a little mad'. Nicolson was especially worried 
that the coup had come at a time when Greece was menaced from abroad, since it was 
possible thatthese hot-heads will mobilize and place some divisions on the Vardar: 
this may well give M. Nincic the excuse which he has long been waiting for' to march 
on Salonica. Even if such foreign adventures were avoided, the British would have to 
try and prevent the generals embarking on extravagant spending sprees for armaments 
which would of themselves threaten peace and wreck the fragile Greek economy. 77 
Others in the Foreign Office were less certain about Pangalos' motives or intentions. 
In McEwen's view, despite his high profile in recent years, his political opinions were 
I hard to define: 'he is bitterly anti-royalist & he has overthrown a republican cabinet . 
Personal rather than political ambition might be his motive and probably 'it would be 
nearest the truth to say that he believes in a strong gov[emmenlt first & foremost with 
himself as the source of its strength'. 781n any event, there was no need for Britain to 
take any action. Nicolson suggested warning Pangalos that he could not claim 
74FO 371/10768 Keeling (chargd at Athens) to FO tel. 100d. 11 Jun. 1925, Cheetham to FO no. 195 
d. 22 Jun. 1925, tel. 107 d. 25 Jun. 1925, unno. tel. d. 26 Jun. 1925. 75 FO 371/10768 min. by Nicolson d. 25 Jun. 1925; DBFP/I/XXVII/209. 76 FO 371/10768 Cheetharn to FO no. 214 d. 8 Jul. 1925 77 FO 371/10768 mins. by Nicolson d. 25 and 26 Jun. 1925. 78 FO 371/10768 min. by McEwen d. 26 Jun. 1925. 
131 
a 
financial liberty for Greece nor ignore her existing international obligations, but 
Chamberlain preferred simply to wait and see how the situation developed. 79 
The French pursued a similar policy. Their influence had been growing in Greece 
during 1925 after the replacement in January of Marcilly. (According to Cheetham7 
admittedly no admirer of Marcilly, the late envoy's hectoring, high-handed manner 
and unsociability had apparently begun to alienate the Greeks. )80 His successor, 
Comte Charles de Chambrun, who had previously served in Turkey and the United 
States and as head of the news department at the Quai d'Orsay, rapidly set out to win 
the confidence of the Greeks. 81 These efforts bore fruit in the shape of a steady flow 
of armaments contracts for French firms. Indeed, Chambrun took it upon himself to 
become 'the general adviser of the Greek Government, especially in Balkan affairs, 
although his conduct here gave the British no real cause for complaint. 82His 
immediate reaction to the coup was a cautious one, given its undemocratic nature, " 
and this attitude was approved by Briand, who had become French foreign minister in 
April. 
The Italians, too, had improved their position in Greece. Brambilla's overtures had 
always been rebuffed in 1924, as Greek public opinion was resolutely hostile to Italy. 
However, after the Yugoslav denunciation of the alliance and the growth of tension 
with Turkey, Michalakopoulos felt it prudent not to alienate Italy. 84 True, the Greeks 
had no illusions about the Italian policy: Rome was strongly suspected of interfering 
in the Greco-Yugoslav negotiations in order to prevent any understanding being 4") 
79 FO 371/10768 mins. by Nicolson, Tyrrell and Chamberlain d. 26 Jun. 1925. 80 FO 371/11346 Cheetham to FO no. 148 d. 6 Apr. 1926; FO 371/11357 Annual Report, Greece, 1925 
p. 24; MAE Grke 78 Charnbrun to QO no. 10 d. 31 Jan. 1925. In fact, Marcilly's reports indicate that he was efficient, realistic, perceptive and quite successful at protecting French interests. 81 FO 371/11346 Cheetham to FO no. 148 d. 6 Apr. 1926; FO 371/11357 Annual Report, Greece, 1925 
p. 24; Comte Charles de Chambrun, Traditions et Souvenirs (Paris, Flammarion, 1952), pp. 68-91. Chambrun later served in Italy during the crises of the 1930s, and this clearly over-shadowed his 
experiences in Greece when he wrote his memoirs. He devotes only five pages to them, one of which 
contains the text of a speech by himself! 82 FO 371/11357 Annual Report, Greece, 1925 pp. 24,32-4,55. 83 MAE Gr6ce 60 Chambrun to QO no. 85 d. 9 Jul. 1925; Chambrun, Souvenirs, pp. 92-3. 84 FO 371/10765 Cheetham to FO no. 115 d. 2 Apr. 1925; FO 371/10765 Annual Report, Greece, 1925 
pp-24-6; DDI/7/Ill/444; DBFP/I/XXVII/208. 
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reached; and Michalakopoulos felt that Mussolini wished to prevent any ententes 
between Balkan states in general and to isolate Greece specifically as a means of 
inducing her to fall in with his ambitions for expansion in Asia Minor. 85There may 
have been some truth in this, even though Italian policy remained somewhat 
ambiguous. At any rate, when the Pangalos coup occurred, the Italians seem to have 
developed hopes of advancing such plans, and Brambilla, on Mussolini's instructions, 
hurried to greet Greece's new rulers. 86 
85 DBFP/I/XXVII/91-2,196-200,205,207-9; DDI/7/III/535. 
86 MAE Grýce 60 Chambrun to QO no. 85 d. 9 Jul. 1925. 
Chapter Five 
The Pangalos Dictatorship 
June 1925 - August 1926 
134 
In the immediate aftermath of the coup, Pangalos was forced to tread warily, for he 
had no developed programme or power base within either the army or the assembly. 
On 27 June he formed a cabinet, with himself as premier and Hadjikyriakos as ad 
interim foreign minister, inaugurating a regime like that of Plastiras after the 1922 
revolution. He did not declare an outright dictatorship, partly from a lack of 
confidence, but also perhaps because he was not a political ideologue, and never 
repudiated democracy per se, only the form it had taken recently in Greece. Instead, 
by 28 June, he was presenting his position as constitutional, claiming that after a 
simple cabinet crisis president Koundouriotis had asked him to form a government; 
and he announced his intention of meeting the assembly on 30 June to seek a 
majority. ' 
In this delicate situation, Papanastasiou, whom Pangalos had earlier considered 
installing as prime minister, offered to deliver the support of the Republican Union 
deputies (thus securing for Pangalos a working majority) if Pangalos would abide by 
certain conditions. Such an arrangement would be of mutual benefit: Pangalos would 
be secure and would not have to resort to outright dictatorship whilst Papanastasiou. 
would be able to exert some moderating influence over him and ensure the retention 
of at least the form of parliamentary democracy. After initially jibbing at any 
restriction of his authority, Pangalos agreed and thereby secured a crushing majority 
in the chamber in the early hours of the morning of 1 JUly. 2 
The collaboration between military and civilian forces was precarious, and this was 
reflected in the conditions to which Pangalos agreed. These terms comprised the 
programme of the Republican Union, aiming at a swift return to normal parliamentary 
life, and there were three main points: firstly, a committee of deputies was to finish 
drafting the constitution (which would be amended and ratified by the assembly in 
October) and new electoral laws; secondly, the assembly was to be converted into an 
I FO 371/11357 Annual Report, Greece, 1925 p. 3; FO 371/10768 Cheetharn to FO unno. tel. d. 26 Jun. 1925, tel. I 10 d. 28 Jun. 1925; Psomiades Balkan Studies 13 2. 2 FO 371/10768 Cheetham to FO tel. 107 d-25 Jun. 1925, unno. tel. d. 26 Jun. 1925, tel. 112 d-30 Jun. 1925, tel. 113 d. I Jul. 1925. 
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ordinary (as opposed to constituent) assembly on 1 November, with elections to 
follow soon after; and thirdly, the government was authorised to issue laws by decree 
during the summer recess, subject to the consent of a special parliamentary 
commission. Although these conditions appeared to tie Pangalos'hands, he insisted 
on a concession on the last point whereby in certain special cases laws could be issued 
by decree without reference to the commission, and these special cases were so 
loosely drafted as to leave Pangalos in theory with almost dictatorial powers. 3 
Although there was no question of de iure recognition, Cheetham established formal 
relations with Pangalos'govemment which was clearly the defacto authority in 
Greece. 4The Foreign Office consensus was that Pangalos would not last long, and yet 
he was not without his apologists in London. 5 Kaklamanos voiced the opinion of 
many Greeks when he told Nicolson on 2 July that he was 'much relieved' by recent 
developments. The deputies in the constituent assembly had become totally 
irresponsible, prolonging their endless discussions in order to draw indefinitely the 
large salary attached to their functions; but Pangalos had forced them to vote their 
own demise in the near future with elections to follow and a good chance of the 
constitution being implemented in the meantime. Greek politics had been 'becoming a 
vicious circle, - and to that extent the change was for the good'. The civilian finance 
minister, Kofinas, could be relied upon to block any extravagant expenditure, and the 
appointment on 2 July of Konstantinos Rentis as foreign minister in succession to 
Hadjikyriakos meant that even the admittedly grave danger of foreign complications 
had now receded. 6 
For the rest of the summer, Pangalos sought to widen the base of his support and 
elaborate his policy. As the majority of Venizelists were hostile to him he began to 
3 FO 371/10768 Cheetham to FO no. 214 d. 8 Jul. 1925; MAE Grke 60 Chambrun to QO no. 85 d. 9 Jul. 1925. 
4 FO 371/10768 min. by Nicolson d. 26 Jun. 1925. In this respect it was all to the good that Cheetharn had not yet presented new credentials, since the previous policy of waiting for a constitution and the 
election of a president could be consistently maintained. 5 For a sceptical view see FO 371/10768 mins. by McEwen d. 26 and 29 Jun. 1925. 6 FO 371/10768 min. by Nicolson d. 2 Jul. 1925, FO to Cheetham no. 402 d. 3 Jul. 1925. 
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conciliate the royalists by appointing Anti-Venizelists to key government positions 
and attacking the liberal press, perhaps in an effort to secure his own safety in the 
event of a future royalist return to power. 7 The royalists were wary, however, and 
Pangalos seemed to be leaving several alternative courses of action open, including 
the proclamation of a dictatorship. 8Certainly, little could be gleaned about his future 
intentions from his policy pronouncements which consisted chiefly of harangues 
against the iniquities of the old parties and vague (and mutually exclusive) promises 
to restore financial soundness and to build up the army and navy. 9 By September the 
government was obviously in difficulties and the widespread belief was that Pangalos 
would soon be removed and replaced by Kondylis whose popularity in the army was 
rising; if he failed to summon the assembly in October he would be ousted by a coup 
and if he did face the chamber he would be voted out and supplanted by Kondylis by 
constitutional means. 10 
At first Pangalos seemed by no means unwilling to face the assembly. By mid- 
September the committee drafting the constitution had completed its labours and 
Pangalos said he would submit it to the chamber for ratification, with elections to 
follow according to Papanastasiou's July timetable. " However, in the space of a 
fortnight Pangalos made a complete volteface. On the night of 29 September at a IM 
special ministerial council Koundouriotis was prevailed upon to sign the constitution, 
which had been amended by Pangalos, and it was published and entered into force 
immediately. A decree law was also issued dissolving the constituent assembly 
forthwith, new elections being scheduled for March 1926.12 The effect of these 
actions, which came as a 'complete surprise', was that the government would rule by 
7 FO 371/10769 Cheetham to FO no. 226 d. 18 Jul. 1925. 8 FO 371/10769 Keeling (chargd at Athens) to FO no. 260 d. 20 Aug. 1925. 9 FO 371/10769 Keeling to FO no. 265 d. 28 Aug. 1925. 1OF0371/10769 Keeling to FOno. 289 d. 11 Sept. 1925; F0371/11357 Annual Report, Greece, 1925 
p. 4. 
FO 371/10769 Keeling to FO no. 29-3 3 d. 15 Sept. 1925. ltý 12 FO 371/10769 Keeling to FO tels. 150-1 d. 30 Sept. 1925. Pangalos suppressed various articles he disliked which had been inserted by Papanastasiou relating to proportional representation, the 
enfranchisement of women and the organisation of the senate (MAE Gr&e 60 Chambrun to QO 
no. 115 d. 25 Sept. 1925, tel. 130 d. 29 Sept. 1925). 
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decree without an assembly for at least six months. 13 Pangalos justified himself by 
arguing that the assembly had lost all prestige in the eyes of the people and that since 
it represented only a fraction of the population (owing to royalist abstention from the 
1923 elections) it was an impediment to that reconciliation of the parties which was 
the cornerstone of the government's policy. 14 
Public opinion was deeply divided in its response. The Anti-Venizelists were jubilant, 
viewing the decrees as another olive branch, like Pangalos'recent agreement in 
principle to the return of Constantine's ashes to Greece; whereas the republicans were 
furious at his tampering with the constitution which they had always regarded as 'their 
own pet lamb'. Moderate Venizelists declared Pangalos' action to be a virtual coup 
d'gtat, and were little mollified when he promised that the amended constitution 
would eventually be submitted to the new assembly for revision and ratification. 15 
The general had at last flexed his dictatorial muscles, but his position remained 
obscure. Although he seemed intent on alienating the republican Venizelists - witness 
his continuing persecution of the liberal and republican press by means of the 
authoritarian Defence of the Regime Act - he was unwilling or unable to throw in his 
lot with the royalists. Rather his declared policy was to dissolve the old party system 
and to create a new mass party drawn from both sides of the schism. 16 In the 
meantime, however, he remained completely dependent on his supporters in the army 
and there were signs that, despite his recent show of strength, his flirtation with the 
royalists was generating disillusion amongst them. 17 
13 FO 371/10769 Keeling to FO tels. 150-1 d. 30 Sept. 1925. 
14 FO 371/10769 Keeling to FO no. 307 d. I Oct. 1925. 
15 FO 371/10769 Keeling to FO no. 265 d. 28 Aug. 1925, tel. 151 UO Sept. 1925, no. 307 d. I Oct. 1925 
[quoted]. 
16 FO 371/10769 Keeling to FO no. 307 d. 1 Oct. 1925, no. 322 d. 16 Oct. 1925; Mavrogordatos, 
Stillborn Republic, p. 33. This act had been introduced in April 1924 and was intended to suppress 
any subversive agitation and prevent the revival of past political passions (Mavrogordatos, Stillborn 0 
Republic, p. 98). Pangalos had amended and strengthened the act after coming to power (FO 371/11334 Cheetham to FO no. 36 d. 27 Jan. 1926). As amended it was 'a monstrous piece of work' 
which 'if enforced would have soon brought nearly the entire population of Greece into prison' ý(FO 371/11334 min. by Greenway d. 10 Feb. 1926). 
17 FO 371/113357 Annual Report, Greece, 1925 p. 4; FO 371/10769 Keeling to FO no. 307 d. 1 Oct. 1925; MAE Gr&e 60 Duchesne (consul at Salonica) to QO no. 35 V Sept. 1925. 
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In the Foreign Office the events of 29 September provoked a good deal of comment. 
The Greek assembly was the only body empowered to ratify the constitution and now 
it had been dissolved; Koundouriotis who was only ad interim President pending 
elections on the basis of the new constitution could hardly sign and proclaim that 
constitution himself According to Nicolson the whole situation was 'highly 
unsatisfactory I: 'what can be the point of a constitution which is unconstitutional 
passes my comprehension'. The consensus was that Pangalos would be overthrown by 
a military coup, either in the near future or after 'a long spell of unlimited power... a 
la Mussolini'. There was certainly no question of Cheetham being issued with 
credentials addressed to an authority constituted in such a purely arbitrary and illegal 
way. 18 In a memorandum of 24 October reviewing the Greek political scene, Harvey 
drew attention to Pangalos' aspirations to imitate the Italian Duce, but concluded that 
'there is nothing to lead us to believe that General Pangalos is a man of the calibre of 
Signor Mussolini'. 19 
French and Italian reactions were, by contrast, far less reserved. As far as Italy was 
concerned, the rapprochement which Mussolini had begun to contemplate earlier in 
the year intensified once the like-minded strongman Pangalos took charge in 
Greece. 10 For the Greeks, now menaced by their northern neighbours, Italy might 
after all prove a source of support, whereas for Mussolini the exercise of influence 
over Greece was part and parcel of his new active Balkan poliCy. 21 In Albania 
particularly, Mussolini was seeking to maximise Italian influence and exclude that of 
Britain, and he was also intent on wooing Yugoslavia. 22 Indeed, Italian 
representatives began to assert that as Britain was preoccupied with the Far East and 
France with Morocco it was natural for Italy to play a leading role in the BalkanS. 23 
The overall thrust of Mussolini's policy was difficult for contemporaries to assess; the 
18 FO 371/10769 mins. by Harvey [quoted] and Howard Smith d. 1 Oct. 1925, Nicolson n[o]d[ate]. 19 FO 371/10769 memorandum by Harvey d. 24 Oct. 1925. 20 FO 371/10765 Cheetham to FO no. 376 d. 24 Nov. 1925; Cassels, Early Diplomacy, p. 306. 21 MAE Grýce 60 Duchesne to QO no. 35 U Sept. 1925. 22 Italian activities in Albania are amply documented in DBFP/I/XXVI-XXVII/chapters I and DDI/7/III-IV passim. See also Cassels, Early Diplomacy, pp. 241-8. 23 DBFP/I/XXVII/215, cf. DDInlIV159. 
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only consistency lay in the search for advantage and Mussolini tended always to 
speak in several senses and leave various courses of action open. 24 There was, 
consequently, a great proliferation of rumours about Italian intentions, and these were 
sometimes a cause of concern both to the British, who were alive to any threat to 
peace and stability in south eastern Europe, and to the French, who had their own 
position to maintain in central Europe and the BalkanS. 25 
Signs of a Greco-Italian rapprochement were not, in fact, far to seek. Soon after 
Pangalos' accession to power, Dino Grandi, the recently appointed under-secretary of 
state for foreign affairs, visited Athens and spoke of the common interests of Italy and 
Greece in the eastern Mediterranean. 26The Italians were subsequently awarded 
several important contracts, including one for 100,000 rifles and another to run an air 
service between Rome, Athens and Constantinople. Pangalos meanwhile made 
strenuous efforts to suppress any anti-Italian sentiment in the Greek press, and the 
Italian press responded in kind with sympathe,., qc articles. 27 
These developments all seemed to be coming to a head late in September when 
rumours spread that a substantial Greco-Italian agreement, perhaps directed against 
Turkey, was in the offing. 28 As it had long been apparent that the Italians saw Asia 
Minor as a possible outlet for their surplus population, 29 these rumours worried the 
British. Indeed, Chamberlain was moved to warn the Greeks that if anything more 
than a settlement of outstanding differences was contemplated - for instance if the 
24 For a discussion of this tactic of Mussolini's, see D. Mack Smith, Mussolini'S Roman Empire 
(London, Longman, 1976), pp. 3-5,21. ID 25 The French were especially concerned about Italian policy as their own relations with Italy were 
deteriorating (Shorrock, Ally to Enemy, pp. 46-9,52-4 and Cassels, Early Diplomacy, pp. 353-76). The 
efforts of Britain and especially France to deal with Italian policy are discussed in more detail in 
chapter 12 below. 
26 DBFP/IIXXVII/212-3. 
27 FO 371/10765 Keeling to FO no. 259 d. 15 Aug. 1925, Cheetharn to FO no. 321 d. 16 Oct. 1925, 
no. 376 d. 24 Nov. 1925; FO 371/11357 Annual Report, Greece, 1925 pp. 25-6. For the rifles contract, 
see also DDInI1111365-6 and IV/78-9. 28 FO 371/10765 Keeling to FO tel. 148 d. 24 Sept. 1925; DBFP/I/XXVII/247; DDI/7/IV/93. 29 DBFP/la/I/700-2. Graham here writes of Italian over- population: 'I have harped on this subject ... ever since I came here ... 
but it does seem to me the crux of the situation. For a discussion of this issue in general, and the connection between emigration and fascist foreign policy, see P. V. Cannistraro and G. Rosoli, 'Fascist Emigration Policies in the 1920s: an Interpretative Framework', International Migration Review 13(4) 1979 673-92. 
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agreement was to be directed against a third party or to involve the assignment of 
zones of influence in Anatolia - then Britain could not remain indifferent. 30 
Chamberlain's warning was perhaps prudent given Pangalos'well known detestation 
of the treaty of Lausanne, but in the event the negotiations did not come to much, 
largely because of the continuing obstacle of the Dodecanese question. The Italians 
considered this resolved, and probably ultimately intended to use the islands as a base 
for immigration into Anatolia, but the Greeks still had hopes of acquiring some of 
them - thus an Italian decision in October to oblige Dodecanesians to become Italian 
subjects inflamed Greek public opinion. 31 The general Foreign Office view was that 
'Britain should walk very warily over this' since the islands, whatever Britain's 
interest in them, were de iure Italian possessions by virtue of Lausanne. 32 On the 
wider issue of possible Italian aggression against Turkey, Chamberlain now Zý 
concluded, like Graham, British ambassador in Rome, that it could be discounted as 
an immediate danger. 33This was also in line with Chamberlain's general policy 
towards Mussolini, of seeking to work with him in a fairly close entente which would 
help restrain his more aggressive tendencies. 34 
French activity in Greece caused Britain less concern. Chambrun was trying to 
exercise his influence on Pangalos, who was known to be a francophile, to keep him 
within constitutional bounds. This was partly an attempt in Greece's interests (and in 
accord with French economic interests too) to promote a stable, legal government in 
Athens and partly an attempt to prevent Pangalos falling too much under Mussolini's 
sway. In June at the time of the coup Chambrun worked closely with Koundouriotis 
30 DBFP/I/XXVII/247. 
31 FO 371/10765 min. by Nicolson d. 26 Sept. 1925, Cheetham to FO no. 321 d. 16 Oct. 1925, no. 333 d. 27 Oct-1925, min. by Harvey d. 27 Oct. 1925 ('A rapprochement will always break down on this Dodecanese question), Cecil to Tyrrell p. l. d. 4 Nov. 1925 and encls.; F0371/11357 Annual Report, Greece, 1925 pp. 25-6. 
32 FO 371/10765 mins. by Harvey d. 9 Nov. 1925, Howard Smith d. 10 Nov. 1925 [quoted], Lampson 
UO Nov. 1925. 
33 DBFP/la/l/292-4; Cassels, Early Diplomacy, p. 307. 34 Cassels, Early Diplomacy, pp. 310-5. On this point see also two articles by P. G. Edwards, 'Britain, Mussolini and the "Locarno-Geneva System"', European Studies Review 10(l) 1980 1-16 andThe Austen Chamberlain - Mussolini Meetings', Historical Journal 14(l) 1971 153-61. 
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to ensure that Pangalos took power in accordance with legal forms, in order 'to 
prevent the accession of another Mediterranean dictator who would not fail to fall 
under the influence of Rome and launch Greece into an adventure'. 35 
The French also used their influence to try and settle the Greeksmajor foreign policy 
problem, that of relations with Yugoslavia. The suspended negotiations with Belgrade 
for the renewal of the alliance involved a whole complex of questions regarding the 
economic and political relations between the two states. One of the most important 
was that of the inefficient running by the Greeks of the railway line between Salonica 
and the Yugoslav frontier, a deficiency which was allegedly having a grievous effect 
on Yugoslav trade. In July the French tried to break the deadlock in the negotiations 
by suggesting the formation of an international company with French participation to 
administer the line. Such an arrangement could be expected to benefit French 
economic interests and increase French influence over both states, as well as 
constituting'a powerful tie between [the two] and a new guarantee of Balkan peace'. 36 
This French initiative is at least partly explained by the growing fear in Paris that the 
Italians were seeking to usurp France's influence in the Balkans and over the Little 
Entente. Certainly this was how the French initiative was seen in Rome: the Italians 
worked to frustrate any French-brokered settlement of the Greco-Yugoslav dispute; 
Mussolini wanted to keep both states friendly towards Italy but mutually hostile, and 
to prevent any Balkan pacts or agreements being negotiated except under Italian 
auspices. 371n the event there was no solution to this particular dispute by the end of 
the year, partly because of Italian intrigue but also because of the intractability of 
both Athens and Belgrade. 
This increase in French and Italian activity at Athens perhaps reflects the fact that 
Greek internal politics and foreign policy were becoming increasingly intertwined. 
35 MAE Grke 60 Chambrun to QO no. 85 d. 9 Jul. 1925, no. 119 d. I Oct. 1925. 36 MAE Yougoslavie 52 QO to Grenard (Belgrade) tels. 134-8 d. II Jun. 1925. French activity in this question is discussed in chapter 12 below. 37 DDI/7/IV/45,59,79-80,91-4,101-2,105,109. 
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This was further demonstrated in October when Pangalos embarked on precisely the 
sort of reckless foreign adventure which London had anticipated. The crisis began on 
19 October when the pacifically inclined foreign minister Rentis resigned owing to 
disagreements with Pangalos on internal policy. Consequently, when news reached 
Athens soon afterwards of a clash between Greek and Bulgarian frontier guards at the 
border post of Demir-Kapu, there was no experienced diplomat at the head of the 
foreign ministry to give counsels of moderation to Pangalos - indeed quite the 
opposite was the case as Hadjikyriakos had replaced Rentis. Oreco-Bulgarian 
relations had been deteriorating sharply over the last two years, and Pangalos was 
convinced that the incident presaged a full-scale Bulgarian invasion. Therefore, on 21 
October, he sent an ultimatum to Sofia and the next day ordered his troops into 
Bulgaria where they occupied a zone several kilometres in depth. 38 
This action caused an international crisis, but one which was swiftly resolved, and 
which provided the League of Nations with its greatest success of the decade. There 
were two main reasons for this: firstly, the Bulgarians behaved absolutely correctly 
and refused to be provoked, which allowed the powers to apportion blame very 
easily; secondly, no vital great power interests were at stake, and in the euphoric post- 
Locarno atmosphere all states felt that they had an interest in checking this naked 
aggression. As these special conditions applied - in contrast to the Corfu incident - the 
machinery of the League was able to work effectively. At first Pangalos was 
recalcitrant: having committed his troops he felt his prestige to be at stake, which was 
especially important as public opinion was extremely excited and municipal elections 
were scheduled for 24 October. However, it was obvious that Greece could not resist 
the united will of the powers for long, especially in the face of threatened sanctions, 
and on 28 October Athens informed the League Council that Greek troops were being 
withdrawn. 
38 Unless otherwise indicated, this section is based on the comprehensive and solid work by J. Barros The League of Nations and the Great Powers. The Greek Bulgarian Incident, 1925 (Oxford, Clarendon, 1970) and FO 371/11357 Annual Report, Greece, 1925 pp. 11- 14. 
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In November, a League commission of inquiry, headed by Sir Horace Rumbold, 
British ambassador in Madrid, visited Greece and Bulgaria to report on the incident 
and to recommend a punishment. To the chagrin of the Greeks Rumbold finally 
decided on an indemnity of E45,000. Furious Greek lobbying to have this sum 
reduced was in vain, for the powers frowned upon such quibbles and suspected that 
Pangalos was merely afraid that the publication of an unfavourable commission report 
would lead to his own downfall. Although the powers consented to certain minor 
textual modifications in the report to protect Greek amour propre, the Greek 
delegates at the League still feared that their public opinion would find it unpalatable. 
However, they could do no more, and at a Council meeting on 14 December the final 
report was adopted by the League. 39 
In fact, the Greco-Bulgarian incident did nothing to weaken Pangalos' hold on 
power. 400n the contrary, his hard line attitude towards 'the hereditary foe' won 
almost universal praise, and this popular feeling was also reflected in the municipal 
election results. Furthermore, he dealt decisively with Plastiras, his old rival and 
guiding light of the 1922 revolution, who had recently returned to Greece to plot 
against him, by deporting him to Italy on 25 October. 41 By now Pangalos'rule was a 
quasi-dictatorship, since he and Hadjikyriakos between them controlled all the key 
ministries. Even the threat from Kondylis - who was rumoured to be plotting a coup - 
was removed when he was put under such close surveillance that he had to abandon 
his intrigueS. 42 
Pangalos' attempts to promote reconciliation also continued. On 23 November a 
conference attended by most of the party leaders saw the beginning of negotiations to 
help heal the schism, which had some success when the royalist leaders promised not 
to make an issue of the regime at the forthcoming elections nor for three years 4n 
39 For Rumbold's role see also M. Gilbert Sir Horace Rumbold. Portrait of a Diplomat, 1869-1941 
(London, Heinemann, 1973), pp. 306-10. 
40 FO 371/10701 Rumbold (Geneva) to Chamberlain unno. l. d. I Dec. 1925. 41 FO 371/10769 Cheetharn to FO no. 334 d. 28 Oct. 1925. 42 FO 371/10769 Cheetham to FO no-338 d-30 Oct. 1925, tel. 183 d. 4 Nov. 1925, no. 357 d-12 
Nov. 1925. 
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thereafter. This seemed to bode well for a return to more normal conditions, as did 
Pangalos' announcement that elections for the senate (the upper house envisaged by 
the new constitution) would be held on 10 January. 43Furthermore, on 4 December he 
restored relative freedom of speech to his opponents by suspending the draconian 
Defence of the Regime Act. This slackening of Pangalos' authoritarianism gave a 
further impetus to reconciliation when the political parties began to negotiate to create 
a common front to contest the elections in opposition to Pangalos' candidateS. 44 
Any hopes of an imminent return to parliamentary government were soon dashed, 
however, for Pangalos showed himself temperamentally unsuited to tolerating 
freedom of speech. The publication of the Rumbold commission report, though not 
provoking the coup that was expected, did unleash a chorus of disapproval at the 
government's handling of foreign policy, a chorus that was swelled by complaints 
about the elections and the ever deteriorating economic situation. All this proved too- 
much for Pangalos who on 30 December banned the press from reporting any 
statements by the Venizelist or republican leaders. This seemed to indicate two 
things: that Pangalos was aligning himself ever more closely with the royalists (who 
had also attacked him in the press but who were excluded from the banning order) 
and that he could not really live with any real measure of democracy. 45 
The inconsistency of Pangalos' behaviour made it difficult for British representatives 
to form an opinion of him. At the end of the year Cheetham pointed out how, 
contrary to all expectation, Pangalos had survived numerous crises and now looked 
relatively secure. Nevertheless most competent observers were still quite at a loss to 
understand what his real objective was: most of his policy seemed to be dictated by 
mere impulsiveness and a desire to conciliate the royalists to ensure his own personal 
43 FO 371/10769 Cheetharn to FO no. 375 d. 24 Nov. 1925, no. 386 d. 2 Dec. 1925, but cf. 
Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, p. 33 on the leaders' promises. 44 FO 371/10769 Cheetham to FO no. 397 d. 10 Dec. 1925. 45 FO 371/10769 Cheetham, to FO tel. 216 d. 9 Dec. 1925, no. 397 d-10 Dec. 1925, min. by Harvey d. 10 
Dec. 1925, Cheetham to FO tel. 234 d-30 Dec-1925; MAE Grýce 60 Chambrun to QO no. 140 d. 22 Dec. 1925. 
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safety. 46 In London, opinions about Pangalos, in so far as there were any, were 
beginning to soften. Although the recent Greco-Bulgarian incident had shown him to 
be a'dangerous petty-Mussolini I, the prospect of his being toppled by a new military 
coup was not viewed with any relish. Any successor was unlikely to be better, and a 
further military pronunciamento would only render a return to normal government 
'more difficult and remote'. 47Foreign Office reaction to the fall of Michalakopoulos 
had shown the value it placed on the longevity of Greek administrations, and as 
Pangalos continued to weather various storms London began to see him as the least 
bad option for Greece. 
The early months of 1926 were a critical period for Pangalos. On-54"anuary, sensing 
that opinion might be turning against him, he declared himself dictator, concentrating 
all constituent and legislative power in his own hands, and postponed the senatorial 
elections indefinitely. His justification was that the reactionary and subversive 
tendencies of the Venizelist and republican politicians were making government 
impossible, and he promised to pursue his original programme of consolidating the 
republic and re-establishing normal parliamentary life as soon as possible. 48 His 
action precipitated the resignations of the minister of marine, Hadjikyriakos, and of 
the minister of national economy. The former had disagreed with Pangalos' methods 
of rule for some time, and also had no desire to become 'a mere tool of his more 
ambitious colleague'; and although he said that he would continue to support 
Pangalos, his resignation undoubtedly weakened the dictator's position. 49 
Nevertheless, as dictator, Pangalos ruled with a 'fine, arbitrary zeal', and struggled to 
cope with the complex problems bedevilling the Greek economy. 50 In November 
46 FO 371/11334 Cheetham to FO no. 423 d. 28 Dec. 1925. 47 FO 371/10769 min. by Harvey d. 5 Nov. 1925, cf. mins by Harvey d. 10 Dec. 1925, Howard Smith 
d. 10 Dec. 1925. 
48 FO 371/11334 Cheetham to FO tel. 3 d. 5 Jan. 1926; MAE Grke 60 Blondel (charg6) to QO tel. 4 d-6 Jan. 1926, no. 4 d. 7 Jan. 1926, Chambrun to QO no. 45 d. 14 Apr. 1926. Blondel wrote that no-one 
in Greece was relishing the prospect of elections since Pangalos'policy of rapprochement with the 
royalists had made their outcome extremely uncertain. 49 FO 371/11334 Cheetham to FO no. 7 d. 7 Jan. 1926. 50 Campbell and Sherrard, Modern Greece, p-134. 
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1925 he had sought to counter bureaucratic corruption by hanging several civil 
servants for embezzlement - in contravention of the constitution and with very limited 
success. 51 Again, in January 1926, in an attempt to shore up the drachma and reduce 
the budget deficit, he introduced a forced loan, by means of cutting all large 
denomination bank-notes in two, but again this had only a temporary effect. 521n the 
long term, Pangalos' inability to solve these chronic problems was a serious threat to 
his position. The passive acquiescence of the people in the dictatorship was 
conditional upon his appearing to rule efficiently and in line with Greece's interests; 
when these problems persisted opinion began to blame them on the high-handedness 
of the dictator rather than as previously on the excesses of the politicians. 53 
In the meantime, Pangalos set about attacking the opposition with renewed vigour. In 
the middle of February rumours of a coup began to circulate and he seized the 
opportunity to arrest Kondylis (who was in fact intriguing), and Papanastasiou and 
Kafandaris (who were totally innocent). 54 On 17 February he announced that they 
would all be deported, not because there was any evidence of their complicity in the 
rumoured coup but 'merely to put an end to disquieting rumours; as if that was not 
enough he then had them transported to Santorin, an active volcanic island. 55 Later it 
transpired that Pangalos had no intention of putting the accused on trial, but had 
simply wanted them out of the way for a while. 56The net effect was to alienate the 
politicians further from the dictatorship. 
For the moment, Pangalos did not tighten the authoritarian screw any further, 
probably because he did not feel secure enough to be totally ruthless. Early in March 
president Koundouriotis talked of resigning in protest at Pangalos' arbitrary and inept tý 
51 FO 371/10769 Cheetham to FO no. 375 d. 24 Nov. 1925, no. 386 d. 2 Dec-1925. 52 T. Veremis, 'The Greek State and Economy during the Pangalos Regime, 1925-1926', Journal of 
the Hellenic Diaspora 7(2) 1990 45-6. For this unusual expedient, see also A. F. Freris, The Greek 
Economy in the Twentieth Century (London, Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 58-61. 53 FO 371/11334 Cheetham to FO no. 63 d. 1 I Feb. 1926; FO 371/12178 Annual Report, Greece, 1926 
p. 2; MAE Grýce 60 Blondel to QO no. 31 d. 20 Feb. 1926: the apathy of the public was 'astonishing'. 54 MAE Grke 60 Blondel to QO tel. 27 d. 19 Feb. 1926, no. 31 d. 20 Feb. 1926. 55 FO 371/11334 Cheetham to FO tel. 38 d. 18 Feb. 1926, no. 76 d. 18 Feb. 1926. 56 FO 371/113334 Cheetham to FO no. 82 d. 24 Feb. 1926. 
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government, voicing a concern which was apparently widespread throughout the 
armed forces. Pangalos responded by reconstructing his cabinet and announcing on 11 
March his plan to return Greece to normal political life: there were to be presidential 
elections in the near future, followed by the revision of the constitution by a 
committee of experts and elections for both chambers of the assembly in October. 
This looked like a great step towards democracy, but the nature of Pangalos' tactical 
manoeuvring became clear when he announced that he would himself stand in the 
presidential election and that afterwards the constitution would be amended to 
increase presidential power at the expense of the assembly. 57Clearly Pangalos 
intended to use the elections to bring some semblance of legitimacy to his personal 
rule. 51 
, In the Foreign Office the declaration of a dictatorship by Pangalos was seen as a 
confession of weakness. 59 His dictatorial methods also came in for some criticism. 
According to Harvey, the arrest and deportation of the opposition leaders was 'a pretty 
stiff proceeding' and showed that Pangalos must either be very nervous indeed about 
his position or 'even a more petty tyrant than we supposed'. 60 Howard Smith, 
however, put matters in perspective, arguing that the logic of dictatorship was not to 
permit opposition of any kind, and that in any case this seerned'no worse than 
M. Mussolini's action against the "Aventine" and less brutal'. 61 
The advent of dictatorship in Greece was never likely of itself to have much impact 
on British policy there, if the example of Italy was anything to go by. In Foreign 
Office eyes, the unstable and immature nature of parliamentary democracy in both 
states was such that governments there must either be dictatorships or ineffectual, and 
the former might well prove more stable. Similarly, Chamberlain maintained a close 
57FO 371/11334 Cheetharn to FO tel. 47 d. 1 Mar. 1926, no. 103 d. 10 Mar. 1926, no. 104 d. 10 
Mar. 1926, Crow (consul at Salonica) to FO unno. tel. d. 25 Mar. 1926. The intention was apparently to 
create a system approximating to that of the United States. 0 58 MAE Grece 60 Blondel to QO tel. 46 d. 19 Mar. 1926. 
59 FO 371/11334 mins. by Harvey d. 4,5,6 and 12 Jan. 1926. 60 FO 371/11334 mins. by Harvey d. 19 Feb. 1926,2 Mar. 1926. 61 FO 371/11334 min. by Howard Smith d. 2 Mar. 1926. 
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and cordial relationship with Mussolini despite the latter's savage oppression of his 
opposition, claiming that Italy's internal affairs were none of his concern and that 
1 62 Mussolini 'is the Government and it is my business to get on with him. 
Pangalos' announcement in March of a timetable for returning the country to normal 
parliamentary life was welcomed in the Foreign Office. Greenway was perhaps the 
most sanguine: 'it really looks as though there were a chance of Greece settling down 
to "normal" political life - "normal" in the Western & not in the Greek sense'. 
Although Harvey felt compelled to moderate this exuberance - "'normal" rather in the 
Italian sense' - he too felt that prospects were improving. 63 Although it was still 
impossible to say for sure how long Pangalos would last, it seemed at least possible 
that he would continue to prevail over whatever opposition arose. 64 
Suspicions that Pangalos intended to manipulate the presidential elections were soon 
confirmed. The law issued on 18 March formulating the electoral regulations created 
a voting system susceptible to army intimidation and laid down conditions, such as an 
age limit, which automatically excluded most of his likely opponents from the 
conteSt. 65 Koundouriotis, who had meanwhile decided to remain in office until his 
successor was elected, resigned immediately in protest, and the political parties began 
negotiations to select a joint candidate to stand against Pangalos on the issue of 
constitutional government. 66 
Even at such a critical point, the politicians found it difficult to overcome their 
differences and the candidate they eventually nominated, Konstantinos Demertzis, a 
62 The issue of Foreign Office attitudes towards fascism in Italy is discussed by P. G. Edwards in 'The 
Foreign Office and Fascism 1924-1929, Journal of Contemporary History 5(2) 1970 153-61. Many 
of the assumptions about Mussolini held by Foreign Office officials which Edwards highlights were 
equally held about Pangalos. For Chamberlain's views on Mussolini quoted here see DBFPIIaAII925, 
and also Mack Sm ith, Roman Empire, p. 14. 63 FO '571/11334 mins. by Greenway d. 23 Mar. 1926, Harvey d. 24 Mar. 1926. 
64 FO 371/11334 mins. by Greenway d-23 Mar. 1926, Harvey and Howard Smith d. 26 Mar-1926. 65 FO 371/11335 Cheetham to FO no. 121 d. 23 Mar. 1926. 66 FO 371/11335 Cheetham to FO no. 125 d. 23 Mar. 1926; Mavrooordatos, Stillborn Republic, pp. 33- 4. 
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moderate Anti-Venizelist, was a relative nonentity. 67Moreover, when nominations 
closed on 31 March with only Pangalos and Demertzis as candidates, the former did 
everything possible to hamper his opponent, for instance by prohibiting publication of 
his election addresS. 68 The last straw for the political coalition came when Pangalos 
postponed the elections in half of Greece until 11 April, so that only his strongholds 
would vote on the original date of 4 April (clearly hoping that the early results would 
influence the later ones). Since the prospects of a fair result were remote, Demertzis 
withdrew from the contest on 3 April and, although for the sake of appearances 
Pangalos tried several times to secure their participation, the coalition thereafter took 
no pan in the electionS. 69 
The outcome was now a foregone conclusion, a fact confirmed by Pangalos on 6 
April when, pre-empting the election results, he assumed the presidential powers and 
amended the constitution by decree to strengthen them. 70 An attempted coup at 
Salonica on 9 April failed to ruffle the dictator's feathers and the final election results 
revealed that Pangalos had gained ninety-three per cent of the votes cast. 71 On 18 
April he took the presidential oath announcing that this 'marked the return of Greece 
into normal paths', and that he intended immediately to promulgate the new 
constitution which had been approved by the people at the election and to remain also 
as premier for the time being. As a magnanimous gesture he pardoned the politicians 
still incarcerated on Santorin, and commuted to life imprisonment the death sentences 
which had been passed on the ringleaders of the recent COUp. 72 Pangalos had at last 
secured some electoral basis for his rule, but the best that could be said for the recent 
election was that it was 'probably not entirely falsified. 73 
67 FO 371/12178 Annual Report, Greece, 1926 p. 4; MAE Grýce 60 Chambrun to QO no. 45 d. 14 Apr. 1926. 
68 FO 371/11335 Cheetham to FO tel. 77 d. 2 Apr. 1926. 
69 FO 371/11335 Cheetham to FO tel. 79 d. 3 Apr. 1926, tel. 80 d. 5 Apr. 1926, no. 152 d. 9 Apr. 1926. 70 FO 371/11335 Cheetham to FO tel. 81 d. 8 Apr. 1926, no. 151 d. 9 Apr. 1926. 71 FO 371/11335 Crow to FO no. 17 d. 10 Apr. 1926, Cheetham to FO no. 159 d. 15 Apr. 1926; Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, p. 33. 72 FO 371/113 35 Cheetham to FO no. 159 d. 15 Apr. 1926, no. 164 d. 19 Apr. 1926. 73 Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, p. 33. 
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The Foreign Office view of Pangalos' machinations reflected the more charitable 
attitude towards him which London was adopting. From Athens Cheetham. reported 
events with a very critical eye, and consistently declared that Pangalos would never 
win a fair election. 74 In London. ) however, opinions were 
different, and Pangalos was 
coming to be seen as an element of stability rather than disorder. Greenway believed 
the election results accurately reflected Greek public opinion and that despite 
Pangalos' uneasy character he was 'a great influence in the country - and an influence 
for good at least so long as he is not seriously thwarted'. Howard Smith similarly 
argued that whether the Greeks did or did not approve of Pangalos they were certainly 
'sick and tired of the politicians of all parties'. 75AIthough their superior Lampson 
dissented and said that Pangalos was unlikely to last much longer, there was a grass 
roots view in the Foreign Office that the Greeks would give Pangalos a fair chance in 
office. 76 
This attitude was illustrated by the resolution of two questions raised by Pangalos' 
election, namely that of official recognition and that of Cheetham's credentials. Since 
his arrival in Greece in March 1924 Cheetharn had been accredited to Koundouriotis 
as regent, and after the April plebiscite it had been decided to wait for the election of 
a president and the passing of the republican constitution before issuing new letters of 
credence. Now, Kaklamanos urged the Foreign Office to issue these fresh credentials 
so as to regularise Anglo-Greek relations, arguing that by their recent votes the Greek 
people had both elected Pangalos and approved the constitution as amended by hiM. 77 
The Foreign Office was not in the least convinced that Pangalos' position was 
constitutionally correct, but decided to consider the question from a wider political 
standpoint. Since he was the defacto authority in Greece and seemed likely to remain 
so it was sensible to consolidate British influence there by recognising him as 
president'on grounds of political expediency and in the general interests of our 
74 FO 371/11335 Cheetham to FO no. 129 d. 26 Mar. 1926, tel. 72 d. 30 Mar. 1926. 75 FO 371/11335 mins. by Greenway d. 13 Apr. 1926, Howard Smith d. 13 Apr. 1926. 76 FO 371/11335 min. by Lampson d. 22 Apr. 1926. 77 FO 371/11335 note by Howard Smith d. 22 Apr. 1926. 
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diplomacy'. 78Accordingly, Cheetham was asked for his opinion on Kaklamanos' 
appeal and as to whether consultation with France and Italy was necessary before 
recognition. 19 
In the meantime, the question of recognition was raised'in a most acute form' at the 
end of May when Pangalos wrote to George V announcing his assumption of the 
presidency. 80 The formal acknowledgement customary in these circumstances would 
amount to official recognition of Pangalos as president, but it was eventually decided 
that one should be sent: the decision to recognise had been taken in principle and any 
other course of action would be illogical and damaging to British prestige in Greece. " 
The way was cleared for this when Cheetham's reply was received. It revealed that 
only he was in an anomalous position since all his colleagues had presented 
credentials after March 1924 and were therefore accredited to Koundouriotis as 
provisional president and not as regent. This obviated the need for consultations with 
France and Italy, and Cheetham's recommendation gave the final impetus for 
recognition. 821n early July George V replied to Pangalos and Britain recognised him 
as president of the Hellenic Republic. 83 
As regards credentials, the Foreign Office at first decided not to send fresh ones to 
Cheetham, who was to be replaced in a few months, but rather to accredit his 
successor to Pangalos. This would have the advantage of giving London a few more 
months 'to make sure that Pangalos is a permanency'. 84Cheetham, however, pointed 
out that this course dodged the issue of to whom his letters of recall should be 
addressed. 15 As recognition had already been conceded in principle and since Britain 
78 There was a long discussion in the Foreign Office on this question: FO 371/11335 mins by 
Greenway d. 26 Apr. 1926, Howard Smith d. 28 Apr. 1926, Adam d. 8 May 1926, Howard Smith d. 13 
May 1926, Sargent d. 14 May 1926, Lampson d. 14 May 1926, Tyrrell d. 15 May 1926, Chamberlain 
d. 17 May 1926. The quoted phrase is taken from FO 372/2282 min. by Harvey d. 8 Jun. 79 FO 371/11335 FO to Cheetharn no. 363 d. 20 May 1926. 80 FO 372/2282 Kaklamanos to FO no. I 286/SI(2)/26 d. 28 May 1926, min. by Harvey d. 8 Jun. 1926. 81 FO 372/2282 mins. by Light d. 5 Jun. 1926, Harvey and Lampson d. 8 Jun. 1926, Tyrrell d. 9 
Jun. 1926. 
82 FO 372/2282 Cheetham to FO tel. 130 d. 12 Jun. 1926. 
83 FO 372P-282 min. by Chisholm d. 14 Jun. 1926, FO to Cheetham no. 474 d. 7 Jul. 1926. 84 FO 372/2282 min. by Lampson d. 15 Jun. 1926, FO to Cheetharn no. 436 d. 18 Jun. 1926. 85 FO 371/11335 Cheetham to FO no. 243 d. 16 Jun. 1926. 
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had no wish to slight Pangalos ('indeed we are anxious to bring him a little more into 
our orbit') Chamberlain decided in July to send Cheetham fresh credentials addressed 
to Pangalos. 86This was in line with the previous pragmatic attitude of the Foreign 
Office, which believed that it was worth flattering Pangalos, whatever the irregularity 
of his position, for the sake of British prestige in Greece. 
The attitude of France towards Pangalos was similar. Despite Pangalos' flirtations 
with the royalists, and France's desire to see constitutional government re-established 
in Greece, Chambrun was Pleased at the outcome of the presidential elections. 
Victory for Demertzis, a man of 'ill-defined opinion but royalist tendencies', could 
have signalled an Anti-Venizelist revanche and possibly have led to a restoration; in 
those circumstances a continued dictatorship was 'the lesser evil'. The French were 
confident of Pangalos'francophilia: he had trained in France, was an ardent 
republican and expressed his pro-French sentiments regularly in the presS. 87The 
continuing conspicuous success of French firms in the award of arms contracts 
seemed also to provide concrete proof of these sympathies. 88 As regards foreign 
policy the French were fairly certain that despite his bombastic speeches, Pangalos' 
intentions were pacific. 89 Although he had definitely moved much closer to Italy, he 
was reported to have told Mussolini that he could never pursue a foreign policy 
contrary to that of Britain. 90 The French view was that whilst sentiment attracted 
Pangalos to France and calculation drew him towards England, only necessity 4: ) 
impelled him towards Italy. 
If the French were confident about Pangalos' intentions, they were certainly not so 
about those of Mussolini. During 1926 Franco-Italian relations deteriorated sharply, 
as the two states clashed over continental and colonial issues with increasing 
86FO371/11335 mins. by Harvey d. 29 Jun. 1926 [quoted], Sargent d. 2 Jul. 1926, Chamberlain d. 3 
Jul. 1926. 
87 MAE Gr6ce 60 Chambrun to QO no. 45 d. 14 Apr. 1926, note by Mantoux d. 21 Apr. 1926; MAE Grece 79 Chambrun to QO tels. 65-7 d. 21 Apr. 1926; Chambrun, Souvenirs, pp. 93-4. 88 MAE Grýce 79 B londel to QO no. 19 d. 3 Feb. 1926, Chambrun to QO tels. 65-7 d. 21 Apr. 1926. 89 MAE Grece 60 QO to Chambrun tel. 3 d. 4 Jan. 1926, B londel to QO tel. 4 d. 6 Jan. 1926, no. 4 d. 7 Jan. 1926, tel. 46 d. 19 Mar. 1926. 
90 MAE Grece 60 note by Mantoux d. 21 Apr. 1926. 
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rancour. 91 One result of this was that the French became more concerned to hold on 
to their position in Greece, as was shown when in May 1926 Pangalos announced that 
for reasons of economy the British naval and French military missions would be 
terminated. 92 The British viewed this decision with equanimity: economy was 
definitely required and in any case the mission had not produced the expected 
commercial advantages for British firmS. 93 Once Kaklamanos had assured London 
that no other power - i. e. Italy - would be invited to send a naval mission, the Foreign 
Office concluded that Britain's 'political position is so strong in Greece for general 
reasons' that the mission could safely be withdrawn. 94 
The French reacted far more vigorously: Charnbrun protested strongly to Pangalos 
about the decision, pointing to the clause in the mission's contract (inserted by the 
French) stating that premature termination of the mission was subject to the consent 
of both governments. 95 In these circumstances the Greeks were forced to accept the 
continuation of the mission, although they hoped its size could be reduced. 96 
Although Chambrun was partly trying to protect the economic advantages the mission 
brought France, he was chiefly motivated by a fear that if the mission was ended 
France's position would be usurped by Italy. 97 
It was certainly true that in early 1926 the Greco-Italian rapprochement was 
continuing apace. In March, foreign minister Roufos visited Rome on his way to a Zý 
meeting of the League and had frank and friendly talks with Mussolini on political Z: P 
91 Early in the year the two quarrelled over a scheme for a tripartite pact also involving Yugoslavia; 
which reflected a wider struggle for influence in south-eastem and central Europe. The other main 
bones of contention were Tangiers, Tunisia and thefuorisciti (Italian exiles in France). See 
DDI/7/IV/157-443 passim and DBFP/la/I/chapters II-IV passim; Cassels, Early Diplomacy, pp. 353- 
76; Shorrock, Ally to Enemy, pp. 46-58. For Italian policy between 1925 and 1928, see G. Carocci, La 
Politica Estera dell'Italia Fascista (1925-1928) (Bari, Editori Laterza, 1969), especially pp. 41-112. 92 FO 371/11340 Cheetham to FO tel. 102 d. 12 May 1926, no. 193 d. 13 May 1926. 93 FO 371/11340 min. by Harvey d. 14 May 1926. 
94 FO 371/11340 note by Howard Smith d. 31 May 1926, min. by Lampson d. 18 May 1926. 95 MAE Grýce 27 Chambrun to QO tel. 88 d. 13 May 1926, no. 65 d. 14 May 1926. 96 FO 371/11340 Cheetharn to FO tel. 1 12 d-18 May 1926; FO 371/11357 Cheetharn to FO tel. 104 
d. 13 May 1926, tel. 118 d. 25 May 1926; MAE Grke 27 Chambrun to QO tel. 97 d. 26 May 1926. 97 MAE Gr&e 27 Chambrun to QO no-65 d. 14 May 1926; FO 371/11340 Cheetharn to FO nos. 193-4 d. 13 May 1926; FO 371/11357 Leith Ross to Lampson p. l. d. 4 Jun. 1926. 
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and economic issues of common interest. 98This was followed in June by the visit to 
Greece of the Prince of Savoia-Aosta, which occasioned great festivities and which, 
though devoid of real political significance, symbolised the warmer relations between 
the two states. 99 There were also persistent rumours that large Greek armament 
contracts were to be placed in Italy, that the Italians were to make a big loan to 
Greece and that some substantial political agreement was in the offing. 100 
This last rumour again aroused fears that Mussolini was trying to inveigle Pangalos 
into aggression against the Turks, and although these fears were to persist throughout 
the year they reached a peak in the spring. In March Briand urged Chamberlain to 
watch Mussolini, who he feared was planning some new thrust either in the Balkans 
or against Asia Minor, and in April De Fleuriau, the French ambassador in London, 
repeated the warning. 101 Certainly, the Turks for their part were becoming extremely 
anxious, and showing 'a marked nervousness, amounting to latent panic, over Italy's 
alleged aggressive tendencies', and they began to prepare their defences. 102Reports 
came flooding into the Foreign Office from various knowledgeable if unofficial 
sources, indicating that plans for an attack were at an advanced stage. 103These fears 
were compounded by the actions of the two dictators. In a conversation with Sir Eric 
Drummond, secretary general of the League, Pangalos remarked that the Turks must 
realise that 'their possession of their European territories was very precarious', and it 
became ever more obvious that he harboured designs on eastern Thrace. 1041n April 
98 FO 371/11337 Cheetharn to FO tel. 48 d. I Mar. 1926, Graham to FO no. 224 d. 12 Mar. 1926, 
Lampson to Howard Smith p. l. d. 17 Mar. 1926, Cheetham to FO no. 114 d. 17 Mar. 1926; 
DDI/7/IV/183-4. 
99 FO 371/12178 Annual Report, Greece, 1926 p. 20. 100 FO 371/11346 Graham to Tyrrell p. l. d. 15 Jan. 1926, p. l. d. 28 Jan. 1926, Treasury to FO 
no. F6172/01/4 d. 24 Feb. 1926, FO to Cheetham. no. 165 d. 3 Mar. 1926, Graham to FO no. 218 d. II 
Mar. 1926, Cheetham to FO tel. 60 d. 17 Mar. 1926, FO to Treasury no. (C3456/704/19) d. 22 Mar. 1926; 
FO 371/11356 Cheetharn to FO no. 126 d. 23 Mar. 1926, no. 165 d. 22 Apr. 1926, Graham to Lampson 
p-l- d-25 Jun. 1926, Lampson to Graham p. l. d. 30 Jul. 1926. 101 DBFP/la/l/495-7,651-4. The rumours were still circulating in a muted form in October (FO 
371/11533 Hoare (Constantinople) to FO no. 531 d. 6 Oct. 1926). 102 FO 424/264 Lindsay (Constantinople) to FO no. 181 d. 14 Apr. 1926; DDI/7/IV/215-8. 103 FO 371/11533 min. by Greenway d. 22 Apr. 1926; FO 371/11356 Cheetharn to FO no. 126 d. 23 
Mar. 1926. 
104 FO 371/11356 Cheetham to FO no. 170 d-24 Apr. 1926, mins. by Howard Smith d. 8 Apr. 1926, 
Harvey dA May 1926; FO 371/11533 Cheetham to FO no. 172 d. 25 Apr. 1926. 
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Mussolini toured Tripoli and made several wild speeches about Italy's imperative 
need for outlets for her population, and these had 'a very perturbing effect'. 105 
These alleged plans were of particular interest to London because of the poor state of 
Britain's own relations with Turkey, embittered by the long running dispute over the 
territory of Mosul, claimed by both Turkey and British-mandated Iraq. 106 Indeed, it 
was precisely this Anglo-Turkish tension which Mussolini intended to exploit to 
further his own ambitions in Asia Minor. 107 Chamberlain, however, gave Mussolini 
no encouragement. True, he was sympathetic to Mussolini's claims on Anatolian 
territory, and recognised that the questions were in a sense linked: Italy's attitude 
might force the Turks to give in over Mosul; 108 and, if the Turks attacked Iraq, it was 
unlikely that Britain would restrain Italy. However, 'it was a very different thing to 
contemplate an unprovoked breach of the peace', and this pacific British public 
opinion would bitterly oppose. 109 Chamberlain took his cue from Graham in Rome, 
who argued that despite Mussolini's bluster and whatever his wild dreams he was for 
the moment too preoccupied with internal consolidation to think of rash adventures. 
The warm personal friendship Chamberlain had built up with Mussolini was another 
factor Chamberlain felt would restrain the Duce from committing aggression. I 10 
In the event the Italian attack never materialised. The very prospect of an Anglo- 
Italian combination was sufficient to terrify the Turks, who in late April suddenly 
made great concessions over Mosul which led to a settlement in June. "' This volte 
P- jace effectively blocked whatever plans Mussolini may have had, for he was warned 
105 FO 800/259 Chamberlain to Graham p. l. d. 21 Apr. 1926; FO 421/3 10 Dodds (consul at Tripoli) to 
FO no. 21 d. 16 Apr. 1926; Cassels, Early Diplomacy, p. 307. 106 A. J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1925, Volume I (London, Oxford University 
Press/Humphrey Milford, 1927) 471-531 (especially 526-7). For developments between October 1925 
and June 1926 see also DBFP/la/l/760-845 passim. 107 Psomiades Balkan Studies 13 1-11 discusses the connexion between the two issues, but perhaps 
ge exagg rates the extent of Greco-Italian plans for aggression. 108 FO 80OP-59 Chamberlain to Graham p. l. d. 21 Apr. 1926; DBFP/la/I/927; Edwards HJ 14 158-9. 109 DBFP/la/I/608,652-3. 
110 DBFP/la/I/608,700-2; D. Mack Smith, Mussolini (London, Granada, 1983), pp. 176-7; Edwards ESR 10 10-13. 
111 FO 800/259 Lindsay to Chamberlain p. l. d. 24 Apr. 1926, Churchill to Chamberlain p. l. d. 14 May 1926; DBFP/la/l/832-6,838,845. 
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by Della Torretta that however sympathetic Chamberlain was to Italy's aspirations, 
Britain's interests meant he could not sanction open Italian aggression. 112 There is 
room to doubt, in fact, how real Mussolini's alleged intentions to attack Turkey had 
been: throughout the first half of the year his policy towards Turkey had been 
contradictory, at times aggressive, at other times thinking about agreements; and by 
April he seems to have heeded the advice of his ambassador at Constantinople that 
hostility was counter-productive. 113Certainly he would have taken action if (as was 
considered possible at the time) Turkey disintegrated, but in April he was reassuring 
Ankara that his intentions were friendly. 114This behaviour - pursuing several 
contradictory policies at once and waiting to see which would be the most profitable - 
was typical of Mussolini. In the event, the idea of negotiations with Turkey fizzled 
out, for after the Mosul settlement the Turks had little incentive to come to terms, and 
Mussolini soon concentrated his attention back on the Balkans and Europe, where he 
had also been intriguing throughout the year. ' 15 
If the Mosul settlement thwarted Mussolini, this was doubly the case for Pangalos, 
who was even less able to act alone. In fact, although Pangalos undoubtedly dreamed 
of expansion at Turkey's expense, he seems to have realised that as a weak power 
Greece would have to wait on circumstances. Thus, like Mussolini, he tempered his 
hostility with reassurance: on 22 April foreign minister Roufos assured Cheetham that 
Greece had 'so great a need of peace and rest that she could not entertain any 
aggressive intentions. 1161t was Greece's relative weakness which convinced the 
Foreign Office that the immediate danger from Pangalos was slight: he was hardly 4n 
likely to embark on adventure when Greece was at her wits'end for money and 
seeking foreign loans, on very bad terms with Yugoslavia and militarily 
112 DDI/7/IV/232-4. Della Torretta also warned Mussolini that Britain would never entirely throw 
over Greece for Italy's sake (DDI/7/IV/275-7). 
113 DDI/7/IV/167-71,177,181-2,187-8,211-2,215-8,221,227-8,230,241,257-8. 
114 FO 424/264 Graham to FO tel. 95 d. 21 Apr. 1926; DDI/7/IV/218,237-8. 
115 For Cassels'account of this whole episode, see Early Diplomacy, pp. 303-14. 116 FO 371/11356 Cheethain to FO no. 165 d. 22 Apr. 1926 cf. no. 195 d. 13 May 1926. The French 
consul at Salonica felt, however, that Pangalos had been intending to fight right up until the Mosul 0 settlement was reached (MAE Grece 79 Duchesne to QO no. 44 d. 7 Jun. 1926). 
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unprepared. ' 17 Cheetham felt that Pangalos was adjusting himself more and more to 
the Venizelist foreign policy tradition of friendship with Britain and France and that 
the rapprochement with Italy was purely a marriage of convenience rooted in 
Yugoslav hostility; and London agreed that Pangalos would not act contrary to British 
wishes. 
118 
Once the prospect of joint action against Turkey receded, relations between Greece 
and Italy cooled somewhat. Chambrun gleefully pointed out to Paris in June how both 
states were losing their enthusiasm for the entente - the Italians had not gained the 
economic advantages they had expected and Greek public opinion was again tuming 
against Italy. ' 19 The Dodecanese were also still an obstacle: in June a declaration by 
Mussolini that they were'Italian for all time'provoked fury, as did Rome's brutal 
Italianisation policy in the islands. 120 Although negotiations went on between Athens 
and Rome for most of the year, apparently with an eye to concluding an arbitration 
treaty, all that transpired was by November was a commercial treaty, 121 and even this 
caused friction as the Italians revived an old claim to cabotage in Greece which 
Athens fiercely resisted. 122 
These wider diplomatic developments had some impact on Britain's policy towards 
Pangalos. For example, in June the Foreign Office decided to send the Mediterranean 
fleet to Greece during its annual cruise later in the year. 123Partly this was to influence 
Pangalos who had now been in power a year and seemed fairly secure: like Mussolini 
117 FO 371/11356 min. by Harvey dA May 1926; FO, 371/11533 min. by Dashwood d. 14 May 1926. 
118FO 371/11356Cheetham to FOno. 176d. 28 Apr. 1926, min. by Harvey d. 11 May 1926. 
119 MAE Grece 60 Chambrun to QO no. 79 d. 10 Jun. 1926. 
120 FO 371/11357 Cheetham to FO no. 237 d. 9 Jun. 1926, no. 387 d. 25 Oct. 1926; FO 371/12178 
Annual Report, Greece, 1926 p. 20; Mack Smith, Mussolini, p. 177. 121 FO 371/11337 SIS report no. 024187 d. 19 Sept. 1926 and mins., Sargent to Cheetharn pl. d. 18 
Oct. 1926, Cheetham to FO, tel. 247 d. 26 Oct. 1926 and mins., Sargent to Wingfield (Rome) 
no. C I 1416G d. 28 Oct. 1926; FO 371/11356 Lampson to Graham p. l. d. 21 Jun. 1926, Graham to 
Lampson p. l. d. 25 Jun. 1926, Lampson to Graham p. l. d. 30 Jul. 1926; FO 371/11359 Graham to FO 
no-1000 d. 25 Nov. 1926. 
122 FO 371/11337 min. by Howard Smith d. 3 Aug. 1926; FO 371/11359 MacKillop (chargd at 
Athens) to FO no. 284 d. 2: 0 Jul. 1926 and mins. 
123 FO 371/11358 min. by Harvey d. 8 Jun. 1926 
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he was a vain and impulsive man who would respond to such flattery. 124More 
importantly, the visit would be an exercise in showing the flag, and would also make 
a point to other powers. As Lampson wrote, 'it will be no bad thing that the world at 
large in the Mediterranean should realise that we have not entirely disinterested 
ourselves in Greece. I fancy the Italians are rather prone to thinkSol. 125Given the 
recent past and Pangalos' apparently good prospects it was important that Britain 
should retain some influence over him. 
Whilst the Foreign Office was relatively content with Pangalos' political activities, 
however, his economic policies were a source of continual friction between the two 
governments, and particularly irritated the British Treasury. Indeed, the Annual 
Report for 1926 states that Anglo-Greek relations up until August 'steadily 
deteriorated' for this very reason. 126The Foreign Office, at Treasury insistence, 
pressed the Greeks to make economies and to balance their budget. These efforts, 
however, were hampered by the reluctance of France and Italy, both eager to flatter 
Pangalos and to win arms contracts, to make similar representations. 127 In April 
Pangalos was persuaded to cancel several large arms contracts, but the damage to the 
budget from excessive military expenditure had already been done. 128When in July 
the Greeks contracted a E1,000,000 loan from a Swedish company to help meet this 
budget deficit, in defiance of their obligations under the 1918 agreement and the ZD 
refugee protocol, this only further enraged the Treasury. 1290ther irritants were the Z: I 
124FO 371/11358 min. by Harvey d. 1 Jun. 1926; F0421/310'Notes on a Visit to Jugoslavia and 
Greece, April 1926'by Harvey d. 6 May 1926. 
125 FO 371/11358 mins. by Lampson d. 9 Jun. 1926, d. 5 Aug. 1926. The Italians were in fact well 
aware of Britain's interest in Greece where naval matters were concerned (DDI/7/IV/275-7). 126 FO 371/12178 Annual Report, Greece, 1926 p. 9. 
127 FO 371/11352 Cheetham to FO tel. 64 d. 20 Mar. 1926, Roussin (British representative on the IFQ 
to FO unno. l. d. 24 Mar. 1926, Treasury to FO no. F 1091/01/3 d. 27 Mar. 1926, Cheetharn to FO no. 150 
d. 8 Apr. 1926, Crewe (Paris) to FO no. 899 d. 13 May 1926, Graham to FO tel. 123 d. 29 May 1926, 
Cheetham to FO tel. 124 d. 31 May 1926, tel. 125 d. 31 May 1926. The British were by now more or 
less resigned to winning no more arms contracts; for this issue see also FO 371/11345 file 535, FO 
371/11351 file 1807 and FO 371/11354 file 2617 passim. 128 FO 371/11352 Roussin to FO unno. l. d. 28 [? Mar. ] 1926; FO 371/11533 Cheetharn to FO no. 172 
d. 25 Apr. 1926; but cf. FO 371/11356 min. by Howard Smith d. 28 Apr. 1926 (1 think we should take 
[Pangalos'] remarks about arms with a grain of salt'). "D 1 129 FO 371/11359 Niemeyer to Lampson p. l. d. 5 Jul. 1926, Treasury to FO no. F7980/04 d. 17 Jul. 1926 
and file 7572 passim. 
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continued non-settlement of British claims, and the application of the forced loan of 
January to British subjects in Greece, contrary to the terms of the 1886 Anglo-Greek 
commercial treaty. 130 The Foreign Office tried to link satisfaction on this latter point 
with the signature of a new commercial treaty in July, but with only limited 
success. 131 
By far the most serious economic point at issue between the two countries was that of 
the Greek war debt. Preliminary negotiations led to the despatch of a Greek 
delegation, headed by Venizelos, to London in June. However, despite the Treasury 
offering relatively lenient terms the Greeks were stubborn and appeared to be seeking 
virtual cancellation of the whole debt. 132 The Treasury, an official told Lampson, was 
used to debtors arguing 
that their claims upon us are sacred obligations to be paid in full while their 
own cash obligations were merely paper promises which we should in no 
circumstances expect to be honoured; but never has this argument been put 
forward with such effrontery as by Monsieur Venizelos. 133 
Negotiations were resumed later in the year, but proceeded at a very slow pace, and 
no agreement was signed until April 1927.134In the meantime the Greeks were 
seeking a further refugee loan, as the funds of the RSC were almost exhausted. This 
was a remote enough prospect, given the political and economic instability prevailing 
in Greece, but the Treasury made it even more so by attempting to make the new loan 
conditional on Greece's settling her war debt. 135At moments of high exasperation the 
130 For the question of claims see FO 371/11348 file 747 passim, and FO 371/12178 Annual Report, 
Greece, 1926 p. 48. For the forced loan see FO 371/11350 file 988 passim and FO 371/12178 Annual 
Report, Greece, 1926 p. 9. 
131 FO 371/11350 memorandum by Harvey d. 18 Jun. 1926 and mins. by Lampson d. 18 Jun. 1926, 
Tyrrell d. 18 Jun. 1926, Chamberlain d. 21 Jun. 1926 and Lampson d. 21 Jun. 1926, MacKillop to FO 
no. 425 U Dec. 1926, mins. by Harvey d. 17 Dec. 1926, Hurst d. 23 Dec. 1926, Sargent d. 29 Dec. 1926, 
FO to Loraine no. 14 d. 4 Jan. 1927. The commercial treaty was signed on 16 July 1926 (FO 
371/11338-9 file 108 passim). 132 FO 371/11342 file 352 passim. 133 FO 3 71/113 52 Treasury to FO unno. 1. d. 1 Jul. 1926. 134 FO 371/11343 file 352 passim; Orde, Reconstruction, p. 298; Mazower, Greece and the Inter-War Economic Crisis, pp. 102-3. 135 FO 371/11340 Lampson to Howard Smith p. l. d. 16 Mar. 1926, LeaO'ue of Nations C. 349.1926. Il 
V Jun. 1926, note by Lampson d. 6 Aug. 1926, Treasury toFOunno. l. d. IOAug. 1926, Kaklamanos 
to Lampson p. l. d. 13 Aug. 1926; FO 371/11341 Niemeyer to Tyrrell p. l. d. 14 Dec. 1926. 
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Foreign Office considered consenting to this, but when the crunch came Chamberlain 
refused to link the two issues. This was not because of concern for Britain's position 
in Greece or on grounds of principle, but because the refugee loan was a humanitarian 
necessity which Britain could hardly veto for selfish purposes. Moreover, 
Chamberlain felt the British had a special responsibility because of the 
encouragement they had given the Greeks in Asia Minor, a contributory cause of the 
refugee influx in the first place. The second refugee loan was finally raised in January 
1928.136 
Meanwhile, in May 1926, Pangalos seemed to be more secure than ever. Soon after 
taking the presidential oath he moved into the former royal palace, previously only 
used for state occasions, and appeared to have prevailed over both military and 
political opponents. 137However, despite his recent election he still lacked any solid 
power base, and the difficulties he was having in acquiring one were reflected in his 
search for a prime minister to head the cabinet he was constructing. Having alienated 
the political parties he searched in the ranks of the military, and settled on General 
Paraskevopoulos, a 'bluff, nationalist soldier' of little political experience but 
Venizelist sympathies who had been living in Paris for some years. 138 Pangalos 
intended Paraskevopoulos to play a very subordinate role, with little freedom on 
matters of policy or personnel; consequently he was much surprised when 
Paraskevopoulos, even before he reached Athens, published a detailed political 
programme providing for free elections and the implementation of the constitution 
without Pangalos' amendments. 139 On Paraskevopoulos' arrival, Pangalos, supported 
by his entourage, was quite intransigent and publicly spelled out the 'rigidly 
136 FO 371/11340 min. by Howard Smith d. 20 Aug. 1926; FO 371/11341 mins by Harvey d. 17 
Dec. 1926, Howard Smith d. 20 Dec. 1926, Sargent d. 20 Dec. 1926; FO 371/11341 min. by Lampson U Aug. 1926; FO 371/11342 mins. by Chamberlain d. 28 Feb. 1926, Howard Smith d. 6 Jul. 1926; 
Orde, Reconstruction, pp. 287-8,297-8. 137 FO 371/11335 Cheetham, to FO no. 180 d. 4 May 1926, no. 186 d. 6 May 1926. 138 F0371/11335 Cheetham to FO no. 202 d. 19 May 1926; MAE Grýce 60 note by Corbin d. 15 May 1926; Llewellyn Smith, Ionian Vision, p. 341 [quoted]. 139 FO 371/11335 Cheetham to FO no. 202 d. 19 May 1926, no. 209 d. 25 May 1926, no. 216 d. 26 May 1926; MAE Grece 60 Chambrun to QO tel. 98 d. 30 May 1926, tel. 100 d. 2 Jun. 1926. 
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secondary rOle' he expected his premier to play. Paraskevopoulos refused to form a 
government on these terms and quickly returned to France. 140 
In July, Pangalos tried twice more to form a cabinet. His first premier elect was 
Konstantinos Zavitsianos, a well known Corfiote conservative politician, who at least 
had the merit of being a civilian. However, the main parties refused to co-operate 
with him, believing that his government would manipulate the elections to provide 
Pangalos with a docile assembly. Zavitsianos therefore refused to form a cabinet, 
which was a setback for Pangalos as it implied that his pledges of support carried less 
weight with potential premiers than the hostility of the political parties. 141 Next, 
Pangalos asked the president of the court of appeal, Zilimon, to form a cabinet 
d'affaires to oversee elections, and declared that he was willing to relinquish some of 
^ le. his dictatorial powers and play a more constitutional ro 142Despite this concession 
by Pangalos the parties again frustrated him, and refused to co-operate with Zilimon. 
Thereupon Pangalos, worried by his deteriorating position, 'abandoned his attempts at 
conciliation and decided to "passer outre"'. 143 
On 17 July he arrested and deported to Naxos the leading Venizelist and republican 
politicians and arranged the formation of a political cabinet under a respected 
economics expert, Eftaxias. 144This was a bold stroke, but one born out of desperation 
as Pancralos knew his military supporters were deserting him; furthermore, his Z: ) 
delegation to the new cabinet of executive and legislative powers formerly vested in 
himself was viewed as proof of his weakness. The government faced serious 
difficulties and needed some immediate tangible success to counteract the effects of 
economic crisis and foreign isolation. 145 Unfortunately, despite Eftaxias' sensible and 
140 FO 371/11335 Cheetham to FO no. 209 d. 25 May 1926, tel. 123 d. 29 May 1926, no. 231 d. 8 
Jun. 1926; MAE Gr6ce 60 Chambrun to QO no. 79 d. 10 Jun. 1926. 141 FO 371/11335 MacKillop to FO tels. 149-50 d. 12 Jul. 1926, no. 276 d. 14 Jul. 1,926. 142 FO 371/11335 MacKillop to FO no. 276 d. 14 Jul. 1926, tel. 153 d. 16 Jul. 1926, no. 279 d. 17 Jul. 1926; FO 371/12178 Annual Report, Greece, 1926 p. 4. 143 FO 371/11335 MacKillop to FO tel. 154 d. 17 Jul. 1926, no. 283 d. 20 Jul. 1926. 144 FO 371/11335 MacKillop to FO tel. 156 d. 19 Jul. 1926, no. 283 d. 20 Jul. 1926; MAE Grke 60 
Chambrun to QO no. 90 d. 17 Jul. 1926. 145 FO 371/11335 MacKillop to FO no. 283 d. 20 Jul. 1926; FO 371/12178 Annual Report, Greece, 
1926 pp. 4-5. 
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conservative financial policy there was no quick fix available for the crippled Greek 
economy, and indeed, because of general uncertainty, the drachma fell by ten per cent 
within a week of the government's taking office. Late in July Pangalos was compelled 
by his minister of the interior to release those detained on Naxos, but they had spent 
their incarceration planning a campaign to oust him and on their return launched a 
concerted onslaught on his regime. 146 
In the first weeks of August two attempted coups - one in Crete and one in Chalkis - 
were crushed, but Pangalos' position was now desperate. 147The economic situation 
deteriorated, and the government's remedy of cancelling various arms contracts 
ý0 further alienated the army, as did rumours that Pangalos was planning to restore the 
monarchy. 148The last straw proved to be Pangalos' capitulation to the Yugoslavs in 
the long running negotiations for the renewal of the alliance. On 17 August, in his 
desperation for a political success, he accepted the Yugoslav terms, but the resulting 
treaty was exploited by the opposition who claimed it betrayed Greek national 
interests. 149 It came as little surprise thereafter when on 22 August Pangalos' old 
adversary Kondylis launched an almost bloodless military coup that toppled the 
government against a background of indifference from the general public. Pangalos, 
who was taking an ill-advised holiday at Spetsai, made a bid for freedom, but was 
soon captured and imprisoned on the rocky (though not volcanic) island of Aegina. 150 
Meanwhile, in Athens Kondylis assumed the premiership and invited Koundouriotis 
146 FO 371/11335 MacKillop to FO no. 285 d. 21 Jul. 1926, no. 295 d. 24 Jul. 1926, no. 298 d. 28 
Jul. 1926, no. 31 1 d. 5 Aug. 1926. 
147 FO 371/11335 MacKillop to FO tel. 169 d. II Aug. 1926, no. 318 d. 12 Aug. 1926, tel. 174 d. 17 
Aug. 1926. 
148 FO 371/11335 MacKillop to FO no. 311 d. 5 Aug. 1926; FO 371/11336 min. by Howard Smith d. 30 
Aug. 1926; MAE Grýce 60 Chambrun to QO tel. 149 d. 22 Aug. 1926. Veremis, however, says that 
Pangalos tried to placate the military with pay rises (Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 7 43,47). The 
Eftaxias cabinet contained several royalist ministers. Pangalos assured Chambrun that he could trust 
them because he had watched them personally to make sure that they took the oath to the republic 
I without flinching' (FO 371/11335 MacKi Ilop to FO no. 295 d. 24 Jul. 1926; MAE Grke 60 Chambrun 
to QO no. 90 d. 17 Jul. 1926). 
149 MAE Grece 60 Chambrun to QO tel. 139 d. 12 Aug. 1926, tel. 149 d. 22 Aug. 1916, no. 103 d. 27 
Aug. 1926; Psomiades Balkan Studies 13 13-14. 
150 F03371/11335 Crow to FO tel. 6 d. 22 Aug. 1926; FO 371/11336 MacKillop to FO no. 331 d. 26 
Aug. 1926; FO 371/12178 Annual Report, Greece, 1926 p. 5. 0 
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to resume the presidency, making the by now very familiar promise to return the 
country to democracy at the earliest possible moment. 151 
During Pangalos' last months in power, the Foreign Office had continued to put a 
favourable gloss on his actions. Throughout May and June his attempts to find a 
prime minister were applauded as heralding a possible return to normality. Harvey 
believed he genuinely wanted elections in order to reduce his dependence on the 
military, and that the danger was that a coup would topple him before he 
succeeded. 152Even Chamberlain shared these positive attitudes, reporting Sir Eric 
Drummond's favourable impression of Pangalos: 'he thought him a man to get things 
done & possessed of a sense of humour - as shown by his sending the principal 
opposition leaders to carry on their political discussions on an active volcanic 
island! '153 In July, when the politicians twice frustrated Pangalos' attempts to 
construct a cabinet, Greenway, who believed Pangalos would be victorious in free 
elections, was scathing in his criticism: the dictatorship was 'infinitely preferable to 
the stupid bickering & vacillations of the political parties. The latter have been the 
ruin of Greece'. 154 
This irritation with the political parties was understandable given London's 
assumptions that Pangalos was popular and sincerely trying to free himself from 
military influence - in such circumstances it was the politicians who were blocking a 
return to democracy and encouraging a coup. After the formation of the Eftaxias 
cabinet Greenway was still optimistic: 
the change from dictatorship to constitutional gov[ernmen]t can only take place 
gradually... but General Pangalos is ... a man of very considerable ability - and it straight", and if only he can keep the army reasonably quiet, he should attain 
his ends and bring back to Greece at least a certain measure of tranquillity. 155 
151 FO 371/11335 MacKillop to FO tel-184 d. 24 Aug. 1926, tel. 186 d. 25 Aug. 1926; FO 371/11336 
MacKillop to FO no. 333 d. I Sept. 1926. 152 FO 371/11335 mins. by Harvey d. 4,19,26 and I Jun. 1926. 153 FO 371/11335 min. by Chamberlain d. 14 Jun. 1926. 154 FO 371/113 35 mins. by Greenway d. 12 Jul. 1926, d. 19 Jul. 1926. 155 FO 371/11335 min. by Greenway d. 5 Aug. 1926. 
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As the Greek economic situation deteriorated, this optimism waned. 156The 
resignation of the secretary general of the foreign ministry on 12 August in protest at 
the concessions being made to Yugoslavia was identified as an ominous sign, and on 
the eve of the coup Howard Smith realised that a crisis was coming and that 
everything now depended on whether the troops would stay loyal to Pangalos or 
defect to Kondylis. 157 
It fell to Greenway in a long minute after the coup to sum up the dictator's record. 
Pangalos' faults were 'not great' and although he was 'highly dictatorial in his 
methods', 'to a certain extent he was justified by the circumstances of the time'. 
Various groups had contributed to his downfall: the politicians could not forgive his 
economic mismanagement and the army and navy resented his aloofness from the 
fpermanent intrigues' that were 'sapping the hearts of those two forces'. The Greek 
people, too, were responsible, for they were impetuous and impatient and appeared to 
expect'the performance of miracles at a moment's notice'. Nevertheless, Pangalos' 
achievements were 'not small' and his record was 'surprisingly good'. One had to 
despair of the Greeks who allowed 'their hopes of prosperity to be continually 
frustrated by the selfish ignorance of the party factions'. With luck Pangalos might 
return to power one day, but in the meantime Greece would'once again relapse into 
the party factions which have ruined her finance and hampered her progress'. 158 
Greenway clearly believed that, despite Anglo-Greek tension over economic issues, 
the peace and stability in Greece which British interests demanded was more likely to 
be realised under a dictatorship than a democratic government. 
The response of the French to the coup also illustrated their priorities. France's 
concerns, which had been manifested throughout the summer, were to ensure the 
continuation of republican and francophile government in Greece and to improve 
156 FO 3 371/11335 mins. by Howard Smith d. 6 Aug. 1926, Greenway d. 10 Aug. 1926. 
157 FO 371/11335 mins. by Bateman d. 13 Aug. 1926, Howard Smith d. 13 and 19 Aug. 1926. 158 FO 371/11335 min. by Greenway d-23 Aug. 1926. In the autumn Greenway visited Greece and 
had his opinions confirmed. The Greeks, he felt, needed a unifying idea like fascism, although 
fascism itself would never take root in Greece (FO 371/11360 memorandum by Greenway d. 12 
Oct. 1926). 
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Greece's relations with Yugoslavia. 159 Immediately after the coup, when there was 
talk of an ecumenical cabinet, Chambrun pressed Koundouriotis to constitute instead 
a purely republican cabinet 'favourable to the Serbian alliance and determined to 
proceed to elections'. Soon, just such a cabinet was formed under Kondylis, who, 
Chambrun noted with satisfaction, was of all Greek politicians 'the most attached to 
the republic and to France. 160Chambrun badgered Kondylis over the Yugoslav 
treaty, which France felt was so favourable to Balkan peace and French interests, and 
eventually secured a promise that it would be ratified if possible. 161 The French were 
pleased at the conclusion of this treaty which was clearly a victory for French Balkan 
policy over that of Italy. The Italians were annoyed, for one thing because the treaty 
lessened the Greeks'fear of isolation. Although the new Greek foreign minister spoke 
warmly to the Italian minister of his feelings for Italy, the passing of Pangalos was a 
severe blow to the Greco-Italian rapprochement he had pioneered. "' 
159 MAE Grke 60 note by Corbin d. 15 May 1926; MAE Grýce 79 QO to Charnbrun tel. 111 d-21 
May 1926. Chambrun put Pangalos' intransigence towards the francophile Paraskevopoulos down to 
the machinations of the Italian inspired Greek royalist press (MAE Grýce 60 Charnbrun to QO no. 79 
d. 10 Jun. 1926). 
160 MAE Grke 60 Chambrun to QO no. 103 d. 29 Aug. 1926. 161 MAE Grke 60 Charnbrun to QO tels. 150-1 d-25 Aug. 1926, tel. 153 d. 27 Aug. 1926; MAE Grke 
79 note by Labouret d. 17 Sept. 1926; MAE Youg0slavie 53 QO to Chambrun tels. 182-3 d. 24 
Aug. 1926. 
162 MAE Yougoslavie 53 Roger (charg6 at Rome) to QO tels. 486-7 d. 26 Aug. 1926, Grenard to 
[? Rome] tel. 222 d. 28 Aug. 1926; DDI/7/IV/312-3,316-7. 
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The revolutionary government established in Athens in 1922 faced immense problems 
in the realm of foreign policy. The success or failure of Greek foreign policy had 
always been dependent to a large extent upon factors beyond Greek control, but now 
Greece was defeated, penniless, isolated, racked by internal dissent and consequently 
dealing with other states from a position of great weakness. Chief amongst Greece's 
foreign difficulties was the question of a settlement with Turkey, which preoccupied 
Greek diplomacy for almost a year and in which Greece's most vital interests were at 
stake. However, this question was also of vital concern to the great powers and 
Greece was a relatively minor player at Lausanne, her interests being subsumed and 
to some extent sacrificed in the Allied pursuit of peace and security for their own 
strategic and economic interests. In another area, moreover, over the next few years 
Greece had to cope not simply with her interests being neglected, but with the virtual, 
and at one point the actual, hostility of one of the great powers. That power was Italy, 
a near neighbour who viewed Greece with some suspicion as a potential rival and 
who as a consequence had actively connived at Greece's defeat in Asia Minor. Indeed, 
Turkey apart, relations with Italy were until the middle of 1924 the chief 
preoccupation of Greek diplomacy, and certainly the aspect of it which attracted most 
attention from the powers. 1 
Greek and Italian interests were potentially in conflict over a whole range of issues, 
but the point where they most acutely clashed in 1922 was over the fate of the 
Dodecanese. This group of islands, situated off the south-western tip of Anatolia and 
including Rhodes, had an ethnically Greek population but had been occupied by the 
Italians since the end of their war with Turkey in 1912. The question of their ultimate 
fate had been complicated by the diplomacy of the Great War, and now they formed 
part of a complex of issues over which the Italians, obsessed with the idea of a 
I An alternative candidate for the chief preoccupation of Greek diplomacy could be the quest for international help in settling the refugees. As mentioned in the introduction above, Greece's troubled 
relations with Turkey (which were mostly concerned with the legacy of the war and the implementation of the peace settlement) were an important aspect of Greek foreign policy which is 
not treated in detail here. Greece's relations with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were also somewhat tense, but again the problems involved did not become acute until 1924 and in any case they were certainly 
not as threatening to European peace as the possibility of conflict with Italy. 
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'mutilated victory' long before Mussolini came to power, sought satisfaction. The 
history of this question, in which Britain took an active part, illustrates the restless, 
discontented character of Italian policy in this period, the existence of a certain 
amount of continuity in foreign policy between Mussolini and his predecessors and 
also the protracted nature of the process of settlement after the war once the 
victorious coalition had fallen apart. 
Under article 2 of the treaty of Ouchy of 1912 between Italy and the Ottoman empire, 
the Italians undertook to ýevacuate the Dodecanese as soon as Turkish forces left 
Tripoli and Cyrenaica. However, a delay in this latter evacuation meant that Italy was 
still in occupation of the islands at the outbreak of the war. Subsequently, by the 
treaty of London in April 1915, by which Britain, France and Russia secured Italian 
adhesion to the Entente war effort, the Allies promised that at the peace the islands 
would be awarded to Italy. By the time of the peace conference, however, it was 
apparent that the United States would never agree to this clause of the treaty of 
London in view of the Hellenic character of the Dodecanesians and their desire to be 
united with Greece. The Italian foreign minister, Tittoni, therefore signed an 
agreement with Venizelos on 29 July 1919 whereby the Greeks were to acquire the 
Dodecanese (with the exception of Rhodes) and to have their position in Smyrna 
recognised in return for concessions to the Italians over Albania. 2 
By 1920 the Italians had begun to doubt the wisdom of this agreement, and 
negotiations were opened for a new settlement. By August these were almost 
complete, and they were brought to a close after Curzon pressed the Italians to 
concede similar terms to those of the 1919 agreement, warning Rome that Great 
Britain would refuse to sign the treaty of Sevres unless the Italians were conciliatory 
2 FO 371/8413 'Memorandum respecting Questions outstanding between England and Italy' by Nicolson d. 4 Apr. 1923, Annex II; DBFP/I/XXIV/24; C. J. Lowe and F. Marzari, Italian Foreign 
Policy, 1870-1940 (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 172-4,185-8. For the text of the 
treaty of Ouchy see BFSPI10611100-3, of the treaty of London BFSP11 12/973-7 and of the Tittoni- Venizelos agreement, Frangulis, Grece 1193-8. For the pre-war history of this question see A. M. De Fabo, The Aegean Island Question and Greece. A Diplomatic History, 1911-1914 (unpublished PhD 
thesis, Washington, 1981). Also useful is P. J. Carabott, The Dodecanese Question, 1912-1924 
(unpublished PhD thesis, London, 1991). 
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on this point. This was a serious threat, for the Tripartite agreement which formed 
part of the Sevres settlement assigned to Italy a large zone of influence in Anatolia 
around Adalia. Consequently, on 10 August 1920 a Greco-Italian agreement (the 
Bonin-Venizelos agreement) was signed in tandem with the treaty of Sevres. Article 
122 of the latter bound Turkey to cede the Dodecanese to Italy, whilst in accordance 
with the Bonin-Venizelos agreement Italy was pledged to hand the islands over to 
Greece (again with the exception of Rhodes, which was to be retained by Italy under 
certain conditionS). 3 
There the matter would have rested, but for the reversal of fortune which 
subsequently occurred in the Near East. The Bonin-Venizelos agreement never 
became operative, for its coming into force was linked to the ratification of Sevres 
which never took place. In February 1922 the Italians told the British that they no 
longer considered themselves bound by the Bonin-Venizelos agreement: the situation 
in the Near East had now completely changed, and as Sevres was to be revised, so the 
fate of the Dodecanese must be reconsidered. This view was hotly disputed by 
Curzon, who told the Italians on 10 February that the 1920 agreement'must still 
constitute the basis of the settlement of the Dodecanesian question' even though it was 
not juridically operative. Great Britain's signature of Sevres and the Tripartite 
agreement had been conditional upon the simultaneous signature of the Greco-Italian 
agreement, and this gave to the latter 'an importance and a solidity greater than its 
merely juridical value'. Although the agreement would have to be reaffirmed before it 
could enter into force, it constituted a 'moral obligation' upon Italy, while the British, 
who had taken a 'very direct interest' in its signature, could not 'now remain 
indifferent to its execution'. 4 
The issue was next raised in June, when the Italian foreign minister, Schanzer, visited 
London for talks. His ultimate goal was to create an Anglo-Italian entente, especially 
3 DBFP/I/XXIV/23-25. For the text of the treaty of Rvres, see BFSPII 13/652-776, of the Bonin- 
Venizelos agreement BFSPII 13/1078-80 and the of Tripartite agreement BFSPA 13/797-803. 4 DBFP/I/XXIV/25-6. 
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concerning economic questions in the eastern Mediterranean and 
Black Sea, where 
the two powers would 'lend reciprocal support' to the fulfilment of their respective 
ambitions. In the short term, he submitted in a memorandum a list of issues 
(mostly 
concerned with Africa) upon which Italy sought satisfaction from Great Britain. 
5 The 
Italians believed that they had been ill-rewarded at the peace conference for their 
efforts in the war, and felt that they were entitled to compensation in Africa and the 
Near East, partly because they had been denied a share in Germany's colonies and 
partly as compensation for the now moribund Tripartite agreement. 6 Schanzer also 
saw that detaching England from Greece and establishing an entente in the 
Mediterranean would be of immense value to Italian poliCy, 7 and he hoped to 
capitalize on the close relations he had established with the British at the recent 
Genoa conference, and the assistance that Italy had rendered England there, which 
had 'proved of very practical value'. 8 
Before Schanzer's arrival the Foreign Office discussed the notion of an Anglo-Italian 
entente in some detail but without much enthusiasm, for the Italians had neglected to 
include anything of benefit to Britain in their proposals. Crowe urged wariness with 
regard to any formula proposed by Schanzer, for otherwise the Italians would seek to 
invoke British support for all kinds of selfish and ill-judged policies, although this 
would probably not restrain Italy from 'playing us false and intriguing against British 
interests everywhere in the East as she has consistently done hitherto'. 9 A 
5 DBFP/1/XXIV/1 -2,11-12. 6 The Italians' claim that they had been cheated of their just rewards rang a little hollow where 
Europe was concerned: they had acquired territory in the Trentino, Alto Adige (despite the principle 
of national self-determination), Istria and Trieste, established a defensible frontier and seen their 
hereditary enemy, Austria-Hungary, dismembered. All this, however, was obscured by the nationalist 
furore aroused by the claim to Fiume, a question that was still not settled (D. Mack Smith, Italy and 
its Monarchy (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989), p. 238). In the colonial field, the Italians had 
more grounds for complaint: Germany's colonies had been parcelled out while Italy was absent from 
the peace conference, and Italy was therefore justified in asking for the 'equitable compensation' 
foreseen in the treaty of London in the event of Anglo-French colonial expansion (Lowe and Marzari, 
Italian Foreign Policy, pp. 169-72; Shorrock, Ally to Enemy, pp. 12-13). 7 The Italians had attempted to detach the British from the Greeks and to persuade them to join in an 
actively pro-Turkish policy in 1921. Curzon had rebuffed that move, being unwilling to abandon the 
Greeks (DBFPIXVIII54-6), but in 1922 the Italians may have felt that with the Greeks in desperate 
straits in Anatolia the omens were auspicious for a renewed initiative. 8 DBFP/I/XXIV/v, 2. 
9 DBFP/i/XXIV/1. 
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memorandum prepared by the Foreign Office for the cabinet struck an equally 
sceptical note. A formal understanding with Italy would bring almost no tangible 
gains to Britain but immense benefits to the Italians who, having escaped their present 
friendless isolation, would feel free to adopt more forceful policies towards Albania 
and Yugoslavia, to make commercial agreements with Germany and the Soviet Union 
and to antagonise the French. Equally and most importantly, an entente would 
strengthen Italy's hand against the 'hereditary and national obstacle to [her] expansion 
in the Levant', Greece. This would amount in effect to Britain's abandoning Greece 
for Italy and the Italians would probably expect to be allowed to keep the Dodecanese 
and to receive economic concessions in the Near East and frontier rectifications in 
Africa. Britain therefore must tread warily: a substantial agreement would be one- 
sided and damaging but even the adoption of some vague formula would be exploited 
by the Italians with adverse consequences for British prestige. 10 
The talks began on 26 June and lasted almost a fortnight. A wide range of subjects 
was discussed, but in essence the Italians were seeking economic concessions and 
recognition of their status as a great power equal to Great Britain. Although the 
British were prepared to make some concessions, the talks became deadlocked on two 
linked points: the Dodecanese and Jubaland. 11 
The British territory of Jubaland, situated between Kenya and Italian Somaliland, had 
long been earmarked by the British as suitable compensation for Italy in lieu of a 
share of Germany's colonies. Detailed discussions had started between the two 
governments in September 1919, and by April 1920 a broad measure of agreement 
had been reached as to the area to be given to Italy. At the same time, the British 
colonial secretary, Lord Milner, made clear to the Italians that since this area was 
substantially greater than the frontier rectification provided for in the treaty of 
London, the agreement on Jubaland 'could only become effective as part of a general 
settlement of all the issues raised at the Peace Conference'. Although talks continued 
'ODBFP/I/XXIV/2-10. 
11 DBFP1I /XXIV/26-126 passim. 
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on the fine details of the agreement, these had not been settled by the time Schanzer 
reached London. 12 In the minds of the Foreign Office, however, the link between the 
Jubaland cession and a general settlement was firm. In a memorandum previewing the 
talks with Italy, it was argued that in view of the 'growing tendency' of Italy to recede 
from her engagements to Greece over the Dodecanese made 'as part of the general 
settlement', Britain should 'continue to hold up" the Jubaland cession until the 
Mediterranean settlement was 'made secure'. 13 
The divergence of view between the two governments soon became apparent, as did 
the grasping nature of Schanzer's demands. The British insisted that the Jubaland 
cession could only be made as part of a wider settlement, including the execution of 
the promises over the Dodecanese made by the Italians in 1920. Schanzer retorted 
that the two questions were entirely separate: Jubaland must be handed over 
immediately as compensation for Italy's sacrifices in the Allied cause, but he could 
promise only to make some future agreement with the Greeks, probably on terms less 
favourable than those conceded in 1920.14Both sides supported their arguments - the 
Italians with rather more justification - by claiming that their hands were tied by 
public opinion. 15 
British motives were rather more complex than those of the Italians. While the 
Admiralty was very uneasy about the prospect of Italian naval bases in the 
Dodecanese, Lloyd George was concerned with broader issues, principally the fact 
that Schanzer was asking him to 'give Greece away in her absence, and to support the 
Italians in a demand for something which was quite contrary to all the principles of 
12 FO 371/8413 'Memorandum respecting Questions outstanding between England and Italy' by 
Nicolson dA Apr. 1923, Annex 1; DBFP/I/XXVI/I 31-3. The interpretation of article 13 of the treaty 
of London was much disputed by the British and Italians: the former emphasised the words 'frontier 
rectification', the latter the term 'equitable compensation'. 13 DBFP/I/XXIV/16-17. 
14 DBFP/I/XXIV/27-8,32,50-2. 
15 Lloyd George claimed that as Jubaland was 'a very good colony' there would be much trouble in 
Parliament over its loss and so it would be better to create a larger package deal. Schanzer, whose domestic position was much more precarious, given the volatility of Italian nationalist feeling, said 
that'if he was obliged to go back to Italy without obtaining anything it would be a very bad thing for his policy, (DBFP/I/XXIV/51,58-62,68-9). 
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[the] Treaties of Peace'. 16 There was more to it than principle, however. The 
continuing importance of the Mediterranean for communications with India meant 
Britain had a concrete interest in keeping on good terms with both Italy and Greece, 
and since an amicable settlement of the Dodecanese question on the lines previously 
agreed by the Italians would obviously help in this respect, Lloyd George felt that he 
must use Jubaland as a lever to promote a settlement satisfactory to Greece. 17 
Moreover, Lloyd George still seems to have believed that the Sevres policy of 
placating Britain's allies at Turkish expense was still viable. Certainly he had not yet 
given up hope that the Greeks might prevail - he "doubted if the Turks could hold 
on'18 - and on 6 July he stated that he favoured 'a complete understanding between 
Italy and Greece' on the Asia Minor question. 19 Given the recent thrust of Italian 
policy and the strength of the Kernalists in Turkey, the idea that Italy should 
relinquish the Dodecanese in return for an understanding with Greece over Anatolia 
was, if seriously intended, clearly unrealistic, but Lloyd George's policy in the 
Dodecanese was conditioned by his fundamental misperception of the situation in the 
Near East. 
Deadlock on the Dodecanese question - according to the British 'politically the most 
important' between Britain and Italy - killed off what slim chance there had been of 
any substantive agreement during the Schanzer talks. 20 The sides were so far apart 
that a mere colourless communique was issued, stating that the two countries were 
united in a desire to promote their common interests and peace and reconstruction in 
Europe. 21 This result was not far from what the Foreign Office had expected, or even 




21 On I July the Italians submitted a draft treaty (DBFP/1/XXIVf74-9) which was discussed by the British on 3 July (DBFP/I/XXIV/69-74). The Colonial Office discussed the treaty with the Italians (DBFP/I/XXIV/79-101) before a British counter-draft was presented on 5 July (DBFP/I/XXIV/1 11- 7). This counter-draft was discussed with the Italians on 6 July (DBFP111XXIV1101-1 1); Schanzer 
was disappointed that this'document did not come up to his expectations' (DBFPIIIX)UV1101) and so it was decided only to issue a vague communiqud (DBFP/lMXIV/l03-4). For the text of the communiqu6 see DBFP/I/XXIV/126. 
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hoped for, but Schanzer left London 'a bitter and disappointed man"22with his 
'political reputation ... destroyed'. 
23 
The basic lines of this dispute between Britain and Italy - which was not settled until 
the summer of 1924 - were now fixed and remained so for many months. The 
transformation of the situation in the Near East by the final rout of the Greeks in Asia 
Minor and the revolution in Athens did nothing to bridge the gulf between the British 
and the Italians on the Dodecanese question or cause them to alter their positions. On 
9 October the Italians again informed the Foreign Office that they regarded the 
Bonin-Venizelos agreement as having lapsed, only to receive on 15 October the usual 
testy response from Curzon: this question could not be 'decided by unilateral action' 
on the part of Italy or 'detached from the general settlement', and such action would 
'logically and inevitably entail the cancellation of the other engagements into which, 
as part of the general settlement, ' Great Britain had entered. 24 
Equally, the rise to power of Mussolini on 28 October (in part facilitated by 
discontent with the disastrous foreign policy of his liberal predecessors including the 
failure of Schanzer's talks in London 25) did not at first herald any change in Italian 
policy. Curzon had feared that Mussolini -a notorious anglophobe - might not be 
prepared to join in a united Allied front at the forthcoming Near Eastern peace 
conference, 26but the Duce's moderate tone in his first interviews with Graham was 
extremely reassuring. Mussolini was adamant that his policy would be pacific and one 
of co-operation and accord with his Allies, and even announced that he was 'prepared 
to negotiate an immediate agreement to embrace [the] Dodecanese and Jubaland'. 27 
22 C. Fink, The Genoa Conference. European Diplomacy, 1921-1922 (Chapel Hill, University of 
North Carolina Press, 1984), p. 303; Carabott, Dodecanese Question, pp. 257-8. 23 DBFP/I/XXIV/696. 
24 FO 371/8413 'Memorandum respecting Questions outstanding between England and Italy' by Nicolson dA Apr. 1923, Annex II; DBFP/l/XVIII/829-30; Lowe and Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy, 
Pp-189,396-7. For Italian thinking at this time, see Carabott, Dodecanese Question, pp. 265-7. 25 C. Fink, Italy and the Genoa Conference of 1922', International History Review 8(l) 1986 53-5. 26 Mussolini had recently written that it was in Italy's interest 'to collaborate in [the] destruction' of 
the British empire (DBFP/I/XVIII/218-9). See also Cassels, Early Diplomacy, pp. 3 10- 1. 27 DBFP/i/XVIII/220-1. See also G. Rumi, Alle Origini della Politica Estera Fascista (1918-1923) 
(Bari, Editori Laterza, 1968), pp. 268-73. 
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This initial impression that Mussolini might in fact be more accommodating than his 
predecessors over the Dodecanese seemed to be confirmed by his reply (dated 3 
November) to Curzon's recent note. Whilst he reiterated that the Bonin-Venizelos 
agreement could not be considered valid after the collapse of the Sevres settlement, 
he conceded that it was 'the result of an agreement between the Allies' and that Italy 
was 'disposed to re-examine with them the problem in its entirety in order to arrive at 
a new settlement'. The Foreign Office chose to interpret this as a direct and distinct 
admission that the Dodecanese question was one which could not be settled by Italy 
unilaterally. However, from the context in which this admission was made, it is clear 
that the Italians meant only. that the question might be included in the inter-Allied 
discussions of the whole Near Eastern situation which were to precede the Lausanne 
peace conference and that if the Allies satisfied Italy's long-standing requests for 
colonial compensation, economic concessions in the Levant and a share in their 
mandated territories they might be prepared to negotiate the cession of some of the 
islands to Greece. 28 
During the talks between Curzon, Mussolini and Poincare held at Territet and 
Lausanne between 19 and 21 November to concert Allied policy this 
misunderstanding was perpetuated. The three agreed that the Turks would be 
deprived of all rights over the Dodecanese and that the fate of the islands would be 
decided by the Allies. However, whilst Curzon believed that Mussolini had thereby 
admitted the legitimacy of Britain's interest in the question, the latter claimed that 
Curzon had tacitly accepted that the future of the islands was now ruled by the treaty 
of London and that they would be retained by Italy. 29 
This difference of opinion only failed to emerge because it was overshadowed by a 
more serious misunderstanding. During the same talks Mussolini gained the mistaken b 
impression that Curzon was prepared to meet Italy's demands for a share in the 
28 FO 371/8413 Memorandum respecting Questions outstanding between England and Italy'by Nicolson d. 4 Apr. 1923, Annex H; DDI/7/I/32-5,46,49,54,294; DBFP/I/XVIII/830; Lowe and Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy, pp. 189-90. 29 DBFP/I/XVIII/310,317; DDI/7/I/86-8,93. 
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administration of the mandated territorieS. 30 When the Italians attempted to formalise, 
this 'agreement' with the British they received a rude shock, the more so as the Italian 
note implied that their co-operation at Lausanne was dependent upon the granting of 
such concessions. Curzon angrily rejected this attempt at blackmail, warning that if it 
continued Britain and France were prepared to go on at Lausanne alone. 31 Mussolini 
was thus denied the striking diplomatic victory he thought he had achieved, and, once 
his anger had abated, he had little option but to toe the Allied line at Lausanne in the 
hope of extracting concessions from England later. 32 
Thanks to this contretemps, the precise position of the Dodecanese was somewhat 
obscured. On 25 November when the question came up for discussion Curzon 
prevented its being raised with the Turks - for which he was apparently warmly 
thanked by the Italians - and subsequently the issue was kept off the agenda. 33 The 
draft treaty drawn up in January 1923 reproduced, as article 15, article 122 of the 
treaty of Sevres whereby Turkey ceded sovereignty over the islands to Italy. The 
Italians hoped that this would be the last word on the subject, but chose not to 
contradict Curzon when he expressed his own, different VieW34 - namely, that he 
would never have consented to the introduction of article 15 had he not received (in 
addition to Mussolini's 'formal promise'of 3 November) 'verbal assurances' from the 
Italian delegation that the Dodecanese question would be made 'the subject of a 
further discussion and a final settlement between the Italian and British 
govemments'. 35 
Although this decision about the fate of the islands rested, therefore, upon an 
equivocation, there was no further discussion of the Dodecanese at Lausanne, and 
30 DBFPII/XVIII/317,323-4,362-5; DDI/7/I/87-8,91-2. 
31 DDIn/l/914,96,98,100,105-6,122-3,130-3; DBFP/I/XVIII/352-3,3624,376-7 
32 DBFP/I/XVIII/362-5,376-7; DDI/7/I/123,135-7,13940,162; Lowe and Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy, pp190-1; Cassels, Early Diplomacy, pp. 24-3 1. 33 DBFP/I/XVIII/336-7,364; DDI/7/I/98,111,278. 
34 DDIn/j/2924,375-6. 
35 FO 371/8413 'Meniorandum respecting Questions outstanding between England and Italy' by Nicolson d. 4 Apr. 1923, Annex II; DBFP/I/XXVI/5. 
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article 15 appeared in the final treaty of 24 July unamended. 36 This was perhaps not 
surprising. There had been far more dramatic questions at stake; and Curzon had in 
any case always insisted that, to minimise the possibility of inter-Allied disharmony, 
only matters relating directly to the peace with Turkey should be discussed at the 
conference. The Dodecanese question was left to become an element in Anglo-Italian 
and Italo-Greek relations in their wider sense. 37 
Anglo-Italian relations in the spring and summer of 1923 were somewhat troubled. 
Although Mussolini had not pursued in power the anglophobe policy he had preached 
in opposition, he was, in British eyes, capricious and inconsistent. On the German 
question his policy was satisfactory, since although he initially supported France in 
the Ruhr occupation he on the whole followed the British line; as he did in the matter 
of Hungarian reparations and reconstruction. 38However, he obstructed Britain's and 
the League's attempts to stabilise Austria, and also intrigued more directly against 
British intereStS. 39 Rumours that he was plotting with Indian revolutionaries against 
the British position in the subcontinent were eventually dismissed by the Foreign 
Office, but a plan which he floated in January for an anti-Anglo-S axon continental 
bloc encompassing Italy, France, Belgium, Germany and eventually the Soviet Union 
was distinctly worrying. 40 This scheme was soon abandoned but, although it had been 
designed mainly to safeguard Italian economic interests in the event of French success 
36 The future of Castellorizzýo, also occupied by the Italians and dealt with in article 15, was the 
subject of some discussion, but it was not strictly one of the Dodecanese (DBFP/lOWIH/692-4,72l- 
5,773,812,838,995). 
37 DDI/7/l/375-6. 
38 FO 371/8413 FO memorandum by [? ] d. 19 Apr. 1923; DBFP/IJXXIV/viii-x; Cassels, Early 
Diplomacy, pp. 47-79; S horrock, Ally to Enemy, pp. 28ff.; S. Marks, 'Mussolini and the Ruhr Crisis', 
International History Review 8(l) 1986 56-69; F. Charles-Roux, Souvenirs Diplomatiques. Une 
Grande Ambassade d Rome. 1919-1925 (Paris, Fayard, 1961), pp. 231-4. By May Lampson was 
writing of the 'apparent loyalty'of Italy over reparations (FO 371/8889 min. by Lampson d. 8 May 
1923). In fact, as Marks demonstrates, Mussolini's Ruhr policy was to put off taking sides irrevocably 
and to promise all things to all men in the hope that both France and Britain would be grateful for his 
Support. 
39 DBFpl, IXX, Vlvii_viii. 
40 FO 371/8889 Crowe to Graham p. l. d. 11 Jun. 1923, Lampson to Graham p. l. d. 21 Aug. 1923, Graham to Lampson p. l. d. 19 Sept. 1923. Tyrrell believed that the rumours about Indian intrigues 
should be taken 'cum grano salis' (min. by Tyrrell d. 16 Aug. 1923). For the continental bloc plan, see DDI/7/j/218-9,225-6,230-1,240,242-4. 
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in the Ruhr and was less anti-British than the enthusiastic Italian press made out, it 
had produced a painful impression in Britain. 41 
The one identifiable theme behind Mussolini's policies was the search for a striking 
foreign policy success to allay growing discontent with his domestic policy and to 
justify fascist rhetoric. 42 The rebuff over mandates, failure to mediate successfully in 
the reparations question and the deadlock over Fiume (despite Mussolini's moderate 
line) all made the Duce keen to expedite settlement of the Dodecanese and Jubaland 
questions. 43 In March he urged Della Torretta to test the water in London to see if an 
agreement could not be reached before the visit of George V to Rome in May. 44 
When the ambassador approached Curzon, however, with the suggestion that the 
Jubaland cession should be separated from the Dodecanese question and executed 
'without delay as a beau geste on the part of England' in order to improve relations in 
the run up to the royal visit, he received the by now standard response: the 
Dodecanese, Jubaland and all other questions arising from the war must be settled 
together as part of a general arrangement after the conclusion of peace with Turkey. 45 
Della Torretta therefore urged caution on Mussolini, arguing that as Anglo-Italian 
relations, though improving, were still somewhat delicate it would be better to 
postpone any initiative pending a further rapprochement, such as might be expected 
after the royal ViSit. 46 
In fact the situation between England and Italy was approaching an impasse, each side 
being unwilling to retreat from its interpretation of the transactions of recent years. 
Mussolini was in fact persuaded by Della Torretta to be patient over Jubaland, and 
41 FO 371/8889 Graham to FO no. 123 d. 2 Feb. 1923 and mins., no. 125 d-3 Feb. 1923, tel. 20 d. 3 
Feb. 1923 and min. by Cadogan d. 5 Feb. 1923, Graham to Lampson p. l. d. 5 Feb. 1923, Graham to FO 
no. 201 d. 23 Feb. 1923; DDI/7/I/230- 1; DBFP/I/XXI/29-32; Lowe and Marzari, Italian Foreign 
PoliCY, pp 192-3. 
42 DBFPIIIXXII30- 1. 
43 FO 371/8889 Graham to FO no. 123 d. 2 Feb. 1923; Marks, IHR 8 56-8. 44 DDInIII350,420. 
45 FO 371/8413 'Memorandum respecting Questions outstanding between England and Italy' by Nicolson d. 4 Apr. 1923, Annex I; [K. Boume and D. C. Watt (general eds. )j B[ritish] D[ocuments on] F[oreign] A[ffairs: Reports and Papersfrom the Foreign Office Confidential Print (Washington, 
University Publications of America, 1983- )]/[part] II/[series] F/5/320-2. 46 DDI/7/j/440- 1. 
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tried to dampen false hopes and to prevent any undue speculation appearing in the 
Italian press about possible concessions in connexion with the royal ViSit; 47 and the 
visit itself, which passed off smoothly between 7 and 12 May, perhaps did something 
to improve Anglo-Italian relationS. 48However, the Palazzo Chigi officials who in 
their anxiety that Mussolini was drifting too far from a traditional pro-British foreign 
policy had encouraged the visit, were to be disappointed in their hope for concrete 
political gainS. 49The British, although they were 'always ready to show every 
goodwill and friendship', were simply not interested in concluding any general 
agreement for political co-operation with the Italians, who had little to offer, and 
there was no chance of spontaneous concessions. 50 Curzon was especially reluctant to 
change his stance over Jubaland, since, in the offers already made, Britain had shown 
1 51 Italy 'exceptional generosity. 
These views were more forcefully stated in June. Nicolson had encapsulated the 
British position in a memorandum in April, outlining the history of 'the two most 
important questions at issue between ourselves and Italy' and reiterating that Jubaland 
was the only lever likely to get the Italians out of the Dodecanese. 52 In the aftermath 
of the royal visit, Graham wrote a long despatch from Rome in which he challenged 
this Foreign Office orthodoxy and urged that the warm feelings engendered by 
George V's trip should be reinforced by a change of heart on the Jubaland question: 
Rome could be very helpful to Britain in European affairs, but, as Italian policy was 
'frankly opportunistic and egotistic', Mussolini might be forced, unless some concrete 
advantage was forthcoming, to turn from Britain towards France, or might even be 
overthrown. Graham then subjected Nicolson's memorandum to a detailed critique 
47 IFO 371/8413 Graham to FO no. 421 d. 4 May 1923; FO 371/8889 Graham to FO no. 443 d. 12 May 
1923; DDj/7/Ij/8. 
48 FO 371/8889 Graham to FO tel. 91 d. 7 May 1923, tel. 94 d. 12 May 1923; MS S EUR F1 12/230 
Graham to Curzon p. l. d. 12 May 1923; DBFP/l/XXIV/695-6. 49 Lowe and Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy, pp 193 -4. 50 FO 371/8413 FO memorandum by [? ] d. 19 Apr. 1923; FO 371/8889 mins. by Nicolson, Lampson 
and Crowe d. 8 May 1923. 
51 FO 371/8889 mins. by Curzon d. 7 and II Apr. 1923. 52 FO 371/8413 'Memorandum respecting Questions outstanding between England and Italy' by Nicolson d. 4 Apr. 1923. 
180 
from an Italian point of view, hoping to produce 'a more sympathetic disposition' 
within the Foreign Office towards Italian claims. His despatch amounted to a heartfelt 
plea for a reconsideration of British policy, in order to remove the Italians' sense of 
1 53 injustice and'consolidate Anglo-Italian friendship for some time to come. 
Graham's exposition of the Italian point of view was reasoned and logical, but his 
arguments met with a decisive rejection. Not surprisingly, London disagreed with the 
specifics of the Italian interpretation of what had passed over Jubaland and the 
Dodecanese; however, as Nicolson pointed out, it would be both 'unprofitable and 
undignified' to engage in a public dispute over those. More to the point were doubts 
as to the actual value of Italy's friendship, something which Graham seemed to take 
for granted in advocating British concessions. 54AIthough Lampson urged that'the 
cooperation of Italy in the councils of Europe I would be cheaply bought 'at the price 
of a few thousand miles of barren African scrub', 55 Crowe heartily disagreed. His 
view was the same as it had been at the time of the Schanzer visit: 'I do not believe 
that whatever price we pay to Italy, we shall in return get her loyal support in any 
single question. I wholly mistrust their governments, from whatever party chosen'. 51 
With both Rome and London so unyielding there seemed little prospect of an Anglo- 
Italian settlement of the Dodecanese or Jubaland questions. 
At this juncture the possibility arose of an Italo-Greek settlement of the Dodecanese 
dispute. Previously, the Greeks had played only a minimal role, not least because the 
British were fighting their cause with Mussolini, and they were in any case 
preoccupied with the wider settlement with Turkey. The official Greek attitude had 
been stated by Venizelos in January in response to the draft treaty of Lausanne: 
Greece welcomed the cession of the islands to Italy by Turkey, but reserved her rights 
under the admittedly non-ratified treaty of 1920 and counted on the Italians for a 
53 DBFP/I/XXIV/695-700. 
54 FO 371/8889 min. by Nicolson d. 13 Jun. 1923. 55 FO 371/8889 min. by Lampson d. 14 Jun. 1923. 56 FO 371/8889 min. by Crowe d. 14 Jun. 1923. 
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solution in line with the principle of nationalities and previous engagements. 57 Later, 
however, the Greeks took the initiative. On 28 May Venizelos wrote privately to 
Nicolson asking whether the British would object to the Greeks'raising the 
Dodecanese question bilaterally with Rome. 58 After some discussion within the 
Foreign Office, Nicolson replied that the British would not insist upon the question 
being settled solely by England and Italy, despite their long-standing and continuing 
interest in it. On the contrary, 'they would welcome itif Greco-Italian talks were to 
produce a solution which they 'could accept as a fair and equitable' one. 59 
Venizelos' inquiry had been prompted by the imminence of a visit to Rome by the 
Greek foreign minister, Apostolos Alexandris. The initiative for this visit had come 
from the Greeks, who were understandably anxious to escape from their isolation, and 
who planned to offer the Italians economic concessions in return for recognition and 
diplomatic support. 601n particular, the Greeks were very alarmed by rumours that the 
Italians were encouraging Yugoslav designs on Salonica. at a time when the issue of 
the Yugoslav free zone there was the subject of delicate negotiation; and they hoped 
for concessions over the Dodecanese question, about which Greek public opinion was 
very excited. 61 
From the beginning the visit was ill-starred. Alexandris annoyed the Italians by 
claiming that they had initiated it, and at Lausanne Montagna poured heavy scom on 
the idea of a rapprochement with Greece. 62 More significantly, the Greeks were 
negotiating from a position of weakness and had little of substance to offer the 
Italians. A long Palazzo Chigi minute argued that although a rapprochement might 
deliver a solution to the Dodecanese problem and help Italy in her relations with 
57 DDI/7/I/341-3. After the Asia Minor defeat the previously relatively neglected Dodecanese 
question was given much more attention by the Greeks (Carabott, Dodecanese Question, pp. 269- 73,295-7). 
58 FO 371/8822 Venizelos to Nicolson p. l. d. 28 May 1923. 59 DBFP/I/XVIII/829-30; FO 371/8822 mins. by Nicolson and Crowe d. I Jun. 1923. 60 DDI/7/11/38,61-2. 
61 DDInIIII61-2; DBFP/I/XXIV/561-2,613-7,642-3,863-4. 
62 DDInIIII38,57-60,70. Montagna was even more ill-disposed towards the Greeks than usual in May because the Athens press had attacked him for his work at Lausanne (DDInIIII32). 
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Yugoslavia, the balance of advantages was against it. Such a rapprochement might 
offend England and would in any case be ephemeral, given the Venizelist (and 
therefore anti-Italian) views of those in the ascendancy in Greece. It concluded that 
any rapprochement must be subordinated to the delivery of concrete advantages to 
Rome in the settlement of the many political and economic questions pending 
between Italy and Greece. 63 Contarini, the secretary general of the Palazzo Chigi, 
therefore insisted in a circular despatch to Italy's ambassadors that the visit should not 
be interpreted as signalling any change in Italy's attitude towards either Greece or the 
existing Greek government. 64 
Alexandris arrived in Rome on 21 June, and his talks with Mussolini were singularly 
unproductive. Economic questions were discussed - principally the likelihood of Italy 
being granted concessions in Greece - and Italy recognised. the utility of an eventual 
restoration of normal diplomatic relations; but when Alexandris raised the 
Dodecanese question Mussolini cut him off, insisting that no such 'question' existed. 
To make matters worse, on his return home Alexandris allowed exaggerated accounts 
of his visit to circulate - including the statement that the Italians had agreed to 
recognise George 11 - in order to strengthen the domestic position of the revolutionary 
government. This only aroused the ire of Mussolini who demanded apologies for such 
gross misrepresentation. 65AIthough the Greeks could fairly claim, considering that 
for seven months the Italians had had nothing to do with the revolutionary 
government, that it was a success for Alexandris to have been received at all, Italo- 
Greek relations had scarcely been improved by the visit. 
The failure of the Alexandris visit illustrated Mussolini's decision not to conciliate the 
Greeks, and in fact he now began to see in them, and the Dodecanese question, a 
possible source of the propaganda victory he had so far been denied. On 17 July 
Contarini told the British charge in Rome, Kennard, that Mussolini 'was personally 
63 DDIM11153-5. 
64 DDI/7/Il/62-3. 
65 DDInIIII63-67; DBFP/I/XXIVn35-6,746-8; MAE Gr&e 78 Marcilly to QO no. '107 d. 2 Jul. 1923. 
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anxious to proclaim the annexation of all these islands to Italy without any 
preliminary communication to His Majesty's Governmentt, but that so far the Palazzo 
Chigi had managed to restrain him from this 'precipitate action'. 66 In fact, rumours 
had been current earlier in the year that the Italians were preparing to annex the 
Dodecanese and they had caused quite a stir in the Greek presS. 67 It was now obvious 
that Mussolini was strongly tempted by the propaganda value of formally sealing 
Italy's ownership of the islands in this way. 
Although Contarini, warned explicitly by Kennard on 17 July that any one-sided 
settlement of the Dodecanese question would have a1amentable effect'on Anglo- 
Italian relations, had indeed promised to continue to endeavour to restrain 
Mussolini'68his sincerity was not beyond question, and the Foreign Office was in fact 
becoming seriously worried. 69 On 25 July Lampson minuted that now, after the 
signature of the Lausanne treaty and the failure of Alexandris' attempts to negotiate 
terms with the Italians, the Dodecanese question was likely to come up 'in acute 
form'. 70 Curzon agreed, and instructed Crowe to give 'a serious warning' to Della 
Torretta. 71 On 30 July Crowe did so, reminding the ambassador of Mussolini's various 
undertakings on this subject and of Britain's 'direct interest' init. 72Throughout 
August, rumours about Italian intentions intensified, partly because of increased 
military activity in the islands, and Kennard was instructed to renew his warnings to 
Contarini. 73The British also gave. warnings to the Dodecanesians who, Bentinck 
reported from Athens, were planning some action against the Italian occupation 
forces. Bentinck told their spokesman that this would be disastrous, as it would 
66 DBFP/I/XXIV/770-1, cf. Barros, Corfu, p-68. 67 DDI/7/II/387; FO 371/8822 Kennard to FO no. 279 d. 15 Mar. 1923. Kennard was chargd between 11 July and 13 September 1923. 
68 DBFP1I /XXIV/770- 1. 
69 For Contarini's trustworthiness see FO 371/8822 Kennard to Lampson p. l. d. 10 Aug. 1923, 
DBFP/I/XXI/32 and DBFPII /XXIV/77 1. 
70 FO 371/8822 min. by Lampson d. 25 Jul. 1923. 71 FO 371/8822 min. by Curzon d-28 Jul. 1923. 72 DBFP1l /XXIV/78 8; DDI17IIIII 06-7. 
73 DBFP/I/XXIV/798.800-1 -, FO, 371/8822 Kollas (Greek chargd in London) to Oliphant no. 2678 d. 8 Aug. 1923, Kennard to Lampson p. l. d. 10 Aug. 1923. 
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definitely provoke the Italians into annexing the islands, and he was confident that for 
the moment they would not act. 
74 
Despite this, the Foreign Office realised that it was necessary to clarify Britain's 
position on the Dodecanese question, and this was done by Nicolson in a 
memorandum of 4 August. He argued that it was necessary to select carefully the 
arguments upon which the British attitude was based: irritation with the 'perfidious 
opportunism'of the Italians must be cast aside, the ethnical argument would have to 
be discarded as double-edged and the naval balance of power argument could not be 
openly avowed. Only the contractual argument - that the Italians were still bound by 
the spirit of their two agreements with Venizelos to cede the islands - remained. 
Basing itself upon this, Britain must try to avoid three dangerous possible outcomes: 
'a full dress diplomatic contest' with Italy; the fait accompli of an immediate 
annexation; or a complete impasse where the 'Dodecanese would become Italian and 
... Jubaland would remain rather aridly British'. Britain must therefore proceed 'very 
tentatively' along one of two paths. If Mussolini annexed the islands Britain would 
have to 'take it lying down' and hope that he could be held to his promise of 3 
November 1922 to discuss further with London their ultimate fate. If, on the other 
hand, he showed restraint, the British, rather than opening negotiations themselves, 
should encourage Greco-Italian talks, making it clear to the Greeks how far they 
would go in supporting them and to the Italians that the cession of Jubaland depended 
on a satisfactory settlement being reached. 75 
This memorandum illustrated the problem posed by Italian restlessness: if Mussolini 
chose in defiance of all his promises to annex the islands there was very little the 
British could do. Curzon's policy at Lausanne of arranging the cession of the islands 
to Italy on the understanding that he would be consulted as to their eventual fate was 
dependent for its success upon Mussolini's good faith and on the Italians' attaching a 




essential difficulty is that the Italians are established in the islands, and short of war, 
we cannot turn themoUt'. 
76 In Foreign Office discussions on Nicolson's memorandum 
doubts were even raised as to whether Britain should even try to get the Italians out. 
Lampson deprecated any British initiative now when the reparations question was 'to 
the fore ... ; for to some extent we count upon 
Italian support in our discussions with 
France'. 77Curzon, however, was more bullish: it was not a question of engagements 
between Italy and Greece, but of the 'repeated promises' made by Italy to Britain that 
'the future of these islands can only be determined by Allied Agreement'. On the other 
hand, there was no reason for Britain to 'fight the battles of Greece' if she did not 
mind losing the islands. Consequently he instructed Nicolson to write privately to 
Venizelos 'to ascertain what the Greeks really want'. 78 
On 10 August therefore, Nicolson outlined for Venizelos' benefit the difficult position 
London was in: Britain maintained her interest in the islands but did not want them 
used as a pretext for a general discussion of Anglo-Italian relations 'which, in present 
circumstances, we desire to avoid'. The British were therefore anxious to facilitate 
direct Greco-Italian negotiations, but before doing so wanted Venizelos' opinion on 
the prospects for such negotiations and on what the Greek government's maximum 
and minimum terms would be. 79 Venizelos'vague reply of 15 August simply stating 
that he would consult Athens on the issue did 'not advance matters'. All London could 
therefore do was wait. 80 There was at this stage little optimism about the possibility of 
a Greco-Italian settlement in the Foreign Office, where Lampson was worried that the 
Greeks might only stiffen their attitude once they knew London was taking a renewed 
interest in the question: "'Timeo Danaos", even when they are looking for, [and] not 
bearing, gifts - as in the present case. 81 
76 DBFP/I/XXIV/792. 





The question of the Dodecanese, however, just as it had earlier been overshadowed by 
the mandates question at Lausanne, was soon again to be overshadowed by more 
momentous events. Throughout the summer Mussolini had adopted an increasingly 
truculent attitude on the question, encouraged no doubt by reports from Athens that 
the Greeks were becoming increasingly obstructive of Italian interests. 82 On 6 August 
he told Della Torretta, in response to Crowe's chiding, that Italy's position was that all 
previous promises had been superseded by article 15 of the treaty of Lausanne and 
that Anglo-Italian relations would be much improved if Britain would cease meddling 
in the Dodecanese. 83Mussolini's inclination to annex the islands was shared by 
certain members of his cabinet, and by late August, with the expected Greek and 
Turkish ratifications of the Lausanne treaty, an opportunity for action began to 
JOOM. 84 
One of the supporters of annexation was the minister of marine, Thaon di Revel, who 
like Mussolini wanted to raise Italian prestige. He believed, however, that an 
annexation of the Dodecanese would be bound to provoke uproar from the Greeks. 
Consequently he held talks with Palazzo Chigi officials in July and August in order to 
decide on possible measures of reprisal in the event of Greek protests after an 
annexation. The coercive measures eventually settled upon consisted of naval 
movements against Athens and the occupation of Corfu, and Di Revel stipulated that 
all preparations were to be completed in secret by the end of August. The extent of 
Mussolini's knowledge of these plans is unclear, but all units had been ordered to full 
readiness to implement the planned naval operations when, on 27 August, news 
reached Rome that the entire Italian delegation on the Greco-Albanian frontier 
delimitation commission had been slain on Greek territory by assassins unknown. 85 
82 DDII711IN 1. 
83 DDI/7/II/108-9. 
84 DBFP/I/XXIV/800; DDI17IIIII 11. The Turkish assembly voted draft laws ratifying the treaty on 23 August, and the Greeks ratified it on 25 August. British ratification was delayed until 15 August 1924 and that of France until 27 August 1924. The treaty entered into force on 6 August 1924 (DBFP/i/XVIII/972). 
85 Barros, Corfu, pp. 33,68-70; Lowe and Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy, pp. 194-5. Barros' source is 
a memoir (published in 1953) by Captain Antonio Foschini, chief of the general staff of the Italian 
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The murder of General Enrico Tellini and his comrades in Epirus provided the pretext 
for the previously mooted occupation of Corfu and sparked off the Corfu crisis. 86Had 
it not been for these killings, it is probable that some sort of crisis would still have 
arisen, but rather in connexion. with the annexation of the Dodecanese. (This is not 
certain, however. Kennard believed Mussolini, who always kept his options open, 
might consider recognising the Greek government in exchange for their complaisance 
over the annexation). 87As it was, Mussolini seized on Tellini's death to achieve his 
propaganda victory, and the ensuing crisis was very much shaped by its origins in 
Epirus (for example, in a crisis arising from the annexation of the Dodecanese, the 
conference of Ambassadors would never have become involved and the Anglo-Italian 
confrontation would probably therefore have been more direct). However, the context 
in which the crisis occurred was marked by the previous deterioration in Anglo- 
Italian relations that owed a great deal to the deadlock over the Dodecanese. Neither 
side had been willing to compromise on this question, with the result that suspicion 
and mistrust already abounded, producing accusations of perfidy and betrayal. Most 
importantly, Curzon's refusal to satisfy Mussolini's fervent desire for a propaganda 
victory had left the latter deeply frustrated - which does something to explain the 
violence and rapidity of his reaction to the Tellini murder. In this respect, the British 
had already made a significant contribution to the crisis that was about to break over 
Corfu. 
navy in 1923. Foschini played a key role in the occupation of Corfu by Italian forces 
(DBFP/I/XXIV/963-8) and was presumably in a position to know of Thaon di Revel's plans. As Cassels notes, Foschini is perhaps 'not the most reliable witness' (Cassels, Early Diplomacy, p. 98), but most historians writing on the subject have accepted the veracity of his account. 86 Cassels argues that either the Janina murders were 'one of the most remarkable coincidences in history'or Mussolini had a hand in them; the latter, however, has never been proved (Cassels, Early Diplomacy, p. 10 1). 
87 FO 371/8822 Kennard to Lampson p. l. d. 10 Aug. 1923; DBFP/i/XXIV/950. 
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The Corfu crisis was a significant milestone in international relations between the 
wars, even if it is perhaps too much to claim, as Barros does, that 
it was 'the first in a 
series of retreats by the powers which culminated with the German annexation of the 
Sudetenland, fifteen years later'. ' It represented a searching examination of the 
commitment of Great Britain and France to upholding the new international order 
theoretically established at Versailles, and was the first real test of the practicability 
of collective security as enshrined in the Covenant of the League of Nations. It also 
illustrated the danger to the status quo posed by a great power unwilling to 'play the 
game' and prepared to use naked aggression to further national interests. As well as 
illuminating these aspects of great power relations, the crisis was a salutary reminder 
to the Greeks (and to other small powers) that despite the guarantees supposedly 
offered by the Covenant and the League, their interests were ultimately as much as 
ever prey to the whims and priorities of the great powers. 
Tellini and his colleagues were murdered on the morning of 27 August when, as they 
were surveying the frontier, their car was ambushed on the Janina-Kakavia road near 
Zepi. 2 The next day Montagna had a stormy interview with Alexandris in which he 
protested vehemently about the murders and insisted upon immediate exemplary 
punishment of the gUilty. 3 Meanwhile,, Mussolini began to formulate a series of 
demands for reparation to be presented to the Greek government. 4 These were 
embodied in a note presented by Montagna on the evening of 29 August. In sum 
Mussolini made seven demands: that a full and official apology should be delivered to 
I Barros, Corfu, p. 296. The Corfu crisis has generated a good deal of literature, and most accounts of 
international relations in the 1920s have something to say about it. Barros' work is comprehensive 
and has stood the test of time well considering that the Foreign Office and Quai d'Orsay archives on 
the crisis were not accessible to the author. Information drawn from these sources has now appeared 
in various articles and books which supplement Barros'earlier work. From the British angle there is 
P. J. Yearwood, "'Consistently with Honour"; Great Britain, the League of Nations and the Corfu 
Crisis of 1923', Journal of Contemporary History 21(4) 1986 559-79 and from the French side J. Blatt, 
France and the Corfu-Fiume Crisis of 1923', The Historian 50 1988 234-59 and Shorrock, Ally to 
Enemy, pp. 37-44. A good selection of British documents has also been published in 
DBFP/I/XXIV/936-1115. Further references can be found in Blatt Historian 50 234. 
2 For an account of the incident and a discussion of the various theories as to who was responsible for 
the crime, see Barros, Corfu, pp. 20-32. 
3 DDIn/Il/125-7,129-30; DBFP/1/XXIV/939-40. 
4 DDInI111128; Barros, Corfu, pp. 35-40. 
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Montagna; that a funeral service, attended by the whole Greek government, should be 
held at Athens; that the Greek fleet should salute the Italian flag; that a full inquiry 
supervised by the Italian military attache should be instituted; that capital punishment 
should be inflicted upon the guilty; that an indemnity of 50,000,000 lire should be 
paid; and that military honours should be paid to the corpses on their embarkation 
onto an Italian ship. 5 The Italian note, essentially an ultimatum, demanded a reply 
within twenty-four hours, and the next evening this was delivered to the Italian 
legation. After contesting the Italian implication that the Greek government bore 
responsibility for the murders, the reply accepted in essence four of the Italian 
demands but rejected the fourth, fifth and sixth of them as incompatible with Greek 
sovereignty. ' 
There is no doubt that the Italians were genuinely outraged by the Kakavia murders, 
and this was reflected in the violence and emotion of the language used by Italian 
diplomats and the Rome press. It was no surprise that Montagna reacted with great 
excitement to the incident but Italian diplomats in Paris exhibited similar feelingS. 7 
The Italian press reflected public opinion in reacting very strongly to the murders and 
giving'vent to their deep-seated hatred of Greece'. Press, diplomats and Mussolini 
himself were from the outset convinced that the assassinations were the result of 
'Greek political intrigues', and discounted any idea that they could be the work of 
renegade Epirote or Albanian bandits. 8 In context this reaction was understandable, 
for the crime was a great blow to Italian national pride, already battered by failure to 
achieve satisfaction in the post-war settlement, and this was exacerbated by its being 
delivered by the hated Greeks. Thus Kennard argued that the 'extreme nationalist 
elements are well pleased to make the most of the opportunity to show the world that 
Italy is a strong Mediterranean power who will tolerate no offence at the hands of her 
5 DDIM111133-4,137; DBFP/1/XXIV/943. 
6 DDIMIIII 39-41,144-6; DBFP/I/XXIV/943-5; Barros, Corfu, pp. 56-9,65-7. 7 DDIM111125-7; DBFP/I/XXIV/941-2. Marcilly reported how Montagna's conduct and 
f megalomania' during the crisis revolted the Athens diplomatic corps, and attributed them 'to his 
temperament and his grudges against the Greeks' and to the fact that as a late convert to fascism he 
wanted to prove himself to Mussolini (MAE Italie 130 Marcilly to QO no. 170 d. 27 Sept. 1923). 8 DBFP/I/XXIV/950; Barros, Corfu, pp. 54-6. 
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neighbours'. 9 Although Mussolini made the most of the incident to implement his 
designs on Corfu - he decided right from the outset that the island should be occupied 
'as a measure of reprisal' - Italian indignation was by no means wholly contrived. 10 
In response to the Greek reply the Italian fleet - working to the plans previously 
drawn up in relation to the Dodecanese - arrived off Corfu in the mid-aftemoon of 31 
August. The operation to occupy the island was then comprehensively bungled. The 
Greek authorities were given insufficient time to telegraph Athens for instructions 
and, despite the fact that no resistance was offered by the islanders, the Italians 
bombarded the citadel of Corfu town where masses of refugees from Armenia and 
Asia Minor had taken shelter. The Greek prefect immediately surrendered but by then 
sixteen people had been killed. " This use of force was apparently contrary to 
Mussolini's orders, and the effect of it was to transfer the sympathy of world opinion 
from the Italians to the Greeks. 12 At five o'clock Montagna presented a note to the 
Greek government announcing the occupation of Corfu 'in a pacific and temporary 
capacity', and warning it to do nothing to alter'the pacific nature of these measures'. 13 
The reactions of Britain and France took some time to become apparent. Initially both 
refused Mussolini's adjurations to make direct representations at Athens, arguing that 
as the dead men were agents of the conference of Ambassadors (i. e. the body sitting 
in Paris established in 1919 to settle questions of detail - as opposed to those of 
principle - arising from the implementation of the peace treaties) it was for that organ 
rather than individual governments to take action. 141ndeed, the conference 
despatched a note to Athens on 31 August, protesting at the murders and reserving the 
right to demand reparations later. 15 Mussolini adhered to this note of protest, whilst 
DBFP/I/XXIV/950. 
10 DDI/7/11/128; Barros, Corfu, pp. 39-40. 11 DBFP/I/XXIV/947,963-8; DDI/7/Il/144,153-4,270-2; Barros, Corfu, pp. 74-9. 12 Barros, Corfu, pp. 74,79-80. Italian intelligence had revealed the presence of the refugees and the bombardment was later criticised by the minister of marine (DDI/7/II/271). 13 DDinliiII43-4,148; DBFP/I[XXIV/946-7. 
14 DDIn/II/127,129,132-3,137-9; DBFP/l/YXIV/936-8,940-3. For the history of the Ambassadors'ý conference, see Barros, Corfu, pp. 3-19. 15 DBFP/I/XXIV/937-8,945-7; DDIMII1148-9. 
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insisting that the conference's undoubted right to reparation did not detract from 
Italy's own (already exercised) right to demand redress for a wrong committed against 
her nationals. 16 
British policy took a decisive turn after the Italian ultimatum and the occupation of 
Corfu. Curzon felt that Italy's demands for reparation were I extravagant - much worse 
than the ultimatum after Sarajevo, and I can hardly conceive any self respecting 
Gov[ernmen]t acceding to them'. Tyrrell recognised, that Mussolini would 'of course 
exploit this outrage to his greatest glory' and that at any moment a new Ruhr question 
might arise in the Adriatic in the shape of the occupation of Corfu. 17The Greeks had 
decided to appeal to the League about the minatory attitude of Italy even before the 
occupation of Corfu - and in fact laid the matter before the Council on I SeptemberI8 
- and the instinctive reaction of the Foreign Office was to support the League. 19 On I 
September Curzon told Cecil that the Italians' actions had 'placed them definitely in 
the wrong' and that he desired 'to support [the] League on the first occasion on which 
20 a small power has appealed to it against [the] high-handed action of a gTeat power'. 
This decision reflected the recent poor state of Anglo-Italian relations and the fact 
that the British saw no reason to conciliate Mussolini or to treat this question other 
than on its own merits. From the first, however, London was aware that the attitude of 
the French might prove decisive: on I September the Foreign Office asked Cecil 
whether he could be sure that London's advocacy of a League solution might not 'lead 
to a fiasco owing to imposition of veto by other Council members'. 21 This anxiety was 
well founded. Poincare soon adopted a more pro-Italian policy, precisely because, 
unlike the British, the French wanted Italian support for their wider diplomatic 
16 DDInIIIII38-9,142-3; DBFP/I/XXIV/943-4; Barros, Corfu, pp. 60-5. 17 DBFP/I/XXIV/943-4. 
18 DBFP/I/XXIV/947,955-6,987; DDI/7/Il/147-8,150,154-6,160-2; Barros, Corfu, pp. 80-1,90-8. The 
League Council was in session from 31 August to 29 September, and the Assembly was sitting 
simultaneously. Plastiras had at first wanted to resist the Italian occupation of Corfu by force, but 
wiser counsels prevailed in Athens. 19 Yearwood JCH 21561-3; Barros, Corfu, pp. 86-7. 20 DBFP/I/XXIV/954. 
21 DBFP/I/XXIV/952-4,958-9; Yearwood JCH 21564. In his reply Cecil strongly advocated full British support for the League but evaded the direct question he had been asked. 
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objectives, particularly in the Ruhr and over Fiume. In the Ruhr, Italian support, 
though equivocal and inconsistent, was considered vital by the French and was likely 
to prove increasingly so as the reparations crisis moved into an acute phase. Similarly, 
the Quai d'Orsay feared that if the League tried and condemned Mussolini over Corfu, 
a precedent would be set for it to judge France over the Ruhr occupation. Fiume was 
a factor of a slightly different kind. Throughout 1923 relations between Italy and 
Yugoslavia had been deteriorating as an impasse was reached on the future of the 
city, and this created a dilemma for the Quai d'Orsay, which wanted good relations 
with both states. It was, therefore, clearly in France's interest to avoid alienating 
Mussolini and to influence him towards moderation in this thorny question; and, in 
any case, Yugoslavia was far more important to France than was Greece. 22 
Indications of the French attitude were soon forthcoming. On 1 September Poincare 
telegraphed to the French representative on the LeagueCouncil, Hanotaux, that he 
now favoured a solution via the Ambassadors' conference. 23 The French press also 
changed its tune: at first it had denounced Mussolini's action but on 1 September the 
mot dordre went out from the Quai d'Orsay 'to be friendly to Italy in articles on her 
present conflict with Greece as France required Italy's support'. 24 Mussolini did not 
fail to notice this, and drew attention to it in his protests to London about the attitude 
of the British presS. 25 Meanwhile, Kennard noted how the French in Rome were 
I clearly making every effort to worm their way into the goodwill of these people 
again, and fall over themselves in their desire to be the first to condole or 
congratulate, which ever the case may be'. 26 
22 Barros, Corfu, pp. 87-8; Shorrock, Ally to Enemy, pp. 33-9; Blatt Historian 50 243-4,249-50. For 
developments in the Fiume question in 1923, see DBFP/I/XXIV/516-8,526-8,546-8,556-7,569- 
70,703-4,757,761,768,771-2,801-2,816,823,830-6. 
23 Charles-Roux, Grande Ambassade, p. 240; Shorrock, Ally to Enemy, p. 38. 24 DBFP/I/XXIV/948-9; DDI/7/II/149-50; MSS EUR F1 12/312 Imperial conference, notes of sixth 
meeting, II October 1923, speech by Curzon; Barros, Corfu, pp. 86. The French and British press 
(with the sole exception of the Daily Mail) had unanimously condemned Mussolini's threats and the 
Occupation of Corfu. 
25 DBFP/I/XXIV/957,960; DDI/7/11/155,178. 
26 DBFP/I/XXIV/951,962. 
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The next few days were occupied by hectic diplomacy as the powers struggled to 
contain and resolve the crisis via meetings of both the League Council and the 
Ambassadors' conference. 27The attitudes of the various powers were now clear. 
Mussolini was adamant that the League had no jurisdiction in this case since Italian 
national honour was at stake, no act of war had been committed and the question was 
before the Ambassadors' conference. Antonio Salandra, Italy's representative on the 
Council, had adopted this attitude on 1 September and was instructed to maintain it 
two days later and authorised to threaten Italian withdrawal from the League if this 
was not accepted. 28The French, both in Paris and Geneva, broadly supported these 
Italian contentionS. 29 Curzon, on the other hand, continued to favour a League 
solution and in his instructions to Crewe in Paris emphasised that the functions of the 
Ambassadors' conference were 'definite, but circumscribed'. 30 Although that body was 
entitled to examine the circumstances of the Kakavia murders, it had 'no title to 
investigate [the] wider problem which has now been referred to [the] League' as a 
result of Italy's action, 'which ought not to pass without being explained and if 
possible vindicated. 31 
Although Curzon was still resolute, others had begun to look for compromise 
solutions which might be facilitated by Greece's willingness to accept the jurisdiction 
of both the Ambassadors' conference and the League. 32 One such scheme was 
27 The League Council met on 4,5 and 6 September, the Ambassadors' conference on 5 September. 
See, Barros, Corfu, pp. 124-187. 
28 DDI/7/II/147-8,150,154-6,159-62,169-71,173-4,179-82; DBFP/I/XXIV/955-6,958,961,968-9,975- 
7; Barros, Corfu, pp. 90-8,105-7,112,125-6. 
29 For example, in the meetings of the League Council and Ambassadors' conference held on 5 
September (DDI/7/II/184-8,196-7; DBFP/I/XXIV/988-92; Barros, Corfu, pp. 132-57). 30 DBFP/I/XXIV/983. 
31 DBFP/I/XXIV/973. Curzon expressed similar sentiments in an interview with Della Torretta on 3 
September. He explained that the'almost unprecedented severity'of the Italian ultimatum which was delivered before guilt was established, coupled with the refusal to accept League intervention, had 
united British public opinion behind the government's policy, namely to uphold the Covenant. The interview was quite friendly and Curzon sympathised with Della Torretta's position in that, as the 
ambassador put it, 'Mussolini having put his foot down could not possibly take it up again either as 
regards ultimatum or the League' (DBFP/I/XXIV/971-3; DDInIIIII77-8). 
32 The Greeks, in their reply to the Ambassadors' conference note of 31 August, had on 2 September 
agreed that if their responsibility for the murders was proved they would make whatever reparations the conference deemed equitable (DDInIIIII74-5; DBFP/I/XXIV/961-2,969-71). The decision of Athens to accept the right of the Ambassadors' conference to reparation angered Polifis, who felt it 
made his job at Geneva of pressing for the competence of the League much harder. It also 'made it 
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developed by Kennard in Rome, who feared that Britain's championing of the League 
would ruin Anglo-Italian relations, and that Mussolini, a prisoner of ultra-nationalist 
sentiment might, if thwarted, 'take some rash and impulsive step'. 33 (Later Kennard 
characterised Mussolini 'as a mad dog who may do infinite harm before he is 
despatchedl)34. On 4 September he made a purely personal suggestion to Mussolini 
that as a way out of the impasse the League Council might declare itself competent in 
theory but concede that, as the Ambassadors' conference was already dealing with the 
matter, it would take no action. Mussolini promised to consider this idea, but London 
was not enthusiastic. Curzon was in fact angered that Kennard was complicating the 
situation and considered sending Graham back to Rome forthwith: 'whenever a crisis 
35 
occurs our Ambassadors always seem to be shooting or holidaying'. 
In Paris, Poincare was seeking a compromise formula, for he too was in a rather 
delicate position. On the one hand he was still anxious to conciliate Mussolini - he 
promised 'to support Italy loyally and unconditionally' until her interests were 
satisfied36 - but on the other hand he had to consider the fact that the Little Entente 
powers and other small states, which had an important place in French diplomacy and 
which regarded the League 'as their salvation', were vociferously supporting Geneva 
and would not take kindly to any French-brokered solution which humiliated the 
League. 37Poincare therefore set out to secure reparation for Mussolini for the 
murders via the Ambassadors' conference, thus achieving an Italian evacuation of 
Corfu and avoiding the question of the League's competence becoming acute. 38 He 
easier for France and Italy to take the case from the friendlier atmosphere of Geneva to the secret 
meetings of the Ambassadorial Conference in Paris'(Barros, Corfu, pp. 119-22). 
33 DBFP/I/'AXIV/951,957-8,960,975-6,983-4. 
34 DBFP/I/XXIV/996. 
35 DBFP/1/XXIV/978-80. This was rather unfair of Curzon who had himself been on holiday in 
France when the crisis erupted and had not returned to London until 2 September. This had 
contributed to the initially extremely cautious response of the Foreign Office to the crisis 
(DBFP/I/XXIV/936-8,943,951,954). Furthermore, Baldwin was away at Aix-les-Bains from 25 
August and did not hurry back to England, a fact which attracted criticism from George V (Barros, Corfu, pp. 18 0- 1). 
36 DDIn/II/158-9,171-2,176; Barros, Corfu, pp. 1 13-6. 37 DBFP/I/XXIV/972,974-5; MSS EUR F 112/229 Cecil to Curzon p. l. d. 4 Sept. 1923; Blatt Historian 
50 240; Shorrock, Ally to Enemy, p. 39- 
38 DBFP/1/XXIV/974-5,977-8. 
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instructed Hanotaux in Geneva and the French charge in Rome, Charles-Roux, in this 
sense on 4 September, explaining that he wanted the League Council not to go into 
the question of competence but simply to state the facts of the case, including Italy's 
avowed intention to evacuate Corfu once satisfaction for the murders was obtained, 
and to recommend that the matter be settled as soon as possible by direct negotiations 
between the interested powers under the auspices of the Ambassadors' conference. 39 
On 6 September the League Council made real progress towards a compromise 
settlement along these lines, although the prime mover in this was not Poincare but 
Cecil. He believed that in the circumstances the best hope for a solution lay in co- 
operation between the League and the conference, so that Mussolini could claim to 
have submitted to the latter whilst the Greeks would have secured a discussion of 
their case by the former. 40 His plan was that the Council should send to the 
conference a list of proposals - essentially comprising those Italian demands which 
the Greeks had accepted on 30 August together with some proposals made by the 
Greek representative in Geneva, Politis, on 4 September4l- as a basis for the demands 
for reparation to be made of Greece. If the conference accepted the proposals, then 
the immediate crisis would soon be settled and, once the Italians were out of Corfu, 
the League could discuss thequestion of its own competence. 42At the Council 
meeting in the afternoon, a slight hitch arose when Salandra objected that the 
communication amounted to a declaration of competence. This was overcome when 
Cecil proposed that rather than sending the proposals officially a mere anodyne 
acknowledgement should be given to the most recent note from the Ambassadors' 
39 Charles-Roux, Grande Ambassade, pp-242-3; Shorrock, Ally to Enemy, pp. 39-40. Charles-Roux 
welcomed this plan as he, like Kennard, feared that with Italian national honour at stake Mussolini 
would never back down (Charles-Roux, Grande Ambassade, pp. 244-5; Blatt Historian 50 241). On 5 
September he put the plan to Mussolini who declared it in essence acceptable (DDI/7/11/188-90). 40 DBFP/I/XXIV/997-9; Barros, Corfu, pp. 157-8. 
41 On 4 September Polifis had proposed that the League should appoint some neutral representatives 
to supervise the investigations already underway in Greece and to form part of an international 
commission of inquiry; that a group of jurists should be selected to decide the indemnity that Greece 
should pay; and that Greece should immediately deposit 50,000,000 lire in a Swiss bank in order to 
guarantee payment of this indemnity (DDI/7/II/178-9; DBFP/IfXXIV/981-2; Barros, Corfu, pp-128- 9). 
42 DBFP/I/XXIV/993-4,998. 
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conference and the minutes of the day's meeting - which included his list of proposals 
- should be sent to Paris under cover of that. This was agreed, in the teeth of 
continued opposition fTom Salandra. 43 
This scheme, though ingenious, was clearly a retreat from the full-blooded support 
for the League which Cecil and the Foreign Office had previously favoured. Cecil 
was, however, no blind zealot, and he could see the need for flexibility and could 
distinguish between means and ends. On 4 September he had written to Curzon that 
he was 'quite ready' to save Mussolini's face, 'provided we really secure what seems to 
me the essential thing, namely the evacuation of Corfu and the limitation of the 
indemnity to something reasonable'. 44 In other words, he was prepared for the League 
and the conference to work together for a peaceful settlement even though this meant 
that Mussolini would evacuate Corfu not in obedience to the League but, rather, 
having gained his ostensible aim of reparation for the murders. 45 
The Foreign Office had its own motives for falling in with Cecil's plan. Various 
government departments had been asked to study the feasibility of imposing sanctions 
on Italy in accordance with article 16 of the Covenant and none was enthusiastic. The 
Treasury was 'seriously perturbed at the consequences of a literal application of the 
article', which would mean, in effect, 'creating a state of war'. Equally, the Admiralty 
was uneasy about the practicability of physically blockading Italy, given Britain's 
limited naval strength in the Mediterranean; and it was doubtful whether any 
sanctions would prove effective without the co-operation of France and the United 
S tateS. 46Cecil's plan thus made perfect sense: if the assertion of the League's 
43 DBFP/I/XXIV/1002-3; Barros, Corfu, pp. 158-76. 
44 MSS EUR F1 12/229 Cecil to Curzon p. l. d. 4 Sept. 1923. 45 DBFP/I/XXIV/997-9,1003,1011,1013; Yearwood JCH 21565-7. Yearwood notes how Cecil was 
as keen as the Foreign Office on maintaining the Anglo-French entente, chiefly because of his desire 0 to see the draft treaty of Mutual Assistance adopted: 'no major British politician had more to lose in being forced to choose between support for France and support for the League of Nations'. 46 DBFP/I/XXIV/986-7; Yearwood JCH 21564. Article 16 provided that if a member state resorted 
to war without first seeking a peaceful method of resolving a dispute, all other members would sever 
all financial, commercial and personal relations with it, and the Council might recommend military 
action against the recalcitrant state. For the text of the Covenant, see BFSPII 12/13-23. Doubts about England's ability to impose sanctions on Italy were also responsible for London's rejection of Cecil's 
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competence could be postponed until after the crisis had been settled via the 
Ambassadors' conference then the League would be vindicated but at minimal cost. 
For an awareness of the practical difficulties in the way of imposing sanctions did not 
lessen the conviction of Cecil and the Foreign Office that the League must eventually 
assert its competence. On the contrary, as Tyrrell wrote on 6 September, the simple 
evacuation of Corfu after the Greeks had made reparation would not settle the whole 
incident: 'the Covenant has been challenged, and it is a cardinal point in our policy 
that the Covenant should be upheld'; and so it was essential for Britain to prevent 
Poincare 'in his passion for saving faces, from doing so at the expense of the 
League'. 17 
The Ambassadors' conference deliberated for almost eight hours on 7 September, 
attempting to reconcile their own ideas about reparation with those of the Italian 
government. Eventually seven demands were agreed upon and embodied in a note to 
be presented to the Greek government. It demanded that the Greek military 
authorities should formally apologise to the Allied representatives at Athens for the 
murders; that a funeral service be held in the Catholic cathedral at Athens; that the 
Greek fleet should salute the flags of the Allied powers; that military honours should 
be rendered to the corpses on their embarkation onto an Italian ship; that the Greeks 
should 'undertake to ensure in all the desirable conditions of celerity the search for 
and the exemplary punishment of the culprits'; that a commission of British, French 
and Italian delegates with a Japanese president should inquire into the murders on the 
spot, completing their work by 27 September; and-that the Greeks should agree to pay 
an indemnity to be fixed by the Permanent Court of International Justice at The 
Hague, the amount in no case to exceed the sum of 50,000,000 lire which was to be 
deposited by the Greeks in a Swiss bank as a surety. These proposals, the Foreign 
suggestion of 6 September that the fleet should be concentrated at Malta as a warning to Italy 
(DBFP/I/XXIV/1012; Barros, Corfu, pp. 178-81). 
47 Curzon papers, Tyrrell to Crewe p. l. d-6 Sept. 1923, Tyrrell to Curzon p. l. d. 6 Sept. 1923, quoted in 
Barros, Corfu, pp. 184 -6. 
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Office noted, followed'nearly identically'the suggestions made by Cecil the previous 
day. 48 
Although these demands were agreed relatively quickly, the same could not be said 
for the concluding paragraphs of the note. In these, Crewe wished to include an 
undertaking from the Italian ambassador, Avezzana, that Greek acceptance of the note 
would lead to an immediate evacuation of Corfu. Avezzana would not give so 
categorical an assurance without instructions, and it was only after lengthy discussion 
that a compromise formula devised by the French was agreed upon. This noted that 
Italy's occupation of Corfu was only the taking of a pledge, stated that the demands of 
Italy were 'covered' by those of the conference and invited the Greeks to 
communicate their acceptance. 19 Crewe was firmly convinced that this formula left 
'no possible excuse' for the Italians to remain in Corfu, since it had been made 
I abundantly clear' to Avezzana that 'extreme concessions'had been made to Italy over 
the demands in order to secure her immediate evacuation. Avezzana had not 
specifically agreed with this, but he had promised to telegraph his government on the 
point, adding that he was sure it would be met. The conference took this 'as an 
undertaking that Corfu would be evacuated on the acceptance by Greece of the 
50 note'. 
This apparent settlement was greeted with varying degrees of warmth in the Foreign 
Office. Nicolson, a League enthusiast who had adopted a stridently anti-Italian 
position throughout the crisis,, 51 regretted that although this 'admirable settlement' was 
really due to the pressure of the League, public opinion would believe that 'the 
weakest of the Great Powers' had 'flagrantly defied the League at one of the rare 
moments when that body was in full Assembly'. 52 Tyrrell, rather more of a 
48 DBFP/I/XXIV/1004-7; Barros, Corfu, pp. 188-97,209-10. 49 B arros, Corfu, pp. 197 -20 1. 50 DBFP/I/XXIV/1007-8. 
51 On 2 September Nicolson had written that Italy was now 'really dangerous' and that if she retained Corfu she would have all the Balkans 'at her mercy' (DBFP11j=V1955). See also Yearwood JCH 21562-3,567-8 and Barros, Corfu, pp. 108-9. 52 DBFP/IIXXIV/1008. 
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traditionalist where Geneva was concerned, was more positive: time had been of the 
essence, and any delay would only have envenomed the situation, jeopardised a 
settlement and led to 'the wrecking of the League'. Curzon agreed: the solution 
reached was reasonably fair, the proposals 'if anything, pro-Greek rather than pro- 
Italian in their complexion', and peace had been secured without prejudice to either 
the League or British intereStS. 53 
In Athens, Bentinck - who had strongly favoured a League solution 54 advised the 
Greeks to accept the demands of the Ambassadors' conference since they seemed to 
represent a compromise. 55 Similar advice was tendered by Greek diplomats abroad, 
who urged that anything other than unequivocal acceptance would give Mussolini a 
pretext to remain in Corfu. Although the Greek government was a little put out that 
penalties were now being imposed before an inquiry had established Greek guilt, all 
this advice was taken to heart. Accordingly, on 9 September the Greeks accepted the 
demands of the Ambassadors' conference and reiterated their request that it ensure 
that the evacuation of Corfu should take place as soon as possible. 56 
The French might have been expected to be well pleased with a settlement which was 
in line with Poincare's compromise solution and which Nicolson termed 'a signal 
triumph'. After all, Poincare appeared to have reconciled the conflicting pressures 
upon himself, gained the gratitude of Italy and Greece and 'demonstrated that no 
European question can be solved unless France plays the leading part'. 57 However., 
others saw matters differently: from Geneva British diplomats reported the 
widespread opinion that 'France has lost a tremendous amount of prestige amongst the 
53 DBFP/I/XXIV/1008-9. 
54 Kennard, ever anxious for a compromise that would give Mussolini the foreign policy success he 
needed to satisfy domestic public opinion, warned London on 6 September that if such a solution 
were not forthcoming Mussolini might be toppled and replaced by either an ineffective liberal 
administration or a military dictatorship. Bentinck had retorted that the issue of Mussolini's prestige 
or his fall from power was 'surely a trifle' compared with the possibility of the 'collapse of [the] law 
of nations'which a check to the League could entail (DBFP/I/XXW/995-6,999). He later attacked the League for its 'supineness' (DBFPII /XXIV/1 039). 
55 DBFP/I/XXIV/1013-4. 
56 DBFP/I/XXIV/1014,1016; Barros, Corfu, pp. 205-7. 57 DBFP/I/XXIV/1008. 
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smaller stateSI. 58 That the French were aware of this discontent was made clear by 
Avezzana in his reports to Rome. He warned Mussolini that the Quai d'Orsay 
expected him to accept the settlement and evacuate Corfu, for they feared that 
otherwise Geneva would open up a discussion of the whole Italo-Greek question in 
which France might have to withdraw from supporting Italy. 59 
Mussolini rejected this advice. On 9 September the Italian government issued a 
communique stating that although Italy accepted the Ambassadors' conference 
demands as satisfying her own, Corfu would only be evacuated after the Greeks had 
'given full and final execution' to those demands. 601n. a telegram to Avezzana 
Mussolini made clear that he had no intention of leaving Corfu simply because the 
Greeks accepted the note, since 'acceptance does not mean execution'. He drew 
attention especially to the fifth demand, and stated that the capture and punishment of 
the assassins would have to precede evacuation. 61 This qualified acceptance, 
communicated to the Ambassadors' conference the next day, was likely to stir up a 
hornets' nest, for it could only lend credence to growing suspicions that the 
occupation was intended to be anything but temporary. 621ndeed, it might, as the 
French had feared, serve as a pretext for the League to re-examine the Corfu 
question. 63 
The challenge facing Britain and France now was to restrain the League from 
challenging Mussolini until they had tied him down to evacuating Corfu. On 10 
September the League Council met, but the question of competence was not 
discussed, at least in part because of British awareness that this would only envenom 
Italo-Greek relations and delay evacuation. Cecil, however, communicated to London 
the unease of the small powers - which he shared - about the continued Italian 
58 DBFP/I/XXIV/101 1-3. 
59 MnIII1207-9. Salandra spoke in the same sense. He represented the Ambassadors' conference 
solution as a victory in substance for Italy which, if accepted, would close the incident; if it were 
rejected, Italy would be left totally isolated (DDInIIII209-10). 60DDInIIII210-1; DBFP/I/XXIV/1014-5. 




occupation: the Czechs and Yugoslavs were convinced 'that this is only the first of 
several troubles that Italy and Mussolini may cause us in the near future', and other 
sources indicated that the Italians were determined to hold the island 'until they have 
succeeded in forcing a settlement of the Fiume question on Italian lines down the 
throats. of the Yugo-SlavS1.64This concern was shared in London, where Tyrrell felt 
that Mussolini was 'quite incapable of playing the game', and argued that the essential 
point was to secure the evacuation of Corfu - and this before the Assembly broke up, 
so that the question could be fully debated there and the competence of the League 
reaffirmed. 65 In the meeting of the Ambassadors' conference also held on 10 
September there was, however, no progress towards this. Avezzana explained Italian 
suspicions that if Corfu were evacuated immediately the Greeks would have no 
incentive to catch and punish the guilty, whereupon the conference was adjourned 
until 12 September so that he could receive more precise instructions from Rome. 66 
These turned out, in a sense, to be conciliatory. Although Mussolini insisted that Italy 
would not have gained satisfaction until the culprits were identified and punished, he 
did allow that if the inquiry concluded that the offenders could not be found Italy 
would evacuate Corfu in return for other reparations, such as the payment by Greece 
of the full 50,000,000 lire indemnity. 670n 12 September when the Ambassadors' 
conference met, Avezzana informed the British and French of this, and the search was 
then on for a formula that would reconcile their desire to tie the Italians down to a 
definite date for evacuation with Mussolini's desire to remain in Corfu until he was 
assured of satisfaction. The discussions were long and heated, and hampered by 
Avezzana's repeated admissions that he might very well be exceeding his instructions 
and could be disavowed by Mussolini. No agreement was possible, and in the evening 
the meeting was adjourned so that Avezzana could refer to Rome. 68 
64 DBFP/I[XXIV/1017-8; Barros, Corfu, pp. 217-9. 65 DBFP/I/XXIV/1018. 
66 DBFP/i/XXIV/1019-1022,1024; Barros, Corfu, pp. 221-5. 67 DDIn/II/222-3. 
68 DBFP/I/XXIV/1026-31; DDI/7/Il/223,225-6; Barros, Corfu, pp. 230-9. 
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The deadlock for a time seemed ominous, especially for Anglo-Italian relations, and a 
conflict between the two powers loomed large. 69 Curzon's attitude was quite 
uncompromising. On 11 September he had authorised Crewe to use the threat of a 
debate in the League Assembly to force the Italians to set a definite date for the 
evacuationof CorfU. 70 He proceeded to turn the screw on both Mussolini and 
Poincare, who had been so keen to save Mussolini's face by a compromise, by the 
same means. If Avezzana would not pledge Italy to evacuate Corfu by 27 September 
(the date set for the end of the commission of inquiry's investigations), Crewe was to 
see Poincare and suggest joint Anglo-French representations at Rome to make clear to 
Mussolini that they would not prevent the matter being discussed at Geneva, where 
they would 'give their fullest support to the decisions which the majority of the 
nations assembled [there] may accept'. If Poincare was unwilling to make these 
representations, Britain would in any case be unable to prevent the matter coming 
before the Assembly. 71 
In the event, a solution came in sight when Mussolini decided to stage a minor 
retreat. 72 On 13 September when the conference reconvened, Avezzana announced 
that although Mussolini could not accept any of the formulae proposed the previous 
day, he would agree a date for evacuation on the understanding that if the culprits 
were not found, Italy would be awarded the whole 50,000,000 lire as an indemnity. 
This seemed to offer the basis for a solution, for it would get the Italians out of Corfu 
by 27 September, which Curzon had insisted to Crewe was the essential point. 
However, in their eagerness to reach a settlement the ambassadors accepted a 
declaration by Avezzana that the full indemnity would be given to Italy if the inquiry 
failed to establish 'that the Greek Government has not committed any negligence'in 
its hunt for the murderers. This skilfully-worded phrase, which put the onus firmly on 
69 The Italian naval attach6 in Paris reported that the situation would become 'very serious' if some 
agreement was not reached (DDInIIII226), and the Italian navy was already making contingency 
plans for facing an Anglo-Greco-Yugoslav combination (DDIf7/II/229-31). 70 DBFP/i/XXIV/1 023. Barros, following Nicolson's monograph on Curzon, incorrectly states that Curzon backed down over the League on 10 September (Barros, Corfu, pp. 214-5). 71 DBFP/I/XXIV/1031-3. 
72 DDin/il/226-8. 
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the Greeks to prove themselves innocent of any negligence or complicity in the crime, 
in effect doomed them to pay the full indemnity, essentially as a bribe to get Italy out 
Of Corfu. " 
Initially this was not appreciated by the ambassadors, who despatched a note to the 
Greeks detailing how the demands decided upon were to be carried out - for example, 
the funeral service was to be on 19 September, and the commission of inquiry was to 
begin work on 17 September. Once a preliminary report was received by the 
conference, it would decide whether the Greeks had conducted a satisfactory search 
for the criminals. If they had not, then further sanctions, notably the award of the 
indemnity, would be taken. 74 
Foreign Office reaction to this settlement was on the whole favourable. Nicolson, 
who foresaw some of the difficulties raised by Avezzana's declaration (though not its 
full implications) was the least enthusiastic: he feared that the Italians might be able 
to avoid facing the Assembly by tergiversating until it stopped sitting, and regretted 
that the League had played such a subdued role. Even so, he had to admit that a 
settlement had been reached which would get the Italians out of Corfu and preserve 
peace in Europe. Tyrrell was more positive: he had never expected the Italians to set a 
specific date for evacuation and was 'agreeably surprised' when they did so, since it 
meant that Mussolini had 'retreated considerably from the position he took up 10 days 
ago'. Curzon shared his relief: his instructions to Crewe had been based on the firm 
expectation that 'no settlement would be obtained at all'. 75 
Amongst Italians, opinions were mixed. Avezzana represented the settlement as a 
victory, in that, with French help, Italy's proposals had been substantially accepted 
despite the opposition of Crewe. 76 Mussolini, however, was far from happy. He too 
failed to grasp the full implications of Avezzana's declaration, and feared that the 
73 DDInIIII233-5; DBFP/I/XXIV/1035-6; Barros, Corfu, pp. 244-7. 74 DBFP/I/XXIV/1034-5. 
75 DBFP/I/XXIV/1036-8; Yearwood JCH 21569-70. 
76 DDIn/II/233,238. 
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resounding and public victory he needed might not be forthcoming. His instructions 
had posited two alternatives: either the guilty must be caught and punished or Italy 
would receive the 50,000,000 lire indemnity. The recent settlement, however, left 
open the 'monstrous' possibility that the Greeks would be unable to catch the assassins 
but be absolved of negligence, leaving Italy to evacuate Corfu without receiving any 
money. 77 Avezzana pointed out that he could hardly have asked the conference to 
exclude 'the case of the absolute innocence and diligence of the Greek government'. 
but Mussolini would not be mollified. 78Contarini warned Avezzana that to placate 
Mussolini it was 'absolutely indispensable' to obtain the full indemnity if the Greeks 
did not apprehend the murderers. 79 
The Greeks were very happy with the settlement, believing that they would escape the 
indemnity while securing the liberation of Corfu. 80 Indeed, a report from Montagna 
that the Greeks considered it a victory that they were to give reparations to the Allies 
rather than to Italy alone, and that they credited England with having secured this 
triumph, was quoted to Avezzana by Mussolini as proof that Italy had been duped. 81 
The funeral service, the saluting of the flags and the delivery of the Greek official 
apology all passed off smoothly, and by 19 September Bentinck was confident that 
the 'unfortunate incident' was 'well on the way to a peaceful settlement' and that 'the 
moral defeat which Italy has undoubtedly suffered will prove a salutary lesson in the 
future to men like Messieurs Mussolini and Montagna'. 82 
Bentinck was unduly optimistic. The League had in fact not yet been vindicated. 
Indeed, on 14 September Sir Eric Drummond wrote that its moral authority had been 
much weakened by recent events, since a powerful state had'with impunity, some 




80 MAE Italie 130 Marcilly to QO tels. 191-2 d. 15 Sept. 1923. 
81 DDInIIII248-50. 
82 DBFPIIIXXIVII052-5. 
83 League of Nations archives, memorandum by Drummond d. 14 Sept. 1923, quoted in extenso in Barros, Corfu, pp. 317-20, cfDBFP/I/XXIV/1041-2. 
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view of this, Cecil warned on 12 September, the small states would not'remain 
indefinitely quiescent'to facilitate a settlement as they had hitherto. 84 Curzon 
responded on 13 September that he was still 'determined not to allow the competence 
of the League to be in any way impaired by the action of Italy' and he supported a 
plan of Cecil's to refer various questions raised by the crisis - such as whether states 
could be held responsible for political crimes committed on their territory - to the 
Permanent Court at The Hague. 85 It soon became apparent, however, that the need not 
to offend the Italians until they left Corfu would be a severe obstacle to asserting the 
League's competence. By 15 September the League had already decided to submit to 
the court only abstract questions rather than ones specifically relating to this dispute, 86 
and on the same day, Della Torretta. told Tyrrell that if the League made any attempt 
to reconsider the settlement then the Italians 'would consider themselves justified in 
resuming their liberty of aýction'. 87 
Mussolini's truculence still governed events. On 16 September the Duce, delivered a 
long rant to Graham, insisting on the guilt of the Greeks and warning that he could 
always reoccupy Corfu or seize other places. Moreover, if Geneva continued to 
meddle, he would'leave without regret a League which placed Haiti and Ireland on 
equality with great powers, which showed impotence in questions of Greco-Turkish 
conflict, Ruhr or Saar and reserved its activities for encouraging socialist attacks on 
Fascisti Italy'. Graham warned London that Italian public opinion was in 'a,!, perilous 
frame of mind'and would welcome a further 'dramatic and sensational stroke'from 
Mussolini if the League reopened the question. 88The reaction of the Foreign Office 
was revealing. Nicolson took a hard line view, arguing that Mussolini would 'defy 
everything except force', and that the issue was 'simply and solely whether we shall or 
shall not be forced to retreat from the position of upholding the Covenant and the 
84 DBFP/I/XXIV/1024. 
85 DBFP/I/XXIV/1033. 
86 DBFP/I/XXIV/1040-2; League of Nations archives, memorandum by Drummond d. 14 Sept. 1923, 
quoted in Barros, Corfu, pp. 318-9. 87 DBFP/i/XXIV/1042-3; DDI/7/II/23 1. See also DDInIIII241,243-4. 88 DBFP/i/XXIv/1043-6. 
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public Law of Europe'. Great Britain must either be 'prepared to go the whole length' 
in support of the League or should 'retreat at once' and allow Mussolini his triumph. 
Curzon did not explicitly accept these alternatives, but he clearly recognised their 
validity. Although he declared that he was 'not at all disposed to yield to the threats' 
of Mussolini, the upshot was a British retreat. Curzon decided that Crewe should see 
Poincare 'and endeavour to secure concerted action at Geneva', and in the meantime 
Cecil should try and postpone any debate on the Corfu affair in the Assembly and, in 
Tyrrell's words, 'show the utmost moderation'. 89 
Poincare hardly needed prompting from London to take a cautious line over the 
League's competence. On 19 September he told Crewe that any declaration should be 
postponed and then only made in an abstract form in order'to avoid any needlessly 
wounding expressions. 90 Cecil, too, accepted that the League would have to forgo a 
public victory for the time being. On 17 September he adopted an extremely 
conciliatory tone in the League Council, and on 21 September a meeting of the 
Assembly passed off quietly with an acceptance of the Ambassadors' conference 
settlement, largely because the British delegation used all its influence to restrain it 
'fTorn action and even from criticism'. 91 
Ultimately, a combination of the need to implement the settlement - which the League 
had done much to shape - and Italian obstinacy entirely precluded that ringing 
declaration of the League's competence which both Cecil and the Foreign Office had 
originally envisaged. The Council and the Assembly at first agreed, after some 
deliberation, to submit the various questions of competence raised by the crisis to the 
Permanent Court of Justice at The Hague; but when Salandra objected to the whole 
notion of a reference to such an international body92 it was agreed on 29 September to 
89 DBFP/i/XXIv/1046-8. Tyrrell similarly denounced'the ravings of this disappointed filibusteree 
but advocated compromise. 90 DBFP/I/XXIV/1 049-52. 
91 DBFP/1/XXIV/1048-50,1056,1064; Barros, Corfu, pp. 256-7. On 17 September Cecil argued that it 
would have been contrary to the spirit of the League for the Council to have discussed its competence instead of bringing the disputing parties together. 92 DBFP/i/XXIV/1048,1050,1056-8,1073. 
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refer the questions to a committee of jurists to be nominated by Council members, 
and the Council merely reaffirmed its competence 'to deal with any dispute arising 
between members of the League likely to lead to a rupture'. 93By the time the jurists 
delivered their verdict in the spring of 1924 the damage to the League's prestige had 
already been done, and the It-alians even managed to smother attempts to have the 
jurists' responses debated. 94 
For the moment, however, the incompatibility between practical imperatives and 
considerations of principle was obscured by the immediate question of whether 
Mussolini could be kept to his promise to evacuate Corfu on 27 September. On 19 
September Graham wrote that although Mussolini's recent excited pronouncements 
doubtless 'contained [the] usual element of bluff , 
with a man of his type one cannot feel too sure. Much will depend on [the] 
outcome of [the] Janina enquiry. If guilt can be established and somebody 
punished or failing that if Greece can be made to pay, feeling here will be 
satisfied. Otherwise there may be trouble. 95 
The outcome of the crisis now turned on the inquiry in Epirus. The commission began 
its work on 17 September, although its effectiveness was hampered by disagreements 
between its members. The Italian. ) Colonel Beaud, was determined to pin the blame 
for the crime on the Greeks, and by playing 'the r6le of prosecuting counsel' he 
clashed with the British representative, Major Harenc, whose impartiality he took for 
an attempt to shield the Greeks from punishment. 96 The Frenchman, Colonel 
Lacombe, attempted to conciliate between these two extremes, 97 whilst the Japanese 
president of the commission, Colonel Shibouya, was completely ineffectual. 98 
93 DBFP/IIXXIV/1081-2. 
94 Barros, Corfu, pp. 257; J. Barros, Office Without Power. Secretary-General Sir Eric Drummond 
1919-1933 (Oxford, Clarendon, 1979), pp. 271-3,275-6. 95DBFP/I/XXIV/1051. 
96 DBFP/I/XXIV/1 059,1107-9. Harenc, 'a man of tact, experience and character', had been instructed by London simply 'to spare no effort to ascertain the truth' (DBFP/I[XMV/1020,1039-40). His report to the Foreign Office is printed in DBFP/I/XXIV/1 106-15. It had been widely expected that the Italians would try and use the inquiry to complicate the settlement of the dispute (MAE Italie 130 Marcilly to QO tels. 191-2 d. 15 Sept. 1923; DBFP/I/XXIV/1039). 
97 Harenc found Lacombe generally supportive, but he complained to Paris that Harenc seemed to have been instructed 'to exculpate the Greek government' (MAE Italie 130 Lacombe to QO tel. [? ] 
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Problems came to a head on 22 September, when the commission had to draw up its 
preliminary report for the Ambassadors' conference. Beaud apart, the commissioners 
were agreed that in the circumstances the Greeks had, a few minor mistakes apart, 
done their utmost to catch the assassins. 99 The Italian, however, threatened to resign if 
his colleagues persisted in this opinion, 100 whereupon Harenc agreed for the sake of 
solidarity to water down the telegram to Paris so that it was could receive Beaud's 
concurrence. He did this with some misgivings, but was persuaded by Lacombe and 
Beaud that it would still be read by the ambassadors as exculpating the Greeks. 101 The 
report as sent stated that whilst the Greek investigations were clearly 'open to the 
reproach of negligence in some respects, only one of the commissioners felt that this 
made the Greeks culpable. 1020n its arrival in Paris, Crewe immediately observed that 
the Italians and French would argue that it constituted sufficient evidence for 
imposing the 50,000,000 lire fine on Greece. 103Whether Lacombe or Beaud had been 
aware of, or understood the implications of, Avezzana's declaration of 13 September 
is not clear, but Harenc was obviously ignorant of them, since he would never have 
allowed the sending of a telegram which did not reflect the views of the majority of 
the commissioners if he had realised that it would leave open the possibility of the 
Greeks being forced to pay the full inoemnity. 104 
Before the Ambassadors' conference met on 25 September Mussolini made further 
attempts to influence his allies. He complained to the Foreign Office about Harenc's 
d. 24 Sept. 1923; MAE Italie 131 note by Laroche d. 15 Oct. 1923; DBFP/I/XXIV/1108-10). Lacombe 
was apparently instructed by Poincar6 to support Beaud (Blatt Historian 50 242). 
98 For Barros'account of the inquiry, see Barros, Cor/u, pp. 258-64. 
99 Barros, Corfu, pp. 262-3. The special circumstances included the mountainous terrain in Epirus and 
the general inefficiency of the Greek police. The Greeks had, Harenc felt, 'taken all steps which are 
to be expected of an immature administration' (DBFP/I/XXIW107 1). 
100 DBFP/I/XXIV/1 059,1109. Beaud insisted 'that he was there to prove the that the Greek 
Government was guilty on all counts. 
101 DBFP/I/XXIV/1070,1109-10. 
102 DBFP/I/XXIV/1058-9; Barros, Corfu, pp. 263-4. The commissioners could not discover who had 
Perpetrated the murders, which they felt were either politically motivated or the result of a vendetta 
against Tellini. 
103 DBFP/I/XXIV/1059. 
104 The Foreign Office, being ignorant of its implications, had not informed Harenc of the importance of the declaration. He implies that Lacombe and Beaud were as surprised as he when they 
realised what interpretation the Ambassadors' conference placed on their report (DBFP/I/XXIV/1071,1114). 
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attitude, arguing that it amounted to a breach of the pledge to hold an impartial 
inquiry, and warned that he would not evacuate Corfu unless the full indemnity was 
promptly awarded; 105 Contarini delivered the same message to Graham, who warned 
London again that Mussolini's foreign policy was 'for home consumption' and that he 
would risk complications abroad to strengthen his domestic position. 106 Mussolini's 
bluster, however, had no effect on ýCurzon. The Greeks, he wrote to Crewe, had a 
right to expect that the size of the indemnity would be fixed by the court at The 
Hague, as the conference had decided on 7 September. If the ambassadors were to 
decide on the basis of a mere preliminary report that the full fine should be imposed 
'it would be difficult to justify their decision, which would in reality be a bribe to 
induce Italy to adhere to her promise of evacuation'. 107 
When the Ambassadors' conference met on 25 September it soon became apparent 
that the British would not prevail against a united Italy and France. Avezzana drew 
attention to the terms of his own declaration of 13 September and on the basis of this 
demanded immediate payment of the 50,000,000 lire to Italy. He argued that his 
declaration had put the onus on the Greeks to provide proof that they had not been 
negligent, and the preliminary report, far from providing such proof, pointed to 
specific instances of Greek negligence. Consequently, unless the ambassadors 
fulfilled their pledge of 13 September and awarded the fine, Italy would regard 
herself as having regained her liberty of action over Corfu. Crewe secured an 
adjournment until the next day and reported to London that in view of this threat, and 
the fact that the French had wholeheartedly supported the Italian thesis, he saw no 
option but to agree to imposing the fine if Corfu was to be evacuated. 101 
ýCrewe's telegram came like a bombshell in London, where the implications of 
Avezzana's declaration had never been appreciated. Only upon re-reading it did 
105 DBFP/I/XXIV/1061-2; DDI/7/II/259-63. 
'()6 DBFP/I/XXIV/1 062-3,1067. Harenc, Contarini argued, had lost 'no opportunity of preventing Colonel Beaud from establishing Greek guilt'. 107 DBFP/I/XXIV/1063-4. Cecil shared Curzon's view that any fine should depend on the commission's final report. 108 DBFP/I/XxIV/1065-6; DDI/7/Il/263-4; Barros, Corfu, pp. 268-80. 
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Curzon realise that the ambassadors had in fact sold the pass two weeks previously 
with the result that the Greeks would be compelled to pay the full 
fine without any 
reference to the Permanent Court. 109 Avezzana's arguments, he told 
Crewe, were 
'inconsistent with [the] equities of [the] case', for the Greeks were to pay the 
maximum penalty even though no evidence of their complicity in the crime had been 
forthcoming. Nevertheless, in the circumstances there was no alternative but to 'defer 
to [the] Italian contention' since otherwise responsibility for the continuance of the 
occupation and the crisis'would be cast upon our shoulders alone'. 110 Accordingly, on 
26 September Crewe informed the Ambassadors' conference that the British 
government agreed to the imposition of the 50,000,000 lire penalty, and Avezzana 
declared that the evacuation of Corfu would begin forthwith. ' 11 
The remaining loose ends were tidied up over the next few months. The 
Ambassadors' conference despatched a note to the Greeks, delivered on 27 
September, instructing them to pay the full penalty, which with some reluctance the 
Greeks agreed to do, on 29 September, the money being transmitted soon after. 1121n 
the meantime, the Italian forces left Corfu and the commission of inquiry was 
somewhat peremptorily wound Up. 113 On 30 October the Ambassadors' conference 
considered the final report of the commission which had been completed a month 
Previously and which contained a proposal that a neutral expert should be appointed 
to help the Greek and Albanian authorities in their further investigations. This 
eminently sensible proposal was, however, thwarted by the Italians, who contended 
that an Italian expert should also be appointed, thus threatening to reopen the whole 
crisis and cause endless complications. 1140n 29 November when the conference next 
discussed the issue the proposal was, at Crewe's suggestion, dropped, and it was 
decided simply to communicate the commission's final report to both the Greek and 
'()9 Barros, Corfu, pp. 281-2. 
1 10 DBFP1l /XXIV/ 1066-7. 
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Albanian governments. I 15With this, it was agreed the whole Corfu question was to be 
considered as 'definitely settled'. 116 
The verdict of the Ambassadors' conference 'caused a painful surprise' in Greece, the 
more so as reports from Janina had indicated that the inquiry would exonerate the 
Greeks. ' 17 Bentinck was appalled by the outcome and echoed the Greek view that 
peace had been purchased 
at the cost of justice. Greece, impoverished by a war originally entered upon on 
the side of the Entente ... has once more been sacrificed 
for the peace of 
Europe. Europe [has] become morally poorer, and the high principles for 
which men fought and died in the Great War are forgotten. 118 
Marcilly, on the other hand, was less downcast. Italian animosity was a fact of life for 
the Greeks but in this crisis world opinion had been united behind them and a 
dangerous confrontation contained. Moreover, the whole crisis seemed to show that 
Greek territory was effectively guaranteed by the powers. ' 19 These views were to an 
extent shared by Greece's leaders who, though disgruntled by the size of the 
indemnity, realised that, Mussolini's determination being what it was, they had had a 
narrow escape. 120 
Italian public opinion expressed 'keen satisfaction' at the decision of the Ambassadors' 
conference, and felt that Corfu could now be evacuated with dignity. The moral was 
also drawn that England had opposed Italy to the end but had been forced to retreat in 
the face of Italian firmness. 121 Mussolini proclaimed the crisis as a great success, 
which, indeed, it was, if one accepts his assertion that the occupation of Corfu was 
only ever a temporary measure. There is, however, some evidence that his real 
intention was to annex the island, and make the Adriatic a veritable mare clausum, 
115 DBFpl, IXXIVII 103-4; Barros, Corfu, pp. 294-6. 116 DBFpl, IXXIVII 104. 
117 DBFP/I/XXIV/1077; MAE Italie 131 Marcilly to QO no. 177 d. 3 Oct. 1923. 118 DBFP/I/XXIV/1079. 
119 MAE Italie 130 Marcilly to QO no. 170 d. 27 Sept. 1923. 120 DBFP/I/XXIV/1077-8. 
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and in that he had been well and truly thwarted by the international community. 
122 At 
any rate his animosity towards the League was intensified by the crisis: he told the 
French ambassador, Barrere, on 5 October that pacifism led to war, that the League 
was'the quintessence of pacifism'and that he did not see how a great power could 
ever submit to such a collection of small states. 123Mussolini's reputation as a 
firebrand was also now established. Montagna had bragged in Athens during the crisis 
that 'the time had come for the small Balkan nations to learn to fear Italy', and to 
some extent this had happened. 
124 
The predominant feeling in London at the end of the crisis was one of disgust. 
Nicolson's view, if extreme, was not untypical. He expressed his frustration in his 
diary: 
I tried in vain to get [my superiors] to see the issue in wider proportions and to 
realise that we had a chance of calling the new world into being in order to 
redress the balance of the old. They would not see it: Tyrrell because he is for 
an arrangement at any price, and had no intellectual principle or moral 
stability: Curzon because his inordinate vanity was affected by the 
Harmsworth press attacks and by a certain jealousy of Lord R. Cecil. The 
result was that we killed the League and fortified Poincare. Terribly distressed 
by this lack of strength and guidance. 125 
Nicolson turned the anger that his disgust engendered on Crewe, whom he blamed - 
somewhat unfairly - for having let Avezzana's declaration -a 'deplorable formula' - 
pass unchallenged on 13 September. 126A more germane criticism was that Crewe did 
not inform the Foreign Office of the implications of Avezzana's declaration, even 
122 Mack Smith, Mussolini, pp. 84-5 ('Italian postage stamps overstamped "Corfu" were already on 
sale and the issue had to be withdrawn abruptly); Lowe and Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy, p. 198; 
Cassels, Early Diplomacy, p. 124. 
123 MAE Italie 131 Barr6re to QO tels. 881-3 d. 5 Oct. 1923. Simultaneously Mussolini was seeking to 
increase Italian representation in the League Secretariat (Baffos, Office Without Power, pp. 274-9). 124 MAE Italie 130 Marcilly to QO no. 170 d. 27 Sept. 1923; MAE Italie 131 note by Laroche d-10 
Oct. 1923; Barros, Corfu, p. 313. 
125 Nicolson papers, Nicolson diary, d. [? 191 S ept. 1923, quoted in Lees-Milne, Nicolson 1208. 
Nicolson's diary entries tended to be quite emotional, but this one, it seems, was written even before 
the final Ambassadors' conference decision. It should be noted that Nicolson never got on with Tyrrell (Lees-Milne, Nicolson 140-1,227,233) and that Curzon had been heavily attacked by the 
Daily Mail as a warmonger for his initial support of the League (Barros, Corfu, p. 86). 126 DBFP/l/XXIV/l 076,1086-7; Yearwood JCH 21,570-2. Curzon also attacked Crewe's 'serious 
error of judgement' here, although the Foreign Office would probably have ultimately had to accept 
the Avezzana formula in any case. 
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though he later claimed to have been aware that after its acceptance there was only 
'the most slender chance' of the Greeks escaping payment of the indemnity. 127 Had he 
done so, the Foreign Office could have ensured that the preliminary report of the 
commission was quite unequivocal, and a more lenient settlement might have been 
achieved. (Crewe's reticence on this point could have been due to his unwarranted 
belief that the Greek government knew who the assassins were). 128 
Other British observers were dismayed at the outcome of the crisis. Crewe, who had 
at first been not unsympathetic to the Italian case (as he said, if five British officers 
had been murdered delimiting the Mosul frontier British public opinion would 
probably have demanded more than simply redress through the League), saw it as a 
'sorry instance of the low-level which post-war morality has reached ... in every 
country of Europe without exception'. 129 It was all very well for Avezzana to quote 
the Don Pacifico affair as a precedent for Italian action, but the truth was that what 
Palmerston did had 'no more bearing on current situations than the acts of Oliver 
Cromwell or Cardinal Richelieu' since after the war states were supposedly 'going to 
attempt to move on a higher plane of conduct'. 130 Curzon was sorely tempted to 
publish a blue book on the crisis even though it could not but expose the 'perfidy of 
the Italians and the connivance of the French' (indeed, that was the rationale behind 
it). 'Are we, he asked rhetorically, 'in everything to kowtow to our Allies[? ]'. In the 
end, however, he decided that it would be better not to 'revive the dispute' or disrupt 
the Entente any further. 131 
The crisis pointed up many paradoxes about the place of the League in British policy: 
peace was secured, but only because the League did not to assert itself; similarly the 
force of public opinion as focused in the Assembly had been shown to be effective, 
127 DBFPIIIXXIVII 074-5; MSS EUR Fl 12/201 Crewe to Curzon p. l. d. 26 Sept. 1923, p. l. d. 27 SePt. 1923. 
128 DBFP1j /XXIV/1 036-7,1057,1060-1,1075. 
129 MSS EUR F1 12P-01 Crewe to Curzon p. l. d. 13 Sept. 1923, p. l. d. 27 Sept. 1923. The Italians had 
ruined their case, Crewe argued, by the 'mad act of occupying Corfu'. 130 MSS EUR F1 12/201 Crewe to Curzon p. l. d-30 Sept. 1923. 131 DBFP/I/XXIV/1086-8,1091. 
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but only if it was not actually used. The crisis also highlighted the gulf within the 
Foreign Office between collectivists like Nicolson - who emphasised the importance 
of the League - and rather more pragmatic traditionalists like Tyrrell. Little serious 
thought, however, was given to the fundamental question of whether the British had 
been wrong to adopt a pro-League policy in the first place or wrong to abandon it 
when its potential high cost became clear. 132 
Nor did the Corfu crisis do much to eliminate the illusions of League enthusiasts in 
Britain; they did not, as one Foreign Office official hoped, come to see 'the League 
not as an ideal or a religion but as a piece of machinery always capable of 
improvement'. 133The LNU 'kept saying that it would all be easy and that there was 
nothing wrong with the League system', 134and the real lessons of Italy's challenge to 
the international order were not faced, enthusiasts preferring to shelter in the 
I meaningless evasion' that the setback was due not to any inherent failings of the 
League, but rather to the failure of statesmen to make the League work. 135 Cecil, who 
throughout the crisis had been realistic and practical, now defended the League's 
action, either in an attempt to put on a brave face or out of complacency, claiming 
that it had fulfilled its wider mission of promoting peaceful settlement. 136By the time 
he came to write his memoirs he was quite deluded about the lessons of the crisis and 
he unfairly blamed the setback for the League purely on Curzon's supposed decision 
to save Italy's face on 26 September by agreeing to the payment of the full 
indemnity. 137 
Curzon's reflections on the crisis were vouchsafed to the Imperial conference which 
met in London in October. The net result of the dispute had been that Greece had 
132 Yearwood JCH 21572-4. The distinction between collectivists and traditionalists derives from 
A-Wolfers, Britain and France between Two World Wars. Conflicting Strategies of Peace from Versailles to World War II (New York, Norton, 1966), pp. 223-8,331-43. 133 FO 371/9456 min. by Yencken nd., cited in Yearwood JCH 21,572. 134 Birn, League of Nations Union, p. 48. 135 Carr, Twenty Years'Crisis, p. 40. Carr makes this point about the League generally, but it 
certainly applies to the Corfu crisis. 136 MSS EUR F1 12/312. Imperial conference, notes of sixth meeting, II Oct. 1923, speech by Cecil. 137 Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, A Great Experiment (London, Cape, 1941), pp. 149-51; Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, All the Way (London, Hodder and Staughton, 1949), p. 179. 
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suffered a'grave injustice', the League had been dealt aconsiderable shock', and 
Europe had escaped 'a renewed conflagration' by means 'which I cannot myself 
applaud". 138However, as he made clear elsewhere, he would not accept any blame for 
the part played by Britain or the Foreign Office in the crisis. 139Rather, the regrettable 
outcome was due to the support France gave Italy and the ineptitude of the 
Ambassadors' conference, which had created a situation wherein Curzon had to 
concede to the Italians 'in order to maintain what I have always held to be the cardinal 
principle of European policy at this moment, namely the entente between ourselves 
and our allies. 140 Given that this was the over-riding principle of British policy, the 
only surprise was that incidents like the Corfu crisis were not more common. For, as 
Crowe told Della Torretta on 2 October, whereas Britain always aimed 'to arrive at a 
just settlement of every case on its merits', her allies preferred 'to see them decided on 
purely political considerations, in which the view of what was just and right did not 
necessarily play a prominent part'. 141 
It was surprising that Curzon did not draw out the implications for British policy of 
attempting to maintain an entente with allies whose attitudes were so divergent from 
his own. After all, he was fully aware of the nature of Mussolini's policy which, he 
told the conference on 5 October, was guided by 'realist principles' which left 'no 
room for treaties or other obligations', such as those contracted over the Dodecanese 
or the Covenant. Mussolini was 'a law unto himself, but also 'hardly master of his 
movementsf, since he had whipped up a popular enthusiasm which he could not 
control and which he lacked the force or vision to channel towards peace or 
retrenchment. Above all, Italian policy was 
conducted exclusively on the bargaining principle - that they do nothing 
except for a return, and that, while they are willing to take anything as a gift, 
they are also willing to extort anything by blackmail. We have no desire to be 
138 mss EUR F 112/312. Imperial conference, notes of sixth meeting, 11 Oct. 1923, speech by Curzon. 
139 DBFP/i/XXIV/1088-9. 
140 MSS EUR F1 12/312. Imperial conference, notes of sixth meeting, II Oct. 1923, speech by Curzon. 
141 DBFP/I/XXIV/1085. 
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other than friends with Italy, but we object to being called upon to pay 
through the nose on each occasion that we are reminded of that privileged 
position. 142 
In the event, despite these frank words Curzon's discontent with the Italians was 
short-lived. During the crisis Anglo-Italian relations had certainly been rather rocky, 
as evidenced by the vituperation of both the London and Rome press, 143 but in the 
aftermath Curzon decided that for reasons of wider policy it would be better to let 
bygones be bygones and he was anxious to make known that his policy was not 
personally antagonistic towards Mussolini or Italy. 144 It was necessary to 'wipe the 
matter off the slate', so that Britain and Italy could resume co-operation on 'the bigger 
issues' such as reparations and the Ruhr. 145 To a degree, Mussolini reciprocated this 
goodwill, and on 18 October told Graham that, on reflection, he realised British 
policy 'had not been animated by any feeling of hostility to Italy'. Indeed, perceiving 
that larger European questions might provide an opportunity for renewed Anglo- 
Italian co-operation, he went on to attack Poincare's policy in terms that would 
certainly have appealed to Curzon: 'France was endeavouring to establish her 
hegemony in Europe and her policy of encircling Germany with her small satellite 
States, whom she financed and armed, was also a menace to peace'. 146 
It was one of the ironies of the Corfu crisis that whereas the rift in Anglo-Italian 
relations was soon healed, and Mussolini's violent behaviour soon forgiven, Curzon 
bore a more long-standing grudge against the French. Indeed, he singled out their 
failure to work with Britain during the crisis for a solution 'in accord with justice and 
right'as the key reason for the final outcome. 147Mussolini's policy, though 
objectionable, could perhaps be interpreted as an isolated occurrence, forced on him 
by Italian public opinion; Poincare's actions, however, seemed to be of a piece with 
142MSS EUR F1 12/312. Imperial conference, notes of third meeting, 5 Oct. 1923, speech by Curzon. 143 MSS EUR F1 12/230 Graham to Curzon p. l. d. 29 Sept. 1923. 144 DBFP/I/XXIV/1089-92. 
145 MSS EUR F1 12/312. Imperial conference, notes of sixth meeting, 11 Oct. 1923, speech by Curzon. 
146 DBFP/I/XXIV/1095-7. 
147 MSS EUR F1 12/312. Imperial conference, notes of seventh meeting, 11 Oct. 1923, speech by Curzon. 
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his whole policy of late. In his statement to the Imperial conference reviewing British 
foreign policy over the past two years, Curzon argued that Britain's I main difficulty' 
had been 'the frequent desertions and the almost chronic lack of loyalty in great 
emergencies' of the French. Although he had striven to maintain the Entente, he had 
received few concessions in return, and their policy seemed 'far from being 
favourable to the recovery of the world'. 148Curzon was obviously predisposed to 
make the most of France's unsatisfactory behaviour in the crisis, which formed 
another item in the catalogue of grievances and accumulatedTesentments that he had 
amassed in recent years and which provided another reason for making up with 
Mussolini. 
The French for their part, while they had antagonised Curzon, found that their 
pandering to Mussolini produced few concrete gains in return from Rome. True, 
Italian help in the final stages of the Ruhr crisis was of some value to France, but co- 
operation between the two states on this question and over Corfu did not lead, despite 
French efforts, to any close entente. 119 Mussolini was always conscious that French 
help was cynical and self-interested: on 2 September he had told Kennard that he 
'fully realised [the] reasons for [the] friendliness of France who wished to make 
trouble between Italy and England and secure Italian support as regards the Ruhr 
question'. 150 Charles-Roux had similarly warned in September that British 
unpopularity in Italy would probably only be temporary, and was certainly not as 
deep-rooted as Italian francophobia; moreover, both Britain and France should now 
be careful since, having flexed his muscles, Mussolini would henceforth be much 
harder to control. 151 Given these warning signs the Quai d'Orsay should perhaps not 
have been surprised when Barrere reported with some alarm in November that in a 
148 mss EUR F1 12/312. Imperial conference, notes of third meeting, 5 OCL1923, speech by Curzon. 149 Poincard wrote to Barrýre on 2ýO October, pointing out the help the two states had given to each 
other on these issues and declaring his readiness 'to continue to give M. Mussolini similar proofs of 
Our goodwill' (MAE [? ] Poincar6 to Barrýre noj? ] d. 20 Oct. 1923, quoted in Shorrock, Ally to 
Enemy, p. 4 1. See also Blatt Historian 50 25 1). 150 DBFP1I /XXIV/960. 
151 MAE Italie 130 Charles-Roux to QO no. 425 d. 17 Sept. 1923, cf. Charles-Roux, Grande Ambassade, p. 242. 
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speech to the Italian senate Mussolini had spoken of France and England in the same 
breath as powers which Italy had overcome in the Corfu crisis. 152 
The area where France might have expected to work with Italy was over Fiume, a 
question which had assumed greater importance for France in view of the widespread 
dismay in the small states of Europe at French policy over Corfu. Instead, the Quai 
d'Orsay was comprehensively outmanoeuvred by the Palazzo Chigi. The Italians held 
out the bait of an accord a trois between Italy, France and Yugoslavia to stabilise the 
status quo in the Adriatic, and the French were immediately attracted to the idea: it 
offered a possible resolution of their dilemma of how to keep on good terms 
simultaneously with both the Little Entente states and Italy, and would also allow 
France to thwart any expansionist designs harboured by either of her potential 
partners. The Italians were, however, acting in totally bad faith, raising the prospect 
of a tripartite agreement so that France would not hamper the conclusion of an Italo- 
Yugoslav settlement of the Fiume question. After stringing the French along for 
several months, and as soon as the Italo-Yugoslav agreement was signed on 27 
January 1924 on terms very favourable to Italy, the Italians dropped the idea in a 
trice. 153 
The Corfu crisis may have seen the apogee of French conciliation of Italy, but the 
Quai d'Orsay's pursuit of the chimerical accord a trois indicated how illusory were 
any French hopes of consistently working with Italy on the major European questions 
of the day, and how incompatible French and Italian interests were in the long run. 154 
The upshot of the Corfu crisis was almost wholly negative for France. The Little 
Entente and Britain had been affronted, the League - the potential value of which was 
never fully appreciated by French policy-makers - had been weakened and Mussolini, 
152 MAE Italie 131 Barrere to QO tel. 999 d. 19 Nov. 1923. 153 Shorrock, Ally to Enemy, pp. 41-6; Charles-Roux, Grande Ambassade, pp. 250-61; M. Poulain, Ultalie, la Yougoslavie, la France et le Pacte de Rome de Janvier 1924; la Comddie de I'Accord ý 
Trois', Balkan Studies 16(2) 1975 93-118. 
154 Blatt Historian 50 249-52. 
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whom the Quai d'Orsay felt had finally emancipated Italy from British tutelage in this 
crisis, showed himself little inclined now to follow a French lead. 
Chapter Eight 
The End of the Dodecanese Question 
October 1923 - July 1924 
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Mussolini's public triumph over Corfu could not fail to have an impact on the biggest 
issue at stake between Italy and England - that of the Dodecanese - especially as the 
Duce had been planning to annex the islands at the moment Tellini was killed. At 
first, the British clearly felt that in his new mood of truculence Mussolini would never 
relinquish any of them. Curzon minuted on I September: 'I am afraid, as the 
Scotsman remarked in another context, "Bang go the Dodecanese"'. ' Similarly, after 
the acute phase of the crisis, Graham reported that Mussolini, under pressure from 
extreme fascists and despite the advice of the Palazzo Chigi, intended to annex the 
islands with very little warning, in order to cover up his difficulties in internal affairs. 
This, Graham warned, was of course likely to subject Anglo-Italian. relations to fresh 
strain. 2Curzon replied that such action would cause him 'the greatest consternation', 
and instructed Graham to warn Mussolini that it would hinder the re-establishment of 
friendly Anglo-Italian relationS. 3 
These apprehensions soon proved to be misplaced. On 10 October when Curzon 
raised the question of the Dodecanese with Della Torretta, the latter 'expressed his 
emphatic disbelief' that Mussolini was contemplating annexation. 4Further 
reassurance came on 18 October when Graham found Mussolini, who was now far 
more relaxed than he had been during the crisis, 'more conciliatory ... than I had 
expected'. Mussolini assured him that he did not have in mind any move concerning 
the Dodecanese and that he was ready I to throw in this question with others for 
discussion'in order to reach a settlement and consolidate Anglo-Italian relations. 
Later, Graham spoke to Contarini who, upon being told that 'any solution which 
satisfied Greece would also be satisfactory' to Britain, suggested as his own personal 
I DBFP/I/XXIV/944. The reference is to a cartoon of 1868 in Punchl541235, where a Scotsman, 
complaining about the high cost of living in London, relates woefully that no sooner had he arrived than ... Bang - went saxpence"'. 2 MSS EUR Fl 12/230 Graham to Curzon p. l. d. 28 Sept. 1923. 3 DBFP/I/XXIV/1088-90. 
4 DBFP/I/XXIV/1092. 
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opinion that Italy might be willing to give up those islands nearest to Greece 'while 
those adjacent to the Turkish coast might be retained by Italy'. 5 
This accommodating spirit, coming so hard on the heels of a period of unmitigated 
stubbornness, was symptomatic of the way fascist foreign policy was to develop: 
Mussolini oscillated between flirting with revisionism and loyally following the 
Entente line, making it difficult for his allies to anticipate his attitude. In this instance, 
there were probably several reasons for Italian complaisance. Mussolini had, after all, 
just won a substantial propaganda victory, and for the time being could afford to soft 
pedal on other issues. It is also possible that the Corfu crisis had revealed to the 
Italian navy that the Dodecanese were a military liability and of dubious value. 6 
Equally, at a time when the Fiume question was still unsettled, Mussolini may have 
feared that annexation of the islands could have sparked off a hostile coalition of 
Greece and Yugoslavia, possibly backed by the small League states or even Britain. 7 
A fourth possibility was that, given 'the internal convulsions in Greece which they are 
helping to promote"8 the Italians were hoping that 'with a collapse in Greece the ripe 
fruit will fall into [their] mouth'. 9 The key reason, however, was probably a desire to 
mend fences with England. By the time of his interview with Graham, Mussolini had 
had time to digest a report from Della Torretta. recommending that he curb press 
attacks on Curzon in order to ensure that the crisis in Anglo-Italian relations would be 
only temporary and to facilitate a settlement of outstanding questions. 10 
No progress was made towards initiating discussions until December, when British 
domestic politics exerted an influence on foreign policy. The general election of 6 
5 DBFP/I/XXIV/1095-9. 
6 Barros, Cor arr ti th fu, pp. 67-8; Lowe and Marzari, Italian Foreign PolicY, PP 198-9. B os men ons e 
argument advanced by some Italians that the islands would be useful only if Italy constructed a 
powerful naval force to operate solely in the eastern Mediterranean. Otherwise, they would be a liability because Italy's existing naval forces would have to be stretched to protect the islands in 
addition to the Italian mainland, which would leave Italian lines of communication vulnerable to the British. 
7 DBFP/i/XXIV/xi. 
8 FO 371/8822 min. by Troutbeck d. 24 Oct. 1923. 9 FO 371/8822 min. by Cadogan d. 24 OcL 1923. The counter-revolution had broken out in Greece on 21 October. 
10 DDInIIII285. 
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December made it very probable that when parliament met in January a Labour 
government would be formed. The prospect of a Labour foreign secretary imbued 
with internationalist and pacific principles clearly worried Curzon. He wrote to Crewe 
that Poincare might well regret having committed 'the gross error of quarrelling with 
the only British government that was likely to be well disposed towards him', and that 
the French might be I the better for reflecting' what it would mean for them to have a 
man like E. D. Morel at the Foreign Office. II Soon after the election Curzon confided 
to Della Torretta his fears for the future of the Entente under a Labour government, 
arguing that given the unremitting hostility of the Labour press towards fascism 
Anglo-Italian relations would especially be at risk. 12He thus suggested that the two 
powers should take advantage of the time before the advent of the new government to 
settle the major questions pending between the two countries. Della Torretta reported 
to Mussolini that Curzon had always been'a warm supporterof the Entente and 
seemed genuinely anxious that a Labour government might destroy it, and that there 
was a much greater chance of resolving the outstanding questions with him than with 
his likely successor. 13 
Curzon had no intention of attempting to settle 'all the complicated issues' which 
$chanzer had raised in 1922, but did hope to resolve both the Dodecanese and 
Jubaland questions. 14A few days later Della Torretta. called with a purely personal 
suggestion for a three-stage process to resolve the Dodecanese problem: first, the 
British would admit that all the islands were de iure Italian possessions (to allow any 
subsequent cession by Italy to appear as an act of spontaneous generosity to Greece); 
second, Britain and Italy would agree how many of the twelve islands should be 
returned to Greece (Della Torretta felt Mussolini would want to retain three); and 
11 MSS EURF112/201 Curzon to Crewe p-l- d-1 I Dec-1923, p. l. d. 12 Dec. 1923, Crewe to Curzon 
p-l- d. 14 Dec. 1923. 
12 DDInIIII339. The Labour press had initially adopted an ambiguous attitude towards the fascist 
experiment; the Corfu crisis led to the first strong and unanimous criticism of Mussolini, and the Matteotti murder in 1924 confirmed its hostility towards him. See C. Keserich, 'The British Labour Press and Italian Fascism, 1922-25', Journal of Contemporary History 10(4) 1975 579-90. 13 DDInlIV339-40. 
14 FO 371/8822 min. by Curzon d. 11 Dec. 1923. 
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third, once a decent government was established in Athens, Italy would conclude an 
arrangement with Greece along those lines. Curzon accepted this as a possible basis 
for agreement, although he was worried that it left a loophole for the Italians to 
demand further compensation from Greece when they came to negotiate the return of 
the nine islands. Nevertheless he told Della Torretta that if such an arrangement could 
be arrived at, Britain would be willing to cede all the territory in Jubaland agreed in 
1920, and he suggested that the first step should be for Italy formally to propose a 
settlement of the Dodecanese question on the lines indicated by Della Torretta. " 
The Foreign Office busied itself in elaborating a procedure for a settlement, but 
things were not as simple as they seemed. 16 On 21 December Graham struck a 
warning note, pointing out that the claim for the retention of a mere three islands by 
Italy seemed remarkably moderate, and speculating that the negotiations were 'being 
conducted by Torretta and Contarini without Mussolini's knowledge and approval'. 
The fact that Contarini was known to be 'extremely anxious for a settlement' only 
reinforced the notion that the Palazzo Chigi was trying to guide Mussolini onto a 
more anglophile path. 17This certainly complicated the negotiations, for Della 
Torretta began to doctor Curzon's views- in order to make them more palatable to 
I 
Mussolini and was reluctant to disclose to Curzon quite how obdurate Mussolini was. 
In his reports to Rome, for example, Della Torretta implied that the new proposal for 
settling the Dodecanese question was more Curzon's than his own, and recommended 
that it be favourably considered; after all, Italy was unlikely to get better terms from a 
Labour government especially if, as seemed possible, the internal upheaval in Greece 
resulted in a government under Venizelos that had British sympathy. 18 Mussolini, 
however, was not very interested in the bargain. He still refused to admit any 
connection between the Dodecanese and Jubaland questions, simply insisting that the 
15 DBFP/I/XXIV/919-21; FO 371/8822 mins. by Nicolson and Curzon d. 15 Dec. 1923. 16 FO 371/8822 min. by Nicolson d. 15 Dec. 1923. 17 MSS EUR Fl 12/230 Graham to Curzon p. l. d. 21 Dec. 1923. 18 DDIf7/11/347-50,356-8. For Torretta's unwillingness to be the bearer of ill-tidings to Mussolini, cf. DBFP/I/XXVII/100-3. 
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British owed Jubaland to Italy by virtue of the treaty of London, while the 
Dodecanese were incontrovertibly Italian by virtue of the treaty of Lausanne. 19 
Although talks went on in London until the formation of the Labour government on 
22 January, no progress was made. All Della Torretta's sophistry could not hide the 
fact that Mussolini was not prepared to compromise and that the gulf between the two 
countries was as wide as ever. On 3 January Della Torretta put Mussolini's views to 
Curzon and demanded in addition a larger share of territory in Jubaland than had been 
agreed in 1920 and more compensationStill. 20 He subsequently began to argue that if, 
after the cession of Jubaland, Italy handed any of the Dodecanese over to Greece, 
'further compensation' would be payable by both Greece and Britain. 21 If Curzon 
found this whole line of argument totally unreasonable, Mussolini found the British 
view equally unpalatable, minuting on one of Della Torretta's telegrams that Curzon 
expected Italy to surrender some of the Dodecanese without any compensation, and 
that on this basis 'agreement is impossible'. 22The depth of feeling aroused by this 
issue, and the conviction on both sides that the other was breaking its pledged word, 
was demonstrated by the willingness of both Curzon and Mussolini to threaten the 
publication of documents. 23 
The Foreign Office was becoming extremely exasperated by the entire Italian 
approach. When Della Torretta put forward his claim for more of Jubaland, Curzon 
confessed that he 'almost gasped' at his audacity; the ambassador, he told Graham, 
reminded him of the ex-prime minister of Poland who 'bore the significant name of 
Grabski', for such was 'the attitude which he invariably takes Up'. 24 Crowe had a 
similar experience, when at the same time he tried to enlist Italian co-operation on the 
19 DDI/7/Il/352-4,362-3. 
20 DBFP/I/XXVI/3-8; DDI/7/11/367-71. The Foreign Office was not surprised by Della Torretta's 
attitude as the secret service had intercepted his instructions (FO 371/9881 min. by Nicolson d. 2 Jan. 1924). 
21 DBFP/I/XXVI/26-8; DDI/7/11/376-8,385-8. 
22 DDI/7/11/3 7 1. 
23 DBFP/J/XXVI/27-8; DDI/7/11/377-8,387. 
24 DBFP/i/XXVI/6. 
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Reparations commission to ensure that its French president ceased to use his casting 
vote on matters of political importance. Della Torretta "talked in a roundabout way' 
for almost an hour before making clear that Mussolini had refused to co-operate 
unless Britain made concessions over the Dodecanese, even though Italian interests in 
the reparations question were identical to those of Britain. Crowe rejected 'this whole 
idea of perpetual bargaining' as 'foreign to British tradition and practice', and 
lamented that Anglo-Italian co-operation would never be possible 'if on every 
occasion where there was a community of interests the Italian government demanded 
to be paid for acting in pursuance of their own interests ... '. 
25Della Torretta. was 
himself uncomfortable with the instructions he had to carry out, and indicated to 
Curzon on 11 January 'that he was in the hands of a master who was reluctant to give 
his assent to any arrangement which did not demonstrate to the entire world that Italy 
had achieved a great diplomatic triumph. 26 
Curzon had a final interview with Della Torretta on 21 January, the very eve of his 
departure from office. Della Torretta. had instructions, since no accord seemed 
possible, to end the negotiations with a declaration of Italy's views, albeit in a friendly 
form. He was also to say that they could only be resumed if the British government 
gave proof of its good faith by executing the Jubaland cession. 27Della Torretta added 
that Italy would also require British recognition of Italian sovereignty over the 
Dodecanese, only four of which, moreover, was she prepared even to consider 
handing over ultimately to the Greeks. Curzon replied that he could not have accepted 
these terms even if he had continued in office. After all, the number of islands 
definitely to be retained by Italy haýd now risen from the three proposed by Della 
Torretta in December to eight, and Britain was supposed to surrender the maximum 
she had ever offered in Jubaland in return for a vague promise that the Italians would 
25 DBFP/I/XXVI/12-14. 
26 DBFP/I/XXVI/28. Della Torretta wrote to Contarini privately, putting the British case as 
expounded by Curzon in an attempt to influence Mussolini indirectly (DDI/7/11/391-2). 27 DDInIIII401-2. 
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initiate negotiations with Greece at a later date, when they would doubtless expect 
further compensation. 28 
In a note to his successor, Curzon recommended that the next move should be up to 
the Italians: either Della Torretta would submit his proposals in a written form or the 
negotiations would lapse. If the latter happened, he feared that the Italians would 
annex the islands and urged that in that case Britain should withdraw all but the 
minimum cession in Jubaland and publish a despatch prepared by Nicolson which put 
the blame for the rupture on the Italians and recapitulated their various breaches of 
faith. 29 Ramsay MacDonald, who was under great pressure of work upon his arrival at 
the Foreign Office, agreed that for now London need do nothing. 30 Meanwhile, Della 
Torretta wrote to Mussolini that he intended to start pressing the new government 
forthwith to adopt a more flexible attitude and to separate the Dodecanese and 
Jubaland questions. He also planned to lobby the British press to try and work up 
sympathy for the Italian poSition. 31 Despite his efforts, however, few people expected 
that the new Labour government 'would go out of its way to provide cheap diplomatic 
victories for a Fascist regime'. 32This seemed to be confirmed when on his assumption 
of office MacDonald annoyed the Italians by writinga personal communication to 
Poincare but not to Mussolini. 33 
Since England and Italy had taken charge of the Dodecanese question, the Greeks had 
been forced to take a back seat. They still constituted, however, one element in 
Curzon's thinking: on 23 January he wrote that Britain must not behave 'unfairly 
towards the Greeks, in whose interests we are really acting; and we must on no 
account allow Signor Mussolini first to dupe us and then to bully or squeeze them'. 34 
Although it was not true, as the Italians continued to suspect, that he was pledged by 
28 DBFP/I/XXVI/54-6; DDI17IIII405. 
29 DBFP/I/XXVI/56; FO 371/9881 mins. by Curzon d-21 Jan. 1924, Nicolson d. 23 and 24 Jan. 1924. 30 FO 371/98 81 min. by MacDonald d. 23 Jan. 1924. 31 DDI/7/11/406. 
32 Cassels, Early Diplomacy, pp. 221-2. 33 DDInII11423-4. 
34 DBFP/I/XXVI/56. 
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some secret agreement with the Greeks over the Dodecanese, he did feel that they 
should not be forced to abandon their claims. 35 He kept Venizelos informed of the 
progress of negotiations and sought his views privately on the Italian offer to cede a 
mere four islands to Greece eventually. Venizelos naturally was hardly enthusiastic 
about this idea, and insisted that Mussolini could not deny the existence of a 
Dodecanese question between Greece and Italy. The minimum solution he believed 
the Greek assembly might accept was the cession of six islands to Greece, and even in 
that event he hoped that those islanders left under Italian rule would be granted some 
measure of autonomy. 36 
During the first two months of MacDonald's government it seemed unlikely that any 
settlement would be reached. MacDonald took his time formulating a policy on the 
Dodecanese and Jubaland, partly because of pressure of work but also because of the 
complexity of the problem and the Foreign Office conviction that Britain had nothing 
to gain by restarting negotiations with the Italians. 371n the meantime, Anglo-Italian 
relations deteriorated. Ponsonby, the new parliamentary under-secretary for foreign 
affairs, upset Rome greatly when in an unguarded moment he referred to the two 
quesfions as 'connected' and averred that there was no prospect of 'an immediate 
settlement'; MacDonald produced a similar effect when he spoke of the islands as 
ethnologically Greek. 38A further row arose over the recognition of the Soviet Union: 
Mussolini had been determined to be the first head of state to take this step, and when 
MacDonald anticipated him he flew into 'one of his fits of ungovernable rage', his 
prestige greatly wounded. 39Lastly, the clear improvement in Anglo-French relations 
when MacDonald's assumed power - he was determined to work with the French to 
35 DBFP/I/XXVI/29-30; FO 371/9881 min. by Nicolson d. 22 Jan. 1924. 36 DBFP/I/XXVI/53-4; FO 371/9881 Bentinck to Lampson p. l. d. 23 Jan. 1924, Graham to FO no. 83 
d. 25 Jan-1924. 
37 FO 371/9881 min. by Crowe d. 25 Feb. 1924; FO 800/219 MacDonald to Graham p. l. d. 25 Feb. 1924. 
38 169 HC Deb 5s 1718-9; 170 HC Deb 5s 28-9; DBFP111XXV11103; DDI/7/II/454-5; DDI/7/III/18; 
FO 371/9881 Graham to FO no. 197 d. 29 Feb. 1924. The Italian press pointed out that it ill-behoved MacDonald to make an issue of this ethnic question considering the ethnic background_ of the inhabitants of Cyprus, Malta and Gibraltar. 39 FO 800/219 Graham to MacDonald p. l. d. 8 Feb. 1924, p. l. d. 22 Feb. 1924; Cassels, Early 
Diplomacy, pp. 189-193; Mack Smith, Mussolini, p. 1 10. 
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solve the reparations question - greatly worried the Italians. The Foreign Office put 
this 'morbid Italian susceptibility and conceit' down to the realisation 'that Italy counts 
for little intrinsically and that she can only play the role of a Great Power if she can 
act as a make-weight in the disputes between other Great Powers: that she can only 
fish with profit in troubled waters'. 40 
This was hardly the best climate for solving complex questions. Mussolini was 
convinced that Britain was ignoring Italian interests, and cited uncertainty about 
MacDonald's intentions towards Italy and Europe as the main cause of the troubled 
situation on the continent. 41 This conviction only drove him to new heights of 
obstinacy over the Dodecanese and Jubaland. Throughout February and March he was 
absolutely adamant that 'it is not possible for me to change my fundamental point of 
view' on those questions. 42Della Torretta, anxious to reach a settlement, hoped 
progress could be made if Italy simply made a vague promise to cede some of the 
islands to Greece in the future, but Mussolini was suspicious of any concession 
smacking of retreat. 43With the Italians in this mood there was little chance of a 
settlement, for although the Foreign Office had no wish to slight Mussolini it was 
equally reluctant to pander to him. 44 
This was especially true of MacDonald, whose attitude at first was exactly what the 
Italians had feared. Although he stressed that his policy towards Rome would contain 
no speck of hostility' and that he wanted 'the most friendly relations' with Mussolini, 
he told Graham that he would not stand idly by if the Duce pursued 'a policy of 
dictatorial imperialism' or attempted 'to terrorise or to boss Europel. 45True, 
MacDonald was keen for 'a complete settlement' with Italy, but he was repelled by 'all 
46 these pettifogging bargains' and wanted 'to deal with such matters on a higher level'. 
40 FO 371/9881 mins. by Nicolson d. 25 Feb. 1924,5 Mar. 1924. 41 MAE Italie 131 Charles-Roux to QO tels. 184-6 d. I Mar. 1924; DDI/7/III/2-4. 42 DDIM111128. 
43 DDIn/III/12-13,16-17,22-4,28,31-2,47-50,52; DBFP/I/XXVI/1 18-9,121-2, FO 371/9882 Della Torretta to FO no. 650 d. 6 Mar. 1924. 44 FO 371/9881 mins. by Nicolson d. 25 Feb. 1924,5 Mar. 1924. 45 FO 800/2 19 MacDonald to Graham p. l. d. 13 Feb. 1924. 46 FO 800/219 MacDonald to Graham p. l. d 25 Feb. 1924. 
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He was also very disturbed by rumours that Mussolini was intriguing against Britain 
at Paris and, after he had had time to go over all the Jubaland and Dodecanese papers, 
confessed that he was appalled at Italian policy. He would not accept extravagant 
Italian demands just so that Mussolini could 'gain political kudos amongst his Fascisti 
following', and would, 'if driven to it by the Italian Government', publish the papers 
despite the grave consequences this would have: 'if European public opinion is decent 
Italian diplomacy would be discredited for a generation and no Power would trust it 
47 for a long time to come'. 
Graham laboured assiduously to try and change the prevailing opinion of Italy in the 
Foreign Office. 1n his private letters to MacDonald he strove to present Mussolini in 
the best possible light, contending that although he was 'absurdly sensitive of real or 
imaginary slights'he was nevertheless a'remarkable man'. 48He also reiterated the 
arguments - consistently rejected by Curzon - that any connexion between Jubaland 
and a general settlement should be 'rendered impalpable', that a comprehensive 
agreement with the Italians was 'advisable', and that Britain should be sympathetic to 
Mussolini's domestic problems and his need for a propaganda victory. 49 
These pleas were followed by a definite proposal on 6 March. After warning that 
Mussolini was increasingly 'inclined to throw up Jubaland altogether and announce 
his intention of annexing the whole of [the] Dodecanese Graham suggested that 
MacDonald should hand over Jubaland forthwith, and that Mussolini should then 
reply, using a pre-arranged text, spontaneously acquainting MacDonald with his 
intentions over the Dodecanese, which would be at some future point to hand over the 
majority to Greece. This would permit the British to discharge their debt of honour 
over Jubaland, placate the Italians and possibly improve Anglo-Italian relations. 50 
47 FO 800/219 MacDonald to Graham p. l. d 10 Mar. 1924. 48 FO 800/219 Graham to MacDonald p. l. d. I Mar. 1924. 49 FO 800/219 Graham to MacDonald p. l. d. 22 Feb. 1924, p. l. d. 1 Mar. 1924. 5ODBFP/I/XXVI/122-4. 
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Graham made little impression on London: too often he seemed, according to Crowe, 
to be 'making himself the mouthpiece of Mussolini's desires, whilst admitting that we 
gain nothing by conceding them'. 51 MacDonald felt that Graham's plan would involve 
a repudiation of the policy of his predecessors and an admission that Britain had no 
real interest in the Dodecanese. Furthermore, he perhaps naively continued, it ignored 
I the moral issue', which was that the Greek islanders would resent being placed under 
Italian sovereignty and that 'since Italy signed a treaty with Greece when the latter 
was victorious and influential, she ought to abide by the spirit of that treaty now that 
Greece is defeated and abandoned by her other allies'. The only point of agreement 
between MacDonald and Graham was that it was useless to employ Della Torretta as 
the conduit for further negotiations since he lacked the courage to report truthfully to 
Mussolini and seemed equally unable to say what the Duce proposed to do. 
Consequently, MacDonald proposed to address a private letter to Mussolini which 
would offer the basis for an agreement, although it would take some time to ; decide 
exactly what that should be. 52 
A private letter from MacDonald to Mussolini was, indeed, eventually to form the 
basis for a settlement of these two questions. However, it was redrafted many times 
before it was despatched, and in its final form it approximated very closely to the 
I etter suggested by Graham - and rejected by MacDonald - on 6 March. 53 This came 
about not solely because of Graham's constant badgering, but also because in the 
space of a few weeks the Foreign Office lost all confidence in the tenability of the 
policy it had been pursuing for four years and decided that it was no longer logical to 
51 FO 371/9882 min. by Crowe d. 19 Mar. 1924. 
52 DBFP/I/XXVI/I 35 -6. Graham had warned MacDonald early on that Della Torretta distorted his 
reports because he was'mortally afraid of Mussolini' (FO 800/219 Graham to MacDonald p. l. d-8 
Feb. 1924). MacDonald's decision was reinforced after Della Torretta submitted a memorandum 
detailing what had passed concerning the Dodecanese when Curzon was in office. MacDonald asked Curzon for his comments on this, and Curzon replied that Della Torretta's account was 'prejudiced 
and incorrect'and his arguments 'disingenuous and immoral'(MSS EUR Fl 12/245 MacDonald to 
Curzon p. l. d. 18 Mar. 1924, Curzon to MacDonald p. l. d. 19 Mar. 1924). MacDonald later made clear 
to Della Torretta. his displeasure at this behaviour (FO 371/9882 MacDonald to Della Torretta p. l. d. II Apr. 1924; DDI/7/III/87-9). 
53 The first draft of the letter was prepared by Nicolson on 10 March (FO 371/9882 mins. by Nicolson d. 7 Mar. 1924,10 Mar. 1924) and can be compared with the final text dated I April (DBFP/I[XXVI/167-8; DDI/7/III/76-7). 
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use Jubaland as a lever over the Dodecanese. It was not, as Cassels has argued, that 
MacDonald 'began to show signs of freedom from Foreign Office restraint'; the 
Foreign Office itself completely changed its mind and MacDonald followed SUit. 54 
This shift is best observed in the views of Nicolson. In February he began to show 
some qualms about the line hitherto followed. Although the Italians had behaved with 
'great meanness and insincerity' and were occupying the islands contrary to all notions 
of justice and national self-determination, he noted that British public opinion was 
growing uneasy that Britain was not playing the game and was holding up the 
Jubaland cession on a quibble. This impression was being fostered by the Italian press 
and by sections of the British press, including the Times, which had been worked on 
by the Italians. 55 Still the deadlock persisted: Nicolson suggested privately to the 
Italian first secretary on 28 February that if only the Italians would promise ultimately 
to give up eight or so islands to Greece, Britain would hand over Jubaland and allow 
Mussolini to portray that act as a triumph. However, on 5 March Della Torretta told 
Crowe that he could not go beyond Mussolini's last proposal, namely that Britain 
immediately cede an enlarged Jubaland in return for the vague promise that 'some I 
islands might be ceded to Greece later. 561n view of this, Nicolson's misgivings 
multiplied: on II March he mused that after dealing with Italian tergiversation on this 
question for so long 'it is quite possible that we do not any longer see the wood for the 
57 trees, and that we are unduly embittered and resentful'. 
Nicolson developed this idea on 13 March in response to another letter from Della 
Torretta which simply recapitulated the maximum Italian claim. It was necessary, he 
wrote, to establish the premises of the British argument, for although he believed 
Britain was on totally sure ground morally (that is, in believing that the Greeks should 
get at least some of the islands) he was not so confident about the legal or political 
position (that is, whether the British could or should insist on having a say in the 
54 Cassels, Early Diplomacy, p. 223; Carabotý Dodecanese Question, pp. 306-7. 55 FO 371/9881 min. by Nicolson d. 23 Feb. 1924, min. by Crowe nd.; DDInIIIJ[7. 56DBFp/IiXX, VI/109_1 11,121-2. 
57 FO 371/9882 min. by Nicolson d. II Mar. 1924. 
234 
disposal of them). Italian public opinion genuinely believed that Italy had been 
betrayed by her allies, and the pressure of surplus population - and thus Italy's need 
for colonial expansion - was intense. More to the point, Mussolini was in occupation 
of the islands, and would only leave if paid or forced to do so, and even if the price he 
demanded was too high, the use of force was out of the question. Worse, the Jubaland 
lever was now not really effective, since Mussolini cared less and less for it, and 
British public opinion deprecated the British government's failure to execute its 
promises. Nicolson viewed with such apprehension the prospect of resuming general 
negotiations with the Italians - since they would demand more and more 
compensation and then place the onus for rupture on Britain - that he suggested it 
would be better 'to cut the gordian knot and to liquidate the situation. Firstly, 
MacDonald should execute the 1920 Jubaland agreement and then publicise Britain's 
views on what had passed over the Dodecanese. Thus the British would have fulfilled 
their obligations, stated that the future of the Dodecanese depended on Italian good 
faith and put themselves 'completely in the right'. Nicolson knew this might mean 
Italy remaining in the Dodecanese for good, but then he feared 'that she will do so in 
any casel. 58 
Nicolson's argument met with a mixed response. Lampson heartily endorsed it, and 
claimed that he had never favoured making the settlement of the two questions 
dependent upon one another. 59 MacDonald, on the other hand, was unsure of the best 
way forward, for he still felt that a general settlement with Italy might be possible, or 
at least should be offered to the ItalianS. 60 Graham meanwhile kept up his pressure 
from Rome, urging an agreement basically upon Italian termS. 61 On 19 March 
Nicolson recapitulated his argument that the British should spontaneously give up 
58 FO 371/9882 min. by Nicolson d. 13 Mar. 1924. It was also true that whereas the Dodecanese had 
once had some importance from the point of view of imperial communications (see above pp. 172-3), 
after the Lausanne peace settlement and the shifting of Britain's imperial lifeline southwards this was 4no 
no longer the case. 59 FO 371/9882 min. by Lampson d. 13 Mar. 1924. Lampson had never mentioned his opposition to this policy before. 
60 FO 371/9882 min. by MacDonald d. 16 Mar. 1924; DBFP/1/XXVI/I 39-40. 61 DBFP/I/XXVI/146-7,151-3. 
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Jubaland: hesitation to do so only weakened the moral case and in the political sphere 
its retention was no longer an asset. 62 MacDonald now declared that his mind was 
'pretty well made up'. A private letter would be sent to Mussolini offering either a 
general political settlement or the separation of the two questions and negotiations 
over them on a strictly legal basis, possibly involving arbitration. If Mussolini chose 
the former, general negotiations could begin, if he chose the later then Jubaland could 
be ceded within the original (minimum) 1920 boundaries and a Dodecanese policy - 
possibly including publication - could be formulated. 63 
The final shape of the letter to Mussolini was further much influenced by Graham's 
comments on the Foreign Office draft. On 28 March he wrote that although he 
welcomed the idea of separating the two questions, he felt that the tone of the letter 
was not really cordial enough: 'in dealing with intelligent, susceptible and sensitive 
people like the Italians (Mussolini himself possesses these characteristics in most 
marked degree) tone ... is often just as important as ... tenour' [sic]. He argued that 
better results would be obtained if the note were recast so as to simply offer Mussolini 
the 1920 area in Jubaland and to reiterate Britain's interest in the ultimate fate of the 
Dodecanese. Graham believed that then 'within a comparatively brief period' 
Mussolini 'could be induced to cede 8 islands to Greece t, since MacDonald's 
generosity 'would render it easier for him to reciprocate by an equally generous act in 
the sense we desire'. 64 
A palpable mellowing of MacDonald's attitude had already been detected by Della 
Torretta, and the Foreign Office took Graham's advice to heart. 65The final letter to 
62 FO 3 71/98 82 min. by Nicolson d. 19 Mar. 1924. 63 FO 371/9882 min. by MacDonald d. 19 Mar. 1924. 64 FO 371/9882 Graham to MacDonald p. tel. d. 28 Mar. 1924. 65 DDI/7/III/47-8,63,70-1,73. MacDonald had made a conciliatory speech in the Commons on 27 
March about his desire for agreement with Italy (171 Hc Deb 5s 1605-7). In the Foreign Office 
Nicolson endorsed Graham's suggestions, though admitting they involved a risk, on the grounds that 'Jubaland is now no lever whatsoever, and that by discarding it we lose nothing and may gain a 
solution on the other tack' (FO 371/9882 min. by Nicolson d. 28 Mar. 1924). On 31 March MacDonald 
minuted that he was 'not prepared to do this straightaway', but evidently later changed his mind (FO 371/9882 min. by MacDonald d. 31 Mar. 1924). For another account of this episode, . see Lees-Milne, Nicolson 1217-8. 
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Mussolini, dated I April, bore a striking resemblance to what Graham had always 
advocated. In it MacDonald first flattered Mussolini, then turned to the two questions 
which most troubled Anglo-Italian relations. He suggested 'that we should meet each 
other's view and that, without making the settlement of one depend on the other, we 
should come to an understanding on both concurrently'. To this end MacDonald was 
willing to begin forthwith negotiations for the transfer of Jubaland and asked only to 
be informed of Italian intentions over the Dodecanese so that he could 'study them 
with a sincere desire to settle the whole matter apart from this offer of mine and on its 
own merits'. 66There was no mention of a general settlement or of conditions: as a 
consequence of the re-think in the Foreign Office MacDonald had abandoned the 
Jubaland lever and admitted, effectively, that Greek claims to any of the islands were 
unlikely to be made good. 
Graham was unable to present MacDonald's letter to Mussolini until 11 April, for the 
Italians were in the middle of an election campaign and the work of the government 
was all but paralysed. 671n the meantime the situation was confused by a new proposal 
from Athens. Whereas Venizelos had in January held out for the cession of six islands 
to Greece, the Greeks, fearful that they might be left in a face to face confrontation 
with the Italians, now changed tack and proposed to allow the Italians to annex all the 
islands without complaint, provided that they would grant them'a special regime of 
autonomy analogous to that enjoyed by dominions in order to preserve their national 
character and to assure their position for the future as in the past'. They hoped that 
-this autonomous regime would be guaranteed by Britain and France and that Britain 
might establish a similar regime in Cyprus as an encouragement to the ItalianS. 68 This 
scheme, Cheetham observed, should 'be regarded as a pis aller ... rather than as real 
objective of Greek wishes'. 69 The rationale behind it was to maintain the territorial 
66 DBFP/I/XXVI/167-8. 
67 FO 800/219 Graham to MacDonald p. l. d-3 Apr. 1924; FO 371/9882 Graham to FO tel. 76 d. 11 Apr. 1924; DBFP/I/XXVI/171. 
68 DBFP/I/XXVI/169-71; FO 371/9882 Cheetham to FO no. 201 d. 20 Mar. 1924, Graham to FO 
no. 328 d. 4 Apr. 1924, min. by Nicolson d. 7 Apr. 1924. 69 DBFP/I/XXVI/174. 
237 
unity of the archipelago and to keep alive the possibility of its union with Greece in 
the long term; for under any partition scheme some of the islands at least would 
definitely become Italian territory. 70 
The Greek proposal also had to be seen in the context of Greco-Italian relations. To 
some extent, these had improved. The Greeks, all too aware of their weakness, 
especially in these turbulent months before and during the establishment of the 
republic, had refrained from antagonising the Italians on the Dodecanese question and 
had spoken in general terms of their desire for better relations. 7 1 The Italians, for their 
part, had, according to the Greeks, put out feelers at Athens with a view to 'joint 
action and particularly ... cooperation in commercial and economic exploitation of 
Asia Minor'. These tentative overtures, however, could do little to counteract the 
intense fear and suspicion which still permeated Greco-Italian relations. The Greeks 
knew of Italy's 'most far-reaching designs in Asia Minor' and 'did not desire to be 
entangled' in them; consequently they had devised their Dodecanese plan 'in 
apprehension of Italian pressure which they would be unable to resiSt'. 72Moreover, 
they recognised the importance the Italians attached to the Dodecanese as a stepping 
stone for the colonisation of Asia Minor and the need to be prepared for Italian 
annexation if it came. 73The Greek proposal was intended to face the possibility that 
Britain might disinterest herself in the Dodecanese and leave the Greeks at the mercy 
of the Italians and to avoid involvement in any new disastrous adventure in Anatolia. 
The Foreign Office doubted the practicality of the Greek scheme. Nicolson was 
sceptical that the Italians would'refrain from imposing "italianita" upon the twelve 
Islands' after annexation and felt that the prospect of an Allied guarantee of 
Dodecanese autonomy was 'extremely uninviting'; the raising of the Cyprus question 
was also unhelpful. 74 Lampson warned more generally that neither Italians nor Greeks 
70 FO 371/9882 min. by Nicolson d. 7 Apr. 1924. 71 DDI/7/III/15-17,55-6; DBFP/I/XXVI/60; FO 371/9881 Bentinck to FO tel. 62 d. 25 Feb. 1924. 72 DBFP/I/XXVI/169-70. 
73 DBFP/l/YXVI/174. The Greek foreign minister told Cheetharn that he realised that the 'permanent 
acquisition' of the Dodecanese 'ranks as a major object of Italian policy'. 74 FO 371/9882 mins. by Nicolson d. 1 and 7 Apr. 1924. 
238 
were trustworthy: "Do not let us be pinched between the two'. 75 More to the point, the 
Greek proposal brought into doubt the whole British strategy of negotiating with Italy 
on the basis of partitioning the islands: as Graham observed, there was no point 
pressing the Italians to accept a solution 'which while unpalatable to them is even 
more distasteful to the Greeks'. 76MacDonald, however, was untroubled by all this. 
The Greek proposal simply reinforced his decision to separate the two questions and 
did not really complicate matters, he told Graham, since the British had not made any 
proposals themselves but were only eliciting Mussolini's intentionS. 77 The wisdom of 
this attitude was demonstrated when on 11 April the Greek foreign minister withdrew 
the proposal 'in favour of any scheme which would afford Greece some security 
against Italian claims '. 78As Cheetham had perceived, the proposals had simply been a 
ballon dessai, designed to test how much support Greece could expect from Britain 
or France 'in the event of drastic action on the part of Italy'. 79 
Mussolini's reply to MacDonald's letter was somewhat slow in coming. Graham's 
contacts in the Palazzo Chigi hinted that Mussolini was struggling to reconcile his 
inclination to be reasonable and on good terms with Britain with the need to impress 
his domestic supporters. Nevertheless, one hopeful sign came on 14 April when 
Mussolini intimated that he might eventually consider cession of the five islands 
farthest from Turkey to 'Greece, a division which Nicolson admitted would be 'not 
really such a bad one'. 80 No -such detailed proposal, however, was contained in 
Mussolini's official reply to MacDonald of 2 May. This was vague and somewhat 
confusing but consisted in essence of an acceptance of the offer of Jubaland and a 
rather argumentative repetition of some old Italian assertions about the Dodecanese. 
Mussolini laid great stress on the offence that would be caused to Turkey by cession 
of any of the islands to Greece, and tried to claim that continued Italian occupation of 
75 FO 371/9882 min. by Lampson V Apr. 1924. 76 DBFP/I/XXVI/171-2,175. 
77DBFP/I/XX'VI/176; FO 371/9882 min. by MacDonald d. 10 Apr. 1924. 78 DBFP/I/)CXVI/179-80. 
79 DBFPIIIXXVIII 73; FO 371/9882 mins. by Nicolson d. 14 Apr. 1924 and Crowe d. 14 Apr. 1924. 80 DBFPIIIXXVIII 81-3; FO 371/9882 min. by Nicolson d. 17 Apr. 1924. 
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the islands would therefore be an act of altruism that would preserve peace in the 
eastern Mediterranean. He was prepared, however, to consider eventually handing 
over some 'islands in which Italy has lesser interestt to Greece, but this could only be 
as part of a wider settlement in the eastern Mediterranean and would in any case 
necessitate 'adequate guarantees and compensation' for Italy. 81 
Some of the ambiguities in the Italian reply were cleared up in a conversation 
between Graham and Mussolini on 3 May. Mussolini assured Graham 'that there was 
no question of exacting guarantees or advantages from anyone but [the] Greeks', and 
that the compensation he would seek Vas not territorial but of a political and 
economic character'. What he envisaged was a cession of some islands as 'part of a 
general settlement ... such as that recently concluded between Italy and Yugoslavia', 
comprising a pact of friendship and the restoration of good relations. In reporting this 
conversation Graham painted a familiar picture, claiming that Mussolini had stood 
out against the unanimous recommendation of his cabinet that Italy should 
immediately annex the whole archipelago, and urged that Mussolini's reply be 
considered in this context. 82 
In fact, the reply was received in the Foreign Office with neither enthusiasm nor 
surprise; after all it had been expected that Mussolini would accept Jubaland whilst 
making no more than qualified promises about the Dodecanese. Nicolson doubted the 
value of his undertakings to open negotiations with the Greeks, but argued that in 
view of wider considerations it would be wise to give him the benefit of the doubt. 83 
Lampson agreed, arguing that 'psychologically the moment is a good one for a 
settlement with Italy. In the coming negotiations [over reparations] their assistance 
81 DBFP/I/XXVI/196; DDI/7/III/102-4. The Italians had previously intimated to Graham that they 
feared cession of any islands to Greece would disrupt Italo-Turkish relations (DBFý/I/XXVI/172). 82 DBFP/I/XXVI/195-7; DDI/7/III/139. 
83 FO 371/9883 min. by Nicolson d. 6 May 1924. 
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(independible [sic] though it may be) will undoubtedly be of value. A prompt 
settlement of Jubaland would seem polite'. 84 
In fact, regardless of the desire to secure Italian co-operation in larger European 
questions, the British, having already retreated so far, and having lost any levers they 
had once possessed, had no option but to accept Mussolini's uncompromising 
response. This was done on 20 May when MacDonald instructed Graham to infonn 
Mussolini of his willingness to conclude the Jubaland convention forthwith and to 
express pleasure at Mussolini's 'decision to discuss with Greece the conclusion of a 
direct and equitable agreement' and a hope that this would not be long delayed. 95 
The Jubaland convention was soon settled. Italian negotiators visited London between 
30 May and 7 June and the agreement - ceding to Italy the area in Jubaland agreed in 
1920 - was initialed then and formally signed on 15 JUly. 86 On the Dodecanese 
question there was, predictably, less progress. On 7 June, Guariglia, head of the North 
African and Near Eastem Department of the Palazzo Chigi and one of the Italian 
negotiators, told Nicolson that although Mussolini 'was really anxious'for a 
settlement with Greece, he could make no move for some time, or Italian public 
opinion'would say that M. Mussolini had lied when he claimed to have induced us to 
separate the two questions'. Moreover, the initiative for opening the negotiations 
would have to come from the Greeks, since Mussolini had 'declared repeatedly that 
the Dodecanese question had been closed forever'. With this in mind Guariglia 
suggested that at some point in the future Britain should act as a mediator between the 
two countries, intimating to Greece that negotiations should be initiated and acting 
during them as 'a sort of invisible umpire'. 87 
84 FO 371/9883 min. by Lampson d. 6 May 1924. The Dawes report had been submitted to the 
Reparations commission on 9 April and negotiations were underway to arrange a conference on the 
reparations question. For this issue, see A. J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1924 (London, 
Oxford University Press/Humphrey Milford, 1928), pp. 266-399. 85 DBFP/I/XXVI/204; DDI/7/III/108,128. 
86 DBFP/I/XXVI/229; DDI/7/III/130,221; Toynbee, Survey 1924, pp. 467-70. For the text of the 
convention, see BFSP11 19/433-7. 
87 DBFP/I/XXVI/229-30. 
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This suggestion was not well received by the British who had only just extricated 
themselves from an untenable and even dangerous position over the Dodecanese. 
MacDonald had no desire to be involved in negotiations over the future of the islands, 
although he expected to be kept informed by Mussolini of any progress in that 
direction for the sake of form. 88As Lampson put it, Britain had 'at last got back onto 
the right lines (it has taken us four years to do it), &I do trust that we shall not get 
drawn back into the mess again'. He accepted that it was somewhat 'ingloriousfor 
Britain to wash her hands of the matter now, but pointed again to the reasons why 
Britain had had to perform a volteface over the Dodecanese and abandon Curzon's 
policy: 
it is merely fatuous to "talk big" if you are not genuinely prepared to act up to 
your words when the crisis comes. Mussolini will at once "call the bluff", for 
he is a man of autocratic power & can mobilise the whole of Italian public 
feeling at a moment's notice on the Dodecanese. Does anyone suppose that 
H. M. G. could do the same with British public opinion regarding the remote 
Mediterranean islands? 89 
As over Corfu, Mussolini's stubbornness had forced the British to retreat by revealing 
the inconsistency and impracticality of their position. 
No Italo-Greek negotiations on the Dodecanese ever materialised. During 1924 the 
Italians consolidated their position in the islands and showed no inclination to make 
any overtures towards the Greeks about them, despite the occasional promptings of 
Graham. 90 Various excuses for this were forthcoming, for example the uncertain 
internal political situation in Greece or the preoccupation of the authorities in Rome 
with the aftermath of the Matteotti murder, but they were rather unconvincing. 91 The 
Greeks were, of course, not happy with this situation, and from time to time grumbled 
to the British about it, but there was nothing either could do. 92 In August, after the 
88 FO 371/9883 min. by MacDonald d. 11 Jun. 1924. 89 FO 371/9883 min. by Lampson d-8 Jun. 1924. 90 DBFP/I/XXVI/240-1,379-8 1; DDI/7/III/255-6,258-9; FO 371/9883 Crowe to Graham p. l. d. 14 
Jun. 1924. 
91 DBFP/I/XXVI/I 83,32 1; FO 371/9883 Graham to Crowe p. l. d. 19 Jun. 1924; Cheetharn to FO 
no. 719 d. 28 Nov. 1924. 
92 DBFP/I/XXVI/320-2,335-6; DDI/7/III/444; FO 371/9883 FO to Cheetharn no. 376 d. 16 Jun. 1924, Cheetham to FO no. 708 d. 20 Nov. 1924. 
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ratification of the Lausanne treaty, it looked as if the Italians would formally annex 
the islands, but Mussolini pulled back from this step, fearful of its likely impact on 
international opinion. 93The British, who had long ago realised that they would not 
shift the Italians from the islands, accepted that they could not now prevent formal 
annexation of what was in fact already de iure Italian territory, and tried to placate the 
Greeks by claiming that 'there was no implication that [the Italians] would refuse 
thereafter to come to some amicable arrangement with Greece'. 94This was hopeful to 
say the least, but from now on it was British policy to do nothing whatsoever about 
the islands and to await an initiative from Italy. 
The Dodecanese and Jubaland imbroglio, which had loomed so large in Anglo-Italian 
relations for so many years, was thus to all intents and purposes resolved by the 
summer of 1924. Various assessments of the outcome are possible. On the one hand, 
it can be portrayed as a victory for Mussolini: by stubborn repetition of an 
uncompromising view he eventually bludgeoned the British into submission and 
gained Jubaland whilst securing recognition of Italy's sovereignty over the 
Dodecanese. On the other hand, it was difficult to portray these results as 'unalloyed 
Fascist triumphs': Italy gained no new territory in the Dodecanese and had to be 
content in Jubaland with less than the maximum claim that had been staked since 
1922. One motive behind the change of British attitude had been a realisation that 
Jubaland was of relatively little value, and even the Dodecanese were useful only as a 
stepping stone to further advances in the eastern Mediterranean such as Italy was not 
yet strong enough to make. In the summer of 1924 the Turks began to express fears Z: ) 
about possible Italian aggression, fuelled by fire-breathing speeches from Mussolini, 
but the crisis following the Matteotti murder ended the possibility of an Italian 
93 DBFP/I/XXVI/315-6; DDI/7/111/262,277,283-4,291-2,297; FO 371/9883 Kennard to FO tel. 215 
d. 27 Aug. 1924. 
94 DBFP/1/XXVI/335; FO 371/9883 min. by Nicolson d. 28 Aug. 1924. The British talked, somewhat 
oddly, of 'annexation' even though the islands already belonged to the Italians. They presumably 
meant a formal declaration of annexation with much pomp and ceremony and, perhaps, a naval 
demonstration (see, for example, DBFPIIIY. XV111220) which would certainly have inflamed Greek 
oPinion. 
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attack. 95 Similarly, in 1926 when Mussolini appeared to be moving in the same 
direction the Anglo-Turkish agreement over Mosul ensured that he was restrained. 
British policy can likewise be interpreted in two different ways. On the one hand it 
suffered a clear defeat, since goals which had been pursued for four years or more 
were precipitately abandoned simply because Mussolini refused to acquiesce in them. 
The Corfu crisis had shown, and this episode reaffirmed, that the British were unable 
or unwilling to oppose Mussolini even where very important interests were 
concerned, chiefly because of the overriding concem for peace and stability which 
made them reluctant to countenance a showdown and more inclined to retreat. 
Furthermore, the Foreign Office can be accused of tactical mistakes in both instances, 
in that they adopted untenable policies at the outset which could not be maintained 
since they had no basis in practical political logic. Over the Dodecanese the further 
charge could be made that the British were too ready - for example, at Lausanne in 
January 1923 - to rely on verbal assurances from Italians whom they knew from 
experience could not be trusted. 96 
On the other hand, a more favourable interpretation is possible. The Foreign Office 
was flexible and realistic in coming to realise that perhaps the game was no longer 
worth the candle and in taking the opportunity of the accession to power of a new 
ministry to change the direction of policy. When the Foreign Office began to lose 
confidence in the bases of its position - because of the attitude of public opinion to 
Britain's obligations and doubts as to the value of Jubaland as a lever - policy was 
adjusted in order to fit this new perception, and this awareness of weakness and of the 
limitations of British capabilities was in fact a strength. British policy-makers at this 
time acted towards Italy on the assumption that though her friendship was worth little 
her enmity could be inconvenient, and here they realised that as they could not force 
Mussolini out of the Dodecanese it was not worth antagonising Italy any further for 
95 Cassels, Early Diplomacy, pp. 225-30. 96 On 27 March 1924 MacDonald discussed in the House how reliance on such verbal 
understandings' could cause difficulties (171 HC Deb. 5s 1606). For the Dodecanese question at, 
Lausanne, see above pp. 175-7. 
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the sake of Greek interests. Thefroideur in Anglo-Italian relations was a worry to 
many observers - Sir Eric Drummond for example wrote privately to MacDonald 
abo'ut it 97- and there can be little doubt that this settlement did something to alleviate 
it, and thus contributed to the improved international atmosphere that facilitated the 
reparations settlement of the summer. But it was not simply, as Cassels has it, that 
MacDonald was 'dedicated to international conciliation in all circumstances'; the 
change in British policy also reflected hard-headed, pragmatic thinking. 98 
Anglo-Italian relations generally improved after the solution of these two intractable 
problems, especially when later in 1924 Baldwin and the Conservatives returned to 
power. The attitudes of British Labour politicians towards Mussolini, were always 
imbued with a certain coolness deriving from ideological antipathy, but the same was 
not true of British Conservatives, whose mild reaction to the Matteotti murder had set 
the tone for international opinion and given succour to Mussolini when his domestic 
position was very delicate. 99 More importantly, whereas neither Curzon nor 
MacDonald had seen any real rOle for Italy in their policy, Chamberlain had the 
definite goal of trying to coax Italy into behaving responsibly in the international 
system and of co-opting her into the settlement of the security question which he was 
trying to fashion. 100 This was achieved in no small part thanks to the series of 
meetings between the two men, during which although Mussolini made the customary 
demands for concessions Chamberlain managed to resist in such a way as to moderate 
Italian ambitions whilst yet flattering Mussolini. 101 The rapprochement took some 
time to develop, and went through some rocky patches - for example early in 1925 
when the two countries quarrelled over concessions in Albania - but it also produced 
tangible results like a settlement of the Jarabub question and the agreement of 
97 Barros, Office Without Power, pp. 279-80. 
98 Cassels, Early Diplomacy, p. 224. 
99 Cassels, Early Diplomacy, pp. 248-55,310-2. 
100 Edwards ESR 10 9-13. 
101 Edwards HJ 14 153-64; Cassels, Early Diplomacy, pp. 312-3. 
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December 1925 over respective interests in Ethiopia. 102 Although the rapprochement 
I- -- broke down in the later 1920s, and although it could never have begun without 
Chamberlain at the Foreign Office, the Dodecanese and Jubaland settlement arrived at 
by MacDonald was a necessary pre-requisite for it. 
Whether this settlement is seen as a victory or a defeat for Mussolini, and whether it 
is taken as proof of British sagacity and realism or as evidence of British weakness 
and irresolution, the main losers were of course the Greeks. A minority of them, 
including Kaklamanos, believed that Greece should bow toforce majeure and accept 
that as Italy was more powerful she would retain the islands. 103 The majority, 
however, were not prepared to resign themselves to this, and continued to aspire to 
obtain some of the islands. The grievance over the Dodecanese was kept alive by the 
vocal activities of expatriate islanders and pressure groups in Athens, and the islands 
continued to present a major obstacle to any Italo-Greek rapprochement. 104 The 
continued weakness and instability of Greece was reason enough for Mussolini not to 
move towards the general political settlement that he had spoken of to Graham, and 
enduring mutual suspicion meant that even when relations improved - for example 
during the rule of Pangalos - they still lacked cordiality. In any event the 'solution' of 
the Dodecanese and Jubaland dispute, roughly coinciding with the apparent settlement 
of the constitutional debate in Greece in favour of the republic, marks a definite break 
in Greek foreign policy. The preoccupation with Turkey remained, but distractions 
ftom internal affairs were now fewer. Moreover, with the Dodecanese question off 
the agenda, relations with Italy moved somewhat into the background and Greece's 
relations with her more immediate neighbours came into prominence. 
102 For the quarrel over Albanian oil concessions in February 1925 when the Italians went so far as to 
accuse Chamberlain of duplicity and bad faith before backing down, see DBFP/1/XXVII/60-130 
Passim and Cassels, Early Diplomacy, pp-247-8. For the practical effects of the Anglo-Italian entente 
in the colonial sphere, see Cassels, Early Diplomacy, pp. 288-314. 103 FO 371/9883 FO to Cheetham no. 376 d. 16 Jun. 1924. 104 See, for example, DBFP/I/XXVII/143-4. 
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Greek aspirations in the Dodecanese were, Cyprus and northern Epirus apart, the last 
remnant of the Great Idea: otherwise after 1923 Greece was a satisfied power whose 
interests lay in internal consolidation and reconstruction and retaining the tenitory she 
already possessed. The position of her north-eastern neighbour, Bulgaria, could 
hardly have been more different, for Sofia was the focus of revisionism in the 
Balkans during the 1920s. Both Greece and Bulgaria had come close in recent years 
to realising the wildest limits of their national aspirations, the former in Asia Minor 
- 
r, 
after 1919 and the latter in Macedonia, Thrace and the Dobrudja during the First 
World War. However, whereas the Greeks suffered a shattering defeat in Anatolia 
and, shocked by the scale of their rout and the massive influx of refugees from 
Turkey, were largely prepared to abandon their expansionist dream, the Bulgarians 
were much less resigned. 1 They had capitulated in the war before their troops could 
be routed in the field and their territory had barely been invaded by the time of the 
armistice on 30 September 1918; consequently they were not at all inclined to accept 
'2 aty the reality of their defeat or the, in their eyes, unjustifiably 
harsh, terms of the tre 
of Neuilly of 27 November 1919. 
For much of the 1920s Bulgarian statesmen used all their considerable ingenuity to 
agitate for revision of various aspects of the peace settlement. This was a difficult 
task, considering the restrictions imposed by Neuilly, the increased strength of 
Bulgaria's neighbours and the preponderance of status quo powers: major territorial 
changes were really out of the question and Bulgaria's policy was necessarily one of 
little stepS. 3 The Greeks and the Yugoslavs were generally pitted against the 
Bulgarians, although the triangular relationship between them was complex. The 
1 The point should be reiterated that with the inclusion of the vast majority of the Greek race within 
the Greek state after the exchange of populations the Great Idea lost its rationale; the Bulgarians, on 
the other hand, were apt to see a Bulgarian minority wherever there were Slav populations on their 
borders. On the other hand, despite their defeat by the Turks and the massive refugee problem, the 
Greeks were still net gainers territorially compared to 1914, since they acquired western Thrace from 
Bulgaria. 
2 H. W. V. Temperley (ed. ), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, Volume IV (London, Oxford 
University Press, 192) 1) 412. 
3 At times the Italians encouraged the Bulgarians in their revisionist efforts, but this assistance was inconsistent and capricious. 
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traditional rivalry between the three races had recently become even sharper: the 
conflicts between their ambitions had been exacerbated by the war and now the 
victors faced the vanquished in defending the settlement that had resulted from it. All 
this created a delicate problem for the great powers who in managing the states 
system sought to preserve peace and stability in the Balkans. On the one hand, 
Bulgarian revisionism had to be contained rather than indulged. On the other, the zeal 
and aggression which Athens and Belgrade sometimes showed in seeking to uphold 
the peace treaty were also a threat to peace that had to be contained. 
The terms of the treaty of Neuilly were considered extremely harsh by almost all 
Bulgarians. 4Whereas the Allies viewed Bulgaria as the Prussia of the Balkans who, 
by the'manner in which she entered the war and the barbarous methods by which she 
conducted it, had put herself completely beyond the pale, the Bulgarians felt that they 
had been treated Most UnjUStly. 5 After the armistice a pro-Entente government had 
taken power in Sofia, the pro-German King Ferdinand had been replaced by his son, 
Boris, and the Bulgarians had argued that their belligerency had been a mistake, 
dictated by a pro-German minority which had misled the country -a situation, they 
pointed out, not dissimilar to that which had prevailed in Greece. 6 Basing themselves 
on these premises and, as the British minister in Sofia observed, naively continuing to 
believe in the 'innate justice of their cause', the Bulgarians had approached the peace 
conference not humbly penitent, but armed with a list of territorial claims against 
their neighbours that they justified on ethnological grounds and Wilson's fourteen 
pointS. 7 
They were to be disappointed. Although some of their ethnological arguments were 
plausible and at times supported (albeit for very different reasons) by the United 
4 BDFA/11/i/10/166-75. 
5 Dockrill and Goold, Peace without Promise, pp. 93-5; Sharp, Versailles Settlement, pp. 142-3; 
H. Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (New York, Grosset and Dunlap, 1965), pp. 34-5; BDFAIIIIII101160- 
1. The Allies in fact adopted the Greek view of Bulgaria, and their hostility to the Bulgarians was in 
Part simply a consequence of their support for Greece. 6 
7 
Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece at the Paris Peace Conference, pp. 85-93. 
BDFA/Ii/j/10/148-52,169; Temperley (ed. ), Peace Conference IV 449-50. 
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States and Italy, the Anglo-French view prevailed that Bulgaria must be punished, 
and should certainly gain nothing. The final treaty rejected Bulgaria's claims in the 
southern DobrudJa and eastern Thrace, and deprived her of western Thrace and some 
small but strategically important areas on her western border which were awarded to 
Yugoslavia. In addition, she was to pay E90,000,000 in reparations and her armed 
forces were limited to 33,000 men, who had to be recruited voluntarily on a long term 
basiS. 8These terms genuinely shocked the Bulgarians, who had seen their prodigious 
and costly military efforts since 1912 come to virtually nothing - indeed worse than 
nothing in view of the aggrandisement of their neighbours. Not surprisingly, Neuilly 
left Bulgaria'an angrily revisionist state I. 9 
The Bulgarian elections of August 1919 brought to power the leader of the Peasants I 
Union, Stamboliiski, 'an authentic, if somewhat demagogic, agrarian radical'. 10 He 
immediately began implementing his vision of imposing the dictatorship of the 
village upon Bulgaria and destroying the dominant power of the cities. To this end he 
introduced radical measures of land reform and compulsory labour service, expanded 
the education system and attacked the 'social parasites' of the merchant classes and the 
professions. II In foreign affairs, although he was hardly happy with Neuilly, he was 
less obsessed with narrowly nationalist aims than the bourgeois parties: he placed his 
faith in the ultimate triumph of a 'Green International' of fellow peasant parties and in 
an eventual confederation between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. This partial abjuration 
of territorial expansion won him some plaudits in the west, but brought him into 
conflict at home with the powerful, and after 1919 fiercely embittered, Macedonian 
lobby. Macedonians in Bulgaria were a well-organised, cohesive group who had 
acquired an influence in the administrative, political and military elites of the country 
8 Dockrill and Goold, Peace without Promise, pp. 95-101; Sharp, Versailles Settlement, pp. 143-4; Temperley (ed. ), Peace Conference IV 166-70,411-5,444-61 and V (London, Oxford University 
Press, 1924) 39-50. For the text of the treaty, see BFSPII 12/781-896. 9 J. Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1974), pp. 323-5; Dockrill and Goold, Peace without Promise, pp. 100-1. 10 Rothschild, East Central Europe, p. 334. II Rothschild, East Central Europe, pp. 334-8; R. J. Crampton, A Short History ofModern Bulgaria (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 87-9 1. 
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quite disproportionate to their numbers. In their view, the loss of the greater part of 
Macedonia to Greece, and especially to Yugoslavia, could never be accepted, and in 
addition to exercising pressure through legitimate organisations they made use of a 
military arm, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO). This 
group (or rather groups, for there were several Macedonian comitadji organisations) 
pursued a two-pronged policy of intimidating governments in Sofia and of launching 
military raids into 'occupied'parts of Macedonia to agitate for an autonomous state. 12 
For some time, Stamboliiski's policies were fruitless: he harassed the Macedonian 
organisations but could not, or would not, crush them, and the Yugoslav government 
showed little interest in his overtures. 13 In June 1922, a recrudescence of comitadji 
activity, not only in Greek and Yugoslav Macedonia but also in the Dobrudja, led the 
Greek, Yugoslav and Romanian governments to protest to Sofia, who promptly 
appealed to the League, asking for an international inquiry into the Macedonian 
situation and claiming that the military clauses of Neuilly rendered Bulgaria incapable 
of controlling the Macedonians. Insofar as the League merely advised the four 
governments to come to some agreement on the subject by negotiation, the outcome 
was a success for the Bulgarians who at one point had been facing the threat of 
'measures of active coercion' from their neighbours. 14But the Foreign Office had 
looked askance at the Bulgarian appeal to the League believing it to be part of a 
revisionist campaign by the 'sly and unreliable' S tamboliiski, designed to pick holes in 
12 CramPton, Modern Bulgaria, pp. 91-3; Rothschild, East Central Europe, pp. 326-7,335-6. The 
rationale of agitating for an autonomous state was, at least for some of the comitadjis, a hope that it 
would eventually be absorbed by Bulgaria as eastern Rumelia had been in the nineteenth century. 
Some Macedonians more explicitly favoured federation with Bulgaria, but they were defeated by the 
autonomists in Spring 1923 (DBFP/I/XXIV/146-7,500-1,625-6,663). A broadly sympathetic portrait 0 
Of Stamboliiski and his domestic and foreign policies is contained in J. D. Bell, Peasants in Power. 
Alexander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, 1899-1923 (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1977), pp. 154-207. 13 DBFP/I[XXIV/146-7; Crampton, Modern Bulgaria, p. 92; Rothschild, East Central Europe, p. 335. 
The murder of the minister of the interior, Dimitroff, by Macedonians in October 1921 
(DBFP/I/XXIV/147) was doubtless a powerful personal incentive for Stamboliiski to avoid a 
showdown with IMRO. 
14 DBFP/I/XXIV/225-7,230-4,254-5,264-6,281,283-4,288,309-10,333,336,344-5,369-70. 
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the military clauses of Neuilly and to pillory the Yugoslavs for maladministration in 
Macedonia. 15 
In fact, Stamboliiski genuinely wanted more positive relations with the Yugoslavs 
and Romanians, and later in the year as the forthcoming Lausanne conference 
approached engaged in a concerted propaganda campaign to win their support for 
Bulgarian aspirations. These feelers met with a warmer response than hitherto in 
Belgrade, not least because the seizure of power by Mussolini in Italy confronted the 
Yugoslavs with 'the suddenly-opened abyss of a possible challenge to war from the 
Italian Fascisti'. 16 A visit to Belgrade by Stamboliiski in November led to a 
considerable improvement in relations and an agreement to establish a mixed 
commission to regulate points at issue between the two states. 17 When the Bulgarian 
premier went on to announce to the press 'that he considered the fate of Macedonia as 
definitely and finally settled', it seemed that he had decided to throw the Macedonians 
over altogether and to work wholeheartedly for rapprochement with Ytigoslavia. 18 
Although comitadji bands continued to operate in Macedonia and Thrace and reached 
a new pitch of activity in the spring, 19 the Yugoslav-Bulgarian mixed commission 
began to meet at Nis from early March 1923 to discuss co-operation over frontier 
security, and the Yugoslavs, aware of Stamboliiski's delicate position, forebore to 
make any official protest. 20 Negotiations were complete within a few weeks when a 
package of measures was agreed for suppressing the comitadjis. As these were not at 
first made public for fear of compromising Stamboliiski, 21 however, the secrecy 
involved began to fuel the suspicions of the Greeks that the negotiations were a cover 
for some far-reaching political agreement between the two states for mutual support 







21 DBFP/I/XXIV/558-61,58 1. 
252 
feared that with Macedonia lost the Bulgarians would concentrate all their revisionist 
energies on western Thrace and Dedeagatch, 22and the publication of the 
Nis 
agreements in May did little to ease these fears. As for the comitadjis, although the 
British thought that Stamboliiski's adherence to the Yugoslav-Bulgarian agreement 
was insincere and intended only for domestic political effect, the Macedonians 
continued to orchestrate a campaign of protest against his supposed treachery. 
23 
The Macedonians were but one of the groups growing dissatisfied with Stamboliiski's 
rule. Members of the professional classes, urban workers, civil servants, demobilised 
soldiers and bourgeois politicians had all been steadily alienated from his regime, and 
a secret military league of reservist officers had begun to plot his overthrow. The 
increasingly violent methods used by Stamboliiski to maintain the Peasants'Union in 
office and his manipulation of the April elections to ensure a pliant Sobranie only 
advanced the scheme, and the premier's growing detachment from reality and 
megalomania served to cement together the diverse coalition he had unwittingly 
created. 241n the early hours of 9 June 1923 the opposition launched a coup that met 
with little resistance and soon swept the country. 25 Stamboliiski himself eluded his 
opponents for some days but on 15 June the government announced 'that after capture 
yesterday [he] was rescued and in subsequent pursuit was killed 
'. 261n fact he had been 
22 DBFP/I/XXIV/560-2,580,582,586. Such an agreement would certainly have been welcomed by 
many in Bulgaria (FO 371/8562 Erskine to FO no. 55 d. 7 Mar. 1923), and the Romanians were almost 
as perturbed as the Greeks (FO 371/8562 Erskine to FO no. 66 d. 27 Mar. 1923). Despite the many 
rumours, the British were convinced that the Nis negotiations had no ulterior motive (FO 371/8562 
min. by Nicolson d. 5 May 1923). The fears of the Greeks were given piquancy by their continuing 
negotiations with Yugoslavia over a free zone at Salonica, and their conviction that the Italians were 
already urging the Serbs towards Salonica so as to distract them from Fiume (see, for example, FO 
371/8832 Bentinck to FO tel. 103 d. 27 Mar. 1923, no. 322 d. 21 Apr. 1923). Equally, peace had not yet 
been signed at Lausanne. These issues are examined more closely in chapters II and 12 below. 23 DBFP/IIXXIV/593-7,599-600,608-9,613-7,624-6,639-41,663. For Britain's views see FO 
371/8562 mins. by Nicolson d. 5,17 and 31 May 1923. 
24 Crampton, Modern Bulgaria, pp. 93-9; Rothschild, East Central Europe, pp. 338-41. 2-5 DBFP/I/XXIV/701-3,705-7,713-8. 
26 DBFP/I/XXIV/716-7. 
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dealt with by his bitterest enemies in IMRO: his body was discovered on 14 June after 
the Macedonians had removed the ears, hands and head. 27 
A new government was quickly established under Alexander Tsankoff, a professor of 
economics, comprising representatives from all the bourgeois parties but depending 
chiefly on military support. 21 Tsankoff soon created a loose confederation of these 
parties, the Democratic Concord, which had no coherent ideology and served 'little 
purpose other than to guarantee the government a dependable majority'. 29At first the 
regime pursued a conciliatory policy, but in September the Bulgarian communists, 
prodded by Moscow, launched a large-scale though ill-prepared insurrection which 
gave Tsankoff the chance to pose as a bulwark against bolshevism (which could serve 
as a useful pretext for seeking changes in the military restrictions of Neuilly). 30 The 
white terror which followed was later criticised by Austen Chamberlain as 
one of the blackest pages in the history of Bulgaria since her liberation from 
the Turkish yoke. It was a regime of pure repression, M. Tsankov's sole idea of 
government being to classify all his political opponents as Communists and to 
clap them into prison, where all were tortured and many disappeared forever. 31 
The next two years saw terrorist action escalate pari passu with the ferocity of 
government repression, culminating in a bomb outrage during a state funeral in Sofia 
cathedral in April 1925 which left well over a hundred people dead. 32Meanwhile, as 
the agrarians and communists battled with the government, Macedonian violence, 
both inside and outside the country, continued unabated and, at least in part, with the 
connivance of the state. 33 
The reaction of Bulgaria's neighbours to the coup was conditioned by its effect on the 
Macedonian question. The fact that Tsankoff had come to power as a representative 
27 Crampton, Modern Bulgaria, p. 98. For the growth of opposition to Starnbolilski and the coup, see 
also Bell, Peasants in Power, pp. 208-41. 28 DBFP/I/XXIV/701,706-7,714-5. 
29 Crampton, Modern Bulgaria, p. 100. 30 Crampton, Modern Bulgaria, pp. 100-2; Rothschild, East Central Europe, pp. 342-4. For an account 
of the September uprising, see FO 371/8570 War Office to FO no. 0169/43 M. 1.2 d. 15 Oct. 1923. 31 DBFPliaIIII94" 
32 DBFP/I/XXVII/147-8. 
33 Crampton, Modern B ulgaria, pp. 10 1 -2. 
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of the pro-Macedonian factions made his position very delicate: if he openly 
sanctioned the Macedonian cause the Yugoslavs might well take aggressive action 
against Sofia; but if he stood up to IMRO he could expect the same fate as 
Stamboliiski- Consequently, relations between the government and the Macedonians 
were always ambiguous and obscure. 34The initial reactions of Yugoslavia and Greece 
to the coup differed greatly. Whilst the former deeply regretted the return to power of 
traditional Bulgarian nationalists - and even massed troops on the frontier - the latter 
was much relieved that 'the much dreaded flirtation between Bulgaria and Serbia' 
appeared to be over. 35At any rate, Greece, Romania and Czechoslovakia restrained 
Yugoslavia, and in July all four states implicitly recognised the new government with 
notes hoping for the 'continuance of good relations'. 36Nevertheless, the Yugoslavs 
clearly had no confidence in Tsankoff , 37and in September fears grew in Belgrade that 
large scale comitadji action was imminent, orchestrated by Rome and designed to 
embarrass Yugoslavia at a time when the Fiume question was most acute. This led to 
a further massing of Yugoslav troops on the frontier, although again Yugoslavia was 
restrained by her neighbours and by Britain and France. 38 Relations improved slightly 
later in the year, and the mixed commission renewed its sittings; however, it could 
never hope to extirpate the comitadji problem, and, indeed, after the September revolt 
a new irritant arose in the shape of agrarian and communist refugees, fleeing 
government repression to take shelter over the border in Yugoslavia. 39 
The British also treated Tsankoff with circumspection. The British minister at Sofia, 
Williarn Erskine, at first assumed that he should enter into official relations with the 
new government, since King Boris had 'either approved or acquiesced in [the] coup'. 40 
34 FO 371/8563 min. by Troutbeck d. 15 Sept. 1923. 35 DBFP/IfXXIVf7O3,705-10,717-8,723. 
36 DBFP/I/XXIV/718,723,736,764. 
37 DBFP/I/XXIV/778,787. 
38 DBFP/I/XXIV/787,836-8,845-7; FO 371/8563 min. by Lampson dA SepL1923, mins. by Nicolson d. 15,17 and 19 Sept. 1923, St. Aulaire to FO unnol d. 19 Sept. 1923, Young to FO no. 354 d. 20 Sept. 1923, Barber to FO no. 192 d. 20 Sept. 1923, Dering to FO no. 545 d. 22 Sept. 1923; FO 371/8559 
min. by Nicolson U Sept. 1923. 
39 DBFP/1/XXIV/850-2,856,874,895-7; FO 371/9665 Erskine to FO no. 44 d. 19 Feb. 1924. 40 DBFP/I/XXIVR02-3,706-7,715-6,739-40. 
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Curzon, however, instructed him to limit his relations with Tsankoff s government 'to 
what is strictly necessary' to make clear that formal recognition was not being 
accorded, and to warn Sofia that any failure to observe the treaty of Neuilly could 
'only involve Bulgaria in the gravest difficulties'. 41 In October the Bulgarian foreign 
minister, Kalfoff, was received by Curzon in London, albeit reluctantly and only after 
Poincare had received him in Paris. Curzon warned him frankly that he should not 
alienate Yugoslavia by fostering the Macedonians and also admonished him for his 
regime's treatment of its political opponents, particularly the leaders of the Peasants I 
Union who were being treated in jail not as political prisoners but as common 
criminalS. 42 (This, perhaps, is a further indication that British action concerning the 
trial of the six in Greece in 1922 was motivated more by considerations of principle - 
a conviction that such persecution was not conducive to peace and stability - than by 
partiality for the royalist ex-ministers themselves). Erskine laboured to try and ensure 
the safety of leading agrarians (or at least those who had not already been assassinated 
by the Macedonians) in Sofia, but he gained the impression that the government was 
mortally afraid of incurring Macedonian displeasure. 43London also continued to 
endeavour to ensure Tsankoff s compliance with the peace treaty, and dismissed a 
Bulgaria plea for a relaxation of the military restrictions of Neuilly in order to deal 
with a supposedly imminent communist uprising: this, Erskine believed, was simply a 
subterfuge to facilitate more political persecution-" 
In 1924 relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria scarcely improved. In January, a 
tactless reference by Tsankoff in the Sobranie to a'Bulgarian minorityin Yugoslav 
Macedonia mollified Macedonian nationalists in Bulgaria but inflamed Belgrade. 45 
The sensitivity of the Yugoslavs on this subject was further illustrated by their hostile 
reaction to the publication by the Times of an interview with one of the leaders of 
41 DBFP/1/XXIV/721-2,724-5,756. 
42 DBFP/1/XXIV/860-2. See also FO 371/8570 file 16977 passim. The Foreign Office had also taken 




IMRO, Todor Alexandroff, and to remarks advocating Macedonian autonomy 
allegedly made by Lord Thomson, minister for aviation in the new Labour 
government, at a meeting of the Near and Middle Eastern Association. The Yugoslav 
view was that, were it not for comitadji activity, the inhabitants of Yugoslav 
Macedonia (or, as they termed it, southern Serbia) would settle down and become 
good Yugoslavs. IMRO's aim, on the other hand, was to foster and perpetuate 
disorder in the region so as to provoke European intervention, and it would only be 
encouraged by declarations of support from prominent figures in the weSt. 46 (The 
Foreign Office concurred, and was most put out by these unauthorised ministerial 
pronouncements, which also caused concern to the king. 47)Yet while the Yugoslavs 
believed that, the Bulgarians were conniving at IMRO's activity, the Bulgarians 
claimed that the Yugoslavs, having freed their hands by reaching a settlement with 
Italy, were planning to provoke disturbances in Macedonia as a pretext for an 
invasion. 48 The British tried to exercise a calming influence at both capitals, and to 
persuade the two governments to co-operate against the comitadjis. 49 
Early in March, fearing further trouble with Athens and Belgrade, the Bulgarians 
organised a crackdown on the Macedonians, ostensibly to emancipate themselves 
ftom their influence and to prevent any large-scale band activity in the spring. Several 
hundred Macedonian activists were arrested, but although the Yugoslavs at first 
welcomed this apparent change of heart by Sofia, they were disillusioned when it 
became obvious that none of the leading Macedonian terrorists had been caught. 
Indeed, the Belgrade press represented Bulgaria's actions as merely 'an attempt to 
throw dust into the eyes of the Great Powers'. After gentle persuasion by Britain, 
however, the Yugoslav government agreed to accept the arrests in good faith and to 
let the matter rest; and although rumours of imminent comitadji attacks continued to 
46 DBFP/I/XXVI/41-4,62-3,75-6,86-92; FO 371/9659 Young to FO no. 61 d. 14 Feb. 1924- 47 FO 371/9659 mins. by Nicolson and Crowe d. II Feb. 1924, MacDonald d. 12 Feb. 1924. 48 DBFP/I/XXVI/26,43-4,67-70,115-7; FO 371/9663 min. by Lampson d. 21 Feb. 1924, Stancioff 
(Bulgarian minister in London) to FO no. 192 d. 25 Feb. 1924. 49DBFp/, /XXVI/99_100 
1108,117,145-6. 
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circulate throughout the spring, this ensured that there was no conflict between the 
two powers. 50 
Throughout the summer the Bulgarians, in an attempt to be allowed to recruit men to 
the colours beyond the limits set by Neuilly, assiduously worked up a scare about an 
imminent rising by a rag-bag alliance of communists, agrarians and Macedonians; and 
at the end of July over 3,000 men were indeed called up in defiance of the treaty. This 
placed the powers in a quandary. On the one hand, they were reluctant to sanction this 
breach of the treaty, especially as the army was already being used by the government 
to persecute its political opponents. On the other hand, so long as there was some 
danger of an uprising and powers were-loath to render the Sofia government impotent 
in the face of it. In the end, however, when the uprising failed to materialise, the 
powers ordered the Bulgarians to disband the recently recruited men. 51 
Th e possibility of a Soviet-inspired uprising nevertheless continued to worry the 
British, especially as other Balkan governments began to share Sofia's fears. These 
worries became particularly acute in December 1924, and the Foreign Office 
instructed British representatives in the Balkans to report any important developments 
pertaining to this threat. At the same time, especially after Tsankoff visited both 
Belgrade and Bucharest late in December, Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations improved 
somewhat. Although no detailed discussions took place at Belgrade, the two countries 
agreed in general terms to co-operate against the communist menace and against 
comitadji activity. The British viewed this development with mixed feelings: although 
they welcomed 'anything tending to loyal cooperation between the Balkan states', they 
also feared that in this instance co-operation against the bolshevik menace might in 
practice mean 'a pre-arranged campaign by the local governments concerned against 
their political opponents, conveniently dubbed "Bolsheviks" for the purpose'. 52 
so DBFP/I/XXVI/85-6,92-4,99-100,104-5,108,115-7,120-1,124,142,144-6,148-9,153-4,156,159- 
60,194-5,205-6. 
51 DBFP/I/XXVI/250-2,286-7,291-2,297-303,310-4; FO 371/9663 Dering to FO no. 401 d. 19 
Jul. 1924, min. by Howard Smith d. 30 Jul. 1924. 52 DBFP/I[XXVI/341-2,357-60,390-1,425-8,431-2,441-3,444-5,457-8,460-3; DBFPIIIXXV1111- 
5,37-9,50-2-, FO 371/9663 Lampson to Young p. l. d. 22 Dec. 1924 [quoted], Erskine to FO no. 177 d. 1 
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Nicolson expressed another fear, namely that the talks might be the first steps towards 
a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation which would lead to Slav domination of the 
Balkans, the collapse of Greece and the destruction of Britain's strategic position in 
the Near East, but this was viewed as unduly alarmist by all his superiors. 53 
In 1925 the Bulgarians renewed their efforts to use the communist menace to evade 
the military restrictions imposed upon them. In February rumours again began to 
circulate that some Comintern. inspired uprising was about to take place in Bulgaria, 
and in March the Bulgarians asked the powers to sanction the raising of an extra 
4,000 militiamen to meet this threat. Erskine recommended that this request should be 
refused, on the grounds that the danger of a revolt was even less than in 1924, when 
the government had in any case purposely exaggerated its fears. The Foreign Office 
shared this view, but the Allied military authorities were inclined to favour the 
Bulgarian pleas. Consequently, early in April the Bulgarians were permitted to raise 
an additional 3,000 militiamen, on condition that they were all volunteers and that 
they were demobilised by 31 May. 54 
Shortly after this the bomb outrage occurred in Sofia cathedral, apparently providing 
confirmation of the Bulgarian government's fears. It certainly provided them with a 
propaganda opportunity: for some time the Bulgarians had been complaining about 
raids onto their territory by bands of agrarian refugees who were concentrated just 
over the border around Nis -a particularly large raid had taken place in February - 
and now they began to insinuate that these agrarians, with the connivance of 
Belgrade, had been responsible for the Sofia massacre. Although they may only have 
been hoping to arouse international pressure to force the Yugoslavs to stop 
harbouring the refugees, in the event, they provoked a very angry response from 
Belgrade and were forced to publish an apology on 28 April. 55 The British were hard 
Oct. 1924, Young to FýO tel. 162 d-28 Dec. 1924, tel. 163 d-28 Dec. 1924, Cheetham to FO tel. 277 d. 30 
Dec, 1924; FO 371/10663 Young to FO no. 466 d. 31 Dec. 1924, no. 467 d. 31 Dec. 1924. 53 DBFP/I/XXVI/462-3. 
54 DBFP/I/XXVII/108-9,120-4,126-7,130,132,135-7,141-2,144-5. 
55 FO 371/10667 Erskine to FO no. 27 d. 10 Feb. 1925, Young to FO tel. 37 d. 22 Apr, 1925, Drummond 
to Cadogan p. l. d. 21 Apr. 1925, Young to FO no. 133 d. 23 Apr. 1925, Erskine to FO tel. 31 d. 27 
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put to it to choose between the Bulgarians and Yugoslavs in these exchanges, since 
neither side was entirely honest. Lampson argued that it was 'a safe axiom to mistrust 
all these Balkan nations equally', and Chamberlain agreed, whilst remarking that 
... Caesar & Pompey are very much alike, especially Pompey". I distrust both equally 
& the Serb a little more'. 56 In any event Lampson trusted that British representatives 
in the area could be relied upon to follow the usual line in these squabbles and 
dispense 'grand-motherliness to all concerned'. 57 
The Bulgarians predictably used the latest terrorist incident to press for a further 
temporary increase - of an additional 10,000 militiamen - in their armed forces, 
hoping thereby to win the argument in principle that existing numbers were 
inadequate to keep order in the country. Initially, the British were not inclined to give 
way, not least because Erskine argued that they would be used for savage reprisals 
against the government's opponents and that the cathedral bomb seemed to have been 
an isolated act rather than the beginning of a concerted terrorist campaign. 58 The 
French and Italians, however, felt that the Bulgarian request was reasonable and so 
the British agreed to grant it, subject to the condition that these troops too should be 
dernobilised by 31 May. This in turn provoked strong and menacing protests from 
Athens and Belgrade, and Britain again had to exercise a calming influence at both 
capitals, emphasising that the extra troops would indeed be demobilised by the end of 
May. 59 Chamberlain then turned his attention to Sofia, where the government was 
beginning to agitate for an extension of the time limit. In view of the fact that he had 
'no sort of confidence in the past or present wisdom or justice of the Bulgarian 
government', he concerted with France and Italy to create a united Allied front to hold 
the Bulgarians to the agreement. 6() Kalfoff, who embarked on a tour of European 
capitals to present Bulgaria's case in person, was told in no uncertain terms in London 
Apr. 1925, Young to FO tel. 46 d. 28 Apr-1925, no. 135 d. 30 Apr. 1925, Erskine to FO tel. 40 d. 3 May 
1925. 




on 18 May that the extra troops must be disbanded, and that the cause of Bulgaria's 
troubles was not so much communist subversion as the misguided and repressive 
policy of the government. The French and Italians supported this view and so the 
Bulgarians were forced to acquiesce in the will of the powers. 61 
The unsettled situation in Macedonia continued to worry the Balkan states throughout 
the summer, and this was the background to the Greek-Bulgarian incident of October 
1925, when the Greeks invaded Bulgaria after a frontier skinnish, only to be reined in 
by the united great powers and the League. The Bulgarians used the incident to try to 
gain credit with the powers maintaining, according to the British representative in 
Sofia at the time, an attitude that was 'correct throughout', whilst using the 
opportunity 'to spread their anti-Greek propaganda far and wide'. 62 
This incident, together with the despatch of the Rumbold commission of inquiry, 
caused some British officials to give some thought to the wider aspects of the 
Macedonian question. Kennard, who since 25 May had been minister in Belgrade, 
suggested privately to Lampson on 30 October that a League commission should be 
sent to the area, and this idea received some tentative support in the Foreign Office. 63 
Lampson, however, was wholly against the idea, since it would be 'either a farce or 
possibly the undoing of the League', and deprecated any notion of Britain's raising the 
Macedonian or comitadji questions. The former would 'automatically cease to exist' 
after ten more years of Serbianisation in Yugoslav Macedonia, and the latter was best 
left to the Yugoslavs themselves to deal with. 64 These views were reiterated in a 
Foreign Office memorandum of 26 November which argued that the 'present partition 
of Macedonia' was 'probably as good a practical arrangement as can be devised' and 
61 DBFP/i/XXVII/168,171-5,178-82,184-6,188-96,204; FO 800/258 Chamberlain to Worthington- 
Evans (minister of war) p. l. d. 3 Jun. 1925. 62 FO 371/10673 Stevenson (charg6 in Sofia) to FO no. 231 d. 28 Oct. 1925. 63 FO 371/10667 Kennard to Lampson p. l. d. 30 Oct. 1925; FO 371/10673 min. by Bateman d-3 
Nov. 1925. 
64 FO 371/10673 min. by Lampson d-33 Nov. 1925; FO 3 71/10667 Lampson to Kennard p. l. d. 7 Nov. 1925. 
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that the comitad i bands were dissipating themselves in internecine feuding and 'given Y* 
an era of comparative peace in the Balkans' would 'probably die a natural death'. 65 
The studied correctness of the Bulgarians' attitude during the crisis in fact won them 
little applause from the British. London was far more impressed by the strictly neutral 
attitude of the Yugoslavs during the affair and drew the lesson that a repeat of 1914 
was unlikely since conflicts in the Balkans could now easily be contained by the 
League provided that Yugoslavia acted with 'common sense and moderation'. 66By the 
end of the year the Tsankoff government was in fact almost totally isolated: its brutal 
domestic policy was provoking increasing resistance from the opposition and Kalfoff 
searched in vain for a foreign policy triumph to shore up the beleaguered regime. 67 
The last straw for the government, however, was Great Britain's declared readiness - 
because of distaste for Tsankoff s methods of rule - to block a League refugee loan 
which Sofia desperately needed. Consequently on 3 January 1926 Tsankoff resigned 
and the government was reconstructed. The new premier, Liapcheff (a Macedonian), 
eased the severity of Tsankoff s rule and allowed the Peasants' Union to function, 
although one consequence of this was that the communists and Macedonians were 
also more free to agitate. 68 
The rise to power of Liapcheff did not have any dramatic impact upon Bulgaria's 
relations with her neighbours. Towards the end of 1925 there was much talk in the 
Balkans about the possibility of the conclusion of a Balkan pact, or of bilateral 
agreements between various countries which might act as precursors for a general 
pact, and rumours flourished about the prospect of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian accord. 
65 FO 371/10667 'The Macedonian Question and Komitaji Activity', memorandum by the Central 
Department, d. 26 Nov. 1925. 
66 FO 371/10673 min. by Bateman d. 8 Dec. 1925; FO 371/10667 'The Macedonian Question and 
Komitaji Activity', memorandum by the Central Department d. 26 Nov. 1925. 67F0371/11223 Annual Report, Bulgaria, 1925, (encl. in Erskine to FO no. 29 d. 11 Feb. 19261 Parts I 
and 111; DBFP/IIXXVII/250-2. 
68 Crampton, Modern Bulgaria, pp. 102-4; Rothschild, East Central Europe, p. 344; DBFPllallII942- 
3. For the refugee loan, which was eventually raised in December 1926, see Orde, Reconstruction, Cý 
pp. 289-91 and Ladas, Exchange, pp. 594-7. It is perhaps telling that it was in the case of Bulgaria 
rather than of Greece that the British were willing to use these financial levers to influence internal 
politics, 
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Information reached London in October that the Bulgarians favoured such a deal but 
that Belgrade was less keen, being unwilling to adopt a wholeheartedly anti-Greek 
poliCy. 69 (In December the Yugoslav foreign minister, Nincic, seemed to confirm this 
when he denied that any rapprochement with Sofia was contemplated. 70) In the new 
year the rumours continued, and the more compliant attitude of Liapcheff towards the 
peace treaties seemed to bode well for an agreement. Indeed, in the spring the 
Yugoslavs finally declared that they hoped to sign an arbitration treaty with the 
Bulgarians, and negotiations began in April. 71 All this soon came to nothing, 
however, as it became clear that Nincic was demanding that the Bulgarians pledge 
themselves to even stronger action against IMRO than Stamboliiski had accepted at 
Nis in 1923. This was obviously unacceptable to Sofia, and London concluded that 
Nincic's whole policy was insincere and designed solely to put pressure on the Greeks 
in the negotiations for renewal of their alliance which were at a delicate stage. 72For 
the rest of 1926 relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia improved little and the 
durability of the problems and animosities in the region was demonstrated in August 
when, as on so many previous occasions, a series of comitadji raids caused Athens, 
Belgrade and Bucharest to insist, in a collective note of protest to Sofia, that the 
Bulgarians crack down on the Macedonian organisations. 73 
Equally durable was the Bulgarian grievance against the Greeks over to the question 
of access to the Aegean through western Thrace. This region, which contained several 
potentially valuable ports, including Dedeagatch, had been Bulgarian since 1913 
when it had been captured from the Turks in the Balkan wars, fulfilling Bulgaria's 
long-standing aspirations for an outlet on the Aegean. 74At the Paris peace conference 
69 FO 371/10794 FO to Kennard no. 484 d. 17 Oct. 1925. 
70 FO 371/10794 Kennard to FO no. 476 d. 16 Dec. 1925. 71 FO 371/11217 Erskine to FO no. 275 d. 31 Dec. 1925, Kennard to FO tel. 55 d. 23 Apr. 1926, no. 161 
d. 23 Apr. 1926, Erskine to FO tel. 21 d. 27 Apr. 1926; FO 421/3 10 Erskine to FO no. IId. 20 Jan. 1926, 
no. 24 dA Feb. 1926, no. 43 d. 4 Mar. 1926. 72 FO 371/11217 Erskine to FO no. 75 d. 27 Apr. 1926, min. by Bateman d. 28 Apr. 1926, Erskine to FO 
no. 78 d. 5 May 1926, tel. 22 d. 11 May 1926, tel. 28 d. I Jun. 1926, memoranda by Drummond d. 24 and 
27 May 1926. 
73 Barros, Office Without Power, pp. 285-6; FO 371/12178 Annual Report, Greece, 1926, p. 17. 74 Temperley (ed. ), Peace Conference IV 456-8. 
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the British and French sought to award it to Greece, but were thwarted by the 
Americans who wanted it to beýcome part of the projected Constantinople mandate or 
to enjoy some form of autonomy. This complication, and the need to settle Bulgaria's 
borders promptly and definitively, shaped article 48 of the treaty of Neuilly wherein 
Bulgaria ceded western Thrace to the Allied powers who -were to decide its fate later. 
To sugar this pill, the Allies undertook to ensure, by some future arrangement, 'the 
economic outlets of Bulgaria to the Aegean Sea'. This was theoretically achieved 
when, simultaneously with the treaty of Sevres, the Allies signed a Thracian treaty 
with Greece. This last awarded western Thrace to Greece, but articles 4-16 provided 
for the freedom of transit for Bulgarian trade in the region, a lease in perpetuity of a 
. r__ - free zone in Dedeagatch and, in anticipation of Greek obstruction, the establishment 
of an international commission to ensure the execution of these clauses. As the 
ratification of the Thracian treaty was, however, tied to that of the treaty of Sevres it 
remained inoperative. 75 
The British representative in Sofia had warned in 1919 that if western Thrace was 
awarded to Greece, 'we shall have only repeated the error of 1903 and created a 
second but minor Macedonian question. 76Bulgaria's continuing designs on the region 
and Greece's determination to thwart their realisation did indeed cause much trouble 
over the next few years. In part this manifested itself over the issue of minoritieS, 77 
but the Aegean outlet question was also a cause of friction, as the Bulgarians tried to 
keep alive the issue of their access in the hope of re-opening the question of the award 
of western Thrace to Greece. The Bulgarians tried - albeit in vain - to have the 
question placed on the agenda of the London conference of February-March 1921 and 
on that of the Near Eastern conference proposed by Curzon in November 1921.78 In 
the meantime, rumours flourished of intrigues between the Kernalists and the 
75 FO 371/9669 memorandum by Nicolson d. 9 Apr. 1924. For the inter-Allied negotiations over 
Thrace, see Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece at the Paris Peace Conference, pp. 85-93,153-72,256-90, 
Helrnreich, From Paris to Sevres, pp. 39-46,85,153-8,164-5,265-6 and BDFA/11/l/10/148-53,157- 
61,165-70. For the text of the Thracian treaty of 10 August 1920, see BFSP11 13/479-85. 76 BDFAII I/I/ 10/ 167. 
77 See chapter 10 below. 
78 DBFP/I/XXII/6-9,55,646. 
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Macedonian and Thracian committees of Bulgaria for joint action in Thrace if Greece 
suffered reverses in Anatolia, and Starnboliiski was warned by Britain not to give 
such schemes any encouragement. 79 By March 1922 the Bulgarians had begun to 
argue that the Thracian treaty was but an annex to the treaty of Sevres and that as the 
latter was to be revised, so the status of Thrace should be reconsidered; and they 
claimed that France and Italy shared this view. 8() There was no truth in these 
assertions, but the Bulgarians kept up a relentless campaign and, as the Lausanne 
conference approached, cast round for support from their neighbours. 81 Although the 
powers did not support all Bulgaria's arguments concerning her rights in western 
Thrace, there was nevertheless a feeling that as Greece was now weaker perhaps the 
previous arrangements should be modified. 82 This was especially true of the British, 
who regretted the fact that the outlet promised in 1920 had not yet materialised; and 
Curzon had the Bulgarians invited to Lausanne to state their case, apparently fully 
prepared to contemplate the 'creation of a neutral zone to provide railway access for 
Bulgaria to the Aegean'. 83 
On 23 November Stamboliiski presented Bulgaria's case to the territorial commission 
of the Lausanne conference, pleading for western Thrace to be constituted into a 
neutral zone, and adding that it was 'not only impossible but psychologically 
inadmissible that the access to the Bulgarian outlet on the sea should pass across 
Turkish or Greek territory'. 84A sub-commission was appointed to consider this 
question, and it reported to the territorial commission the next day, recommending the 
creation of an international commission to construct a free port at Dedeagatch and to 
supervise the running of the railway between the port and Bulgaria. The Bulgarian 
representative on the sub-commission continued to insist, however, that it was 'only 
by direct possession of the territory in the neighbourhood of the railway and the port, 
79 DBFP/1/XXII/57,72-3,218-22,227-35,258-61,275-8,284-5,301,304-6,389,589,624,628-9,639,645- 
80 DBFP/I/XXIV/156-60,174-7,191,231; FO 371/11223 memorandum by Bateman d. 2 Mar. 1926. 
81 DBFP/I/XXIV/384-5,389-91,401; DBFP/lJXVIII/244-5. 
82 FO 371/9669 memorandum by Nicolson d. 9 Apr. 1924. 83 DBFP/1/XVIII/237-8,273; DBFP/I/XXIV/231,390. 
84 Cmd. 1814 pp. 29-39; DBFP/1/XVIII/325-6. 
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or by placing that territory under a completely autonomous regime ... that the port of 
Dedeagatch can be constructed, controlled and developed in accordance with the 
economic interests of Bulgaria'. 85 When the main commission discussed the report in 
the afternoon what Curzon termed 'a merry encounter' took place between Venizelos 
and Stamboliiski 'who belaboured each other with good natured fury to the great 
delight of the committee 1.861n the end, Curzon spoke firmly to the Bulgarian premier 
- as he reported to London: 'at bottom we all know his petition for Dedeagatch as an 
economic outlet is sham and will never materialize and that what he wants is a 
jumping off place for the recovery of Western Thrace; and he told Stamboliiski that 
he should be grateful that the powers were ready to accord Bulgaria the effective 
economic outlet she craved and that article 48 of the treaty of Neuilly in no way 
justified the claim for the constitution of western Thrace as an autonomous zone. 87 
Nevertheless, Curzon continued to try 'to fix up something better for Bulgaria, in 
order to meet Stamboliiski's objections and 'to absolve the Allied Governments from 
the reproach of having evaded the promise given by them'in 1919.881nfonnal talks 
continued between the delegations during which the Bulgarians argued that 
Dedeagatch. was in fact unsuitable as a port, that the site they wanted was some six 
kilometres to the west, and that the administration of the port should be placed 
entirely in Bulgarian hands and the railway between the port and Bulgaria be under 
international control. 89 Venizelos made what concessions he could to meet these new 
demands, both to test the sincerity of the Bulgarians and to try and remove a cause of 
friction, but the indications from Sofia were that Stamboliiski himself would not 
accept any new scheme, believing that the longer the question remained unsettled, the 
greater was Bulgaria's chance of securing an autonomous regime for western 
85 Crtzd. 1814 pp. 63-4,79-80; DBFP/I/XVIII/331. 
86 DBFP/I/XVIII/331; Cmd. 1814 pp. 62-76. 87 DBFP/I/XVIII/331-2. 
88 FO 371/8557 min. by Curzon d. 5 Jan. 1923; DBFP/I/XVIII/497. 89 DBFP/I/XVIII/497-8; Cmd. 1814 p. 457; FO 371/11223 memorandum by Bateman d. 2 Mar. 1926. 
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Thrace. 90 The sub-commission convened on 28 January to make a formal offer to the 
Bulgarians of a ninety-nine year lease at the site of their choice for a port under their 
administration (but Greek sovereignty) with all possible international guarantees for 
freedom of transit. This offer, together with another made by Venizelos for trade 
facilities at Salonica. (which he considered the natural economic outlet for western 
Bulgaria) identical to those accorded to Yugoslavia, the Bulgarians rejected. 91 This 
confirmed Curzon in his view that Sofia was actuated by 'political and territorial 
ambitions' in this question, and that, having made these offers, the powers had 
fulfilled their obligations and could return to the terms of the 1920 Thracian treaty 
which would be ratified with the treaty of Lausanne. 92 
The powers having washed their hands of the matter, the question of the outlet was 
now a purely Greco-Bulgarian one: for the guarantees embodied in the 1920 treaty to 
become operative a convention would have to be signed, but the Bulgarians were not 
at all inclined to do this. 93 In 1924 the Greeks made a further effort to settle the 
question through the mediation of one De la Barra, a South American official of the 
international tribunal at The Hague, who had played a part earlier in the year in 
mediating between France and Great Britain over the Ruhr and who in May visited 
the Balkans in his capacity as president of the Greco-Bulgarian arbitral. tribunal 
90 DBFP/I/XVIII/498; DBFP/1/XXIV/459-60; FO 371/11223 memorandum by Bateman d-2 
Mar. 1926. 
91 Cmd. 1814 pp. 457-64. 
92 DBFP/I/XVIII/498-9. In the interval between the first and second phases of the Lausanne 
conference, Venizelos continued to work to reach a settlement. He proposed, via the Yugoslav 
minister at Sofia, Rakic, an exchange of territory whereby Greece would give Bulgaria a strip along 
the western bank of the Maritza river, including Dedeagatch, in return for a strip equal in area from 
that part of western Thrace left to Bulgaria in the treaty of Neuilly. This scheme was first mooted in 
February and was under discussion for some months; but it came to nothing as Stambohiski would 
not consider ceding any Bulgarian territory, and in any case it was a purely personal suggestion by 
Venizelos which might well have been rejected by the Greek assembly (FO 371/8557 Erskine to FO 
no-44 d. 16 Feb. 1923 and mins., no. 49 d. 26 Feb. 1923, min. by Nicolson d. 20 Mar. 1923, min. by 
Lampson d. 4 Apr. 1923, min. by Tyrrell d. 4 Apr. 1923, Stancioff to Lampson no. 384 d. 7 Apr. 1923; 
DBFP/I/XXIV/682-4). The Bulgarians then made several attempts, both before and after the 
Tsankoff coup, to have the issue put on the agenda at the second session of the conference, but 
ultimately they were no more successful than before (DBFP/I/XXIV/582,682-4; FO 371/8557 min. 
by Curzon d. 5 Apr. 1923, min. by Adam d. 12 Apr. 1923, min. by Curzon d. 13 Apr. 1923, min. by 
Nicolson UO May 1923, Rumbold (Lausanne) to FO tel. 187 d. 12 Jun. 1923, tel. 210 d. 19 Jun. 1923). 93 FO 371/11223 min. by Bateman d. II Mar. 1926. 
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dealing with a variety of questions at issue between the two governmentS. 94 The 
Greek foreign minister, Roussos, gave De la Barra a memorandum containing a new 
offer for a free zone for the Bulgarians at either Salonica, Kavalla or Dedeagatch. 
Cheetham ascribed this new and 'remarkable' offer to Greece's feelings of isolation 
and weakness and the 'wish for support against Italian pressure which is the 
determining influence in Greek foreign poliCy'. 95 Whatever the motive, Greece's 
overtures were not well received in Sofia. Kalfoff claimed that the offer was less 
favourable than those made at Lausanne and that for fear of a nationalist backlash his 
government could not publicly renounce its designs on Thrace. 96The Greek proposal 
was officially rejected on 6 June, and Erskine was unable to elicit from Kalfoff 'an 
indication of the minimum which would satisfy the Bulgarian government'. 97 In the 
Foreign Office, Nicolson commented that, as in 1923, the Bulgarians hadonce again 
placed themselves completely in the wrong'. 98 
There were no new developments in this question over the next few years, except for 
a further Greek offer in 1926 for a free zone in Salonica, which was again rejected. 99 
The transparency of the arguments used by Sofia in rejecting the various proposals 
made to them since 1922 was such as to remove any doubts that the Bulgarians were 
playing a waiting game, hoping to turn any future trouble in the region to their 
advantage and in the meantime refusing to renounce their claims-100 It was even 
arguable whether their demands for an outlet made economic sense: with the Straits 
opened after 1923 Varna and Bourgas on the Black Sea coast were ample to handle 
Bulgaria's trade and the opening of an Aegean outlet would only diminish their 
prosperity. 101 
94 DBFP/1/XXVI/238-9,586-7. 
95 FO 371/9669 Cheetharn to FO no. 372 d. 31 May 1924. 
96 FO 371/9669 Erskine to FO no. 107 d. 3 Jun. 1924. 97 DBFP/i/XXVI/239. 
98 FO 371/9669 min. by Nicolson d. 17 Jun. 1924. 99 FO 371/11223 Cheetharn to FO no. 85 d. 24 Feb. 1926, min. by Bateman d. 11 Mar. 1926, min. by 
Drummond d. 27 May 1926. 
100 FO 371/11223 memorandum by Bateman d. 2 Mar. 1926. 
101 FO 371/9669 Erskine to FO no. 25 d. 2 Feb. 1924; FO 371/11223 Erskine to Bateman p. l. d. 29 
Apr. 1926. 
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The Bulgarians' motives in sticking to a revisionist policy were not hard to appreciate: 
Nicolson wrote in 1924 that this policy was the 'one which I should certainly adopt 
myself if I were a Bulgarian'. 102 Nevertheless, it proved fairly fruitless in the 1920s: 
apart from a lessening of the reparations burden the treaty of Neuilly was maintained IF 
and enforced virtually in its entirety. 103This was at least in part due to the tactics the 
Bulgarians were driven to adopt. Outright, sullen revisionism was clearly not feasible 
given their weakness and isolation, and dutiful compliance was not a viable option 
given, for example, the enduring power of the Macedonian organisations. 
Consequently the Bulgarians had to adopt a middle course - maintaining publicly that 
they were loyally executing the terms of the treaty whilst in fact refusing to abandon 
their claims or privately conniving against the peace settlement. This strategy in turn 
forced them into some manifestly false positions - as in the case of the Aegean outlet 
- which were hardly calculated to win the confidence of the powers (who were 
prejudiced against them anyway) and which neither concealed their real intentions nor 
won them any benefits. The same was true regarding IMRO, where the proximity of 
the comitadjis' aim of preventing the quiet integration of Yugoslav Macedonia into 
Yugoslavia to traditional Bulgarian state aspirations cast doubt on the Bulgarians I 
protestations that they were willing but unable to control the bands. The 
tergiversation of the Bulgarians on this issue sullied their image in the west and made 
the powers less inclined to accord Sofia the benefit of the doubt when (admittedly 
ingenious) requests came for revision of the military restrictions of Neuilly to meet 
the communist threat. Given the unpopularity of the Bulgarians with the powers it 
was questionable whether they could have succeeded in revision in any 
circumstances; as it was, the particular strategy they employed only increased the 
imtation and suspicion with which they were viewed and only hindered their policy 
even more. 
102 FO 371/9659 min. by Nicolson d. 5 Mar. 1924. 
103 For the reparations question, see Orde, Reconstruction, pp. 288-9. This issue and also Bulgaria's 
attempts to evade the disarmament clauses of the treaty of Neuilly are covered in 
DBFP/j/XXjj, XXlV, XXVj, XXVjj. 
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The greatest cause of friction between Greece and Bulgaria in the early and mid- 
1920s was the question of minorities, specifically the status and treatment of the 
ethnic Greek minority in Bulgaria and of the Slav minority in Greece claimed by 
Sofia as Bulgarian. This question was connected with the comitadji question, with the 
issue of the Aegean outlet and, indeed, with Bulgarian revisionism as a whole, but in 
the interests of clarity it would be well to consider it separately. The history of this 
issue and the conflicts it caused is instructive, both as a further example of the 
problematic nature of relations between victorious and vanquished powers in the 
Balkans and as an illustration of the intractability of minority questions in a region 
where ethnic groups were hopelessly intermingled. Moreover, the attitudes and 
policies of the powers, and especially Great Britain, towards these conflicts are 
pertinent, considering that at the Paris peace conference the powers attempted for the 
first time to establish a systematic regime for the protection of minority rights in 
eastern and central Europe. 
Even before the peace conference convened, the Allies had realised that some sort of 
provision would have to be made for the protection of minority rights. Given the 
racial jumble in eastern Europe the successor states were bound to contain large 
numbers of ethnic minorities and, apart from the moral responsibility of the Allies 
who were to sanction the creation of these states, it was clearly also in the Allies' own 
interests to reduce the likelihood of combustible inter-racial conflicts that could 
threaten the peace. ' Thus the powers devised minority treaties which were foisted 
upon the successor states - and other states where it was deemed necessary - in an 
Ternperley (ed. ), Peace Conference V 112-21. There is a dearth of modem scholarly work on the 
origins and workings of the inter-war minorities treaties. The best general accounts are still 
C. A. Macartney, National States and National Minorities (London, Oxford University 
Press/Humphrey Milford, 1934), L. P. Mair, The Protection of Minorities. The Working and Scope of 
the Minorities Treaties under the League of Nations (London, Christophers, 1928) and P. de Azcdrate, 
The League offations and National Minorities. An Experiment (Washington, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 1945). There is also an extremely useful essay by A. Sharp, 'Britain and the Protection of Minorities at the Paris Peace Conference 1919', in A. C. Hepburn (ed. ), Minorities in 
History (London, Edward Arnold, 1977), pp-170-88. I have also drawn upon an unpublished paper 
given at a Leeds University research seminar on 18 November 1991 by C. Fink, entitled 'The Paris Peace Conference and Minority Rights'. 
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attempt to guarantee equal treatment and full civil and political rights for all nationals 
belonging to'racial, religious or linguistic minorities', especially as regards education 
and religion. The first such treaty was that signed by Poland on 28 June 1919., which 
fon-ned the model for later treaties signed by Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumanial 
Greece, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and Turkey. 2The treaties were placed under the 
guarantee of the League of Nations, whose responsibility it therefore became to 
enforce them. However, the actual procedure adopted by the League fell far short of 
what the minorities desired. Although the minorities were allowed to petition the 
League about their grievances, the Council could only act if it was formally apprised 
of an infraction by a member government. As this rarely happened in practice, the 
system was in effect weighted heavily in favour of the new states and against the 
minoritieS. 3 
Although the powers were no doubt sincere in their attempts to provide protection for 
minorities, it could not be claimed that the system they established was very effective 
in eliminating this cause of international dispUteS. 4 Indeed, the weaknesses of the 
system reflected and contributed to the flaws and inconsistencies of the whole 
Versailles settlement. For one thing, there was the basic problem of defining 
nationality, and a divergence between the Anglo-Saxon view of nationality as 
essentially state-based and the east European view based on cultural or racial unity. 5 
There were also contradictions inherent in any attempt to re-draw borders paying 
some regard to national self-determination: clearly, given the need to create viable 
2 For the evolution of the treaties, see Mair, Protection ofMinorities, pp. 37-59, Macartney, National 
States, pp. 212-72 and Sharp, Minorities in History, pp. 170-5. For the text of the Polish treaty, see 
Macartney, National States, pp. 502-6. 
3 For the involvement of the League with the treaties, see Mair, Protection of Minorities, pp. 60-75, 
Macartney, National States, pp. 295-423 and Azcarate, League of Nations, pp. 92-136,161-209. 4 A-Cobban, The Nation State and National Se If-D e termination (London, Collins, 1969), p. 89. 
Azcdrate, a former director of the Minorities Section of the League, argues, with no little sophistry, 
that the League and treaties were not trying, to end the oppression of minorities but rather simply to 
stop that oppression provoking international disputes (Azcdrate, League offations, pp. 15-6). 5 Macartney, National States, pp. 30-91,280-4; Sharp, Minorities in History, p. 178; Cobban, Nation State, pp. 49-50,57-76,107-8. Generally speaking, while west Europeans looked for objective tests and 
Proofs of nationality, east Europeans believed it to be much more a question of subjective, personal 
perception. 
272 
states, 'the disintegrating process of self-determination had to be stopped at some 
point or other', but this meant according the right of self-determination to some 
groups while denying it to others. 6 A further problem was the attitude of the 
governments of the new states who bitterly resented the imposition of the minorities 
treaties as a violation of their newly won and jealously guarded sovereignty. They felt 
that they should have a wholly free hand in their internal affairs even if this meant 
'before they have hardly leapt into the light of freedom, beginning to oppress other 
races than their oWn'. 7 
There was little doubt about the aims of the British policy-makers involved in 
framing the minorities treaties. They had no intention of creating states within states, 
providing autonomy for minority groups or endeavouring to secure privileged, as 
opposed to equal, treatment for them. Indeed, they actually took pains to prevent any 
excessive infringement of the sovereignty of the new states, for example by ensuring 
that the minorities could not appeal directly to the League: such an arrangement 
would in any case have created too many problems for the western powers who 
possessed extensive overseas colonies inhabited by 'minorities'. 'The underlying 
British assumption throughout was that the Versailles settlement represented a final 
and permanent solution to the problems of eastern Europe,. The British felt that to 
allow the minorities to retain their cultural identity would in fact facilitate their 
assimilation into the new states: in other words the system of protecting minorities 
was envisaged only as a temporary expedient on the road to integration. The new 
states, however, were weak and insecure, and feared that such a system would in fact 
perpetuate the existence of distinct, aloof and alienated groups whose allegiances 
were deeply suspect, and so they were reluctant to treat them generously. In some 
cases this suspicious attitude was indeed justified: many of the minorities were by no 
6 Cobban, Nation State, pp. 57-84; Macartney, National States, pp. 272-80; Sharp, Minorities in 
History, pp. 176-7. 
7 Cobban, Nation State, pp. 85-8; Macartney, National States, pp. 284-94. Cobban quotes this 
despairing remark made by Lloyd George about the attitudes of the successor states to their 
minorities. Polish maltreament of minorities in the early part of 1919 was a crucial factor in 
determining the powers to impose minority treaties at the peace conference (Fink, 'Paris Peace 
Conference'). 
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means content to accept the new frontiers as final or to allow themselves to be 
assimilated. They endeavoured to use the treaties to keep alive their grievances, and 
many allowed themselves to be exploited by neighbouring kin states for their own 
ends. 8 
it is difficult to speak with certainty about the exact size of the minority populations 
of Greece and Bulgaria, for Balkan population statistics of the time are notoriously 
unreliable, representing as they did tools in the propaganda wars between the various 
states. 9 Moreover, from the Balkan wars up to the 1920s the picture was further 
complicated by the many migrations of populations fleeing either warfare or 
persecution. 10 However, in 1919 there were roughly 30,000 ethnic Greeks resident in 
Bulgaria, mainly concentrated on the Black Sea coast around Bourgas and Varna. " In 
Greece, the largest ethnic minority in 1919-20 was Turkish, but the next largest was 
Slavic, inhabiting western Thrace and Macedonia and estimated in 1920 as numbering 
139,000.12This minority was claimed by Sofia as Bulgarian, but its identity was 
perhaps the most hotly disputed of any European minority and represented a political 
problem that was at the heart of the continuing Macedonian question. " 
The Yugoslavs had their own substantial Macedo-Slav population and heatedly 
denied that it constituted a Bulgarian minority or, indeed, a distinct ethnic group of 
any kind. Rather they claimed that 'there is no distinction between the Macedonian 
and the Serb', and that the Macedo-Slavs whom they were desperately and brutally 
trying to integrate into Yugoslavia were not a racial, religious or linguistic minority 
8 Sharp, Minorities in History, pp. 179-84. 
9 This problem once 'led a Commission of Inquiry of the Camegie Foundation to remark cynically 
with respect to a Yugoslav demographer that "the ethnographic notions of Mr. Cvijic vary ... with the development of ... S erbian political aspirations"' ( Pentzopoulos, Balkan Exchange, p. 133). See also Pentzopoulos, Balkan Exchange, pp. 128-9 and Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, pp. 227-8. 10 Ladas, Exchange, pp. 10-23,121-2; Macartney, National States, pp. 430-5. II Ladas, Exchange, p. 122. 
12 Pentzopoulos, Balkan Exchange, p. 128. This figure includes those Bulgarians resident in eastem 
Thrace. 
13 Azcdrate, writing from personal experience, points to the wider political context of this identity 
problem: the bitter dispute between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia as to the nature of the Macedonian 
dialect was 'rele gated to the peaceful sphere of philological investigation' when relations between 0 them were going through a cordial phase (AzcArate, League offations, pp. 4-5,48-51). 
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falling within the purview of the minorities treaties. 14The Greeks, conversely, 
stubbornly refused to admit that their Slavs were either Serbian or Bulgarian, but 
usually claimed that they were slavophone Greeks whose Slavic language did not 
preclude them from possessing Greek national consciousness. 15 The British view was 
more detached and can be taken to represent the consensus of educated western 
opinion: viz., that these people were 'a section of the South Slav race intermediate 
between the Bulgarians and the Serbs' and that there was little more difference 
between'the Slav of Macedonia and the Slav of Serbia than between an inhabitant of 
Yorkshire and an inhabitant of Devon'. 16 They spoke 'a dialect understood by both 
Serbs and Bulgars, but slightly more akin to the Bulgarian tongue than to the Serbian', 
and it was 'incorrect to refer to them as other than Macedo-Slavs'. 17Nevertheless, all 
three Balkan states constructed their arguments about the identity of this minority in 
order to buttress their own position in Macedonia (and in Bulgaria's case to keep alive 
expansionist goals), and precisely because the issue so clearly related to that of 
territorial integrity, all three states were extremely sensitive over it. 
The Bulgarians were bound by articles 49 - 57 of the treaty of Neuilly to protect the 
rights of their minorities. 18 The Greeks, however, did not sign a minorities treaty until 
the time of the Sevres settlement, and this treaty remained inoperative until the treaty 
of Lausanne came into force in August 1924.19 There was, however, another 
14 FO 371/9659 min. by [? Baillie] d. 18 Feb. 1924 [quoted], min. by Nicolson d. 5 Mar. 1924. 
15 Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, pp. 228,246-9. 
16 FO 371/9659 mins. by Nicolson d. 19 Feb. 1924,5 Mar. 1924. 
17 FO 371/10667 'The Macedonian Question and Komitaji Activity, memorandum by the Central 
Department, d. 26 Nov. 1925. The British view was thus that the Macedo-Slavs constituted a distinct 
ethnic group. It is difficult, however, to see how those who had a Bulgarian national consciousness 
can be distinguished from Bulgarians - to see, for example, what difference there was in practice between the Macedo-Slavs of Greek Macedonia who opted to emigrate to Bulgaria and the Slavic, 
'Bulgarian' population of western Thrace (although this is not to say that all Macedonians were 
Bulgarian). Macartney refers to the Macedo-Slavs as'Buloaro-Macedonians, 'an intermediate race, ZD akin in some respects to the Serbs, in many more respects to the Bulgars, and with many peculiarities 
entirely their own' (Macartney, National States, pp. 528,530). Mavrogordatos argues that for the 
Macedo-Slavs 'identification with Bulgaria, although prevalent, competed with separate national identity and aspired statehood' (Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, p. 228). 18 BFSPIJ 12/794-6. 
19 For the text of this treaty, see BFSPA 13/471-9. Yugoslavia also signed a minorities treaty, on 10 
September 1919. For the text, see BFSPII 12/514-23. 
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instrument dealing with Greek and Bulgarian minorities. On 27 November 1919, 
simultaneously with the signature of the treaty of Neuilly, the Greeks and Bulgarians 
had signed an agreement allowing for a reciprocal and voluntary exchange of their 
minority populations. This exchange convention had been suggested by Venizelos, 
who saw that it was in Greece's interest to Hellenize her northern territories, 
especially as a substantial minority of the Slavic population of Macedonia and 
western Thrace, regardless of Greek propaganda, clearly possessed Bulgarian national 
consciousness and would only be a source of friction with Bulgaria if left in situ. The 
Bulgarians had little choice but to accept the scheme which the powers seized on with 
alacrity as likely 'to help a permanent settlement of the troubles which have so long 
affected the Balkans. 20 The exchange was to be supervised by a mixed commission 
comprised of a Greek, a Bulgarian and two neutral delegates appointed by the League 
(eventually a New Zealander, Colonel Corfe, and a Belgian, Commandant de Roover, 
were selected). 21 This commission had two main functions; firstly, to facilitate the 
exchange of populations and the liquidation of property left behind, and, secondly, to 
prevent the exercise of pressure to emigrate on either minority, which would have 
detracted from the voluntary nature of the exchange. 22 
The exchange convention was hardly an unalloyed triumph. In the first place, the 
fundamental principle behind it was at odds with that of the minorities treaties, since 
it was designed to coax the minorities into emigrating, while the minorities treaties 
were intended to protect their rights in situ. This was reflected in the detailed terms of 
the two instruments. The convention provided that those emigrating, whilst being 
allowed to take their movable property with them, had to abandon their immovable 
property which the mixed commission would then liquidate, the idea being that all 
links with the old country would be cut. However, the Greek minorities treaty of 
20 Minutes of the thirty-eighth meeting of the New States committee, 25 July 1919, quoted in Ladas, 
Exchange, pp. 29-30. For the origins of the convention, see Ladas, Exchange, pp. 27-48 and 
0 
0 Macartney, National States, pp. 435-9. For the text, see BFSPII 12/997-1000. 21 For the composition, duties and workings of the mixed commission, see Ladas, Exchange, pp. 49- 
74. 
22 Azcdrate, League of Nations, p. 19. 
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August 1920, in common with all the minorities treaties, contained a clause allowing 
members of the Slavic minority in territories to be transferred to Greece to opt for 
Bulgarian nationality whilst retaining their immovable property in Greece. Although 
such people had to move to Bulgaria within a year, the inconsistency was a clear 
encouragement to them to refuse to take advantage of the convention and to retain 
their property in Greece in the hope that the territory in question might one day revert 
to Bulgaria. At the same time, those Slavs habitually resident in western Thrace were 
equally free under the minority treaty to opt for Greek nationality and to remain 
living there, even if in fact they were strongly pro-Bulgarian in sympathy. Such a 
provision was, of course, indispensable if the rights of minorities in transferred 
territories were to be protected and if the exchange was to remain voluntary, but it 
was hardly conducive to 'clearing up the inextricable intermingling of the two racial 
elements in these territories and establishing a racial homogeneity therein'. 23 The 
Bulgarians, who were in any case eager for economic reasons to be rid of those 
refugees from Macedonia and western Thrace who had by 1919 flooded over the 
border, seized on and exploited the contradiction between the aims of the exchange 
convention and the minority treaty to keep alive their revisionist claims on Greek 
territory. 24 
The process of exchange was always very much influenced by the refugee situation in 
Greece. From late 1922, when the mixed commission first began to function, until 
June 1923, very few people of either minority showed much willingness to emigrate, 
although the Greeks in Bulgaria who were threatened by Stamboliiski's agrarian 
legislation were slightly more enthusiastic. The situation changed drastically, 
however, once the Greek refugees began to flood in from Asia Minor. These refugees 
were billeted on Bulgarian as well as Greek villages in Thrace and Macedonia and 
this pressure, together with a certain measure of Greek government harassment, 
23 Ladas, Exchange, pp. 40-1; Macartney, National States, pp. 436-9. 24 Macartney, National States, pp. 436-9. Macartney argues that'the idea of persons choosing Greek 
nationality but remaining Bulgarian in sympathies does not seem to have occurred to the Committee [on New States] which was presumably misled by the Allies' propaganda into under-estimating the pro-Bulgarian feeling in Macedonia'. 
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compelled large numbers of Bulgarians to flee or emigrate across the border. These 
people in turn settled themselves on Greek villages in Bulgaria and forced their 
inhabitants to move to Greece. These pressures, together with that exerted by Sofia 
and IMRO on Bulgarians in Greece to stay put, meant that the exchange was 
voluntary in name only. The mixed commission functioned until 1932, but it was 
estimated that the vast majority of those who emigrated 'were in reality refugees who 
fled during the troubled period of 1923-41.25 In all, the mixed commission dealt with 
154,691 persons, 101,800 of whom were Bulgarian and 52,891 of whom were Greek. 
Of these, however, 40,000 Bulgarians and over 20,000 Greeks had emigrated before 
the convention came into force, and several thousand more did not officially avail 
themselves of its provisions. In total roughly 55,000 Bulgarians and 30,000 Greeks 
were official emigrants under the terms of the convention. The net result of this was 
that Bulgaria was almost free of Greeks, but 82,000 Slavs, of uncertain sympathies, 
remained in Greece (in 1928), mostly in western Macedonia. 26 
Considering that the exchange convention was really designed to shift the Slavic 
population out of Greece, this outcome could be seen as a failure, certainly from the 
Greek point of view. However, Macedonia was in these years more or less 
Hellenized, and the Slavic population in the western region was separated from 
Bulgaria by a compact mass of Greeks. Moreover, western Thrace, where Bulgarian 
irredentist ambitions were chiefly focused, was entirely cleared of its Bulgarian 
population. 27 The mixed commission itself bore the brunt of much criticism for the 
problems that arose in the implementation of the exchange. Certainly, sloth was one 
of its chief characteristics: it took two years to even begin functioning and was very 
tardy in liquidating the property of the emigrants. 28The neutral members of the 
25 Macartney, National States, pp. 439-4 1; Ladas, Exchange, pp. 10 1 -2 1. 26 Macartney, National States, pp. 440-1; Ladas, Exchange, pp. 122-3. Accurate figures are again 
difficult to ascertain; those quoted are from Macartriey, those of Ladas differ slightly. 27 Macartney, National States, pp. 441,530; Pentzopoulos, Balkan Exchange, pp. 129-30. 28 Macartney, National States, p. 441. The work of the mixed commission was in three phases: a 
preparatory period lasting until December 1922; the period spent supervising the emigration which lasted until 1925; and the time spent liquidating immovable property until 1932 (Ladas, Exchange, 
Pp. 624). For the drawn out process of liquidation, see Ladas, Exchange, pp. 124-331. 
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might seize Salonica, perhaps in alliance with the Bulgarians, and felt that the 
Hellenization of Greek Macedonia only increased the temptation for Belgrade to act 
before it was too late35 -a view that was also echoed by some French observers. 361n 
other words, these minority questions were of much more than academic concern to 
the states involved, and continuing political and territorial instability provides the 
context within which disputes over minorities took place. The friction between 
Greece and Bulgaria over the exchange was most intense between 1923 and 1925 
when the larger part of the physical transfer of populations was taking place, and 
reached such a pitch in 1924 that the League of Nations had to intervene. -During this 
period the whole system for the protection of minorities was a cause of great friction 
between Greece and Bulgaria, and appeared, paradoxically, almost as a threat to 
peace. 
In the spring of 1923 Greek maltreatment of the Slav minority in western Thrace 
aroused severe protests from Sofia. Towards the end of March the Bulgarians 
complained to -the powers that the Greeks were deporting large numbers of Macedo- 
Slavs to the Greek islands and Thessaly and were installing refugees from Asia Nfinor 
in their houses in 'a systematic policy of exterminating the Bulgarian elements' there. 
The Bulgarians argued that by this the Greeks had shown themselves unfit to rule 
western Thrace and urged the power s to take it from them and to establish a regime 
there 'that will enable the inhabitants to live in peace and prosperity'. 37The initial 
British reaction to these complaints was dismissive: the accusations were 'probably 
immensely exaggerated' and 'mainly inspired by a desire to work up a case against 
Greece'in order to win the Bulgarians a sympathetic hearing over western Thrace at 
Lausanne 
. 
38 Consequently, the British did not intervene in the question - except for 
tactfully drawing Greece's attention to the suffering being inflicted on some of the 
35 FO 371/9897 min. by Nicolson d. 16 Dec. 1924; FO 371/11337 'Memorandum on Serbian "Minorities" in Greek Macedonia'by Bateman d. 3 Mar. 1926; DBFP/I/XXVI/462-3. 36 MAE Bulgarie 45 Marcilly to QO no. 201 d. 9 Sept. 1924. 37 DBFP/I/XXIV/563-4; FO 371/8564 Stancioff to Curzon no. 346 d. 3 Apr. 1923. 38 IFO 371/8564 min. by Troutbeck d. 6 Apr. 1923, min. by Nicolson d. 6 Apr. 1923; DBFP/i/XXIV/563-4. 
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deportees who were short of food - and accepted the Greek argument that the 
deportations had been necessary because the Slavs had been colluding with comitadjis 
to disrupt Greek communications in the sensitive frontier zone at a time when tension 
with Turkey was acute. 39 Furthermore, the Greeks soon replied to the Bulgarian 
complaints with an assurance that the deportees would be allowed home once peace 
was concluded. 40 
Nevertheless, the Bulgarians appealed to the League Council, which discussed the 
question on 19 and 21 April. The Bulgarians demanded that in the short term the 
deportees be allowed to return home and that an international inquiry be instituted, 
but they revealed their real intentions by urging that western Thrace should be placed 
under League mandate. The Greeks replied that the root cause of the problem in 
western Thrace was not Greek policy, but comitadji activity, over which the 
Bulgarians should have exercised some control. 41 These were familiar arguments, but 
the British felt these counter- accusations 'were so unreliable that it was ... better to 
give them no encouragement'. 42Accordingly the Council took no drastic action, but 
adopted a resolution instructing Drummond to pass on all the relevant documentation 
to the Allies (still the legal sovereigns of western Thrace until the 1920 Thracian 
treaty was ratified) and to express the hope that the future status of western Thrace 
could be settled quickly. 43 The Bulgarians seized on this admission that western 
Thrace was not yet juridically Greek and renewed their pleas to the powers to protect 
the Slav minority there, 44but again they were politely rebuffed. The British viewed 
39 DBFP/I/XXIV/564,566-7. 
40 DBFP/I/XXIV/572. 
41 FO 371/8565 Drummond to Curzon p. l. 0.26 Apr. 1923 plus encls.. 42 DBFP/I/XXIV/589-9 1. The French acyreed with the British that intervention at Athens was C undesirable (FO 371/8565 St. Aulaire to Curzon unno. l. d. 1 I Apr. 1923). The Italians, though keener 
to act in response to Bulgaria's pleas, also seem to have taken no action (DBFP/I/XXIV/572,590; 
DDInIII480-1). 
43 FO 371/8565 'Memorandum respecting the Deportation of Bulgarians from Western Thrace' by Troutbeck d. I Jun. 1923. 
44 FO 371/8565 Stancioff to Curzon no. 518 d. 27 Apr. 1923. 
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would come under the auspices of the League by virtue of the Greek minorities 
treaty-51 
For a time the Bulgarians persisted in their appeal to the League, which was due to 
consider the question on 29 June. 521n the meantime harrowing reports were coming 
out of Bulgaria about the vast numbers and pitiable condition of the refugees who 
continued to arrive there and, although these appeared to be exaggerated, the Foreign 
Office now admitted that 'prima facie there seems a pretty strong case against the 
Greeks'. 53AIthough the earlier deportations had been justified on the gounds of 
military necessity, the Greeks had exceeded their legal rights in settling refugees in 
the houses of the deportees and this- had in turn contributed to the flight of refugees to 
Bulgaria. Accordingly the British now decided not to oppose the idea of an inquiry by 
the League and to draw attention to the illegality of the refugee settlement methods 
being adopted by the Greeks. 54The Bulgarians, however, in view of the Greek 
promise to allow the refugees to return to their homes, withdrew their appeal to the 
League on 9 June and so no inquiry was instituted. 55 With that decision the immediate 
political crisis caused by the minorities was resolved, although clearly a major 
problem remained. During the rest of the year the powers kept up constant though 
discreet pressure on the Greeks to ensure the eventual return of the deportees and 
their good treatment in the meantime, 56 and the mixed commission also took a close 
51 DBFP/I/XXIV/681-2. 
52 FO 371/8565 min. by Troutbeck d. 6 Jun. 1923. 
53 FO 371/8565 Erskine to FO no. 119 d. 21 May 1923, no. 122 d. 23 May 1923, min. by Lampson d. 3 
Jun. 1923 [quoted], min. by Nicolson d. 6 Jun. 1923. There was also some pressure in Parliament for 
action to be taken over the plight of the Thracian minorities. See, for example, 163 HC Deb. 5s 1343- 
4,2323-4. 
54 FO 371/8565 'Memorandum prepared for the British Representative on the Council of the League 
of Nations on the Question of Alleged Oppression of Bulgarians in Western Thrace by the Greek 
Authorifies'by Troutbeck d. 21 Jun. 1923. The Foreign Office did not hold the Greeks directly 
responsible for the flight of refugees into Bulgaria. Nicolson argued that, a few exceptions apart, the 
Greeks wanted to prevent such a movement which would inevitably cause hardship to the Greek 
minority in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian government or IMRO, he went on somewhat obscurely, were 
more likely to be responsible (FO 371/8565 min. by Nicolson d. 6 Jun. 1923). 55 FO 371/8565 Avenol to FO no. 11/29053/27553 d. 20 Jun. 1923. 
56 DBFP/I/XXIV/744,760,812,815-6; FO 371/8565 Bentinck to FO no. 454 d. 4 Jun. 1923 and mins., 
no. 487 d. 21 Jun. 1923; FO 371/8566 Bentinck to FO no. 532 d. 4 Jul. 1923, no. 544 d. 10 Jul. 1923, min. by Rendel d. I Aug. 1923, Bentinck to FO no-649 d. 20 Aug. 1923, 'Report on the Work of the High Commission for Refugeesby Dr. F. Nansen dA Sept. 1923 (A. 30.1923 X11). 0 
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interest in these matters. At the end of the year, however, the situation was still far 
from satisfactory. Corfe reported that the Greeks did not extend to their minorities the 
rights accorded in the (as yet unratified) Greek minorities treaty, and that the 
Bulgarians consequently refused to give their minorities the protection theoretically 
afforded by the treaty of Neuilly. The treaties were thus routinely breached, and their 
non-application was, in Corfe's opinion, the cause of 'a very large part of the unrest in 
the Balkans today'. 57 
During 1924 the situation deteriorated further. Both Greece and Bulgaria exerted 
pressure on their respective minorities to emigrate, with the complication that 
whereas Athens was willing to receive ethnic Greeks from Bulgaria, Sofia and IMRO 
wanted the Macedo-Slavs to stay put. 58 By the summer, the harassment of both 
minorities, accompanied by a virulent press war, had become so bad that the mixed 
commission was forced to suspend acceptance of declarations of intent to emigrate 
'made in the time of excitement and fright'caused by the persecution. 59 It was in this 
troubled atmosphere, aggravated by an upsurge in comitadji activity in Macedonia, 60 
that an incident occurred on 27 July at Talis, a slavophone community near the 
Bulgarian border in which a considerable number of Asia Minor refugees had been 
billeted. A large group of Macedo-Slav villagers had been arrested by the authorities 
there, suspected of collusion in terrorist activity in the region , and was being led 
away bound together with ropes and accompanied by an escort of Greek troops. 
According to the commander of these troops, this group was then attacked by 
comitadjis, and in the subsequent engagement several of the Slavs were killed by :: II zn 
57 DBFP/i/XXIV/914-5; FO 371/8562 Barber (charg6 in Sofia) to FO no. 178 d. 30 Aug. 1923 and 
encls. 
58 FO 371/10771 Annual Report, Greece, 1924 pp. 15-16; FO 371/9669 Erskine to FO no. 126 d. 2 
Jul. 1924, no. 136 d. 16 Jul. 1924, Kaklarnanos to FO no. 2270 d. I Aug. 1924, Erskine to FO no. 145 d. 4 
Aug. 1924; MAE Bulgarie 44 Picot (minister in Sofia) to QO tels. 37-8 d. 5 Aug. 1924, Marcilly to QO 
no. 182 d. 8 Aug. 1924. 0 59 Ladas, Exchange, p. I 10. 
60 DBFP/1/XXVI/289,292-4; FO 371/9661 Cheetharn to FO no. 402 d. 14 Jun. 1924, Kaklamanos to 
FO no. 2204 d. 26 Jul. 1924, Bentinck to FO no. 491 d. 31 Jul. 1924; FO 371/9669 Erskine to FO no. 142 UO Jul. 1924. 
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cross-fire. In fact, the Greek troops opened fire on their prisoners without any 
provocation, and shot just under twenty of them in cold blood. 61 
To the delight of the Bulgarians and the chagrin of the Greeks, the mixed emigration 
commission at once instituted an inquiry into this incident. The Greeks felt that the 
problem was a terrorist and not an emigration one, but nevertheless co-operated. 62 
The inquiry was completed by 16 August and concluded that the action of the Greeks 
was 'inexcusable'. 63De Roover told Erskine that there was no proof of comitadj*1 
activity in the area and that he was convinced that the incident leading to the original 
arrests 'was engineered by the Greek Military Authorities as a pretext for the brutal 
massacre which ensued' - the only bright spot being that despite the complicity of the 
local authorities it was evident that the Athens government'were in no way 
implicated'. 64 Corfe, too, declared that the episode was a typical, if extreme, example 
of the sort of persecution habitually suffered by the Slav minority in northern Greece 
which could easily escalate into a full-scale Greco-Bulgarian confliCt. 65 
The Talis incident certainly did raise the tension between the two states who in the 
immediate aftermath embarked upon an acrimonious exchange of correspondence and 
cast around for support from other powers. 66This continued after the publication of 
the mixed commission's report: on 22 August the Bulgarians addressed a very 
uncompromising note to the Greeks demanding exemplary punishment of the 
delinquents (something the Greeks had already promised) and adding that only if this 
were effected could Sofia accept the commission's exoneration of the Greek 
government. The Greeks thereupon - in a note which 'indicated very clearly that in the 
61 DBFP/I/XXVI/289,292-3; FO 371/9661 Bentinck to FO no. 491 d. 31 Jul. 1924, Erskine to FO 
no. 155 d. 19 Aug. 1924, Bentinck to FO no. 551 d. 29 Aug. 1924; Mair, Protection of Minorities, 
Pp-177-9; A-To1jv-T(x-(DF-p7(x57j, EXXTjvo-Bo1jXý(xptKFq MFtovo'M'TF-q, HponoKoxxo rIoxtTn- 
KaXoo)o, 1924-1925 (Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 1986), pp. 45-7. The Bulgarians 
claimed that nineteen Macedo-Slavs were killed, although the report of the mixed commission 
inquiry gave a figure of seventeen. 
62 DBFP/i/XXVI/289,292-4. 
63DBFP/i/XXVI/310. 
64 FO 371/9661 Erskine to FO no. 155 d. 19 Aug. 1924. 65 FO 371/9661 Bentinck to FO no. 551 d. 29 Aug. 1924. 66 Toi)vr(x--(Dpp7(X5-q, E, %XTjvo-Boi)%7(xpt'Ke; MF-tovoTqTe;, pp. 47-51. 
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opinion of the Greek Government Bulgaria was a semi-civilised country'- formally 
repudiated the Bulgarians' right to interfere in a purely intemal affair. Both states then 
dragged in other unconnected issues and accusations in a correspondence which was 
both a'good illustration of the intensity of the suspicion and hostility which exists 
between the two countries'67and a'childish exchange of fatuities 1 . 69 This hostility 
rendered stillborn a new mixed commission of Greek and Bulgarian officers which 
the two states had sought to establish to prevent similar incidents near the frontier; it 
also provoked the British to exert a calming influence at both capitals. The 
Bulgarians-, who Howard Smith felt were 'as usual ... doing all they can to spoil a 
good case by infuriating the Greeks', were told to stop trying to make capital out of 
the affair, while the Greeks were warned that unless they adequately punished the 
officers responsible they would doubtless be brought before the League Council for 
contravening the 1920 minorities treaty which had been in force since 6 AuguSt. 69 
The Talis incident and the subsequent recriminations demonstrated that the existence 
of the minorities treaties was not reducing friction between Greece and Bulgaria. On 
the contrary, either because of the inadequacies of the treaties or their non- 
application, the minorities concerned were suffering from a systematic infringement 
of their rights. These circumstances reinforced a current of thinking in League circles 
that action was necessary to strengthen the minority protection system and to ensure 
the effective execution of the minorities treatieS. 70 A leading proponent of this view 
was Gilbert Murray, Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford University, a dedicated 
internationalist and a leading light of the League of Nations Union. 71 Murray attended 
the League Assemblies of 1921 and 1922 as a South African delegate at the invitation 
67 DBFP/I/XXVI/322-6; FO 3 71/9661 Mischeff (minister in London) to FO unno. l. d. 4 Sept. 1924; T 
0UVr(x--(DEp7(x5Tj, EUTjvo-BoUýapvcF-q MF-toV0TTjTF-q, pp. 51-2. 68 FO 371/9661 min. by Howard Smith d. 18 Sept. 1924. 
69 DBFP/I/XXVI/292-3,322-3,326,330; FO 371/9661 min. by Howard Smith d. 10 Sept. 1924. The 
cOmmander of the Greek troops received a fifteen year prison sentence in January 1925 (FO 286/916 Cheetham to FO no. 23 d. 16 Jan. 1925). 70 For this current of thinking about reform of the League protection system, see Macartney, National States, pp. 356-69. 
71 For Murray's involvement with the League and the LNU, see D. Wilson, Gilbert Murray OM. 1866-1957 (Oxford, Clarendon, 1987), pp. 244-56,283-3 10. 
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of Cecil, and proposed, at the former session, the creation of a permanent minorities 
commission to be in general control of the execution of the minorities treaties, and, at 
the latter, the appointment of resident agents of the League to monitor the observance 
of the treaties in 'some localities of mixed population '. 72Neither of these proposals 
was implemented, largely because of opposition from the states concerned, who 
looked askance at anything smacking of the 'establishment of a permanent 
organisation for the supervision of their internal government'. 73 This in turn reflected 
a general problem that dogged the whole history of the minorities treaties, namely 
that of reconciling effective international guarantees with the prevalent doctrine of the 
primacy of national sovereignty and the right of states to conduct their internal affairs 
as they pleased. 74 
Murray certainly made his general proposals with an eye to the Balkans. According to 
Kaklamanos, he was a 'fanatical Bulgarophil"75and he wrote to his wife in 1921 from 
Geneva of his sympathy for a race which was 'suffering horrors from the Serbs in 
Macedonia'. 76Similarly, he was much affected by the propaganda of advocates of 
Macedonian autonomy: 'their solution would have been the best, but it is now 
impossible. All we can do is to try to enforce the Nfinority Protection clauses. These, 
they say, are a dead letter'. 77 In 1923 his general ideas were revived by those tackling 
minority problems on the spot in the Balkans. After the difficulties caused by the 
deportations of Slavs in the spring, Corfe suggested in August that the mixed 
72 Wilson, Gilbert Murray, pp. 285-6,291-2; F. West, Gilbert Murray. A Life (London, Croom Helm, 
1984), pp. 188-192; Mair, Protection of Minorities, pp. 63-7; Macartney, National States, pp. 358,366- 
7; Azcdrate, League offations, pp. 131-2,188-90. 
73 Mair, Protection ofMinorities, p. 64. 
74 In his assessment of the protection system, Macartney wrote: 'so long as the majority nations 
which have assumed command of the different states persist in their theoretically absurd and 
unattainable endeavour to make of those states the exclusive instruments of their own national ideals 
and aspirations, so long will the minorities be placed in a position which no system of international 
protection can render tolerable' (Macartney, National States, -p. 42 1). See also the discussion of self- determination and sovereignty in Cobban, Nation State, pp. 74-84, especially pp. 81-2. 75 Greek foreign ministry archives, Kaklamanos to Athens no. 3225 d. 15 Nov. 1924, quoted in Toiuvc 
(x--(DF, p7(x8TI, EXXT1vo-BoL)X7ccpt1-cF-; MF-tovoTqrrq, p. 77. 76 Murray papers, Gilbert Murray to Mary Murray p. l. d. 12 S ept. 192 1, quoted in Wilson, Gilbert 
Murray, p. 285. 
77 Murray papers, Gilbert Murray to Mary Murray p. l. d. 9 Sept. 1921, quoted in Wilson, Gilbert 
Murray, pp. 285-6. 
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emigration commission should be given the additional function of supervising the 
application of the provisions protecting the rights of Greek and Bulgarian minorities 
so as to ensure that any emigration would be truly voluntary. 79 Although this proposal 
clearly owed much to that of Murray concerning resident agents, it was better 
received. The Greeks were more reluctant than the Bulgarians, it was true, but they 
were feeling their international isolation keenly (after the onset of the Corfu crisis) 
and did not feel confident enough to oppose such an apparently unobjectionable 
proposal. 79 However, although both governments accepted the idea in principle, the 
matter was shelved for the time being on the quite reasonable grounds that the Greek 
minorities treaty was unratified and therefore not in force. 80 
The idea of a permanent commission to regulate problems between Greece and 
Bulgaria was again resurrected at the time of the De la Barra mission in June 1924. 
The Greek proposals put to Sofia via De la Barra contained a suggestion for a 
f permanent commission to deal with any other differences between the two countries', 
the operation of which would, if Possible, be extended to include Yugoslavia. 81 
Although this proposal came to nothing because of Bulgarian obstinacy over the 
Aegean outlet, it clearly made an impression on De la Barra. In mid-August he told 
the Quai d'Orsay that such a commission, which it was implied would encompass 
minorities questions, was the key to peace in the region, and asked whether France 
would take the initiative in suggesting such an accord to the Balkan governments 
concerned. " 
In early September the French minister in Sofia observed that the Bulgarians would 
probably welcome such an initiative: it was an article of faith for them to try and 
draw international organisations and foreign powers into their disputes with their 
78 FO 371/8562 Barber to FO no. 178 d. 30 Aug. 1923' and encls. 79 Toi)vra-(Dcp7(x5Tj, EXXTjvo-BoU7apucF-; MF-tovoTqTF-;, pp. 55-67. 80 Mair, Protection of Minorities, p. 177. 81 DBFP/I/XXVI/239; MAE Bulgarie 44 QO to Marcilly no. 172 d. 9 May 1924, Picot to QO no. 101 
Ul May 1924 and encls. For De la Barra, see above pp. 265-6. 82 MAE Bulgarie 44 QO to Marcilly no. 299 d. 21 Aug. 1924. 
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neighbours, whom they feared to face alone. " Marcilly was less enthusiastic: 
although the Greeks would be well advised to accept some international safeguard 
against the claims of their northern neighbours, the work of a permanent commission 
would throw an unwelcome light on the brutal Hellenization of Macedonia and 
Thrace, much of which was carried on by local military authorities who would brook 
no interference. In any case, he doubted the wisdom of France's proposing such a 
commission, since the burden of enforcing its decisions would fall upon her, and 
involve her in making invidious choices between the rival claims of Greece and 
Yugoslavia. 84 The French minister in Belgrade shared this caution. Yugoslavia, he 
warned, was unlikely to accept anything smacking of a restriction on her sovereignty, 
and was certain to refuse a minority protection regime which would hinder the 
Serbianisation of Yugoslav Macedonia. 85The probable opposition of Yugoslavia 
proved the decisive factor in Paris: on 26 September the Quai d'Orsay told Marcilly 
that there was no sense in France's proposing a scheme that was doomed to fail. 86 
In the meantime, however, a scheme very similar to De la Barra's had been evolved at 
Geneva where, during September, the fifth Assembly of the League was in session. 
This scheme was the culmination of all the previous attempts to reform the minority 
protection regime, and had been given its final impetus by the lamentable effect of the 
Talis incident on Greco-Bulgarian relations and the coming into force of the Greek 
minorities treaty on 6 August. In this atmosphere the Greeks were forced to accept the 
utility of some arrangement along the lines of that proposed by Corfe and de Roover 
in 1923 to ensure the application of the minorities treatieS. 87Consequently, during 
September, negotiations took place to this end between the Greek delegate to the 
League, Politis, the Bulgarian foreign minister and delegate, Kalfoff, the head of the 
League Minorities Section Erik Colban, and Gilbert Murray, attending at Geneva as b7 
83 MAE Bulgarie 45 Picot to QO no. 155 d-9 Sept. 1924. 84 MAE Bulgarie 45 Marcilly to QO no. 201 d. 9 Sept. 1924, no. 242 d. 15 Nov. 1924. 85 MAE Bulgarie 45 De Billy to QO no. 3110 d. 9 Sept. 1924. 86 MAE Bulgarie 45 QO to Marcilly no. 331 d. 26 Sept. 1924. 87 The Greeks were also induced to co-operate in this scheme because negotiations for the refugee 
JOan were still at a very delicate stage (Times, 12 Mar. 1925). 
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a substitute British delegate. The main point at issue in these discussions was whether 
it should be the whole mixed commission or simply its neutral members who would 
be given the supervisory task. Eventually the Greeks were successful in their attempts 
to ensure that the Bulgarian commissioner would have no say in their internal affairs, 
and the second alternative was adopted. 88 
On the morning of 29 September, in the League Council, Politis and Kalfoff made 
identical proposals inviting the neutral members of the mixed commission to assist 
their governments in the application of the minorities treaties on behalf of the League 
of Nations. Corfe and de Roover were to advise each government on the execution of 
the provisions of the treaties, an- d were to be entitled to receive petitions from the 
minorities and to suggest remedies for the grievances in question to the government 
concerned. They were also to be allowed to undertake investigations into the 
condition of the minorities and were to submit reports to the secretary general of the 
League every six months. These proposals were welcomed by the Council and were 
put into the form of two distinct protocols, signed by the representative of the 
government concerned, the president of the Council and the secretary general (that is 
to say, there was no agreement between Greece and Bulgaria; both states undertook 
an identical obligation vis a vis the League). 89The final clause of each protocol 
provided that it was to come into force as soon as it was approved by the Council. 
Gilbert Murray, rapporteur to the Council on this question, hailed the protocols as a 
distinct advance, modelled on his own earlier proposals for resident agents and a 
permanent commission, which he was sure would help to resolve a problem that was 
I1 90 one of the bitterest in Europe . 
The Bulgarians regarded the signature of the Politis-Kalfoff protocol as a victory for 
their diplomacy which, their propaganda made clear, would be used to consolidate 
88 Toijvca--(DFpýa8jj, EX? ajvo-BoiAýCcpt1cF-; MetovoTqrF,;, pp. 67-76. 89 Henceforth, these two documents were known as the Politis-Kalfoff protocol or simply (and 
confusingly) as the Geneva protocol. 90 DBFPII[XXV11349-50; Toi)vTa-(DEpj(x5Tj, EU71vo-B oiA7otpticF-ý MEtovoTTjrF-;, pp. 76-83; 
Ladas, Exchange, pp. 110-2; Mair, Protection of MInorities, pp. 179-80. 
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their claims in Greek Macedonia and western Thrace. 91 On 18 October Kalfoff 
thanked Erskine warmly for the support of the British delegation in Geneva, and 
particularly Murray who had'contributed greatly'to the minorities settlement. 92 The 
Bulgarians regarded the settlement as 'an important step in advance', 93 and they were 
eager for the neutral commissioners to begin their new tasks. 94 Their objectives 
became clearer during the meetings of the mixed commission in October, when their 
representative Robeff, argued that those slavophones who had already opted for 
emigration should be given a chance to change their minds since, after the signature 
of the protocols, many 'regretted their declarations of emigration, expecting a new era 
for the minorities'. 95 Whatever the justice in this contention, the Bulgarian attitude 
showed the Greeks, who had hitherto evinced little interest in the protocol, that it 
might yet be the cause of much trouble. 96 
Greek apprehensions were well founded, although Belgrade was to be an even greater 
source of trouble than Sofia. Relations between Greece and Yugoslavia had been poor 
for some time, the chief Yugoslav grievance being an economic one - namely, the 
maladministration of the railway line running between Salonica and the Yugoslav 
frontier and Greek obstructiveness over the Yugoslav free zone at that port. The 
tardiness of the Greeks in giving satisfaction over these points had sharpened 
Yugoslav dissatisfaction with the alliance of 1913, which seemed in any case to have 
been rendered undesirable and obsolete by the subsequent aggrandisement of Serbia 
and the past unreliability and present impotence of the Greeks. 97 The signature of the 
Politis-Kalfoff protocol gave the Yugoslavs another grievance: in October they 
complained to the Greeks that it had been negotiated without their knowledge and 
91 Toi)vr(x--0Ep7a8Tj, EXXTjvo-Bo'uXyXptKE; MCIoV0TTjrE;, pp. 87-90,165; FO 371/10663 
memorandum by Melas (Greek charg6 in London) d. 4 Mar. 1925; Times, 12 Mar. 1925. 
92 DBFP/i/XXVI/376. 
93 FO 371/9669 Erskine to FO no. 184 d. 23 Oct. 1924. 94 FO 371/9669 Barber to FO no. 206 d. 22 Nov. 1924. 95 Ladas, Exchange, pp.. 114-5; To1, )vw-(DF-pyx8Tj, EXXTjvo-Bo1A7(xpiKF-; MF-tc)voqcF-;, pp. 88-9. 96 Toj)vr(x-(j)Epý(y8Tj, EXX'qvo-BoiA7(xpi1cE; MF--LovoTqrF-;, pp. 84-6,90,107-8. 97 MAE Yougoslavie 51 Marcilly to QO no. 245 d. 21 Nov. 1924; TolwToc-4DEp7cc5ij, EXXTjvo-BoA7 
(XptKEq MetovoTnre;, pp. 90-6. Greco-Yugoslav relations are discussed in more detail in chapters II 
and 12 below. 
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To this end, in intensive discussions with League representatives, the Greeks 
subrnitted various suggestions for the modification, postponement or annulment of the 
protocol-108 These negotiations took place largely during the meeting of the League 
Council at Rome in December, which was attended by most of those concerned with 
this particular minorities problem. The Greeks expanded on their objections to the 
protocol: it was largely responsible for the friction with Yugoslavia, and Greek public 
opinion resented the idea of the establishment of a permanent foreign presence and 
interference in Greece's internal affairs. Their ideal solution, therefore, would be for 
the protocol to be considered annulled, whereupon they would pass laws establishing 
minorities offices in regions of mixed population to oversee and ensure the 
application of the minorities treaties within Greece. This was by no means acceptable 
to Colban and Drummond, however, who pressed the Greeks to implement the 
protocol and to meet Yugoslav objections by extending its scope to embrace all 
minorities in Greece, not just the 'Bulgarians'. In the longer term it was open to the 
Greeks to make the protocol redundant by actually ensuring that the minorities 
treaties were being observed - at the moment this was clearly not the case, and if the 
Greeks rejected the protocol the League might have to take stronger action. 109 There 
was little chance of compromise between thesp two positions, and by the end of the 
year there was deadlock, with both sides believing that important principles were at 
stake. 110 
In this impasse, the British were inclined to support the Greeks. At first the Foreign 
Office had looked favourably on the protocol, considering it to be a 'good proposal' 
and a 'great accomplishment', 111 but all that changed after the denunciation of the 
alliance. The Greeks emphasised to London that the protocol was the chief cause of 
the rupture with Yugoslavia, and also made much of the influence of Gilbert Murray 
108 FO 371/9670 Cheetham to FO no. 725 d-4 Dec. 1924, tel. 269 d. 21 Dec. 1924. An account of these 
negQtiations is given in Toluvw-OF-pý(x5T1, EX), Tjvo-BoU7aptKF-; MUOVOTIICF-;, pp. 105-20, 
although it rather plays down the difference of opinion between the Greeks and the League. 109 FO 371/9670 Cadogan to Nicolson unno. l. d. 29 Dec. 1924 and encls. 110 FO 371/9670 Drummond to Cadogan unno. l. d. 27 Dec. 1924 and encls. 111 FO 371/9669 min. by Nicolson d. 2 Oct. 1924, min. by Bateman d. 7 Oct. 1924. 
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in persuading them to fall in with it. This was slightly embarrassing for the British 
since Murray 'had made the proposal without the instructions or knowledge of the 
Foreign Office, and we had only heard of it after it had been made and adopted'. 112 
However, apart from a feeling of responsibility arising from the part played by 
Murray, there were sound practical reasons for the Foreign Office to assist the Greeks 
out of their predicament: as a memorandum of 4 December put it, given the possible 
existence of an Italo-Yugoslav understanding, pressure on Greece to ratify the 
protocol could 'only increase the tension at present existing and may lead to a highly 
dangerous situation which Bulgaria will be the first to exploit'. In view of this, the 
Foreign Office recommended to Chamberlain that if the question came up for 
discussion at the Rome Council meeting it should be shelved, and that'it would be 
better if the Greeks were allowed quietly to escape from the obligations to which 
M. Politis pledged them'. 113 
Although for the time being the Foreign Office was content with this pragmatic 
response, Murray's role in the evolution of the protocol provided food for thought. As 
Nicolson noted on 3 December, Murray's proposal had nearly caused a war, and was 
'illustrative of the danger which exists in dabbling in Balkan minority questions'. ' 14 
The Foreign Office was already aware of the potentially malign influence of 
enthusiastic amateurs in foreign policy. In February, when tension between 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria over the comitadji question had been acute, the Foreign 
Office had been greatly irritated by the activities of the Near and Middle East 
Association. Crowe had written that, by its advocacy of the cause of an autonomous 
Macedonia, it seemed to be 'doing its best ... to promote the outbreak of war 
in the 
Balkans'. ' 15 Lampson had concurred, arguing that although 'the Macedonian 
settlement was not one of the strong points of the Peace Treaties', the treaties had 
112 DBFP/I/XXVI/422-3; FO 800/256 min. by Tyrrell d. I Dec. 1924; FO 371/9897 min. by Nicolson 
d. 9 Dec. 1924, Barber to FO tel. 40 d. 16 Dec. 1924; MAE Bulgarie 45 De Fleuriau (French ambassador 
in London) to QO no. 72ý9 d. 26 Dec. 1924. 113 DBFP/I/XXVI/422-3. 
114 FO 371/9669 min. by Nicolson d. 3 Dec. 1924. 115 FO 371/9659 min. by Crowe d. 21 Feb. 1924. See also p. 256 above. 
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nevertheless been signed and had to be enforced: to encourage Bulgarian irredentism 
as the association did would do Sofia no favours, for it would only provoke the 
Yugoslavs to attack Bulgaria. ' 16The presence in the British government of a 'leaven 
of pro-Bulgars' (mainly Lord Thomson, minister for aviation, and Noel Buxton, 
minister for agriculture and fisheries), however, acted as a spur to Bulgarian agitation, 
and encouraged, for example, the autonomist Macedonians to act whilst they might 
still hope to receive some sympathy from Britain. 117 Buxton certainly dabbled in 
these minority questions- if less publicly - by sending memoranda to the Foreign 
Office. In February 1924, for example, he recommended representations at Belgrade 
to ensure the observance of the minorities treaties, and a full-scale League inquiry, by 
resident agents, into the administration of Macedonia. The problem with all this , 
Crowe noted rather wearily, was that Buxton assumed 'facts to be as he hears them 
reported in Bulgaria,. 118 
Whilst these enthusiasms remained private, they could do little harm. A more 
important point raised by Murray's activities, however, was that of British 
representation at the League. As Tyrrell wrote on 1 December, the fact that Murray 
had devised the protocol without consulting the Foreign Office or even, apparently, 
Lord Parmoor, the head of the British delegation in Geneva, was 'another instance of 
the very false position we have drifted into abroad by being represented by delegates 
who are not really speaking and acting on behalf of the Government'. 119 Previous 
British governments had had problems on this score: Curzon had argued at length 
with Cecil about the latter's role in British foreign policy; 120 and MacDonald had 
objected to Parmoor's original choice of Noel Buxton as a British delegate to the 
September 1924 Assembly on the grounds that his views on foreign policy were 
highly contentious and not necessarily those of the govemment. 121 Chamberlain had 
116 FO 371/9659 min. by Lampson d. 28 Feb. 1924. 117 FO 371/9660 Young to Lampson p. l. d. 20 Mar. 1924. 118 FO 371/9659 Buxton to Ponsonby p. l. d. 29 Feb. 1924 and encl., min. by Crowe d. 6 Mar. 1924. 119 FO 800/256 min. by Tyrrell d. I Dec. 1924; FO 800/257 memorandum by Nicolson d. 6 Jan. 1925. 120 MSS EUR F1 12/229 passim. 121 PRO 30/69/200 MacDonald to Parmoor p. l. d. II Aug. 1924, Parmoor to MacDonald p. l. d. 12 Aug. 1924, MacDonald to Parmoor p. l. d. 13 Aug. 1924. 
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been determined to seize control of British League policy for the Foreign Office, and 
had relegated Cecil to a very subordinate role as soon as he assumed office. 122The 
experience of the problems caused by Gilbert Murray was a salutary lesson which 
-reinforced this tendency, and the Politis-Kalfoff protocol incident was the final 
impetus for Chamberlain's 'somewhat revolutionary' decision to attend all subsequent 
League Councils and Assemblies in person. 123 
For the present, British efforts were concentrated on assisting the Greeks. By January 
1925 the Politis-Kalfoff protocol had become a 'highly controversial issue in Greek 
politics': Michalakopoulos had decided to submit it to the assembly for ratification 
(and, in effect, rejection), taking the line that as his government had not been 
responsible for negotiating it, it need not be bound by it. (This attitude had already 
caused the resignation on 19 January of his foreign minister, Roussos, who had also 
been foreign minister in the previous government and who had thus been technically 
responsible for the signature of the protocol. 124) Although the final clause of the 
protocol stipulated that it should come into effect upon approval by the League 
Council, Michalakopoulos was able to defend his decision to put the protocol before 
the assembly by citing the Bulgarians who, rather unwisely and in an attempt to 
embarrass the Greeks, had submitted it to the Sobranie for approval in December. 115 
His scheme - that Greece should first unilaterally abrogate the protocol and then 
square matters with the League - had been evolved, after the failure of his earlier talks 
with Geneva, with the help of Venizelos, who also submitted his views to the Foreign 
Office in London via Kaklamanos. Venizelos argued that, even without the friction 
with Yugoslavia, Greece would be right to reject a protocol that provided for 
122 McKercher IHR 6 570-9 1, especially 575-6; FO 800/256 min. by Crowe d. 20 Nov. 1924, 
Chamberlain to Cecil p. l. d. 21 Nov. 1924. 
123 McKercher IHR 6 576-7; MAE Bulgarie 45 De Fleuriau to QO no. 729 d. 26 Dec. 1924. McKercher 
seems to miss the parallel point that this incident became so grave because Politis, too, failed to keep 
his government totally au courant with his activities. 124 DBFP/I/XXVII/10-1 1; FO 371/10768 Cheetharn to FO no. 31 d. 19 Jan. 1925. 125 FO 371/9670 Drummond to Cadogan unno. l. d. 27 Dec. 1924 and encls., Cadogan to Nicolson 
unno. l. d-29 Dec. 1924 and encls.; ToI)V'r(x-(Dep7(x5'q, EX?, Tjvo-BOIA7(XPIKE; MMVOTýTE;, pp. 113- 
4,166-7. 
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be put on the agenda of the next League Council meeting. The Greek assembly had 
decided that the provisions of the protocol were at variance with those of the Greek 
minorities treaty since they institutionalised interference in Greek internal affairs and 
'far from assuring a period of peace, constitute a source of conflicts and continual 
fTiction'. 131 
The actions of the Greeks greatly displeased the Bulgarians who, as Nicolson had 
perceived, were doing all they could to keep the protocol alive. On the one hand, they 
petitioned the mixed emigration commission to conduct an inquiry into the treatment 
of minorities in both countries, in order to put the Greeks in an awkward position 'by 
perpetuating international interest in the question'. 132The Greeks were reluctant to co- 
operate with this inquiry, and placed. various procedural obstacles in its path, not least 
because they now strongly doubted Corfe's impartiality. 1330n the other hand, the 
Bulgarians sought support from the great powers, in the first instance to prevent a 
Greek rejection of the protocol and then to try and secure assistance in opposing the 
Greeks at the Council meeting due in March. Kalfoff spoke eloquently of the danger 
posed to stability in Bulgaria by the continuing influx of refugees from Greece, and 
contrasted Bulgaria's loyal execution of her obligations with Greece's flouting of her 
own, but to no avail. Although for a short time it appeared that the Italians might help 
Sofia, the British and French were never in doubt that the Greeks were right to 
concentrate on improving their relations with Yugoslavia, even at the expense of 
those with Bulgaria. 134 
Indeed, the British now began to render more active assistance to the Greeks. The 
acting secretary general of the League, Joseph Avenol, suggested on II February that ZýP 
131 FO 371/10663 League of Nations C. 54. M. 32.1925 1 note by Drummond and encls. (also printed 
in Touvr(x-(Dep7()c5Tj, EXXTjvo-BoUý(XP*I-KEq MELOVOTTITF-;, pp. 197-8). 132 FO 371/10663 Barber to FO no. 5 d. 14 Jan. 1925, min. by Nicolson nd. [quoted]. 133 FO 371/10663 Cheetham, to FO no. 25 d. 16 Jan. 1925, Erskine to FO no. 16 d. 29 Jan. 1925; FO 371/10664 Colban to Cadogan unno. l. d. 31 Mar. 1925 (enclosing a report by Corfe and De Roover d. 2 Mar. 1925), min. by Bateman d. 14 Apr. 1924, min. by Howard Smith d. 15 Apr. 1925. 134 DBFP/I/XXVII/' )7-8,71-2; FO 371/10663 mins. by Bateman dA Feb. 1925, FO to Erskine no-42 
d. 6 Feb. 1925, min. by Bateman d. 17 Feb. 1925, min. by Howard S mith d. 17 Feb. 1925; Tol)v. T(x-(DF-p- 
ýC(8ý, EXX1jvo-Bo-uX7(xpvcE; MF-tovoTqcF-;, pp. 129-32. 
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Chamberlain should act as rapporteur for the minority protocol question when it 
carne before the Council. This idea was welcomed by the Foreign Office, on the 
grounds that only the British knew all the intricacies of the question and that in any 
case 'as we are responsible for this muddle, we should assume a leading part in 
clearing it up 
'. 135As Chamberlain himself put it: 'Bother! or words to that effect, but 
Yes'. 136 
Accordingly, in early March the Foreign Office drew up a draft report for 
Chamberlain to present to the League Council. This began by rejecting the Greek 
contention that no contract had ever existed between Greece and the League without 
Greek ratification of the protocol, and then went on to challenge the Greek assembly 
resolution of 3 February, specifically the claim that the protocol was at variance with 
the minorities treaties and constituted an unwarrantable interference in Greek internal 
affairs. The report went on, however, to concede that, given the internal problems the 
protocol had caused in Greece, and the friction it had engendered with Yugoslavia, it 
would be in the best interests of peace for the Council to release Greece from her 
obligations. Lastly, the report posited the conditions upon which this should be done, 
which were intended to ensure that 'the indirect interests of the Bulgarian 
Government, as well as the more direct interests of the Slavophone minorities, are not 
thereby sacrificed'. Greece was to be asked three questions about her treatment of 
minorities: what had been done since September 1924 to execute the minorities 
treaties; what did the Greeks plan to do in the future to this end; and what were the 
needs of the Slav minority regarding education and religion, and what measures did 
Greece intend to take to satisfy them. The League's consent to releasing Greece from 
her obligations was to be made dependent on her answers to these questions. 137 
In its criticism of the Greeks this report was, in Lampson's words, 'very outspoken'. 
This, however, was inevitable, for although the Greeks had to nullify the protocol to Z-1) 
135 FO '371/10663 Avenol to Cadogan unno. l. d. II Feb. 1925, min. by Nicolson d. 18 Feb. 1925 
[quoted], min. by Lampson d. 19 Feb. 1925. 
136 FO '371/10663 min. by Chamberlain d. 20 Feb. 1925. 137 FO 371/10663 draft report by Nicolson d. [? 2] Mar. 1925. 
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irnprove their relations with Yugoslavia, the face of the League had also to be saved, 
and this could only be at Greek expense: 
the prestige of the League is worth more than that of the Greeks: and though 
the Greeks are to some extent to be humiliated, they get out of the Protocol, the 
Bulgars get protection (to which they are entitled by treaty) and, ultimately, 
everyone ought to be satisfied. A very ingenious way out in fact! 138 
In any case, the Foreign Office had no desire to create unnecessary problems for the 
Greeks. True, when on 4 March the Greek charge in London presented Nicolson with 
a memorandum espousing the Greek case, Nicolson warned him that the Greeks 
'could not expect to be let off easily' and that they would find Chamberlain's report 
'somewhat severe'. 139However, at the same time he helped him by outlining the 
contents of the report, which enabled Athens to begin planning its riposte well before 
the meeting of the Council. "' 
The League Council discussed the protocol on 14 March, but before then there were 
further negotiations between British and Greek representatives at Geneva to modify 
Chamberlain's report. The main objection of the Greeks, as expressed by Venizelos, 
their chief delegate, in a letter to Chamberlain on II March, was to the contention 
that Greece had in fact been bound by the protocol. Venizelos reiterated the Greek 
argument that, although Politis had kept Athens aufait with the general tenor of his 
negotiations at Geneva the previous September, he had introduced the clause 
providing for its immediate entry into force on his own initiative, and so Greece was 
entitled to regard the protocol as void. Chamberlain went some way to meet these 
objections, and watered down his report by making several textual alterations, the 
most important of which accepted that Politis had exceeded his instructions in signing 
the protocol. 141 
138 FO 371/10663 min. by Lampson d. 2 Mar. 1925. 139 FO 371/10663 pro memoria communicated by Melas d. 4 Mar. 1925, min. by Nicolson d. 5 
Mar. 1925. 
140 Toi)vr()c--OCpý(X8-rj, EX%ijvo-Boi)%7ccpticz; MF--Lovovlreq, pp. 13')-3. 141 FO 371/10664 FO memorandum by Cadogan d. 18 Mar. 1925 and annexes. 
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Chamberlain opened the Council meeting on the morning of 14 March by reading his 
now modified report, concluding with the three questions which were to be put to the 
Greeks about the treatment of minorities. Venizelos then replied with an 
accomplished speech, firstly admitting that the Greek assembly resolution of 3 
February had perhaps been unfortunately worded and then giving some preliminary 
answers to Chamberlain's questions. He then contended that the Greek assembly had 
done ?a great service' to the League by putting an end to an arrangement that, though 
inspired by laudable intentions, ignored political realities and would otherwise have 
caused nothing but friction and created a permanent problem for Geneva. Finally, he 
alluded to the recent abortive attempts to establish a tighter system of collective 
secunty: 
in conclusion, because I am an old man, I would like to make a 
recommendation to the secretariat of the League of Nations. It would be best, 
perhaps, for the future, whenever an agreement is being concluded before or by 
the League of Nations, to avoid the word'protocol'; it seems to bring bad 
luck. 142 
Chamberlain's report was thereupon approved by the Council, and embodied in a 
letter from Drummond to the Greeks on 2 April. 143 
This outcome was obviously unwelcome to the Bulgarians. They had fought a vain 
rearguard action at Geneva in favour of the protocol, and now could only draw some 
crumbs of comfort from the condemnation of Athens contained in Chamberlain's 
report: they claimed as a 'moral success' the fact that he had supported Bulgaria's right 
vto interest herself in the lot of the Bulgarian minority'in Greece. 1441n Britain, a 
motley assortment of bulgarophils and League enthusiasts continued to agitate in 
parliament and the press to ensure that the Greeks did not evade their obligations 
under the minorities treaties, but it was difficult for them to attack the Geneva 
142 FO 371/10664 'Extract from the minutes of the Eleventh Meeting (Public) of the Thirty-Third 
Session of the Council of the League of Nations' d. 14 Mar. 1925; To1jvccc--OEp7a8TJ, EXXTIvo-Bou), 
ýUPIXF_g MaovoTý, if,;, pp. 134-7,199-210. 
143 Toi)vr(x--O6p7(X8jj, EXXTjvo-BoiA7(xpticF_; MetovoTq. Teý, pp-137-8,211-2. 
144 FO 371/10664 Kalfoff to Chamberlain p. l. d. 12 Mar. 1925 and encl., Erskine to FO no. 55 d. 18 
Mar. 1925 [quoted]. 
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settlement which was in theory designed to achieve the same end as the Politis- 
Kalfoff protocol, namely the protection for the slavophone minority. 145 
In formulating their replies to the League's questions, the Greeks were subjected to 
conflicting pressures. On the one hand, Colban suggested early in April that the Greek 
reply should be ready by mid-May, so as to allow the question to be dealt with at the 
June Council meeting. As to the content of the reply, he intimated that the third 
question - relating to the specific cultural needs of the Slav minority and the steps the 
Greeks would take to meet them - was the most important, and that the reply should 
'give as exactly as possible the actual position of the Slav minorities in Greece, with 
an indication of their geographical distribution and material conditions', as well as 
details of their demands 'in respect to schools and religious matters' and 'the 
programme of the Greek Government for satisfying these demands'. 146This was 
hardly music to the ears of the Greeks, who by this time were in the middle of 
negotiations at Belgrade for the renewal of the Yugoslav alliance. They would have 
preferTed to postpone any discussion of the sensitive minorities question until after 
the conclusion of these negotiations; much less did they want to embark on a detailed 
exposition of the situation of the minorities such as Colban envisaged, since this was 
certain to envenom relations with the Yugoslavs given their notorious sensitivity on 
the question of the Macedo-Slavs. 147 
Eventually, the need for the Greeks to remain on good terms with the League ensured 
that their replies were ready by the end of May; but the necessity of not offending 
Belgograde meant that the content of the replies was an uneasy compromise. In their 
covering note the Greeks first responded in a conciliatory tone to the Council's 
criticism of the resolution of 3 February, but went on to rebut the contention that the 
145 181 HC Deb. 5s 922-3,2242-3; 183HCDeb. 5s 910; PRO 30/69/117OTchitchovsky to 
MacDonald p. l. U Mar. 1925, Noel Buxton to MacDonald p. l. d. 23 Mar. 1925. This volume also 
contains a number of press clippings critical of Greece taken, for example, from the Manchester 
Guardian. 
146 FO 371/10664 Colban to Cado ' oan unno. 
l. d. 1 Apr. 1925 and encls.; To'L)V'T(X--(DCpýcc8'q, EX? 'Tjvo- 
BOIAý(XptKcý MetovoTTjTF-;, p. 138. 
147 Touv-T(x-(DcpT(x8, q, EUTIvo-B o'uX7(xpticE; MEtovoTflTE;, pp. 13 8-9. 
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protection of the Slav minority in Greece was of even indirect interest to Bulgaria; on 
the contrary, minority questions were internal ones which involved only the state 
concerned and the League. In response to the League's first question, the Greeks said 
that as the minorities treaty had only come into force the previous August, no 
legislative action had yet been taken to ensure the protection of minorities; and that 
the case of the Slav minority was further complicated by the voluntary exchange that 
was still being effected. Nevertheless, the existing Greek constitution and laws 
already accorded full rights to all minorities. The response to the second question - 
about the future intentions of the Greek government in this area - was equally vague 
and stated only that it would take any action necessary to ensure the rights of 
minorities. 
The reply to the crucial third question was equally nebulous, stating merely that the 
needs of the slavophone minority were no different from those of any other minority, 
and that these needs were guaranteed by the minorities treaties and Greek law. 
However, the Greek government was prepared to consider in a friendly spirit any 
requests made to it for the opening of slavophone schools or for the use of the Slav 
dialect in church services. Lastly, the Greeks promised not to discriminate against the 
slavophone minority, but warned that they would not allow the schools or churches of 
the minority to be used for propaganda against the Greek state. 148 
The Greek reply was formally delivered to the League on 29 May. But already before 
this, when its contents had been discussed by Colban and the Greek charge at Berne, 
Dendramis, the dissatisfaction of League circles had become manifest. In Colban's 
view, the third reply was far too vague; it implied that the Greeks would not enforce 
the minorities treaty unless requested to do so; and it was unlikely to be accepted by 
the Council without prolonged discussion. Dendramis pleaded in reply that even in its 
present vacrue form the Greek reply risked offending Yugoslavia. In the alliance t) Z) 
negotiations Belgrade had been pressing for the signature of a bilateral protocol b Z: ) t) 
148 FO 371/10664 Colban to Cadogan unno. l. d. 29 May 1925 and encls.; Touvvx-4DF-p7(x5Tj, EUTIv 
o-Boj)XT(XptKEc MFtovoTnrEq, pp. 139-40,212-7. Iz 
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sirnilar to the Politis-Kalfoff protocol, by which the Macedo-Slavs would be 
recognised as Serbs. Greece's insistence that minority questions concerned only 
individual states and the League was therefore objectionable to the Yugoslavs who 
had claims on minorities in Greece and resented any League interference with their 
own. If the League was to launch a detailed investigation into the position of the 
Macedo-Slavs, Greece's relations with her neighbours would be even more inflamed. 
Colban took note of Greece's difficulties, but warned Dendramis that the final 
decision rested with the rapporteur, Chamberlain, who he felt sure would be unable 
to close the matter on the basis of the Greek note. 149 
In fact, the British, who took a broader view of the issue, were more sympathetic to 
the Greeks than Colban, who after all was concerned much more specifically with the 
welfare of the minorities. Nicolson argued on 4 June that the Greek replies were 'not 
wholly unsatisfactory when we consider what a difficult course the Greeks had to 
steer between their own public opinion on the one hand, and on the other the menaces 
of the S. C. S. Government'. The Greeks were 'not by nature inclined to persecute their 
minorities', and their assurances could be accepted 'as being made in perfectly good 
faith', subject to a supplementary assurance being given that they would fulfil their 
obligations under the treaties irrespective of whether they were petitioned to do so or 
not. 150 Chamberlain agreed, and in the end decided that the incident could be closed, 
provided the Greeks gave the further assurance stipulated by Nicolson. 151 
Any potential clash between the priorities of the British and those of Geneva was 
averted, when circumstances conspired to ensure that the question was disposed of 
quickly. On I June the negotiations between Greece and Yugoslavia were adjourned 
sine die, largely because of Greece's refusal to accept Yugoslavia's exorbitant 
demands. As regards minorities, the Greeks were well within their rights to refuse to 
sign a protocol with the Yugoslavs, since their contention that such matters concerned Z1- 
149 FO 371/10664 Colban to Cadogan unno. l. d. 29 May 1925 and encls., cf. Towvx--(DEPý011, EXX 
ývo-Boi)Xý()tptKE; Mp-tovornTF-;, pp. 140-1. 
150 FO 371/10664 min. by Nicolson dA Jun. 1925. 151 FO 371/10664 min. by Chamberlain d. 5 Jun. 1925. 
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only themselves and the League was, as Chamberlain recognised, correct. 152 
Furthermore, the suspension of the negotiations produced a general disposition to 
avoid resuscitating controversy in the minorities question. On his journey to Geneva, 
Chamberlain received Venizelos in Paris on 6 June, and assured him that he would 
accept the Greek replies. 153 Briand, ever-anxious to compose Greco-Yugoslav 
differences, told Politis in Paris that he too would support the Greeks at Geneva, and 
even the Italians, who had latterly been working to hinder a rapprochement between 
Athens and Belgrade, agreed not to make trouble. This spirit also apparently 
permeated the Minorities Section of the League: Dendramis reported that Colban now 
believed that the question had become a political one, and that the preservation of 
peace in the Balkans was the highest imperative. 154 
The Council considered the Greek reply on 10 June, by which time the contents of a 
supplementary Greek statement had been arranged between Chamberlain and the 
Greek delegate, Kaklamanos. 155 Accordingly, after Chamberlain had read the Greek 
replies, Kaklamanos made a speech, refuting accusations of vagueness, and detailing 
the administrative measures that were in hand to meet the educational and religious 
needs of the slavophone minority in accordance with articles 8 and 9 of the Greek 
minorities treaty. Chamberlain expressed the hope that the Council would find these 
statements satisfactory as proof 'that the Greek Government realised its obligations 
and was prepared to meet them' - to which the Council unanimouslY assented. It was 
agreed that no further action was required and the Politis-Kalfoff protocol was 
thereby laid to rest. 156 
152 FO 371/10664 min. by Chamberlain d. 5 Jun. 1925. For the breakdown of negotiations, see 
DBFP/I/XXVII/176-8,189-92,196-200,205-9 and chapter 11. 
153 Toi)vr(x-(Dppýa5Tj, EXXTjvo-Bo-okýapiKe; MEtovoMiF_;, pp. 141-2; FO 800/258 Crewe to 
Chamberlain p. l. d. 2 Jun. 1925, Chamberlain to Crewe p. l. d. 3 Jun, 1925, Crewe to Chamberlain p. l. 
dA Jun. 1925. Chamberlain urged Crewe to take steps beforehand to prevent 'that eminent person who 
is also an excessively loquacious gentleman from taking up too much of my time. 154 Toi)vT(x-(Dp ': oi)X7(xpL1cc; MaovoTfl-TE:;, pp. 142-3,168. pyx5TI, EkXTjvo-B 
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In some respects, British policy during this affair was untypical. Usually, the British 
government preferred to operate by means of general statements of principle and 
exhortations to moderation and compromise, and always preferred joint Allied action 
to unilateral steps. 1570n this occasion, however, Chamberlain - albeit reluctantly - 
felt compelled to intervene directly in the dispute and took various initiatives without 
consulting France and Italy. It was, on the other hand, quite typical that while 
Chamberlain's action was channelled through the League, he still saw that body not as 
a potentially autonomous institution but as an instrument of policy to be used by the 
powers as and when they wished. 158 It suited Chamberlain in this instance to mask the 
prominence of his own role and to use the League to negate a policy because it did 
not fit with British interests;, but what seemed to be a League achievement was in fact 
a British one. 
British policy during this affair was also symptomatic of British policy in the Balkans 
in general at this time. The ultimate British goal of preserving peace demanded that, 
once the Yugoslavs had taken umbrage at the protocol, London should opt to work 
with the Greeks to secure its annulment -a decision which was only reinforced by the 
fact that a British representative had largely been responsible for the contentious 
protocol in the first place. Yet this did not reflect any particular partiality for the 
Greeks. It simply demonstrated once again Britain's overwhelming concern for the 
restoration of stable conditions in Europe, something which certainly also overrode 
abstract notions of principle to do with minority protection. 
In working to reconcile Greece with Yugoslavia, the British were of course accepting 
the perpetuation of a lesser evil, namely conflict between Greece and Bulgaria over 
their minorities. In this respect, the League settlement certainly did not bring peace 
since, notwithstanding the fact that the Greek minorities treaty was now in force, the 
157 DBFP/I/XXVI/v. 
158 For a discussion of Chamberlain's view of the function of the League and its r6le in British 
Policy, see P. J. Beck, 'From the Geneva Protocol to the Greco-Bulgarian dispute: the development of 
the Baldwin government's policy towards the peacekeeping r6le of the League of Nations, 1924- 
1925', British Journal of International Studies 6(l) 1980 52-68. 
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elimination of the protocol only re-established the troubled situation that had 
prevailed the previous summer. The provisions for the protection of minorities 
continued to go unobserved in both countries and continued to envenom relations 
between them. In late July, the Greek mayor of the village of Stanimaka in Bulgar-ja 
was murdered, and this incident, together with other alleged instances of pressure 
upon Greeks to emigrate and of comitadji action, was used as a pretext by the volatile 
Pangalos, now in charge in Athens, to reinforce Greece's frontier troops. 159The Greek 
press did not help matters by hinting that these reinforcements 'might even be used to 
occupy a strip of Bulgarian territory as a means of pressure on the Bulgarian 
government', and tension between the two was very high. 160 Kalfoff tried to be 
conciliatory, but lamented that the real cause of trouble was the influx of refugees to 
Greece, which created pressure on the Bulgarian minority there and a consequent 
refugee problem in Bulgaria. 161 The Greek government for its part continued as the 
summer wore on to make accusations of varying degrees of plausibility against Sofia 
about the persecution of Greeks in Bulgaria. 162 
In these circumstances - with Pangalos at the helm in Greece and long-standing bitter 
disputes rumbling on - the outbreak of the Greco-Bulgarian incident in October 1925 
hardly came as a surprise. Once the fighting was over, the report of the League of 
Nations Rumbold commission underlined the contribution that this minority problem 
made to the instability of the Balkans. The main problem, the commission argued, 
was the large number of Slavs previously resident in Greece who had opted for Greek 
nationality - as they were entitled to do by the Greek minorities treaty - but had been 
forced to flee to Bulgaria leaving behind property in Greece which had been occupied 
by incoming Greek refugees. These people formed a seething mass of discontent in 
Bulgaria, since they were largely destitute, susceptible to the wiles of IMRO and 
hostile to the ethnic Greeks remaining in Bulgaria. The commission recommended Z: ) 
159 DBFP/I/XXVII/227-8; FO 286/916 Keeling to FO no. 246 d. 5 Aug. 1925. 160F0371/10664 Erskine to FO no. 173 d. 6 Aug. 1925 [quoted], min. by Bateman d. 11 Aug. 1925. 161 FO 286/916 Keeling to FO tel. 132 d. 6 Aug. 1925, Erskine to FO no. 178 d. 13 Aug. 1925. 162 FO 371/10664 Stevenson to FO no. 208 d. I Oct. 1925. 
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that they should either be allowed to avail themselves retrospectively of the 
provisions of the exchange convention - in which case their properties in Greece 
would be liquidated and compensation awarded - or be induced to renounce their 
claim to opt for Greece (and their theoretical right to return there and oust the 
incoming refugees from their former homes) in return for generous compensation. 
This was but one of a package of measures recommended by the commission to iron 
out the inconsistencies between the minorities treaties and the exchange convention, 
to effect a more complete exchange and to speed up the work of liquidation so that 
those who had emigrated should lose their ties with their former country of 
residence. 163 
The Rumbold commission report thus posited a realist political solution to the 
minorities problem which the Politis-Kalfoff protocol had addressed from a more 
idealistic perspective. The protocol had emphasised the minorities treaties rather than 
the exchange convention, and was intended in practice to discourage emigration by 
according to the minorities as full an international protection as possible. Conversely, 
the Rumbold commission accepted that in the circumstances prevailing in the Balkans 
it was better to persuade the minorities to emigrate, to have Slavs on one side of the 
frontier and Greeks on the other, than to try and ensure protection of their rights in 
their original countries. 164This in turn illustrates the two contradictory impulses 
underlying the approach of the great powers and the international community to the 
problem of the existence of non-dominant minorities after the war. On the one hand, 
there was the liberal idea that guaranteeing the rights of minorities and ending their 
maltreatment was the best way to eliminate the minority problem as a source of 
international friction. This gave birth to the minorities treaties and the whole League 
protection system; but it brought with it the problem, however, that interference with 
the internal affairs of states did not sit well with the primacy of national sovereignty 
163 Mair, Protection of Minorities, pp. 185-7; Ladas, Exchange, pp. 91-3; Toi)v'r(x--(DeP7(X5Tj, EkkTlvo 
-Bo, ukýctpjjcF; MaovoTqiF-g, pp. 159-61. 
164 Ladas, Exchange, pp. 92-3,113-4. 
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as enshrined in the post-war peace settlement. On the other hand, there was a 
pragmatic, realist view that given the political circumstances prevailing in eastern and 
south-eastem Europe, and whatever the hardship and suffering caused by exchanges 
of populations, friction might best be removed by eliminating the minorities 
themselves. This countervailing impulse produced, most traumatically, the Greco- 
Turkish compulsory exchange, but also the voluntary exchange between Greece and 
Bulgaria. This particular comer of the Balkans, where both these contradictory 
strategies for dealing with minorities problems were employed simultaneously, 
presents, perhaps, an interesting case study; and the outcome of the conflict between 
the two strategies would seem to point clearly to the greater effectiveness of exchange 
as a means of securing the peace and stability which the interests of the great powers 
demanded. 
In the Greco-Bulgarian case, the outcome of these twin processes by the late 1920s 
was something of a messy compromise. The very fact that two contradictory 
instruments had been established in 1919-20 made this likely, and the added 
complication of the influx of refugees from Asia Minor - which was the root cause of 
a large amount of defacto compulsory emigration between Greece and Bulgaria - 
made it certain. At first the Greeks obstructed the implementation of the Rumbold 
commission report, and then the Bulgarians made little effort to induce their refugees 
to avail themselves of the benefits of the exchange convention. The results, therefore, 
were disappointing. Although the flotation of the Bulgarian refugee loan eased the 
situation there somewhat, many residual claims lingered on as a source of resentment, 
quiteapart from the numbers of Slavs who actually remained resident in Greece. 165 
Still, this whole episode was testament to the difficulties faced by minority groups by 
virtue of the fact that states, and ultimately the great powers, defined the nature of the 
'problem'posed by their existence and imposed solutions in their own state interests. 
Overall, the shabby treatment meted out to both Greek and Bulgarian minorities in 
these years by Balkan states, great powers and even, perhaps, in the case of the 
165 Ladas, Exchange, pp. 93-4,591-617; Mair, Protection of Minorities, pp. 186-90. ' 
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Politis-Kalfoff protocol, by the League, provides a good illustration of the fact that 
although the powers introduced the minority protection system to help preserve 
peace, it was just as likely that minority rights would be sacrificed in pursuit of that 
same end. 
Chapter Eleven 
Greece and Yugoslavia: an Alliance in Abeyance 
1922-1925 
312 
The Politis-Kalfoff protocol affair, although in part a product of Greco-Bulgarian 
antagonism over minority issues, was also a function of the troubled relationship 
between Greece and Yugoslavia. The haste of the Greeks to rid themselves of the 
protocol reflected the central importance which restoring cordiality with Belgrade 
occupied in Greek external affairs until the end of the Pangalos dictatorship (and 
indeed beyond). The points at issue were complex and varied, ranging from economic 
grievances over Salonica, through the minority problem of the status of the Macedo- 
Slavs, to a point of prestige concerning the lands of a Serbian monastery on Mount 
Athos. ' Forever looming behind these ostensible issues, however, lay the spectre of 
Yugoslav territorial claims to Greek Macedonia, and especially Salonica, and the 
alliance negotiations were also an attempt to register and quantify the changed 
balance of power between the two states since 1913. The great powers, too, were 
involved: the Italians perhaps most directly (because of their pretensions to dominate 
their neighbours), but also the British, concerned for Balkan stability, and the French, 
because of economic interests and the key role of Yugoslavia in their security system. 
Equally, the negotiations reflected the wider course of international relations in 
Europe. After Locarno, they became enmeshed in the search for a Balkan security 
pact and helped both to frustrate its achievement and to demonstrate why it was 
always a remote prospect. 
The external relations of Yugoslavia in this first decade of its existence were complex 
and multi-faceted. A corollary of the large size of the state was that it faced foreign 
policy problems at all points of the compass. As the inheritor of a large part of the 
Habsburg lands in the north, Yugoslavia was an integral member of the Little 
Entente, committed to working with Romania and Czechoslovakia to contain and 
control the revival of Austria and, more particularly, Hungary. As a state constructed 
around the nucleus of Serbia, Yugoslavia also shared the more specifically Balkan 
orientation of that kingdom: the cold rivalry with Bulgaria, the troubled friendship 
with Greece and the attempt to establish a modus vivendi with the infant Albania. This 
1 DBFP/1/XXVI/398-400. 
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last involved not only the ongoing delimitation of the border between the two states, 
but also a certain measure of Yugoslav interference in Albanian internal politics: 
Belgrade, for example, certainly had a hand in the return to power of Ahmed Zogu 
Bey in December 1924.2 This concern for influence in Albania was in turn one of the 
issues which involved Yugoslavia in friction with her great power neighbour, Italy. 
Rome viewed Belgrade with suspicion as a regional rival, and although the resolution 
of the Fiume question and the conclusion of the Pact of Rome in January 1924 in 
theory marked the achievement of an accommodation between the two states, in 
practice their relations continued to be equivocal. Moreover, as an integral part of 
France's network of alliances and influence in eastern Europe, Yugoslavia was a key 
element in the Franco-Italian struggle for pre-eminence in central Europe and the 
Balkans which intensified during and after 1925. 
The domestic political foundations upon which Yugoslav foreign policy was based 
were characterised by both stability and profound divisions. 'For most of this period 
Yugoslav politics were dominated by the Serbs, and especially the Radical party 
headed by the veteran statesman Pasic. He was prime minister continuously (except 
for the brief period from July to October 1924) from the first Yugoslav elections in 
1920 until April 1926. This apparent stability, however, belied the profound divisions 
that split Yugoslav society and politics: antagonism between the Serbs and Croats was 
intense, and centred on the issue of nature of the new state. On the whole, Serbs 
tended to see the new state as a Greater Serbia, and consequently to favour unitary, 
centralised. political arrangements, whereas the Croats preferred to think of it as a 
union of equals and to argue for a federal, decentralised political structure. The 
diversity and fragmentation of the opposition parties allowed the Radicals to fashion 
the state in their own image in the early 1920s, and by 1925 the Croats had 
abandoned their more extreme demands for autonomy, accepted the constitution and 
monarchy and joined a coalition government with the Radicals. This consensus was, 
2 Albanian issues are amply documented in DBFPIIIXII, XXII, XXIV, XXVI and XXVII. An (admittedly tendentious) account of Albanian politics in this period can be found in K. Frasheri, The History of Albania (A Brief Survey) (Tirana, [no publisher] 1964), pp. 213-41. 
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however, always uneasy and once death removed the commanding presence of Pasic 
in December 1926 Yugoslav democracy became increasingly unworkable, leading 
King Alexander to establish a royal dictatorship in 1929.3 
This domestic instability hardly crippled Yugoslav diplomacy, but it did at times 
exert an influence upon it. Although Pasic was in office almost constantly, the 
Radical party never achieved an absolute majority in the Skupstina, and its dominance 
was due in large part to a mastery of the intricacies of coalition politics. The need to 
win votes or to buy off particular interest groups in these circumstances was bound to 
affect foreign policy to a certain extent. In April 1923 during a cabinet crisis, when 
Pasic was attempting to rebuild his government, rumours began to circulate that the 
Serbs would seek'foreign adventures as a relief to the complications at home'. Nincic, 
however, rebutted these tales, arguing that domestic instability was in fact a great 
incentive for Belgrade to pursue a pacific foreign poliCy. 4 More substantively, in the 
winter of 1924-5, Nincic's campaign against the bolshevik menace - his 
rapprochement with Bulgaria and his activities in Albania - was conducted with at 
least one eye on the internal political situation and the Radicals' desire to dish the 
Croats. 5 After the rapprochement between Serbs and Croats in 1925, the Croats were 
able to exercise a more direct influence on policy: they obstructed the ratification of 
the Nettuno conventions of July 1925 with Italy, for example, and this contributed to 
Mussolini's drive to isolate Yugoslavia which later bore fruit in Italian agreements 
with Albania and Hungary. 6 
In the early 1920s Greco-Yugoslav relations were cordial enough but nevertheless 
tinged with unease and suspicion. In 1923 at Lausanne the Yugoslavs were generally 
supportive of Greece (although not to the point of encouraging the war party there to 
3 For accounts of Yugoslav politics up to 1929, see Rothschild, East Central Europe, pp. 201-35 and 
A. N. Dragnich, The First Yugoslavia. Searchfor a Viable Political System (Stanford, Hoover 
Institution Press, 1983), pp. 1 -73, especially 14-42. 4 DBFP/lfXXIV/580,586,599-601. 
5 DBFP/I/XXVI/439-40,450,460; Dragnich, First Yugoslavia, pp. 35-6. See also pp. 127,257-8 above 
and PP-322-3 below. 
6 Rothschild, East Central Europe, pp. 227-8. 
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re-open hostilities) and after the conference the Greeks 'professed the profoundest 
gratitude' for this assistance. 7Equally the Yugoslavs were sympathetic during the 
Corfu crisis and, whilst maintaining an interest in the personal safety of King George, 
adopted a benevolent attitude during Greece's constitutional convulsionS. 80n the 
other hand, Belgrade took a leading part in obstructing the adhesion of Greece to the 
Little Entente, on the grounds that Athens had no interest in central Europe, and 
although the Greeks accepted this rebuff they felt it keenly. 9 Moreover, rumours 
persistently arose about Yugoslav intrigues with one or other power hostile to Greek 
interests: in March and April there was talk of a possible separate peace or secret 
political agreement between Belgrade and the Turks; 10 the Yugoslav -Bulgarian 
rapprochement symbolised by the Nis negotiations caused the Greeks concern 
throughout the spring, I' and there was also at the same time a resurgence of perennial 
fears in Athens of a potential Italo-Yugoslav agreement directed against Greece. 12 
There was little of substance in any of these fears and rumours, but the fact that 
Athens gave them credence betrayed not only the Greeks' sense of isolation but also 
their uncertainty about the reliability of their northern ally. 
In theory the alliance of 1913 still governed relations between the two powers: the 
Greeks referred to it as 'the pivot' of their foreign policy and the Yugoslavs spoke of 
the links of 'friendship and alliance' which bound them to Athens. 13 The validity of 
the alliance was, however, in some doubt given the momentous changes that had 
occurred in the Balkans since its signature, and this was reflected in the most 
7 FO 371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 p. 43; DBFP/1/XXIV/708. The Yugoslavs had their own 
interest in the achievement of a peace settlement of course, even though they eventually refused to 
sign the treaty of Lausanne with all the other powers in protest at the provisions dealing with the 
Partition of the Ottoman debt (DBFP/I/XVIII/777,789,919-20,947,954-5,972). 
8 FO 371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 pp. 42-3. 9 DBFP/I/XXIV/692-3,707-9,731-2,734,781,784,814-5; FO 371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 
p. 43; FO 371/8841 file 10117 passim. 10 DBFP/I/XVIII/597-8,670-1. 
11 See pp. 251-2 above. 
12 FO 371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 p. 42; FO 371/8832 Bentinck to FO no. 322 d. 21 
Apr. 1923. 
13 FO 371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 pp. 42-3. For the text of the alliance, see 
BFSP/108/686-9. 
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pronunent political issue existing between Greece and Yugoslavia, that of the 
Yugoslav free zone at Salonica and related questions. In one sense this was simply a 
hangover from pre-war days: in article 7 of the 1913 alliance the Greeks had 
undertaken to provide facilities for Serbian trade at the port, but the convention of 
May 1914 to implement this promise remained unratified at the outbreak of the war. 14 
On the other hand, when the Yugoslavs took up this question again after the Greek 
defeat in Asia Minor, the context had completely changed: Serbia had been 
immeasurably strengthened by transformation into Yugoslavia and Greece relatively 
much weakened. The Yugoslav demands for satisfaction on the Salonica question 
thus also reflected a desire to establish a new modus vivendi, more in keeping with the 
present balance of power between the two states than the 1913 alliance. 15 
In November 1922 the Greek foreign minister, Politis, visited Belgrade to seek 
Yugoslav support for the forthcoming peace conference. To this end, the Greeks 
offered to improve the harbour at Salonica, to ratify the 1914 convention and to 
conclude a new commercial treaty. The Yugoslavs, however, were looking for much 
more from Athens than this (which was little more than they had secured in 1914), 
and early in January Nincic declared that 'there could be no question of any political 
conversations with Greece' until 'a more satisfactory agreement' was reached 
regarding Salonica. 16Later in the same month a report came from Athens that 
14 FO 371/8832 memorandum by Troutbeck d. 19 Jan. 1923. For the text of the 1914 convention, see 
BFSP11 12/1097-1108. 
15 There seem to have been no detailed discussions between Athens and Belgrade on the Salonica 
question before the Greek defeat. The question was, indeed, only raised in the context of Yugoslav 
denials of territorial ambitions there. See, for example, DBFP/I/XXII/128-9,185-7,218-21,258- 
61,267,284-5,287-8,290,301. Article 10 of the 1913 alliance had stipulated that it was to last for at 
least ten years ('11 ne pourra etre d6noncd avant 1'expiration de dix anndes': BFSPI1081689), and so it 
was not surprising that the Yugoslavs should have turned their attention to it and the Salonica 
question in the winter of 1922-3, quite apart from the fact that Greece was now weak and the war in 
Anatolia over. There seems in fact to have been a widespread belief or understanding, despite the 
actual wording of the treaty, that after ten years some positive act of renewal would be necessary. 
Pasic said as much in July 1921 (DBFP/1/XXII/287-8,290) and in November 1924 Marcilly spoke of 
the treaty as having lapsed eighteen months earlier and having been tacitly prolonged ever since 
(MAE Yougoslavie 51 Marcilly to QO no. 245 d. 21 Nov. 1924). In fact, there could be no doubt that 
juridically the treaty would still be in force until one of the contracting parties denounced it. 16 DBFP/I/XXIV/384-5,390-1,401,456; FO 371/8832 memorandum by Troutbeck d. 19 Jan. 1923. 
These proceedings were tinged with comedy: originally the Yugoslavs accepted the Greek offer of In November because they mistook a copy of their own draft proposals of 1914 for the signed definitive 
convention. When it became clear that the latter document was rather less favourable the Yugoslav 
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Yugoslavia had asked Greece for a territorial corridor some fifteen kilometres wide 
stretching from Salonica to the Yugoslav border and encompassing the rail line 
linking the two states. Although the Yugoslavs later denied making any such demand, 
it nonetheless indicated the drift of their ambitions. 17 
The Greeks recognised the necessity of conciliating their ally and by March both 
powers had submitted drafts for a new convention. These were agreed on the basic 
point of a free zone for the Yugoslavs at Salonica, but there were 'differences big 
enough to cause considerable controversy' between them over the details of the 
management of the port and the overall division of authority there, issues which the 
Greeks regarded as impinging upon their sovereignty. 18 Negotiations rumbled on, and 
in April the Greeks made further concessions, recognising that at a moment when the 
Turkish situation was so delicately balanced they could not afford to antagonise 
Belgrade: the Yugoslav-Bulgarian rapprochement and rurnours of a secret Italo- 
Yugoslav political agreement (whereby Rome would induce Belgrade to abandon 
designs on the Adriatic in favour of expansion southwards) also contributed to Greek 
acquiescence. 19 The final Greek climbdown came on 10 May when a convention was 
signed in Belgrade giving the Serbs a free zone in Salonica of some 94,000 square 
metres leased for fifty years. 20 Negotiations continued throughout the summer on the 
texts of various protocols to be attached to the convention to regulate its application 
with regard to rail transit, veterinary precautions and customs matters. Eventually, 
four protocols were agreed on 28 August and signed on 6 October. 21 This, it seemed 
minister in Athens was hastily instructed not to proceed with the exchange of ratifications 
(DBFP/I/XXIV/456). 
17 DBFP/i/XXIV/465,540. 
18 FO 371/8832 min. by Troutbeck d. 22 Mar. 1923; FO 371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 pp. 42- 
3; DBFP/I/XXIV/539-40. 
19 FO 371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 p. 43; DBFP/1/XXIV/561-2,580,586,593- 
4,599,601,613-7. 
20 DBFP/I/XXIV/642-3,863-4; FO 371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 p. 4-3 3; FO 371/8832 
Bentinck to FO no. 968 d. II Dec. 1923; A. J. Toynbee, Survey ofInternational Affairs 1920-1923 
(London, Oxford University Press/Humphrey Milford, 1927), pp. 340-343. For the text of the 
Convention, see BFSPII 18/599-615. 
21 DBFP/I/XXIV/642-3,863-4; FO 371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 p. 43; FO 371/8832 
Bentinck to FO no. 672 d. 25 Aug. 1923, min. by Troutbeck d. 6 Sept. 1923; Toynbee, Survey 1920- 
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to the Foreign Office, was 'a real step forward' in relations between the two stateS, 22 
since'an important stumbling-block to friendly relations' between them had been 
reinoved. 23 
The agreements were not, however, of themselves sufficient to put Greco-Yugoslav 
relations on a really cordial footing. Indeed, it soon became apparent that they would 
satisfy neither Yugoslavia's narrow economic needs at Salonica nor its wider desire 
for a redefinition of relations with Greece. In December, Athens was perturbed to 
learn that Yugoslav capitalists, with the connivance of the government in Belgrade, 
had been buying up shares in the Oriental Railway Company which controlled the 
line between Salonica and the Yugoslav border station at Ghevgheli. Although it 
seemed that this acquisition of rights of exploitation over the line could not affect 
Greek sovereign rights over it, the fact that the Yugoslavs had gone behind the backs 
of the Greeks in their efforts to increase their control over the railway was ominous. 24 
This was doubly embarrassing since commercial traffic on the railway was a complete 
shambles - the line was only single-tracked and was run by the Greeks with neither 
speed nor efficiency - and the Yugoslavs began to voice complaints that tariffs were 
high, traffic was most irregular and that their economic interests were suffering real 
darnage as a reSUlt. 25Equally, 'no practical steps were being taken to develop the 
Serbian free zone', since Belgrade was unable to come to terms with the French 
company which owned the land, and the Greeks, rather rashly, were developing their 
1923, p. 343. There is some confusion as to when the convention and protocols were finally ratified, 
but the most likely date seems to be 30 May 1924. 22 FO 371/8832 min. by Nicolson d-7 Sept. 1923. 23 FO 371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 p. 43. 24 DBFP/i/XXIV/913; FO 371/9896 Annual Report, Greece, 1923 p. 43; FO 371/8832 Bentinck to 
FO tel. 580 d. 6 Dec. 1923, mins. by Nicolson d. 8 andlO Dec-1923, Young to FO no. 464 d. 13 Dec. 1923, tel. 153 d. 18 Dec. 1923, no. 467 d. 18 Dec. 1923, mins. by Aveling d. 20 Dec. 1923, Nicolson 
d. 20 Dec. 1923, Aveling d. 29 Dec. 1923; FO 371/9884 Bentinck to FO no. 1018 d. 27 Dec. 1923, min. 
by Aveling d. 9 Jan. 1924, Young to FO no. 49 d. 6 Feb. 1924. 25 FO 371/9884 Dept. of Overseas Trade to FO ref. 14255 F. E. d. 14 Nov. 1924, ref. 14255 F. E. d. 15 
Dec. 1924. Detailed reports from the consul in Salonica, Crow, on economic activity at that port can 
be found in FO 371/9894 file 6098 passi . M. 
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own free zone, totally encompassing the Yugoslav one and evidently designed to 
monopolise Salonica's trade. 26 
it was no surprise, therefore, that stories about Yugoslav annexationist ambitions 
continued to emerge from the Balkan rumour mill. In June 1924 a particularly 
extravagant report arose detailing an alleged Yugoslav-Bulgarian plot to seize 
Salonica, Dedeagatch and Kavalla with the tacit support of Italy. This tale was soon 
denied by all concerned. Mussolini, for instance, assured Graham that it would be 
'absolutely contrary to Italian interests' for him to shake 'the tottering edifice of 
Balkan peace', whilst Kalfoff told Erskine that his own efforts to improve Bulgaria's 
position would always be constrained by the limits of Neuilly. Nincic, too, was 
categorical in his denials: he was quite satisfied with what Yugoslavia had already 
obtained at Salonica and he had'no, desire to add one inch'to, Yugoslav territory. The 
British minister, Young, was convinced that the Pasic government was concerned 
only with internal consolidation. 27 
Yugoslav disavowals of any immediate territorial designs on Salonica may perhaps 
have been sincere, but they did not preclude longer term or less far-reaching 
ambitions. In early August Marcilly reported that the Yugoslavs had delivered a 
strongly worded note to the Greeks demanding satisfaction in the long-standing 
question of the nationality of about 300 individuals resident in Salonica but 
originating from districts transferred to Serbia after the Balkan wars. This issue 
appeared innocuous enough, but demonstrated that Yugoslavia would not neglect 
anything that might 'strengthen its interests and its position at Salonica'. Moreover, 
behind this issue lurked the question of the Greek Macedo-Slav population which 
Belgrade was eager to claim as its own. In sum, the Yugoslavs were prepared to Z) 
continue the alliance with Greece, but only on making the Greeks pay a heavy price 
for it. 28 In this context the signature of the Politis-Kalfoff protocol, with all it implied 
26 FO 371/10771 Annual Report, Greece, 1924 p. 14. 27 DBFP/I/XXVI/266-8. For an earlier assurance by Nincic in the same vein, see 
DBFP/I/XXVI/148-9. 
28 MAE Grece 78 Marcilly to QO no. 176 d. 2 Aug. 1924. 
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for Yugoslav aspirations in Macedonia, must have appeared to Belgrade not so much 
as the last straw than as a golden opportunity, and on 14 November Belgrade 
denounced the alliance with Greece. The Greeks professed their'Complete surprise"29 
but Marcilly took this as proof of either disingenuousness or unwisdom: the 
Yugoslavs had been making demands of the Greeks on a whole host of issues for 
months, but the Greeks had as usual procrastinated -a dangerous proceeding, 
Marcilly observed, when the state concerned was 'a neighbour conscious of its 
strength and of the weakness of its opponent'. 30 
At first, there was confusion as to the exact motive behind the denunciation and as to 
whether it was part of some wider intrigue. On 18 November Nincic provided Young b 
in Belgrade with a catalogue of grievances: the Politis-Kalfoff protocol and the 
Hellenization of Greek Macedonia, the mismanagement of the Salonica railway and 
free zone, the question of the Slav families in Salonica referred to by Marcilly in 
August and, 'a culminating act of unfriendliness', 'the dispossession of the Serbian 
monastery of Saint Sava on Mount Athos of its lands'. Young was uncertain whether 
the denunciation was an electoral manoeuvre - an act of firmness to distract attention 
from internal problems -, a genuine attempt to make the Greeks more amenable in 
the pending questions, or the result of some Italo-Yugoslav combination. At any rate, 
despite Nincic's reassurance that he had no designs on Salonica and that he would 
renew the alliance, Young feared that the denunciation was so brusque that it must be 
more than simply the 'denouement of a series of unremedied grievances'. 31 By 27 
November, however, he was calmer, and had become convinced that the Politis- 
Kalfoff protocol was 'the real offence'. The Greeks, who of course had their own 
reasons for dissatisfaction with the protocol, reinforced this message, and assured 4-- 
London that there was no 'danger to Balkan peace'. Young's fears of an Italo- It) 
29 DBFP/I/XXVI/398-401. For the text of the Yugoslav note of 17 November formally denouncing 
the alliance and the Greek reply of 18 November, see FO 371/9897 Cheetham, to FO no. 716 d. 27 
Nov. 1924- According, to the treaty, six months notice had to be given for the denunciation of the C) alliance; failing that it would remain in force for a year from the date it was denounced 
(BFSPI1081689). 
30 MAE Yougoslavie 51 Marcilly to QO no. 245 d. 21 Nov. 1924. 31 DBFP1j " /XXVI/398-400; FO 371/9897 Young to FO tel. 120 d. 20 Nov-1924. 
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yugoslav intrigue, though not dispelled entirely, also receded: the Italian minister in 
Belgrade, General Bodrero, an indefatigable intriguer, might have tried to get some 
such scheme off the ground, but there was certainly no concrete evidence of any 
agreement. 32 
The possibility that Yugoslavia's action presaged some wider upheaval instigated by 
Rome had been the initial concern of the Foreign Office. 33 This worry had hardly 
been assuaged when Mussolini had told Graham on 20 November that he believed the 
alliance would never be renewed and that 'not immediately, but sooner or later, Serbia 
would attempt to carry into effect the designs she had always cherished regarding 
Salonica'; and had given the impression that Rome would not discourage this. 340n 
the other hand, London was always sceptical about the possibility of any genuine 
agreement between Yugoslavia and Italy - two powers which 'hate one another like 
poison'35 - and noted that the realisation of their designs on Albania and Salonica 
would involve breaking solemn treaties which was now 'no longer so simple a matter 
as formerly'. 36 
The question of Italian involvement aside, the Foreign Office had firm ideas as to the 
root cause of Yugoslavia's action. Although London was of course to assist the 
Greeks in the abrogation of the Politis-Kalfoff protocol, the Foreign Office believed 
that'the main cause of friction ... probably really is over the question of 
Salonica'. 37 
This view was most forcefully articulated by Lampson who, spending his leave in the 
Balkans in October, had gained first-hand and painful experience of the condition of 
the Ghevgheli-Salonica railway: the whole line had been congested with goods 
32 DBFPIIIXXV11400- 1. For Bodrero's 'accustomed bluff irresponsible manner', see, for example, 
DBFP/1[XX'VI/267-8 and FO 371/9897 min. by Howard Smith d. 22 Nov. 1924. 33 FO 371/9897 min. by McEwen d. 20 Nov. 1924. 34 DBFP/I/XXVI/402; FO 371/9897mins. by Howard Smith d. 25 Nov. 1924, Lampson d. 26 
Nov. 1924. The Romanian minister at Athens told Cheetham that, although he did not believe Italy 
and Yugoslavia 'were acting in concert, 'he suspected Italian insfigation at Belgrade' 
(DBFP/I/XXVI/403-4). There were other indications of Italian involvement: see, for example, FO 
371/9897 Young to FO tel. 121 d. 20 Nov. 1924, min. by McEwen d. 21 Nov. 1924, Young to FO 
no. 433 d. 27 Nov. 1924. 
35 FO 371/9897 min. by Lampson d. 22 Nov. 1924. 36 FO 371/9897 min. by Crowe d. 26 Nov. 1924. 37 DBFP/i/XXVI/409. 
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traffic, and a sixty kilometre journey on an express train had taken three and a half 
hours-38 From the outset Lampson argued in his minutes that this was 'one of the chief 
bones of contention' in the dispute and that since S alonica. was the natural economic 
outlet for the whole of Yugoslav Macedonia the Greeks would be well advised 
actually to provide the adequate facilities which they had promised in May 1923.39 
While he had no desire to interfere in Greek affairs, he feared that if this problem was 
not dealt with 'the trouble will ultimately not be confined to the railway question 
alone' and might produce 'a really critical situation ... which might even affect the 
peace of the Balkans'. His assessment evidently impressed Chamberlain who 
suggested an informal approach to the Greeks intimating that they should get a 'first 
class railway manager', perhaps appointed by the League, to put their railways in 
order; and on 27 November Lampson suggested to Cheetham in a private letter that 
he might wish to put the idea to Michalakopoulos informally. 40 In the event, 
Cheetham took no action because Michalakopoulos and Roussos were totally 
preoccupied with the parliamentary crisis caused by the Politis-Kalfoff protocol. 41 
But, on 27 November, he reported reassuringly that the Greeks were optimistic about 
the possibility of an agreement over Salonica and consequently the renewal of the 
alliance, which might even be extended to include Romania. 42 
In the meantime the general situation in the Balkans had been temporarily disturbed 
by a serious communist scare, in part triggered by the recrudescence of troubles in 
Albania. This raised all sorts of complicated issues for London since it was not clear 
whether the Albanian unrest was further evidence of collusion between Yugoslavia or 
Italy or rather likely to set the two at odds. In addition, it was difficult to assess how 
far communism, either in Albania or elsewhere in the Balkans, was a genuine 
38 DBFP/i/XXVI/399,409-10. 
39 FO 371/9897 mins. by Lampson d. 21 Nov. 1924,22 November 1924. 40 DBFp/, /XXVI/409_ 1 1; FO 371/9897 min. by Chamberlain d. 23 Nov. 1924. A despatch from 
Cheetham, also of 27 November, gave details of the present state of the Salonica free zone and 
railway. The zone was 'at present partly under water'and inconveniently walled off from the rest of 
the port, whilst the railway was still afflicted by high tariffs and excessive delays 
(DBFP/I/XXVI/411-4). 
41 FO 371/9897 Cheetham to Lampson p. l. d. 11 Dec. 1924. 42 DBFP1I /XXVI/411-2. 
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menace: after all, there was some evidence that Nincic was merely using the 
communist bogey as a pretext for intervention in Albania and for the suppression of 
domestic opponents. 43 In the end this crisis was contained: in late December there was 
indeed a revolution in Albania as Ahmed Zogu Bey, ousted in May 1924, returned to 
power, but although he did so with Yugoslav assistance the Italians, though 
discomfited, took no action. The communist scare also faded away after giving rise to 
some measure of rapprochement between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria symbolised by the 
visit of Tsankoff to Belgrade. 44 
To all these events, the British reacted in their usual fashion, instructing their 
representatives to monitor developments closely and urging restraint on all 
concerned. 45 In connexion with these wider developments, there was some 
disagreement in London as to the implications of the Greco-Yugoslav dispute. In a 
circular despatch to ministers in the Balkans on 8 December Crowe explained 
hopefully that the Yugoslavs were actuated primarily by the 'essential grievance' of 
the Salonica free zone and railway and that they intended merely to remake the 
alliance on more favourable terms. He conceded, however, that some 'more serious 
and extensive object'might underlie Belgrade's action and thus urged extreme 
vigilance. 46Young was unable to throw much light on this: he reported a conversation 
with Pasic of 10 December which consisted chiefly of a diatribe on the minorities 
issue, and reaffirmed his belief that the Yugoslavs did have designs, albeit long-term 
and at present dormant, on Greece's Aegean coast. " 
43 DBFP/i/XXVI/418-476 passim; DDI/7/Ill/353ff; FO 371/9897 file 17537 passim. 
44 DBFP/I/XXVI/452-66,468-476; DBFP/I=VII/1-14,37-9,50-2. For Italo-Yugoslav relations over 
Albania, see also Carocci, Politica Estera, pp. 32-40. 
45 See, for example, DBFP/I/XXVI/419-20,424-8,448-9 and FO 371/9897 Lampson to Fotic p. l. d. I 
Jan. 1925. Fotic was a Yugoslav diplomat who had once served in London but was now working in 
the Belgrade foreign ministry who had been Lampson's guide during his recent tour of Macedonia. 46 DBFP/I/XXVI/425-8. The Yugoslav chargd in London had told Lampson on 2 December that 
Belgrade's 'main grievance' was Salonica, but his remarks left Lampson with the impression that the 
Yugoslavs were'preparing the way for something drastic as regards both Albania and Bulgaria, but 
Principally the former'. 
47 DBFP/I/XXVI/433-6. 
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The most alarmist view of Yugoslav intentions at the end of 1924 was taken by 
Nicolson, who did not 'for a moment agree that the real root of the quarrel is the bad 
management of Salonica'; what the Yugoslavs really wanted was 'Salonica itself. And 
one day they will get it'. " In response to a report that the Yugoslav minister in Paris 
had been talking up the existence of a communist conspiracy in the Balkans which 
might necessitate Yugoslav action, he wrote that it was 'impossible to resist the 
conclusion that Italy has given M. Pasic a free hand in the BalkanS'. 49 His 
apprehensions culminated in the new year in a series of long minutes about the 
imminent prospect of a possible Yugoslav-Bulgarian confederation, encouraged by 
Italy, which would dominate the southem Balkans. This bloc would be impervious to 
British influence or naval pressure and would soon deprive Greece of her northern 
territories; moreover, it would leave British imperial communications in the eastern 
Mediterranean vulnerable to Italy. This apocalyptic vision was, however, not shared 
by his superiors: a joint Slav descent on Salonica might indeed be detrimental to 
British interests, but it did not seem at all likely in the near future. 50 
Although Nicolson and his colleagues might disagree as to the underlying 
implications of the Greco-Yugoslav dispute, they were at one as regards the 
desirability of a speedy resolution of the Salonica transit question to eliminate 
Yugoslavia's ostensible grievance-51 It cannot be said, however, that their efforts to 
resolve the railway question met with much success. On 19 December Cheetham was 
again instructed to suggest the appointment of a railway adviser to the Greeks, but 
nothing came of this since Roussos either wilfully or accidentally missed the point, 
maintainin a, that 'difficulty is one of rollin cy stock, particularly engines' and raising the bb 
red herring of possible Greek purchases of locomotives from Britain. 52 London 
decided that to ask the Yugoslavs to raise the possibility of a neutral railway manager 0 
48 FO 371/9897 min. by Nicolson d. 16 Dec. 1924. 
49 DBFP/I/XXVI/444-5; FO 371/9897 min. by Nicolson d. 17 Dec. 1924. 50 DBFP/I/XXVI/461-3. 
51 FO 371/9897 min. by Nicolson d. 22 Dec. 1924. 52DBFP/I/XXVI/445,467-8; FO 371/9897 mins. by Lampson d. 18 Dec. 1924, Crowe d. 18 Dec-1924, 
Howard Smith d. 22 Dec. 1924, Lampson d. 22 Dec. 1924, Crowe d. 23 Dec-1924, Chamberlain d. 25 
Dec. 1924. 
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with Athens might prove counter-productive, and Lampson contented himself with 
another letter to Cheetharn. 53 
It was with some relief, therefore, that London learned at the turn of the year that 
Greco-Yugoslav relations seemed to have begun to improve of their own accord. 
Nincic had assured Chamberlain when they met at the League Council in Rome in 
early December that he meant to renew the alliance with Greece'54 and later he told 
Young that he would not demand anything from Greece that would infringe her 
sovereignty. 55 Better still, on 30 December Kaklamanos announced in the Foreign 
Office that preliminary discussions about the renewal of the alliance had taken place 
in Paris between Nincic and Venizelos. The Greeks had shown a willingness to make 
some concessions over S alonica and as a result of these 'most cordial' talks the two 
governments had decided to open formal negotiations for a new Salonica agreement 
56 and the renewal of the alliance early in the new year. 
The French were as keen as the British to see a settlement between Greece and 
Yugoslavia, for the latter was still a key element in French Balkan and European 
policy. There was as yet no French security system in the institutionalised sense in 
eastern Europe, and France as yet had no formal links with the states of the Little 
Entente beyond the Franco- Czechoslovak treaty signed on 25 January 1924; France 
had, however, generally encouraged co-operation between these states, was interested 
in ties with them and recognised their potential as weapons in her anti-German and 
and-revisionist annoury. 57 The Corfu crisis had pointed to a possible contradiction 
53 FO 371/9897 Fotic to Lampson p. l. d-18 Dec. 1924, mins. by Lampson d-23 Dec. 1924, 
Chamberlain d. 25 Dec. 1924, Howard Smith d. 29 Dec-1924, Lampson d. 30 Dec-1924, Chamberlain 
UO Dec. 1924, Lampson to Fotic p. l. d. I Jan. 1925. 54 FO 371/9897 min. by Chamberlain d. 25 Dec. 1925. 
55 DBFP/i/XXVI/458-60. 
56 DBFP/I/XXVI/466-7; FO 371/10771 Annual Report, Greece, 1924 pp. 14-15; MAE Yougoslavie 
51 QO to Grenard (Belgrade) tels. 270-1 d. 20 Dec. 1924. The Greeks had already taken steps to lower 
tariffs on the railway line and to improve facilities at Salonica. 57 The Franco-Czechoslovak treaty was quite limited, providing only for consultation over matters of 
joint interest and the maintenance of the peace treaties. The French had wanted also to conclude a 
military agreement but the Czechs had flatly refused - despite this the treaty still aroused 
fears of 
French militarism (DBFP/I/XXIV/869-71,932-4; DBFP/I/XXVI/2-3,16-17,31,38-41). The Italians 
responded to this French step by announcing the Pact of Rome (DBFP/I/XXVI/25-6) and then In July 
by the conclusion of a similarly anodyne Italo -Czechoslovak pact (DBFP/1/XXVI/44-6,78,109,202- 
326 
between this policy and French attempts to work closely with Italy, and French 
enthusiasm for the tripartite agreement with Italy and Yugoslavia mooted by Rome 
during the winter of 1923-1924 was at least partly derived from a hope that such a 
treaty might overcome these contradictions. The collapse of the tripartite agreement 
after the Pact of Rome left the French suspicious of Italy, fearful of her ambitions to 
undermine their influence in eastern Europe, but at the same time unwilling to 
abandon altogether the idea of Franco-Italian co-operation. The Pact of Rome also 
retarded moves towards a formalisation of Franco-Yugoslav relations: in the summer 
of 1924 the French prepared a draft treaty analogous to the Czechoslovak one, but the 
Yugoslavs would not sign it for fear of alienating the Italians, with whom they felt 
they could not afford to quarrel. 58 After this rebuff French enthusiasm for a bipartite 
agreement with Yugoslavia also waned, especially after the formulation of the 
Geneva protocol which held out the possibility of general security arrangements, and 
3). The French eastern alliance system only really came into existence after Locarno, with the 
conclusion of a military convention with Czechoslovakia in October 1925 and treaties with Romania 
and Yugoslavia in June 1926 and November 1927 respectively (Shorrock, Ally to Enemy, pp. 48,300; 
Hovi, Questfor Stability, pp. 120-2). These complemented the political and military arrangements 
which France had made with Poland during 1921 (Hovi, Questfor Stability, pp. 119: -21). It should be 
noted, however, that this systernatisation of French links with the east was motivated at least in part 
by worries (or an awareness) that Locarno signified a French retreat from support for the east 
European settlement: see N. Jordan, 'The Cut Price War on the Peripheries: The French General Staff, 
The Rhineland and Czechoslovakia', in Boyce and Robertson (eds. ), Paths to War, pp. 129-3 1. The 
overall conclusion of the two key works by P. S. Wandycz, France and Her Eastern Allies 1919-1925. 
French- Czechoslovak-Po lish Relationsfiom the Paris Peace Conference to Locarno (Minneapolis, 
Minnesota University Press, 1962) and Twilight of French Eastern Alliances, is that France's attempts 
to create an effective eastern banier or cohesive alliance system failed, not least because of conflicts 
of interest between Poland and the Little Entente and because for France this was always only one 
strategy amongst many for attaining security. He cites 1923-4 as the heyday of French attempts to 
make the alliance system a reality by forging links (especially military ones) between the Little 
Entente and Poland. Once this failed, France turned to Great Britain which led to Locarno and 
limitations upon France's commitment to eastern Europe. More work needs to be done on relations 
between France and the Little Entente, especially Yugoslavia and Romania, both generally and in 
connection with what might loosely be termed 'security policy'. Wandycz admits this in a useful 
article which outlines the existing literature and formulates the questions which still need to be 
addressed: 'The Little Entente: Sixty Years Later', Slavonic and East European Review 59(4) 1981 
548-64. A useful Foreign Office summary of the treaties in force in eastern Europe in January 1925 is 
printed in DBFP/I/XXVII/273-80. 
58 Shorrock, Ally to Enemy, pp. 41-7. Shorrock intends his work to stand as a coffective to the alleged 
view that after the failure of the Anglo-American guarantee France immediately turned to the small 
states of eastern Europe for her security; this, he argues, overlooks the strenuous efforts France made 
to work with Italy in the 1920s (Shorrock, Ally to Enemy, pp. 32-58 passim). Hovi agrees that these 
eastern alliances were of lesser importance to the French than potential ones with the United States, 
Great Britain, Belgium or Italy (Hovi, Questfor Stability, pp. 123-5). 
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Paris concluded that although an alliance with Belgrade might still be desirable, it 
was now up to the Yugoslavs to take the initiative. It went without saying, however, 
that despite their doubts about a formal alliance the French were concerned to 
rnaintain their influence in Yugoslavia and to make Belgrade's policy conform 'to the 
interests of French policy, that is to say to the general interest of Europe and to the 
consolidation of peace'. 59 
After the denunciation of the Greco-Yugoslav alliance the French moved quickly to 
pour oil on troubled waters. On 17 November the Greek minister in Paris informed 
the Quai d'Orsay of the 'small cloud' that had arisen in Greco-Yugoslav affairs, as a 
result of the Politis-Kalfoff protocol, and requested French intervention at BelgTade. 60 
The next day the Quai d'Orsay instructed Marcilly to mediate in a dispute between the 
Greeks and the French Salonica port company which was delaying the transfer of the 
free zone to the Yugoslavs and, more importantly, told the charge in Belgrade to 
remind the Yugoslavs of the interest Paris attached 'to the maintenance and even to 
the tightening of the bonds between Yugoslavia and Greece, and the desire that we 
have to see promptly vanish the misunderstanding that has just arisen between these 
states'. " In a long despatch Marcilly analysed the causes of the dispute and defined 
the French interests at stake in it. He placed the Politis-Kalfoff protocol, the 
immediate cause of Yugoslavia's action, in the context of growing Yugoslav 
dissatisfaction over a long period with the terms of the alliance and Greek disregard 
for Yugoslav interests. The Greeks might profess to be sanguine about the prospects 
for a renewal of the alliance, but in reality they were 'profoundly troubled' and would 
have to pay a high price for a new treaty. From the French point of view, such a 
treaty was clearly desirable: a Salonica. settlement would protect the general interest 
59 MAE Yougoslavie 51 Q0 to Grenard unno. tel. d. 6 Dec. 1924, note for the president of the council 
d. 17 Dec. 1924. 
60 MAE Grke 78 note by Laroche d. 17 Nov. 1924. 61 MAE Yougoslavie 51 QO to Henry (Belgrade) tels. 243-5 d. 18 Nov. 1924 (repeated to Athens 
tels. 136-8). 
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I that we attach to safeguarding, for every eventuality, the freedom of communications 
through this port with the states of central Europe'. 62 
This last consideration represented a direct and particular French interest in the 
dispute that was qualitatively different from the general British interest in peace and 
stability. The Yugoslavs certainly seem to have been aware of this. Although at one 
point the assistant foreign minister told the French charge that the minorities protocol 
was the real cause of the dispute, a few days later Nincic himself emphasised the 
Salonica issue: this port was of paramount importance to the whole Little Entente and 
Poland, since in a new conflict with Germany it would be a vital supply line. By 
bringing matters to a head with the Greeks in order to settle this issue the Yugoslavs 
were, Nincic asserted, serving French interests as well as their own. 63 In its initial 
instructions in early December to the new French minister in Belgrade, Grenard, the 
Quai d'Orsay underlined the importance of this issue: Grenard's chief task was to 
work for the preservation of peace (an interest of France and Yugoslavia alike) and to 
consolidate French economic and political influence in Belgrade even though, for the 
moment, an alliance was out of the question. However, the restoration of amicable 
Greco-Yugoslav relations was also considered essential, for those states, for the peace 
of the Balkans and for France. Indeed, in view of the rOle played by Salonica in the 
last war, the settlement of the port and railway questions was 'an absolute necessity. " 
To French pleas for moderation, Pasic and Nincic responded with assurances that 
their policy was both francophile and pacific. 65 This did not, however, remove all 
French anxieties, not least because for Paris the spectre of Italian intrigue always 
hung over Yugoslav questions. The French charge in Belgrade, reporting rumours 
that Rome was stiffening the Yugoslavs against Athens, opined that the Yugoslavs 
62 MAE Yougoslavie 51 Marcilly to QO no. 245 d. 21 Nov. 1924; MAE Grýce 78 Marcilly to QO 
tel. 59 d. 20 Nov. 1924. 
63 MAE Yougoslavie 51 Henry to QO no. 359 d. 27 Nov. 1924, no. 361 d. 2 Dec-1924, note by Laroche 0 d. 4 Dec. 1924. 
64 MAE Yougoslavie 51 QO to Grenard unno. tel. d. 6 Dec. 1924. 65 MAE Yougoslavie 51 Henry to QO no. 361 d. 2 Dec. 1924, Grenard to QO tel. 106 d. 15 Dec. 1924. 
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undoubtedly coveted their own outlet on the Aegean. 66 These worries were only 
fuelled when in mid-December Nincic travelled for talks with Mussolini at Venice, 
where Italian and Yugoslav negotiators had been trying to agree a commercial treaty 
since October: the suspicion was that some far-reaching Adriatic-Aegean agreement 
covering Albania and Salonica was in the offing. The public outcome of these talks 
was a communique detailing discussions over Fiume and containing a mutual 
affirmation of the principle of non-intervention in Albanian affairs, but Nincic felt it 
politic to proceed immediately to pariS67 to convince the French that they had no 
reason for anxiety. Although Herriot still suspected that the discussions had been 
more intimate than Nincic would admit, 68 Grenard's assessment at the end of the year 
was that Yugoslav policy gave no real cause for alarm. True, the activity in Albania, 
talks with Italy and even the visit of Tsankoff were all motivated (internal electoral 
considerations aside) by a desire to put pressure on Greece, but the Yugoslavs knew 
that their security was ultimately linked to that of France. 69 
In January the Greeks continued outwardly to be hopeful that the rift with Yugoslavia 
would soon be healed. The Politis-Kalfoff protocol was well on the way to 
abrogation, 70 and information coming from Belgrade seemed more positive: Nincic's 
latest utterances were conciliatory and looked forward to the rapid liquidation of 
existing problems. 71 Although negotiations could not begin until February - after the 
arfival of the new Yugoslav minister, Gavrilovic, in Athens and the Yugoslav 
elections set for 8 February - and even though the Greeks appeared ignorant of what 
precise demands the Yugoslavs were likely to make, they seemed confident of a 
SUCCeSSfUl oUtCoMe. 720n 29 January Kaklamanos, who was on the point of leaving 
for Athens to represent Greece in the negotiations, spoke cheerfully to Lampson about 
66 MAE Yougoslavie 51 Henry to QO no. 359 d. 27 Nov. 1924. 67 DBFP/I/XXVI/419-20,423,425-8,431-3,436,458,460. These negotiations were continued in 
Florence in 1925 and culminated in the signature at Nettuno on 20/21 July 1925 of conventions 
relating to the execution of the peace treaties and the Flume settlement (DBFPIIIXXVIIII99). 68 MAE Yougoslavie 51 QO to De Fleuriau tel. 2724 d. 26 Dec-1924. 69 MAE Yougoslavie 51 Grenard to QO tels. 123-5 d. 30 Dec. 1924, no. 384 d. 31 DeC-1924- 70 DBFP1j /XXVII/ 10- 11. 
71 FO 371/10767 Cheetham to FO no. 19 d. 12 Jan. 1925. 7- 'ý FO 371/10767 Cheetham to FO no. 13 d. 8 Jan. 1925; DBFP11 /XXVII/27-8. 
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the attitude Greece would adopt in the talks, remarking as he left hirn'that he hoped 
to be back before the end of March with his treaty with Serbia in his poCket'. 73 
This optimism ignored two substantial clouds on the horizon. In the first place, it 
seemed very probable that the question of the Salonica-Ghevgheli railway would 
prove far more intractable than the Greeks anticipated. The British proposal for the 
appointment of a neutral railway manager had sunk without trace in the Greek 
bureaucracy, and in any case, as Venizelos told Nicolson on 22 January, 'the 
introduction of the League at Salonica would be considered an "outrage" by the 
Serbian government'. Nevertheless, the Greeks recognised the necessity of improving 
conditions at the port and on the line. This was doubly urgent, Venizelos believed, if 
the Yugoslavs really did have aspirations to supplant Greece at Salonica: the next five 
or ten years of Hellenization and modernisation would be crucial in securing Greece's 
hold on her northern provinces and it was important to give the Yugoslavs no cause 
for complaint during this time. 74 
Meanwhile, Kaklamanos told Lampson that Greece would guarantee to improve the 
railway line provided the Yugoslav company which held shares in it would sell them 
to the Greeks in order to remove any doubts about its ownership and control. He was 
confident that, so long as the Greeks offered a sufficiently generous sum for the 
shares, the Yugoslavs would prove amenable. 75 Rumours from Belgrade, however, 
indicated that the Yugoslavs were in fact likely to demand administrative control over 
the railway even though it was in Greek teTritory. 76 A Foreign Office investigation 
into the legal position arising from Yugoslav ownership of the shares concluded that 
although the situation was very complex and obscure, the Yugoslavs probably derived 
no concrete rights from them. Nevertheless, the lengths to which they had gone to Z: ) 
73 DBFP/I/XXVII/52-4. 
74 DBFP/I/XXVII/2 7-3 1. As Nicolson put it, the Yugoslavs did 'not want the League to be ZD 
represented in any quarters which they consider to be a Serb preserve' (FO 371/10766 min. by 
Nicolson d. 12 Jan. 1925). 
75 DBFP/I/XXVII/52-3. 
76 FO 371/10766 Young to FO no. 15 d. 14 Jan. 1925, tel. IId. 23 Jan. 1925; MAE Yougoslavie 51 
Grenard to QO no. 4 d. 15 Jan. 1925. 
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acquire them pointed to a determination to control the line, with ominous implications 
for Greece, and Young predicted that this would 'form the crucial point of the 
negotiations'. 77Nicolson asked Venizelos what he would do if the Yugoslavs made 
the renewal of the alliance conditional on the cession of the railway. Venizelos at first 
dismissed this possibility, but then 'looked glum, and murmured something about 
Greece not being a vassal of Serbia'. 78 
The second potential difficulty was the attitude of Italy and the state of italo- 
Yugoslav relations. This relationship was important, because of its implications for 
the extent of Yugoslav ambitions at Salonica, but also unfathomable, because of 
conflicting accounts emanating from the parties involved. When Nincic met 
Venizelos in Paris late in December, he apparently admitted that the Italians had been 
trying to direct the Yugoslavs towards Salonica and to arrange a partition of Albania. 
The Yugoslavs had, of course, resisted these enticements but, for the sake of Italian 
susceptibilities, had agreed that the new treaty with Greece would not 'in any form be 
aimed against Italy' and would therefore apply only to the Balkans. Venizelos had 
accepted this, not least because he too desired good relations with Italy, Greece's 
I powerful and unscrupulous neighbour'. 79The Italians, for their part, protested their 
innocence to the British: early in January, for example, General Bodrero confided in 
Young his shock at Yugoslavia's recent recklessness in Albania and his alarm at 
Yugoslav intentions towards Greece in general and Salonica in particular. 80 
This plot thickened later in the month. In a long conversation with Young at the 
annual Saint Sava ball on 27 January , King Alexander spoke of 
his recent trip with 
77 FO 371/10766 Young to FO tel. 8 d. 10 Jan. 1925 and mins., FO to Crewe no. 179 d. 14 Jan. 1925, 
Young to FO no. 15 d. 14 Jan. 1925 [quoted] and mins., Cheetham to FO no. 40 d-30 Jan. 1925, Phipps 
(Paris) to FO no. 273 d. 2 Feb. 1925, Cheetham to FO no. 75 d. 20 Feb. 1925 and mins. This legal 
question was complex because it involved a whole host of treaties and agreements dating back to the 
original railway concessions granted by the Porte in the 1860s. The information was eventually 
collated in a memorandum which went through various drafts during the year. See, for example, FO 
3 371/10766 memorandum by Harvey d. 2 Oct. 1925. 78 FO 371/10766 min. by Nicolson d. 24 Jan. 1925. 79 DBFP/I/XXVII/29. It goes without saying that the veracity and sincerity of any statement 
supposedly uttered by Nincic and then reported by Venizelos to a third party is open to question. 80 FO 371/10766 Young to FO no. 5 d. 5 Jan. 1925. 
332 
Nincic to Paris, asserting that Romano Avezzana had 'made proposals ... to the effect 
that the time was coming, or was very near, for a partition of Albania'. The king 
described this as 'a rank breach of faith', and emphasised his determination 'to allow 
no non-Balkan state, to set foot in the Balkans' and to maintain Albania as an 
independent and viable state. 81 Young's report hardly tallies, however, with 
Avezzana's record of his conversation with Alexander, according to which it was the 
king who had raised this controversial subject and given a 'discreet hint' as to the 
desirability of an Albanian partition. 82 Later, the king changed his story and claimed 
that it was General Bodrero who had suggested this move, but again the Italian record 
of the conversation concerned casts the king himself in the role of agitator against 
Albania. 83 
This was not the only manifestation of disingenuousness on the part of the Yugoslav 
sovereign. It was perhaps only to be expected that the Yugoslavs, as part of their 
balancing act between France and Italy, should speak in very different tones to 
representatives of each about their fundamental sympathies, but the king's fulsome 
evocation of Italo-Yugoslav intimacy in his talks with Avezzana and Bodrero would 
certainly have caused raised eyebrows at theQuai d'Orsay. 84More to the point, 
Alexander's conversations with the Italians cast a different light on the nature of 
Yugoslavia's ambitions in the Aegean. On a previous visit to Paris in December 1923, 
he had already, while giving the 'most satisfactory assurances in regard to Salonica' to 
the French, taken no pains to hide his aspirations there from Avezzana; 85 so now, in 
81 DBFP/i/XXVII/46-8. 
82 DDI/7/111/410-2. 
83 DBFPIIIXXV11160; DDI/7/III/412-5. King Alexander certainly seems to have relished diplomatic 
intrigue. Later on at the Saint Sava ball he repeated to Bodrero the fears he had expressed to Young 
about Italian ambitions in Albania, but this time he presented them as Young's own views! Bodrero 
reported this to Rome, which caused Contarini to protest to Graham at the imputation of Italian bad 
faith. Young regretted that the Italians could not be told all without'giving the King away and his 
little game', but Alexander evidently realised that he had placed Young in a predicament since he 
later apologised (DBFP/1/XXVII/46-9,56-7,59-60; DDI/7/III/426-7). 
84 DDI/7/111/410-5. The usual Yugoslav line with France was that the interests of Paris and Belgrade 
were so close that a formal alliance was unnecessary. See, for example, MAE Yougoslavie 51 
Grenard to Q0 tels. 51-3 d. 3 Mar. 1925. 85 DBFP/IIXXVI/36,436; DDI/7/II/334-7. 
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talking to Bodrero he had explicitly stated Yugoslaviats intention 'to expand ftendere] 
towards the Aegean'. 86 
Certainly, the realisation. of these ambitions would require Italian acquiescence if not 
support, but it was by no means clear that this would be forthcoming. Early in 
February the British intercepted a report from the Czech minister in Belgrade, who 
was considered to be particularly well informed, pointing to the existence of 
a policy of double dealing in the Balkans on the part of Italy. On the one hand, 
in anticipation of future conflicts with Greece, Italy is making every effort to 
force Jugoslavia to direct her attention on Salonica, while, on the other hand 
and with a view to complicating the Balkan situation in her own interests, she 
is recommending Greece to take all precautionary measures to resist Jugoslav 
Imperialism. 
Bodrero, the Czech minister reported, was confident that he had 'succeeded in his task 
and declared that in the near future Jugoslavia would undoubtedly develop a 'Vardar' 
policy towards the Aegean'. 87The Foreign Office gave much credence to this analysis 
of the essentially ambiguity of Italian policy: 
The Italians are of course strongly anti-Greek: it is a question of competition in 
the Mediterranean: at the same time they are really anything but pro-Serb, as is 
almost inevitable in view of their aspiration to make the Adriatic an Italian 
lake. 
1 88 In Lampson's words, 'any true Italo-Serb cooperation is unlikely. 
The auguries for the negotiations, meanwhile, were far less favourable than Greek 
optimists imagined. Even if Yugoslav aspirations towards Salonica were for the 
moment merely projects in King Alexander's mind, it was evident that the Yugoslavs 
were conscious of Greek weakness - as Alexander put it, the alliance would in effect 
be an 'exclusively unilateral obligation' - and would demand a heavy price for a new 
86 DDI/7/III/411,4 1 33. This was not in their conversation at the ball, but in a talk they had had some 
time earlier in Venice, when Alexander had been met by Bodrero as he returned from his visit to 
Paris. 
87 DBFP/I/XXVII/91-2. 
88 FO 371/10796 min. by Lampson d. 10 Feb. 1925. Bateman added his own opinion that Bodrero was I an unscrupulous and indiscreet individual who exerts a sinister influence both on King Alexander 
and the Serb Gov[ernmenlt'(min. by Bateman d. 10 Feb. 1925). 
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treaty. It was also increasingly apparent that the Salonica-Ghevgheli railway would be 
the focus of their claims. 89 At the same time, it seemed that the Italians, even if their 
attitude was still obscure, were very unlikely to be helpful. Precisely how they would 
meddle was not obvious, but it was almost certain that meddle they would. In the 
spring of 1925 Italian foreign policy was moving into a new, more active phase after 
Mussolini's successful reassertion of his authority within Italy in the wake of the 
Matteotti affair. An inkling of this trend came with an Anglo-Italian quarrel over oil 
concessions in Albania in February90, and it was scarcely possible that a reassertion of 
Italian policy abroad would leave Greece and Yugoslavia unaffected. 
A preliminary round of Greco-Yugoslav negotiations in Athens in late February-early 
March passed off smoothly enough, but only because the crucial issues were not 
addressed. A draft military convention - aimed essentially against Bulgaria and 
Turkey and limited to the Balkans - was easily agreed, and the Greeks also conceded 
a key Yugoslav demand for the 'right of importing arms and munitions of war through 
Greek territory in case of hostilities not involving [the] casus feoderis. The general 
question of the Salonica-Ghevgheli railway was not, however, discussed: the Greeks 
had simply announced that they could not allow their 'full rights' in the line to be 
questioned, and Gavrilovic, evidently reluctant to show his hand, had said that 'he 
could not define his attitude at the present stage since experts at Belgrade must first 
be consulted'. This was ominous, but the very inconclusiveness of the talks permitted 
continued optimism. While Gavrilovic: stressed Yugoslavia's vital need for a Salonica 
settlement, he insisted that Greek sovereignty would not be wounded and that 
Belgrade would seek only 'reasonable concessions ... in return 
for alliance vital to 
89 DDI/7/IH/41 1; MAE Yougoslavie 51 Grenard to QO no. 4 d. 15 Jan. 1925. It is, of course, possible 
that Alexander's exposition of Yugoslavia's Aegean ambitions to the Italians was itself merely a 
tactical manoeuvre. 
90 Cassels, Early Diplomacy, pp. 241-8,259-61,315-9. For Mussolini's move onto the offensive on the 
domestic front, including his key speech of 3 January 1925, see Mack Smith, Mussolini, pp. 92-108. 
Albanian matters, including the question of oil concessions, are documented in DBFP/I/XXVII/60- 
247 passim and DDI/7/111/434ff. passim. See also pp. 244-5 above. The Italians recovered from the 
initial shock of Ahmed Zogu's seizure of power in Albania by adopting a forward policy and working 
very hard in 1925 to draw both him and his country into their orbit: see, for example, 
DBFP/I/XXVH/235-7 and DBFPllalll2gl. 
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Greece'. Kaklamanos remained wildly optimistic as usual, telling Cheetham that the 
Yugoslavs 'had no objection to purchase of shares of Ghevgheli line by Greeks' and 
that the negotiations 'might even be concluded this month'. 91 
in fact, the negotiations were not resumed until late April, and in the meantime the 
Yugoslav attitude hardened. For a while this was obscured when the Romanians 
floated the idea of a tripartite Balkan bloc in which they would participate with the 
Greeks and Yugoslavs: apparently they hoped to gain access to the facilities of 
Salonica, to cement the territorial status quo in the region and to place an obstacle in 
the way of any future German Drang nach Osten. However, although this scheme 
was never really a viable prospect, the fact that Nincic opposed it because he felt that 
it would 'accord too great an importance' to Greece92 was indicative of a general 
stiffening of views in Belgrade. In mid-March, Gavrilovic gave an optimistic 
statement to the press, predicting the conclusion of the negotiations by April and the 
accession of Greece to the Little Entente, but he was immediately forced by his chief 
to issue a d, 6menti. 93At the same time, Nincic told the Belgrade correspondent of the 
Times that the Yugoslavs could never think of selling their rights in the Salonica rail 
line, so vital was it for their economic existence and as a supply route for war 
matgriel. 94 This attitude was maintained into April, and on the eve of the re-opening 
of the negotiations Nincic's deputy told Young that Yugoslav control of the line was 
now a minimum sine qua non if Greece wished to enjoy the benefits of a defensive 
alliance with Yugoslavia. 95 An impasse thus seemed almost inevitable, since the 
91 DBFPIIIXXVIIIJ 13-4. 
92 DBFP/i/XXVII/138-40; FO 371/10767 Young to FO no. 128 d. 16 Apr. 1925 and mins.; MAE 
Grke 78 De Billy to QO no. 59 d. 19 Mar. 1925, QO to Minist&e de Guerre no. 668 d. 21 Mar. 19 25 
[quoted], Chambrun to QO tel. 40 d. 2 Apr. 1925; MAE Yougoslavie 51 Grenard to QO tel. 68 d. 17 
Mar. 1925, De Billy to QO no. 68 d. 29 Mar. 1925. According to Grenard, the Romanians also wanted 
to prevent Greece falling too much under Yugoslav influence, but the scheme collapsed because they 
demanded a restoration of the monarchy in Greece as the price for their support (MAE Yougoslavie 
51 Grenard to QO tels. 103 -4 d. 25 Apr. 1925. 93 F03371/10767 Young to FO no. 96 d. 19 Mar. 1925; MAE Yougoslavie 51 Grenard to QO tel-68 
d. 17 Mar. 1925. 
94 FO 371/10767 Young to FO no. 96 d. 19 Mar. 1925. 95 FO 371/10767 Young to FO tel. 34 d. 20 Apr. 1925. 
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Greeks were still adamant that they could never admit Yugoslav pretensions to 
control the railway. 96 
The Greeks' worst fears were realised when the negotiations proper began in Belgrade 
on 27 April. At first the Greek government tried to forestall the Yugoslavs by 
explicitly declaring that it had to retain control over the administration of the line, but 
the reluctance of the Yugoslavs to respond was more ominous than reassuring. 
Kaklamanos 'foresaw that the obnoxious demand would be made, especially as the 
Yugoslavs had already unexpectedly asked for'the enlargement of the Salonica free 
zone by an area of no less than 38,000 square metreSI. 97 For a fortnight, continued 
Yugoslav reticence permitted a slight raising of Greek spirits, 98 but by the end of the 
month all illusions had been dispelled. On 26 May Nincic told the new British 
minister in Belgrade, Kennard, that the Yugoslavs had claimed the administration of 
the railway and that there was 'no likelihood of an early conclusion of the 
negotiations'. 99 In fact, the Yugoslavs had demanded not merely administrative 
control over the line - including all stations and personnel - but also 'the right of 
supplying police and customs officials on the land traversed by the railway'. In other 
words, this land'would be considered as Serbian territory, the station at Salonica thus 
becoming a frontier station'. The Greeks considered this demand for a territorial 
corridor - which went far beyond the economic concessions they were prepared to 
grant - to be totally incompatible with their sovereign rights, and on 1 June the 
negotiations were adjourned sine die. 100 
96 FO 371/10766 Cheetharn to FO no. 129 d. 16 Apr. 1925 and mins. 97 DBFP/l/XXV11/1 76-8; FO 3 71/10767 Young to FO tel. 52 d. 6 May 1925; A. J. Toynbee, Survey of 
International Affairs 1926 (London, Oxford University Press/Humphrey Milford, 1928), p. 168. 
98F0371/10767 Cheetharn to FO tel. 83 d. 12 May 1925, no. 154 d. 15 May 1925; MAE Yougoslavie 
51 Grenard to QO tels. 131-3 d. 17 May 1925. 
99 DBFP/I/XXVII/190-3. Kennard took up his post on 25 May 1925. 100 DBFP/i/XXVII/196-200; Toynbee, Survey 1926, pp. 168-170. The Yugoslavs embodied their 
demands in a draft railway convention (FO 371/10767 Kennard to FO no. 186 d. 5 Jun. 1925 and encl. ). 
This, McEwen argued, could leave the Greeks with no 'illusions as to the nature of Serb aspirations 
respecting Salonika', and Nicolson felt that the Yugoslav demands were ones which 'no Greek 
90vernment or Greek Assembly could possibly grant without sacrificing their independence'(FO 
371/10767 min. by McEwen d. 10 Jun. 1925, min. by Nicolson d. II Jun. 1925). 
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In retrospect this outcome was wholly predictable: during May Nincic had become 
increasingly frank about his desire to redefine Greco-Yugoslav relations to reflect 
more accurately the strength of the respective parties. On 5 May he told Grenard that 
the Greeks had nothing to offer as allies - they would 'always turn their backs on 
danger"Ol - and on 26 May he made a similar point to Kennard: 'Serbia had no need 
of Greek military assistance' which in any case would not amount to much, but 'must 
have some tangible quid pro quo for the military assistance which [she] would have 
to render to Greece under any new alliance'. 1021t was Nincic's desire to see the 
balance of power between Greece and Yugoslavia reflected in the alliance which was 
really at stake in the negotiations, and in a sense the specific points at issue were 
simply the means by which he hoped to achieve this end. He had good reason to 
emphasise the railway question: the lamentable condition of the line was universally 
acknowledged, and the interest of other states of eastern Europe in its traffic meant 
that Yugoslav stubbornness could be portrayed as altruism. 103This was certainly the 
best issue to bring the negotiations to a head: the Greeks had conceded on every 
minor issue and had very good reasons104 to reject the Yugoslav demand for the 
signature of a minorities convention analogous to the Politis-Kalfoff protocol. At any 
event, whether the Yugoslavs had sought to engineer the adjournment of the talks or 
not, it was obvious that they were in no real hurry 'to renew the alliance unless they 
obtain the concessions they desire'. 105 They were determined to exact what they saw 
as a fair price, and it remained a matter of speculation whether, as part of a deal, they 
in fact intended ultimately 'to get S alonika'. 106 
101 MAE Yougoslavie 51 Grenard to QO tels. 114-6 d. 5 May 1925. 
102 DBFP/I/XXVII/191-2. 
103 After the breakdown of negotiations, Kennard wrote that the general impression amongst his 
colleagues was that 'the Jugoslav delegates have opened their mouths somewhat too wide', but that 
they were 'fully justified' in seeking to improve trade links with S alonica, for their own sake and for 
that of Romania, Czechoslovakia and Poland (DBFP/I/XXVII/198). 
104 DBFPIIIYXVIII19 1-2,196-8. The Greeks argued that the minorities treaties were sufficient to 
protect the interests of all minorities in Greece and that minority questions concemed only individual 
states and the Leacrue. This was, of course, both legally quite correct and in line with the argument 
that they were simultaneously advancing at Geneva to secure the annulment of the Politis-Kalfoff 
0 
protocol. See above pp. 302-5. 10-) DBFP1I /XXVII/ 19 8. 
106 FO'3371/10767 min. by McEwen d. 5 Jun. 1925. 
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The British viewed all this with detached resignation. They had long believed that the 
Greeks were likely to be forced to choose between the alliance and the railway, and 
so there was little surprise when this situation actually materialised. 107At the same 
time, they were sornewhat irritated by the insouciance of the Greeks: by not taking 
steps to improve the running of the line (for example, by heeding the British 
suggestion of a neutral manager) they had given the Yugoslavs a legitimate grievance, 
and by allowing Yugoslav capitalists to buy up the shares in the railway, they had 
given Belgrade a peg upon which to hang a claim to controlit. 108 There was, 
however, no question of British intervention. This could do little good. Howard Smith 
warned that Yugoslavia, 'the coming great power in the Balkans', was determined to 
get control of the railway: British intervention 'would only earn for us Serb enmity in 
the future'. 109 Lampson similarly favoured abstention: 'If Greece does not get her 
alliance with Serbia it is mainly her own affair', even though he admitted that this 
might bring in its wake 'Balkan reactions of the usual type. ' 10 
As the full extent of the impasse became clear British abstentionism was confirmed. 
The Yugoslavs had the whip-hand, McEwen declared on 22 May, and were 
determined eventually to get Salonica. Even if the Greeks improved the railway the 
Yugoslavs would 'not be long in finding a fresh grievance to take the place of the old'5 
since'the Serbian wolf is not now in a mood to listen to excuses, however convincing, 
from the Greek lamb'. III In this situation, Chamberlain decided, Britain should 
remain as aloof as possible, and should airn, if the situation became acute, to put the 
whole dispute in the hands of the League. 112Thus when on 27 May Chamberlain was 
107 DBFP/I/XXVII/1 77. 'We have foreseen this all along. I warned [Kaklamanos] before he left that 
the Serbs were likely to open their mouths pretty wide' (FO 3 71/10767 min. by Lampson d. 7 May 
1925). 
108 DBFP/1/XXVII/178,189. 
109 FO 371/10767 min. by Howard Smith d. 13 May 1925. 10 FO 371/10767 min. by Lampson d. 14 May 1925. 111 FO 371/10767 memorandum by McEwen d. 22 May 1925. 112 FO 371/10767 min. by Chamberlain d. 26 May 1925. The Foreign Office was agreed that the 
quesfion should be transferred to the League if a crisis arose, even though Nicolson for one thought 0 
this would not please the Yugoslavs. Tyrrell wrote that this should be done 'as we did in the case of 
Corfu% an analogy which would scarcely have cheered the Greeks (FO 371/10767 mins. by Nicolson 
d. 25 May 1925, Lampson d-25 May 1925 and Tyrrell d. 26 May 1925). 
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urged by the Greek charge to 'express a hope to the Serbian government that the 
negotiations would not be broken off, he declined on the grounds that this would not 
contribute to a settlement. ' 13 Similarly, Kennard was instructed to keep his distance 
from Kaklamanos, and to avoid giving any impression that Britain was ready to take a 
hand in the negotiations. ' 14 At the last moment, when the talks were about to collapse, 
Chamberlain relented somewhat, and began to consider a joint Anglo-French 
approach to Belgrade (we owe Greece something'), ' 15 but this never materialised and 
the policy of non-intervention was maintained. 
An assessment of whether any wider British interests were at stake in the dispute 
seemed to confirm the wisdom of this policy of inactivity. Britain was obviously 
concerned with the maintenance of peace in the Balkans, but in a memorandum of 22 
May McEwen identified another possible consideration: the change in the 
Mediterranean balance of power that would follow a Yugoslav acquisition of 
Salonica. 116Nicolson seized on this to revive the fears of a Slav domination of the 
Aegean which he had expressed earlier in the year. If the Greeks lost Salonica, he 
argued, they would soon lose western Thrace too; and this would lead to a new 
refugee crisis, Greek bankruptcy and serious damage to British commercial and 
financial interests. More importantly, if Salonica fell into the hands 'of a strong 
military power comparatively immune to naval pressure, our influence in the 
Mediterranean will have suffered a serious rebuff. ' 17 This was evidently an extreme 
113 DBFP/I/XXVII/189-90. In a briefing paper Nicolson had made the point that British influence 
would count for little in Belgrade, since the Yugoslavs wanted nothing from Britain but wanted 
Salonica very badly. An appeal to the League might also achieve little for the Greeks, since it would 
just antagonise the Yugoslavs and be blocked by France and Italy (FO 371/10767 min. by Nicolson 
d. 27 May 1925). 
114 FO 371/10767 min. by Nicolson d. 30 May 1925, FO to Kennard tel. 56 d. 30 May 1925; 
DBFP/I/XX'VII/196. 
115 FO 371/10767 Kennard to FO tel. 83 d. 30 May 1925, mins. by McEwen d. 2 Jun. 1925 and 
Chamberlain d. 2 Jun. 1925. 
116 FO 371/10767 memorandum by McEwen d. 22 May 1925. 117 FO 371/10767 mins. by Nicolson d. 27 May 1925. 
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view, but Nicolson's superiors gave it enough credence to ask the Admiralty for their 
views. III 
By the time the Admiralty replied the negotiations had broken down, but in any case 
the navy evidently did not share Nicolson's alarm. The chief of the naval staff, Lord 
Beatty, argued that in a general sense a strong Greece was desirable as a counter- 
weight to Italy and that therefore the preservation of the status quo was in British 
interests. However, he felt that it was fairly irrelevant who actually owned Salonica, 
as long as it was not in the hands of one of the great powers. ' 19 Nicolson protested 
that this missed the point that to all intents and purposes Yugoslavia was a great 
power in the Balkan region, and certainly one impervious to British naval pressure, 120 
but Lampson had the last word. If Salonica were to pass to Yugoslavia by peaceful 
agreement with Greece, then 'we could hardly object', however desirable it might be 
that the status quo should be maintained. If, on the other hand, 'Salonica were seized 
by force then there would be a threat to the peace of the world and we should all of us 
(including the League in its corporate capacity) be concerned'. 121 
Unlike the British, the French were prepared to consider intervention. As Grenard 
told Young in April, although the French like the Yugoslavs had an interest in the 
efficient running of the Salonica. railway, they would nevertheless insist on adequate 
guarantees for Greek sovereignty. 122He repeated exactly this message to Nincic 
during the negotiations in May, but despite Greek hopes that French pressure would 
hasten an agreement, it proved of no avail and the Yugoslavs continued to pose their 
'harsh conditions'. 123This pained the French who sympathised with Greek arguments 
that the continued deadlock would both destabilise the region and undermine the 
118 FO 371/10767 mins. by Chamberlain d. 26 May 1925, and Tyrrell d-27 May 1925, Hankey to 
Tyrrell unno. l. d. 29 May 1925, Nicolson to Hankey unno. l. d. 2 jun. 1925, Hankey to Nicolson unno. l. 
3 Jun. 1925. 
119 FO 371/10767 Hankey to Lampson unno. l. d. 9 Jun. 1925 and encls. 120 FO 371/10767 min. by Nicolson d. 12 Jun. 1925. 121 FO 3 71/10767 min. by Lampson d. 13 Jun. 1925. 122 FO 371/10767 Young to FO no. 128 d. 16 Apr. 1925. 123 MAE Yougoslavie 51 Grenard to Paris tels. 131-3 d. 17 May 1925, Chambrun to Paris tels. 62-3 
d. 23 May 1925. 
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republican regime in Greece. Moreover, as Kaklamanos argued, Yugoslav policy over 
Salonica was very short-sighted: as the last war had shown, it would do the Little 
Entente no good to have a hostile Greece in their rear. 'It will be no use at all to 
Serbia to hold the railway and the port of Salonica if the Greek fleet controls the sea 
and blockades the port'. 
124 
Kaklamanos' appeal for intervention was heeded by Paris. On 2 June Grenard was 
instructed to express French disquiet at the hitch in the negotiations and the fact that 
Yugoslavia's 'unacceptable conditions' were the chief obstacle to agreement, 125 
whereupon he reminded Nincic of the importance of the alliance, and suggested 'that 
the Jugoslav pretensions as regards the Salonica line were unduly exorbitant and that 
it would be wise to modify them and show a generally more conciliatory attitude. 
Nincic's reply was, however, evasive and merely repeated familiar arguments about 
Greek weakness; and in any case by this time the negotiations had already been 
adjourned. Grenard was, nevertheless, hopeful that French representations might be 
renewed later to greater effect, and Nincic did at least assure him that the suspension 
of the talks would not signify any rupture in relations. 126 
The r6le played by the Italians in the negotiations was the subject of intense 
speculation. Throughout the talks the Greeks discerned the malign hand of Italy at 
work behind the scenes, striving to prevent any rapprochement between Greece and 
Yugoslavia. 1271ndeed, they managed to instil in the British 'a suspicion amounting 
almost to certainty' that Italy was backing Yu goslavia. 128After the breakdown of the b 
talks, the Greeks continued to plough this sarne furrow, arguing that Italy had 'played 
124 MAE Yougoslavie 51 Chambrun to QO tels. 62-3 d. 23 May 1925, Grenard to Paris tels. 152-4 d. 30 
May 1925. 
125 MAE Yougoslavie 51 QO to Grenard tel. 125 d. 2 Jun. 1925. 
126 DBFP/I/XXVII/196; MAE Yougoslavie 51 Grenard to Paris tels. 156-9 d. 3 Jun-1925, no. 127 d. 4 
Jun. 1925. The British speculated that the French were 'possibly rather alarmed at the singleness of 
Purpose displayed by the Serbs over the question of Salonika(FO 371/10767 min. by McEwen d. 2 
Jun 
- 1925). 127 MAE Youoroslavie 51 Chambrun to QO tel. 58 d. 7 May 1925, Grenard to QO tels. 152-4 d. 30 May 
1925. 
128 FO 371/10767 memorandum by McEwen d. 22 May 1925. 
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the r6le of "Mephistopheles"'. Nor was it just the British who found this idea 
plausible: Grenard too was 
under the impression that the Italian government had used their influence with 
a view to bringing about a rupture of these negotiations, though he had no 
evidence in support of this supposition. It was, however, generally the policy of 
Italy to prevent, if possible, any understandings between the Balkan 
Governments, and he had no doubt that she had acted in accordance with that 
policy in the present case. 129 
Grenard was doubtless confirmed in this analysis by dark hints from Nincic that Italy 
(and Bulgaria) had promised Belgrade liberty of action in the Salonica question. 130 
Unfortunately but perhaps predictably, the published Italian documents throw little 
light on this matter and betray little beyond a lively general concern at the possibility 
of the creation of a bloc of Balkan states based around a nucleus of Greece and 
Yugoslavia. "' 
The Greeks may or may not have been sincere in painting a black picture of Italian 
policy, and this picture may or may not have been accurate. At the same time, it is 
clear that Italian policy and Greek attitudes towards Italy were not free from 
ambiguity: whilst the Greeks were at odds with Yugoslavia and blaming Rome, they 
also saw the utility of trying to cultivate better relations with the Italians. In 
retrospect, British observers argued that ever since the denunciation of the alliance 
Michalakopoulos had perceived the potential value of Italy as a counter-weight to 
hostile Yugoslavia, and these realist calculations had begun to overcome the Greeks' 
acquired antipathy towards Italy. Simultaneously, the Italians were attempting to 
ingratiate themselves with Athens: in the spring Italian diplomats became more active 
there and their work bore fruit with the visit of an Italian fleet to Navarino and 
Salonica in mid-May. 132 True, talk of a genuine or lasting rapprochement was still 
premature, but Michalakopoulos made clear that he was prepared to turn Italian 
129 DBFP/I/XXVII/196-8; MAE Yougoslavie 51 Chambrun to QO tel. 70 d. 2 Jun. 1925; FO 
371/10767 Kennard to FO tel. 87 d. 2 Jun. 1925. 
130 MAE Yougoslavie 51 Grenard to QO tels. 131-3 d. 17 May 1925, no. 127 d. 4 Jun. 1925. 131 DDI/7/III/530-1,535. 
132 FO 371/11357 Annual Report, Greece, 1925 pp. 24-6. 
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intrigue to his advantage if Yugoslavia maintained an unfriendly attitude. Thus he 
told Young cryptically on 15 May that 'if it were necessary [for Greece] to become a 
satellite, he would choose a stronger power than Serbia'. 133This very language was 
repeated to Chambrun after the suspension of the negotiations in June, 134and the 
British charge in Athens was struck by Michalakopoulos' admiration for the Italians, 
and the 'great efforts' being made by them 'to repair their position here'. The general 
feeling in Athens, he noted, seemed to be that if Greece could not have the Yugoslav 
alliance she would either do without it or find 'new friends'. 135This foreshadowed the 
next phase of this dispute when the great powers were to become much more actively 
involved and the whole issue was to become entangled with the bigger questions in 
European international relations. 
133 FO 371/10767 Cheetharn to FO no. 154 d. 15 May 1925. 134 MAE Yougoslavie 51 Chambrun to QO no. 68 d. 9 Jun-1925. 135 FO 371/10767 Keeling to FO no. 177 d. 5 Jun. 1925. 
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In the wake of the adjournment of the Greco-Yugoslav negotiations, the three Entente 
powers all became more actively involved in the dispute. In the van were the Italians, 
if only by virtue of the increasing intimacy developing between Rome and Athens - 
albeit an intimacy that some Greeks viewed with misgivings. On 17 June 
Kaklamanos, while he blamed Nincic personally for Yugoslav intransigence, 
lamented to Nicolson that the hitch in the negotiations would give encouragement to 
the militarist party at Athens and charged Bodrero with having 'left no stone unturned 
to envenom the relations between Greece and Serbia'. ' A week later, 
Michalakopoulos alluded to Italy's selfish motives: Rome wanted to prevent the 
fonnation of any Balkan combination and, specifically, 'to isolate Greece, in order 
that she might be induced to fall in with Italian ambitions in Asia Minor'. 2Certainly, 
great efforts were being made by Italian diplomats to increase their influence at 
Athens, and the rise to power of Pangalos - at least in part facilitated by the recent 
foreign policy setback3- in no way hindered them. Indeed, the visit to Athens on 7 
July of Dino Grandi, a key Italian foreign policy-maker, seemed to indicate that 
Greco-Italian relations were about to enter a new and more cordial phase. 4 
The rise of Pangalos and the growing d&ente between Rome and Athens could not 
but have an impact on Yugoslav policy. At first, some feared that the Yugoslavs 
might react strongly, and take advantage of Greece's internal convulsions to march on 
Salonica. Kennard, for example, warned that the new found haste of the Radical party 
to come to terms with the Croats (in negotiations for a coalition) might reflect a desire 
to free their hands for such an external adventure. 5 The Foreign Office was, however, 
not persuaded that the Yugoslavs would go so far as to defy the powers and launch an 
attack on Greece, 6and soon Kennard was reporting that the Yugoslavs were more 
DBFP/i/XXVII/205-6. 
2 DBFP/1/XXVII/208-9. 
3 FO 371/10768 min. by McEwen d. 29 Jun. 1925. 4 DBFP/I/XXVII/209-10,212-3; FO 371/11357 Annual Report, Greece, 1925 p. 25- See also pp. 138- 
40 above. 
5 DBFP/i/XXVII/2 10; FO 371/10768 Kennard to Nicolson p. l. d. 26 Jun. 1925, min. by Howard Smith 
d. 29 Jun. 1925. 
6 FO 371/10768 mins. by Howard Smith, Nicolson and Lampson d. 30 Jun. 1925. 
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likely to use Greece's political instability simply as a further argument for their 
acquiring control of the Salonica railway. 7 
However, it soon became apparent that recent developments were breeding insecurity 
rather than confidence in Belgrade. By the middle of July the Yugoslavs were 
seriously alarmed at reports of Italian military preparations in the Trieste area and 
came to believe that some 'rash foreign adventure' in the Balkans was being 
contemplated. They did not necessarily expect to be the victims of such an adventure, 
but their relations with Italy had clearly recently taken a turn for the worse, and the 
coincidence of this with the Greco-Italian rapprochement was obviously causing 
concem. 8From. mid-June onwards, therefore, Nincic's declarations to Kennard struck 
a newly conciliatory note, emphasising Belgrade's lack of territorial designs and 
determination, after a cooling-off period, to renew the alliance; 9 and the most 
dramatic evidence of this Yugoslav change of heart came with Belgrade's response to 
a French initiative aiming to break the deadlock over the Ghevgheli-Salonica railway. 
This initiative had originated with De Fleuriau in London who early in June had 
suggested the formation of a new independent company to administer the line and 
provide the efficient service the Yugoslavs demanded whilst not infringing Greek 
sovereignty. He envisaged the participation of foreign capital in this company which 
would permit the installation of some neutral, preferably French, individual at its 
head. The idea evidently appealed to Briand, who on II June instructed Grenard to 
take 'energetic and insistent' action to press the scheme upon the Yugoslavs and 
facilitate a resumption of negotiations. 10 At first Grenard met with a cool response, 
Nincic arguing that the scheme would not provide sufficient guarantees for Yugoslav 
interests and that in any case he did not favour further negotiations before the actual 4: 5 
7 DBFp/, /XXVII/210. 
8 DBFP/1/XXVII/214-6,219-20. The Yugoslav minister in Rome attributed the decline in Italo- 
Yugoslav relations to Mussolini now being'more in the hands of extremists and ultra-nationalist wing 
of his followers' (DBFP/I/XXVII/219). The Foreign Office did not believe that Italian aspirations to 
play a leadinor r6le in the Balkans would lead them into adventure, and Lampson later minuted that'it 
was a pity that Mr. Kennard started this hare' (FO 371/10695 min. by Lampson d. 22 Jul. 1925). 9 FO 371/10768 Kennard to FO tel. 95 d. 17 Jun. 1925, no. 233 d. _30 
Jun. 1925. 
10 MAE YouQoslavie 52 QO to Grenard tels. 134-8 d. II Jun. 1925. 11 
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expiry of the treaty in November. ' I After the Pangalos coup, however, Nincic beaan 
to change his tune and on 16 July, when the scare about Italian military preparations 
was at its height, he told Grenard that he accepted the French suggestion and that, in 
order to 'cut short Italian intrigues', he proposed to resume negotiations with the 
Greeks as soon as possible. 12 
The French now hastened to press their proposal on Athens: on 20 July Chambrun 
spoke to Rentis who accepted in principle the idea of an international company to run 
the railway. ' 3 The difficulty was, however, that the details of the scheme - how the 
company would be organised, and the proportion of share capital to be allotted to 
each country, for example - had been left vague by the French who hoped that Greece 
and Yugoslavia could settle such matters for themselves; and it soon became apparent 
that negotiations over these details were likely to divide the two states rather than 
draw them together. 14What the Quai d'Orsay in fact envisaged was a company which 
would be neutral in terms of its management and the nationality of its capital - this 
would of course permit French capitalists to take a leading role - but because this had 
not been made explicit, the idea arose in Athens and Belgrade that what Paris 
proposed was a Yugoslav-Greek company with some minority (perhaps one fifth) 
French participation. This was not acceptable to either state: the Yugoslavs would 
only accept a company that was purely Yugoslav, or at worst Franco-Yugoslav, 
whilst the Greeks refused to contemplate any Yugoslav participation at all, insisting Z: ) 
that the company should be either Franco-Greek, Anglo-French or, failing that, under 
the control of a truly international governing body similar to the Danube commission. 
11 MAE Yougoslavie 52 Grenard to QO tels. 174-9 d. 19 Jun. 1925, tel. 181 d. 20 Jun. 1925, tels. 184-5 
d. 22 Jun. 1925. 
12 MAE Yougoslavie 52 Grenard to QO tel. 193 d. 29 Jun. 1925, tels. 215-6 d. 16 Jul. 1925; In DBFP/IJXXVII/214-6; FO 371/10695 Kennard to FO no. 262 d. 21 Jul. 1925. 
13 MAE Yougoslavie 52 QO to De Fleuriau tels. 999-1000 d. 18 Jul. 1925, QO to Chambrun tels. 183-5 
d. 19 Jul. 1925, Chambrun to QO tels. 92-4 d. 20 Jul. 1925. 
14 MAE Yougoslavie 52 QO to Chambrun tel. 187 d. 22 Jul. 1925, note by Seydoux (assistant director 
Of political and commercial affairs) d. 23 Jul. 1925, Grenard to Q0 tels. 230-2 d. 24 Jul - 1925, Charnbrun to QO tels. 98-9 d. 30 Jul. 1925. 
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The net effect of all this was that by the end of August, despite agreement in principle 
to the French proposal, the two sides were no nearer any sort of settlement. 15 
Other factors played their part in frustrating a settlement. For one thing, the 
Yugoslavs again took up cudgels on behalf of the Macedo-Slavs in northern Greece, 
who were coming under increasing pressure from refugees from Anatolia: in mid-July 
Belgrade sent Athens a series of notes 'so stiff in tonethat the Greeks hesitated to 
reply to them officially. 16Essentially, the Yugoslavs were still holding out for the 
signature of a separate convention to regulate the application of the minorities 
treaties, while the Greeks were determined to resist this. Indeed, by the end of 
August, the minorities question had become, according to the French, at least as big 
an obstacle to rapprochement as that of the Salonica railway. 17This refusal to make 
concessions did not bode well for the renewal of the alliance, but it did seem to be the 
guiding spirit behind Greek PORCY. In mid-July, for example, Rentis had raised the 
idea of the conclusion of a series of compulsory arbitration parts in the Balkans, and 
by August this had matured into a plan for a fully-fledged Balkan pact. This was a 
cunning move, since the proposal was ostensibly unobjectionable, even laudable, but 
iculties in was in fact designed as 'the cheapest way for Greece to overcome the diffi 
which she was involved with Serbia,. It was, however, also rather transparent, and the 
15 DBFP/1/XXVII/215-6,221-5,231-3; DDI/7/IV/79-80. This confusion over details seems to have 
been due to a breakdown of communications in the French policy-making process. On 6 August when 
De Fleuriau first directly informed the Foreign Office of his plan he stated that the share capital 
would be split in the ratio 40: 40: 20 between Greece, Yugoslavia and France (FO 371/10768 min. by 
Lampson d-6 Aug. 1925). A fortnight earlier, in a conversation with Caclamanos, Nicolson had 
anticipated this division, apparently by chance, and it became generally accepted that this was the 
essence of the French plan (DBFP/1/XXVII/221,223-4). This detail, however, was never made 
explicit in the French documents. On 22 August the Quai d'Orsay told Grenard that the Yugoslav 
demand for absolute control over the new railway company did 'not seem to correspond' to the 
original French suggestion foreshadowing a neutral company, but this was the first time Grenard had 
heard officially that the French intended there to be no Yugoslav or Greek participation (MAE 
Yougoslavie 52 QO to Grenard tel. 220 d. 22 Aug. 1925, Grenard to QO tels. 264-6 d. 24 Aug. 1925). 
Subsequently Nincic relented a little and conceded that a purely French company might be 
acceptable if Yugoslav claims in other areas were met (MAE Yougoslavie 52 Grenard to QO 
tels. 267-70 d. 26 Aug. 1925, note by De la Baume d. 27 Aug. 1925). In I'D 16 DBFP/I/XXVII/220,232; MAE Yougoslavie 52 QO to Grenard tels. 172-3 d. 24 Jul. 1925; FO 
371/10768 Kennard to FO no. 233 d. 30 Jun. 1925. 17 MAE Yougoslavie 52 note by Seydoux d. 23 Jul. 1925, Grenard to QO tels. 235-7 d. 27 Jul. 1925, 
Chanbrun to QO tels. 98-9 d. 30 Jul. 1925, tel. 102 d. 4 Auo,. 1925, Grenard to QO tels. 252-60 d. 19 I Aug. 1925, tel. 271 d. 27 Aug. 1925, notes by De la Baume d. 26 and 27 Aug. 1925, QO to Athens 0 ZýI tels. 213-5 d. 28 Aug. 1925; FO 371/10768 Keeling to FO tel. 13 34 d. 6 Aug. 1925. C-) b 
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Yugoslavs coolly made clear that while they were in sympathy with the idea of 
arbitration treaties, they would have to be signed 'side by side with and not anterior to 
the settlement of the Salonica Railway and Minorities questions in accordance with 
Yugoslavia's desires', which were 'reasonable and moderate'. 18 
In September, discussions continued at Geneva, where both Nincic and Rentis were 
attending the sessions of the League Council and Assembly, and where the 
atmosphere was expected to be more conducive to agreement than that of Athens or 
Belgrade. 19 At first it seemed that these expectations were well founded. The idea of a 
Balkan security pact drifted into the background and talks between Rentis and Nincic, 
facilitated by Briand, appeared to make some progress. At one point the Yugoslavs 
accepted the idea of a purely French company running the railway, and in return the 
Greeks were ready to offer some concessions over the minorities issue. This 
agreement proved, however, to be ephemeral, since before the protagonists had even 
left Geneva the Yugoslavs retracted their concessions, returned to the demand for at 
least a mixed company and insisted that 'the question be reopened de novo through 
the ordinary diplomatic channels' at some later date. The deadlock therefore 
continued, and although both sides paid lip-service to the desirability of agreement, 
they had now adopted entrenched positions. In this situation, Nincic seemed resigned 
to postponing any further negotiations until the advent of a more reasonable Z) 
government in Greece. Even so it was by no means obvious that the Yugoslavs held 
all the cards, and rumours that a formal Italo-Greek understanding - perhaps even also 
embracing Bulgaria - was in the offing were plausible enough to cause some concern b ZD 
in Belgrade. 20 
18 DBFP/I/XXVII/223,2'ý'4-5,239-41; MAE Yougoslavie 52 Chambrun to QO tels. 92-4 d. 20 
Jul. 1925, note by Avenol d. 22 Jul. 1925, QO to Chambrun tels. 194-6 d. 25 Jul- 1925, Grenard to QO 
tels. 252-60 d. 19 Aug. 1925, QO to Chambrun tels. 223-5 d. 28 Aug. 1925. 
19 DBFP/I/XXVII/222. The Council met from 2-28 September and the Assembly from 7-26 
September. 
20DBFP/I/XXVII/241-4,247-50; FO 371/10766 Keeling., to FO no. 296 d. 17 Sept. 1925, Kennard to 
IFO no-382 d. 7 Oct. 1925, Kennard to Nicolson p. l. d. 9 Oct. 1925, Nicolson to Kennard p. l. d-15 
Oct. 1925; FO 3 371/10768 Ogilvie-Forbes (Belgrade) to FO no. 371 d. 29 Sept. 1925, min. by Harvey 
V Oct-1925, Kennard to FO no. 389 d. 16 Oct. 1925; MAE Yougoslavie 52 Grenard to QO no. 254 C d. 16 Sept. 1925, Chambrun to QO no. 114 d. 22 Sept. 1925, Clauzel (Geneva) to QO tel. 95 d. 28 
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This state of affairs left the French rather disgruntled. In truth their mediatory role 
had always been 'a somewhat onerous one' 21as they strove to remain on good terms 
with both sides whilst finding a mutually acceptable solution that would also secure 
their own political and military interests in the region. 22 Certainly, they perceived that 
there could be no stable peace in the region without a genuine agreement between 
Greece and Yugoslavia: for this reason they always argued that the points at issue 
between the two must be settled in a spirit of 'reciprocal confidence and loyalty, and 
the alliance renewed, before there could be talk of arbitration treaties or a Balkan pact 
- the pact could not be the basis of a rapprochement, but must be built upon it. They 
warned the Greeks in particular that arbitration treaties would provide much less 
security than an alliance; indeed, to float the idea of an arbitration pact was both 
'inopportune and harmful'to eventual rapprochement. 23French policy was not, of 
course, wholly altruistic: a settlement of the Salonica question on the lines envisaged 
by De Fleuriau was designed to secure the lines of communication between Salonica 
and central Europe and to buttress French influence in a region where it was 
increasingly threatened by Italy. It was, therefore, galling to the French that by the 
end of September, not only had the idea of an eastern security pact atrophied, but 
there was no imminent prospect of either a Salonica settlement or a renewal of the 
alliance under French auspices. 24 
Italian policy during this period was characterised by a lively interest in the course of 
the dispute and particularly in French efforts at mediation. One factor in this was 
certainly the desire to improve relations with Greece at a time when Italo-YuZo,, oslav 
Sept. 1925, Grenard to QO tels. 293-7 d. 29 Sept. 1925, Anginieur (charg6 in Belgrade) to QO tel. 291 
d. 9 Oct. 1925 no. 283 d. 22 Oct. 1925. 21 DBFP/i/XXVII/232. 
22 FO 371/11357 Annual Report, Greece, 1925 p. 9. 23 MAE Yougoslavie 52 QO to Chambrun tels. 194-6 d. 25 Jul. 1925, tels. 203-4 d-30 jul. 1925, 
tels. 223-5 d. 28 Aug. 1925 [quoted]. Grenard feared that if the Greeks did not make concessions for 0 the alliance, the Yugoslavs would eventually just take what they wanted anyway (MAE Yougoslavie 
52 Grenard to QO tels. 230-2 d. 24 Jul. 1925, tels. 252-60 d. 19 Aug. 1925). 24 MAE you 0 croslavie 52 Clauzel to QO tel. 95 d. 28 Sept. 1925. Chambrun had always believed that 0 the Greek pact scheme was merely a tactical manoeuvre (MAE Yougoslavie 52 Chambrun to QO 
tel. 118 d. 31 Aug. 1925). 
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relations had become rather equivocal. 25 The Greeks played on this, and tried to win 
Italian support for the idea of intern ationali sing the railway by pointing out that this 
might provide opportunities for Italian influence in the region. 26That the preservation 
and extension of their influence was the main concern of the Italians was made clear 
in a memorandum. of 17 September which explicitly stated that Italy's interest lay in 
preventing the formation of any Balkan bloc or Greco-Yugoslav entente (which 
would be susceptible to French or British influence whilst excluding that of Italy) and 
ensuring that Greece and Yugoslavia continued to gravitate separately and 
independently towards Italy. To this end, the memorandum suggested an initiative to 
trump the French and facilitate a settlement of the Salonica question: Greece and 
Yugoslavia would be told that accepting the French solution would be an unfriendly 
act, and that Italy would be willing to participate instead in a joint company to run the 
railway. 27 Rome had evidently investigated the ramifications - for example the 
financial implications - of going ahead with this scheme'28and Bodrero, for one, was 
keen to make some positive move to influence events, but in the end no action 
materialised. 29 
In this respect British policy approximated more closely to that of Italy than that of 
France. After the Pangalos coup, the Foreign Office was unanimous in its 
determination that Britain should stay aloof from the Greco-Yugoslav dispute and, if 
a crisis arose, endeavour to place it before the League. 30 The French initiative on the 
railway question did nothing to alter this view. On 23 July Nicolson told Kaklamanos 
that a railway company controlled by the French 'would be a good thing and in the 







-3 371/10768 mins. by Howard Smith, Nicolson and Lampson 
UO Jun. 1925, min, by Howard 
Smith d. 9 Jul. 1925. Nicolson also believed that Britain should not object to improved relations 
between Greece and Italy: these were inevitable 'now that we have of necessity abandoned the phil- 
hellene policy initiated by Canning, and pursued with profit for both countries for over a hundred 
Years' (min. by Nicolson d. 7 Jul. 1925). 
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with the Yugoslavs in commercial matters but would certainly restrain them from am! 
political (or military) aggression since France 'did not in the least wish to see Serbia 
turning her back on Central Europe and indulging in Balkan imperialism'. French 
involvement would provide 'a very dependable guarantee for Greece' who need not 
fear being trapped in the French orbit: 'our experience of the planetary systems 
evolved at the Quai d'Orsay was that they quickly developed a centrifugal tendency'. 
In other words, if the French were willing to take on the responsibility of brokering a 
settlement, then the Greeks would be foolish to refuse and the British, as Lampson 
noted, would 'have no reason to be jealous'. 31 Even so, the British had no desire to 
become involved in the scheme themselves. Chamberlain was keen to remain 'as non- 
committal as possible' and on 27 July Lampson discouraged Kaklamanos' suggestion 
that an Anglo-French combine should run the line: 'British capital only invested in 
things which were commercially attractive and which were not really political 
enterprises'. 32 
If the British looked benignly on the French railway scheme, they were much less 
keen on Rentis's idea for a Balkan arbitration pact. At first, Nicolson assumed that the 
scheme would receive Britain's blessing as long as it was in the style of Locarno and 
encompassed Bulgaria and Turkey as well as the former victor powers of the region. 33 
British opinion soon came to regard the proposal as inopportune, however, not least 
because it became clear that the Yugoslavs were opposed. Belgrade perceived that the 
Greek ballon d'essai was designed to postpone concessions and to gain the benefits of 
an alliance on the cheap, and let it be known on 31 August that if Rentis sounded 
other powers with a view to pressurising Yugoslavia then this 'would not be regarded 
by public opinion as a friendly act'. Nicolson attributed this announcement to 
Yuoroslav fears that the Greeks might bring the proposal before the Geneva Assembly: Z: ) Z: I 
31 DBFP/i/XXVII/221-2. 
32 DBFP/I/XXVII/2-)2-5; FO 371/10768 mins. by Nicolson, Lampson, Tyrrell and Chamberlain d. 30 
Jul-1925. 
33 FO 371/10768 Nicolson to Selby p. l. d. 31 Aug. 1925. 0 
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The Serbs know that it is force and not justice which will give them what they 
want at Salonika and in regard to the Minorities, and they also know that their 
attitude on both these questions would be impossible to defend if it ever came 
to open discussion by the Assembly. This situation, i. e. right versus might, was 1: ) 
just the sort of situation for which the League was devised, and if Greece 
appealed to these principles she would acquire sympathy with the smaller 
powers. But the fact remains that Yugoslavia is her neighbour and is 
unscrupulous, whereas the sentimental sympathy of Scandinavia would be of 
small avail-" 
In other respects too the plan was untimely: Chamberlain did not want the Locarno 
negotiations complicated in any way. Thus he suggested to Rentis in Geneva 'that at 
this moment patience was needed, [and] that possibly if our western pact was 
successfully negotiated the example of the great Powers of the west might influence 
other countrieS'. 35 These arguments must have carried weight with Rentis and 
contributed to the dropping, for the moment, of the idea of a Balkan Locarno. 
British policy in these particular instances was in perfect harmony with the line laid 
down in May and June when the troubled Balkan situation - of which the Greco- 
Yugoslav dispute was a key component - had given rise to general policy discussions 
in the Foreign Office. One of these was triggered by Kennard who, on the eve of his 
departure for Belgrade, requested an exposition of British Balkan policy with 
particular reference to possible developments, such as a Yugoslav seizure of Salonica 
and the creation of Balkan confederation. Lampson did not see how 'we can profitably 
I answer or wisely attempt to answer Mr. Kennard's searching questions . 
The fact is, squarely put, that we have no fixed policy in the Balkans - or 
indeed anywhere else, save the restoration of a normal situation resulting in 
for British products and British increased trade and thereby a geater opening 
finance and industry generallv. Is not the strength of this country its 
opportunism, in the best sense of the word? We prefer to know the concrete 
problem before we face it: we do not commit ourselves in advance. All we 
want is peace and quiet so that we may get on with our industrial work at home 
and develop our markets abroad. 
34 DBFP/l/XXVll/234-5; FO 371/10768 min. by Nicolson d. I Sept. 1925, Ogilvie-Forbes to FO 
no. 345 d. 2 Sept. 1925. 
3'DBFP/I/XXVII/242-4; FO, 371/10768 Selby to Nicolson p. l. d. 8 Sept-1925. 
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Chamberlain added his own gloss to this: Britain had no immediate interests in the 
Balkans such 'as would dictate a particular solution of any of its many problems', 
rather'our one & only interest is peace - internal & external - among the Balkan 
nations'. Britain therefore worked for moderation and reconciliation among those 
nations, not from any compulsion to be 'the policeman and pedagogue of the Balkans', 
but because the security Europe and Britain needed had to be built on foundations of 
stability. This was not the same as 'no policy or only a negative policy: 'rightly 
understood & practised this is a positive policy'even if 'the method of its application 
to any particular emergency can only be decided when that emergency anses'. 36 
That Chamberlain's conception of British interests did not doom British policy to 
passivity was to be soon demonstrated. On 4 June Nicolson put up a proposal based 
on the premise that recent developments - including communist activity and the 
adjournment of the alliance negotiations - 'have demonstrated that the Balkans still 
constitute a focus of instability, and that the SCS Government are inclined to profit by 
the disunion or indifference of the Great Powers in order to advance their own highly 
dangerous ambitions'. The French shared British fears about this, but it was also 'very 
essential to secure if possible the adherence of M. Mussolini to a policy of joint action 
for Balkan peace' since 'Anglo-French representations at Belgrade would be politely 
disregarded: but concerted pressure on the part of Great Britain, France and Italy 
would have a very sedative effect'. Nicolson therefore suggested that when 
Chamberlain met Briand at Geneva they should issue an invitation to Mussolini for 
'the informal reconstruction of the Concert of Europe for the purpose of maintaining 
some sort of order and discipline in the Balkans 1.37 It was natural that the idea of a 
flexible, informal ad hoc system of collaboration between the great powers should 
have appealed to Chamberlain: this was his wonted method of proceeding and in this 0 
case it also fitted in with his general policy of rapprochement with Italy and his desire 
36 FO 371/10695 min. by Bateman d. 12 May 1925, memorandum by Howard Smith d. 16 May 1925, 
mins. by Lampson d. 17 May 1925 and 18 May 1925 [quoted], mins. by Tyrrell d. 19 May 1925 and 
Chamberlain d. 21 May 1925 [quoted]. 
37 DBFP/I/YXVII/201-2. The proposal apparently originated with Tyrrell (FO 371/10695 mins. by Iz: ) Nicolson and Tyrrell d. 4 Jun. 1925). The Leag,, ue Council met at Geneva from 8-11 June 1925. 
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to entice Mussolini into acting responsibly in the international SyStern. 38 He and 
Briand agreed on the text of a proposal and on 10 June handed Scialoja, the Italian 
representative on the Council, a telegram inviting Mussolini to consider not I any 
clearly defined collective action' but rather the exercise of the solidarity of the great 
powers in Balkan affairs 'by more frequent exchange of views and whenever 
opportunity presents itself by a common diplomatic action'. 39 
Although this was a positive step by Britain, its feasibility was questioned by 
Kennard, who doubted that it would ever be possible to concert the divergent policies 
of the great powers in the Balkans, where the French wanted to encourage closer links 
between the Balkan states under their own auspices whilst the Italians wanted to keep 
those same states divided. The British interest in peace, he argued, would be better 
served by the promotion of a Balkan confederation. 40 This idea in turn found no 
favour in London, where a policy of detachment and reserve was still preferred, but 
Lampson at least shared Kennard's scepticism: 'in practice, we [already] do concert 
when it is practicable to do so, but over such things as Salonica we are never likely to 
have loyal cooperation from Italy'. 41 Any hopes of speedy action were further reduced 
by the fact that, for some reason, Scialoja never actually passed the telegram on to his 
master in Rome and a further copy was not transmitted, via Della Torretta, until 
AuguSt. 42Even now, Mussolini made no great haste to respond. When he met 
Chamberlain at Locarno in October, the possibility of instituting a regular exchange 
of ideas was touched upon, but his reply was 'rather non- committal'. 43When Della 
Torretta finally transmitted Mussolini's official response on 24 October, it was vague 
in the extreme. Doubtless because he did not wish to limit Italy's freedom of 
38 For this last point, see Edwards ESR 10 1- 13. 
39 DBFP/i/XXVII/201-2; FO 371/10695 Chamberlain to Tyrrell p. l. d. 8 Jun. 1925. The telegram also 
flattered Mussolini by referring to the 'special authority' enjoyed by Italy in Balkan affairs. Q FO 371/10695 Kennard to Nicolson p. l. d. 19 Jun. 1925, p. l. d. 22 Jun. 1925. 41 FO 371/10695 mins. by Lampson and Tyrrell d. 1 Jul. 1925, min. by Chamberlain d. 2 Jul. 1925, 
min. by Lampson U Jul. 1925 [quoted]. 
42 FO 371/10695 min. by Bateman d. 11 Aug. 1925, Chamberlain to Della Torretta unno. l. d. 12 
Aug. 1925, Della Torretta to Chamberlain unno. l. d. 13 Aug. 1925; FO 800/258 Chamberlain to 
Graham p. l. d. 20 Jul. 1925, Graham to Chamberlain p. l. d. 30 Jul. 1925; DDI/7AV/58,70-1. 
43 FO 371/10695 Chamberlain (Locarno) to FO no. 43 d. 17 Oct. 1925 and encl. 
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manoeuvre and precisely because he was aware of the divergence of Entente interests 
in the Balkans, Mussolini merely recapitulated the terms of the Chamberlain- B ria nd 
telegram and said he would 'welcome with a lively interest' any concrete future 
Pr0poSalS. 44 By the time of this reply, of course, the situation between Greece and 
Yugoslavia was one of stalemate. The only consolations were that both sides were 
t enphasising their good will to each other' and that, so the Foreign Office believed, 
Nincic seemed 'to harbour no sinister intention of forcing a quarrel on Greece, at all 
events for the present'. 45 
Other events in October, however, were to divert attention away from Greco- 
Yugoslav relations. In the Balkan arena, the Greek-Bulgarian incident erupted after a 
border skirmish on 19 October. After Greek troops crossed the Bulgarian border the 
situation was one of crisis until 28 October when, under pressure from the League 
and the powers, they withdrew; thereafter, until December, the Rumbold commission 
of inquiry was at work and there was intense speculation as to its findingS. 46 Of wider 
importance was the initialing of the Locarno treaties on 16 October, which was 
widely held to have inaugurated a new era of pacification in international relations: 
this new spirit was, in fact, one reason why the international community was united in 
47 its response to the Greek-Bulgarian incident and so quickly reined the Greeks in. 
More precisely the Locarno ageement triggered off a new wave of speculation (and 
some enthusiasm) in Europe about regional guarantee and arbitration pacts, and this 
was all the more intense because, with the western pact safely signed, Austen 
Chamberlain took up the matter. The obvious places to consider for an extension of 
the principles of Locarno were central Europe and the Balkans, and the Greco- 
Yugoslav dispute now became subsumed in the search for a Balkan pact. 
44 FO 371/10695 min. by Lampson d. 24 Oct. 1925, Della Torretta to Lampson unno. l. d. 24 Oct. 1925 
and encls.; MAE Yougoslavie 52 note by Laroche d. 22 Oct. 1925; DDIRAV/122. The co-operation of 
the powers over the Greek- B ul garian incident was perhaps an example of the sort of collaboration 0 Chamberlain envisaged: see Orde, International Securiýy, pp. 203-4. 1 45 FO 33 71/10766 mins, by Harvey d. 13 and 21 Oct. 1925. 46 For more details, see pp. 142-3 above. 47 Barros, League of Nations and the Great Powers, pp. 118-20. 
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Already, in his speeches preceding the Locarno pact, Chamberlain had expressed the 
hope that after its conclusion 'perhaps other nations might follow our example'. At 
Locarno he had mentioned this to Mussolini and to the Czech foreign minister, Benes: 
he suggested that the latter should take the initiative and begin consultation with 
Nincic and Mussolini about a central European pact, which Chamberlain felt was for 
the time being a more promising prospect than a Balkan one. 48This Benes did in a 
conversation with Nincic at Bled on 21 October, but Nincic was rather wary of the 
idea and both ministers asked for a concrete initiative from the powers. 49 
Consequently Chamberlain defined his attitude in a circular dispatch to British 
ministers in the central European capitals. Britain, he wrote, would welcome a 
Danubian pact, but salvation 'must come from within, and there can be no real peace 
but by consent. If the Great Powers were to impose peace, such peace would remain 
an outer garment which could be thrown off at any moment'. The governments of the 
smaller powers must therefore 'show the same largeness of view and desire of 
reconciliation as the Great Powers have done, but at the same time patience was 
needed for this spirit and for concrete proposals to mature. In the meantime, two 
essential preconditions were vital, namely 'a policy of conciliation and goodwill to 
minorities' and the co-operation and goodwill of the Italian government'. 
Chamberlain's intention, in other words, was not to force the pace in this field or to 
impose any British conception of a pact, but rather to promote and foster the 
development of a'Locarno-mentality' in the region, from which a pact would 
naturally folloW. 50 
From the beginning it was obvious that there were serious obstacles in the way of any 
such general rapprochement. Chamberlain was adamant thatthe counsel, assistance 
and goodwill of Italy as the Great Power most directly interested must prove a vital 0 
factor'in the success of the negotiations, but when Graham approached Mussolini his Z: ) 
48 DBFP/I/XXVII/893-4; FO 371/10695 Chamberlain to FO no. 43 d. 17 Oct. 1925. 
49 DDI/7/IV/120-1; FO 371/10701 Kennard to FO tels. 134-6 d. 22 Oct. 1925, no. 401 d. 22 Oct. 1925. 
50 DBFPllalll64-5; FO 371/10701 mins. by Bateman d. 2-3 3 Oct. 1925 and Howard Smith, Lampson 
and Chamberlain d. 24 Oct. 1925. 
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response was no more than lukewarm. 5lMore importantly the Hungarians showed no 
enthusiasm for pacts with their neighbours until their multiple grievances - 
particularly over the question of Magyar minorities - had been satisfied. 52 A Foreign 
Office memorandum of 11 November identified these two major problems: the 
Italians were 'disinclined to favour any move for understanding between the States of 
Central Europe as this might lead to something akin to a Danube Confederation, or, in 
other tenns, a reconstitution of the Dual Monarchy under another name'whilst 
Hungary had 'no special inducement to lead her to seek reconciliation with her 
neighbours, and she can only regard them with thoughts of hatred and wait for the 
hour of her revenge'. 53Nevertheless, there was some progress in December when, at a 
League Council meeting in Geneva, the Hungarian prime minister, Count Bethlen, 
was persuaded by Chamberlain and Lampson to consider an initiative to set up some 
arbitration agreement with Czechoslovakia as the first step towards a pact. 54This 
progress was bound to be slow, however, since Bethlen had many internal problems 
to overcome before he could pursue this poliCy'55 and it was in fact checked 
altogether shortly afterwards by the outbreak of a forged currency scandal which 
severely disrupted relations between Hungary and her neighbours. 56 
From the outset, Nincic had made it clear that although he could contemplate a 
central European pact, it was premature to talk of any general reconciliation between 
51 DBFPllalll65-6. 
52 FO 371/10701 Barclay (Budapest) to FO no. 283 d. 6 Nov. 1925, min. by Lampson d. 1 1 Nov. 1925. 
53 DBMIa/11124-9. The Romanians were generally enthusiastic about a pact, although anomalously 
they felt a Balkan pact would have more chance of success than a Danubian one (FO 371/10701 
Derinor to FO no. 501 d. 7 Nov. 1925). The Czechs were not sure that the time was yet ripe (FO 0 371/10701 Dodd (Prague) to FO no. 416 d. 17 Dec. 1925) and the Austrians were opposed, since a pact 
would mean abandoning, any hope of Anschluss with Germany or recovering the south Tyrol TO 
371/10701 Akers-Douglas (Vienna) to FO no. 303 d. 26 Nov. 1925; DBFP/la/I/174-7). 
54 DBFP/la/l/223-30; FO 371/10701 FO to Barclay no. 370 d. 3 Dec. 1925, FO to Crewe no. 4014 d. 4 
Dec. 1925, min. by Lampson d. 7 Dec. 1925, Lampson (Geneva) to Howard Smith unno. l. d. 12 
Dec. 1925, mins. by Lampson d. 1 `3 and 24 Dec. 1925. Lampson's persuasion included telling the 
Hungarians that if they read the preamble to the German-Polish arbitration treaty signed at Locamo, 
they would see that arbitration treaties with their neighbours need not mean renouncing once and for 
all their lost provinces. 
55 DBFP1la111229; FO 371/10701 Lampson to Kennard p. l. d. 28 Dec-1925 
56 BDFA/Ii/F/2/? 
-00-9,211-19,221-7; FO 371/11243 memorandum 
by Howard Smith d. 9 Oct. 1926; 
Orde, International Security, pp. 204-5. 
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Yugoslavia, Greece and Bulgaria. In particular, until the Greeks became less 
intransigent over the Salonica railway there could be no question of renewing the 
alliance, and without that there could be no Balkan pact. 57When the Greek-Bulgarian 
incident erupted soon afterwards, Yugoslavia adopted a position of studied neutrality: 
there were (perhaps inevitably) rumours of some secret Yugoslav-Bulgarian 
understanding, but Nincic steadfastly declined to intervene. He was, however, hardly 
upset to see his two troublesome neighbours at odds, and hoped that Greece's action 
would have put her out of court with Geneva and thus have frustrated Greek plans to 
submit the Salonica railway question to the League for arbitration. 58 The Greeks, 
however, were adept at the diplomatic manoeuvring so often incumbent upon small 
powers and were determined, by taking advantage of wider developments, to recover 
swiftly any ground lost by their truculence towards Sofia. Thus on 2 November they 
addressed a telegram to Sir Eric Drummond, noting that one of the tasks of the 
Rumbold. commission would be to suggest measures to prevent the recurrence of 
incidents like the recent one and remarking that, as the League secretariat was 
currently considering a proposal for a pact of security involving compulsory 
arbitration between the Balkan states, the Greek government was 
glad to be in a position to adhere in principle to such an initiative, the salutary 
effects of which are quite plain. Compulsory arbitration, moreover, has been 
one of the characteristics of their recent programme in foreign politics. Greece 
... will not 
fail to associate herself with every measure, aiming at the equitable 
solution of any dispute or conflict, which might arise in the Balkans and at the 
consolidation of general peace, for which peace in the Balkans is a vital and 
essential necesSity. 59 
This communication did not result from an outbreak of the Locarno-spirit' at Athens. 
Rather, by trying to place themselves at the head of any movement towards a Balkan 
pact, the Greeks were manoeuvring to rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of ZýP 
57 FO 371/10701 Kennard to FO tel. 136 d. 22 Oct. 1925, no. 401 d. 22 Oct. 1925. 
58 FO 371/10672 Kennard to FO tel. 137 d. 23 Oct. 1925; FO, 371/10673 Kennard to FO no. 409 d-28 
Oct. 1925, no. 4 10 d. 29 Oct. 1925, min. by Bateman d. 3 Nov. 1925, FO, to Kennard no. 529 d. 2 
Nov. 1925, Erskine to FO no. 240 d. 12 Nov. 1925; MAE Yougoslavie 52 Anginieur to QO no. 288 d-25 
Oct. 1925; MAE Bulgarie 56 Chambrun to QO no. 124 d. I Nov. 1925. The Greeks had hinted that they 0 
mi, o,, ht refer the rail question to the League if the Yugoslavs refused to accept a purely French 
company (MAE Yougoslavie 52 Grenard to QO tels. 285-7 d. 29 Se 0925). 0p 59 FO 3 71/10763-3 FO, to Cheetham no. 642 dA Nov. 1925 and encl - 
(Punctuation as in ori ginal. ) 0 
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international opinion, to overcome their general insecurity and isolation, to 'anticipate 
other suggestions less palatable to them which may come from the Rumbold 
Com[mission]' and to evade the demands which the Yugoslavs were insisting on as a 
sine qua non for the renewal of the alliance. 60 In other words, as with Rentis' pact 
proposal in the summer, the Greeks were speaking the language of Locarno and 
cultivating an air of righteousness in order to camouflage their less exalted and more 
traditional self-interest. In fact, as Drummond soon made clear, no Balkan security 
pact was under consideration by the League - it was hardly within the League's 
competence to propose such things. Nor had the Greeks made any such proposal 
themselves; rather, they were simply seeking to get their support for the idea put on 
record, to influence any concrete proposals that might materialise in the near future 
and to encourage progress towards a pact which they hoped would settle all their 
foreign policy problems cheaply and at one fell SWoop. 61 
Greece's manoeuvres were not well received. The French perceived that Athens was 
trying to enmesh Belgrade in a pact in order to escape from the difficulties of direct 
negotiation, and held to the line that a pact must follow and not precede the settlement 
of their disputes and the stabilising of the Balkan political situation. 621n Athens, 
Cheetham, gulled by the Greeks into believing that any sort of pact must be a good 
thing, was dismayed to note that Chambrun was conducting propaganda against the 
idea and trying to force the Greeks to come to terms with Yugoslavia. 63London, 
however, did not share his alarm, believing it to be natural and desirable that the 
French should continue to work for the renewal of the alliance which would be 
evidence of a change of spirit which is the sine qua non of a pact 1.64Cheetharn was 
told to'go slow'and to encourage the Greeks to do the same: 'anything of the nature Z) Zý 
60F0371/10701 mins. by Bateman d. 9 Nov-1925, Howard Smith d. lONov. 1925 and Chamberlain 
d. 10 Nov. 1925 [quoted], FO to Crewe no. 4014 d. 4 Dec. 1925. 
61 FO 371/10701 Drummond to Cadogan unno. l. d. 4 Nov-1925 and encls. 
62 MAE Yougoslavie 52 QO to Grenard tels. 294-7 d. 9 Nov. 1925, Chambrun to QO no. 129 d. 12 o Nov. 1925, note for the president of the council d. 28 Nov. 1925. 
63 FO 371/10768 Cheetharn to FO no. 354 d. 12 Nov. 1925; FO 371/10701 Cheetham to FO tel. 184 d. 6 
Nov. 1925, tel. 186 d. 6 Nov. 1925, tel. 187 d. 7 Nov. 1925. 
64 FO 371/10768 min. by Bateman d. 25 Nov. 1925; FO 371/10701 mins. by Bateman and Howard 
Smith d-9 Nov. 1925, Lampson d. [? 10] Nov. 1925, Chamberlain d. 10 Nov. 1925- 
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of a Balkan pact can only be slow growth resulting from a general consciousness of 
its need'. Moreover, the Foreign Office was 'not without suspicion of the bona-fides 
of this sudden desire of Greek government to make the scheme their own: it comes 
curiously on the top of recent Derni-Hissar incident'. 65 
The Greek scheme was in any case crippled by the opposition of Sofia and Belgrade: 
the Bulgarians would not consider a pact until their own grievances over the 
minorities and an Aegean outlet were dealt with, 66and the Yugoslavs, although in 
principle in favour of a pact, were 'much offended' by the Greek initiative and 
likewise denounced it as premature. 67The Greeks made some further token efforts to 
rally the great powers to their side, 68but by December their initiative in favour of a 
Balkan pact had failed. As Chamberlain put it, the Greeks had been happy 'neither in 
the moment nor the manner in which they put forward their proposal' and they would 
have done 'better to settle some minor questions first'. 69 
None of this, of course, facilitated a settlement of the Greco-Yugoslav dispute. 
Throughout the months when the proposed pact was being discussed, there were 
periodic rumours that negotiations might be restarted, but these were without 
substance: the Greeks had no intention of shifting their position on the railway 
question and the Yugoslavs therefore had no incentive to negotiate. 10 This caused 
some irritation in the Foreign Office, where Bateman wrote that the sooner the Greeks 
realised 'that the alliance must precede a pact & that alliances connote a certain 
amount of give & take on both sides the better'. 71 Nevertheless, despite Lampson's 
65 FO 371/10701 FO to Cheetham tel. 134 d. 11 Nov. 1925. 
66FO 371/10701 Erskine to Bateman p. l. d. 5 Nov. 1925; MAE Yougoslavie 52 Dard to QO tel. 183 d. 7 
Nov. 1925. 
67 FO 371/10768 Kennard to FO tel. 161 d. 22 Nov. 1925, min. by Howard Smith d. 23 Nov. 1925 
[quoted], Kennard to Howard Smith p. l. d. 4 Dec. 1925; FO 371/10701 Kennard to FO no. 428 d. II 
Nov. 1925, Kennard to Lampson p. l. d. 20 Nov. 1925, Kennard to FO no. 447 d. 26 Nov. 1925. 
68 FO 371/10701 min. by Howard S mith d. 14 Nov. 1925, Rumbold to Chamberlain p. l. d. I Dec - 1925. 69 FO 371/10701 min. by Chamberlain d. 2 Dec. 1925. 
70 FO 371/10768 Eyres (Durazzo) to FO tel. 54 d. 9 Nov. 1925, Kennard to FO tel. 158 d. 11 Nov. 1925, 
Cheetham to FO no. 354 d. 12 Nov. 1925, Kennard to FO tel. 161 d. 22 Nov. 1925, mins. by Harvey d. 233 
Nov. 1925, Bateman d. 25 Nov. 1925, Kennard to FO no. 438 d. 24 Nov. 1925, Kennard to Howard 
Smith P. I. d. 4 Dec. 1925; MAE Yougoslavie 52 Grenard to QO no. 314 d. 26 Nov. 1925. 
71 FO 371/10768 min. by Bateman d. 1 Dec. 1925. 
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determination that Britain should avoid 'getting drawn into these Balkanics' '72 British 
policy was not entirely passive. In late October Kaklamanos had suggested that if no 
agreement could be reached in direct negotiations, the railway question might be 
referred to the advisory and technical committee of the League on communications 
and transport, a neutral non-political body whose mediation the Yugoslavs would 
surely accept. 73Lampson followed up this idea in December, telling both Rentis and 
Kaklamanos that since a direct settlement (the ideal solution) was so remote a 
prospect, it might be advisable to refer the matter to the League; 74and he put the 
same suggestion to the Yugoslav minister in London, Djuric, who agreed that it was 
worth consideration. 75 As Lampson told Kennard a week later, there was no guarantee 
that the Yugoslavs would accept, but if they refused to turn to the League committee 
('an international technical body who can have no special axe to grind') this would at 
least throw light on whether their aims were purely economic or rather 'political 
(which I more than suspect)'. 76 
At the turn of the year there even appeared to be some glimmer of hope regarding the 
wider question of a Balkan pact. Amidst the blizzard of 'usual Autumn rumours I 
concerning new alignments in the Balkans - talk, for example, of Yugoslav- 
Bulgarian, Greco-Bulgarian and even Turco-Yugoslav rapprochernentS 77 it became 
quite clear that the Yugoslavs were preoccupied with and'grenuinely panicky about 
Italian ag[g]ressive designS'. 78 In a conversation with Nincic at the end of December, 
72 FO 371/10768 min. by Lampson d. 3 Dec. 1925. 
73 FO 371/10673 note by Howard Smith d-30 Oct. 1925. 
74 FO 371/10768 min. by Lampson d. 14 Dec. 1925; FO 371/10766 min. by Lampson d. 30 Dec. 1925- 
75 FO 371/10695 min. by Lampson d. 22 Dec. 1925. Lampson made these suggestions in a purely 
personal capacity: official intervention was certainly not contemplated (FO 371/10768 FO to 
Kennard no. 595 d. 7 Dec. 1925). 
76 FO 371/10766 Lampson to Kennard p. l. d. 31 Dec. 1925. 
77 FO 371/10673 FO to Kennard no. 529 d. 2 Nov. 1925, Erskine to FO, no. 240 d. 12 Nov. 1925; FO 
371/10794 FO to Kennard no. 484 d. 17 Oct. 1925, Bateman to Stevenson p. l. d. 17 Oct. 1925 [quoted], 
Kennard to FO no. 467 d. 16 Dec. 1925, Kennard to Howard Smith p. l. d. 17 Dec. 1925. 
78 FO 371/10794 Kennard to Howard Smith p. l. d. 17 Dec. 1925. The Foreign Office sought Graham's 
views privately about Italian intentions, but did not take Nincic's rantings seriously (FO 371/10794 0 
min. by Lampson d. 23 Dec. 1925, Lampson to Graham p. l. d-30 Dec. 1925; DBFP/la/I/292-4). The 
consensus was that Mussolini definitely wanted an outlet for his surplus population, but would seek it 
in Anatolia and 'not Dalmatia', and that the Italians were making up to the Greeks in preparation for 
this eventuality: 'doubtless the old bribe of Constantinople has been held out to the Greeks. Let us 
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Kennard played on these fears in an effort to advance the cause of a Balkan pact in 
accordance with Chamberlain's instructions, arguing that the possibility of external 
aggression made unity between the Balkan states all the more imperative. Nincic 
promised to consider this argument, and Kennard evidently felt that he had made 
some progress. 19 On 24 December he told Lampson that, although he knew the 
Foreign Office did not want'to play too prominent a part in Balkan politics, it might 
be possible to prompt the Yugoslavs into taking the lead in introducing the 'Locarno- 
spirit' into the Balkans. True, it was always difficult to rely on their word, but Nincic 
was scared of Italy and, whilst 'unintelligent and unreliable' was also 'vain and 
ambitious', and would relish the prestige that such an initiative would bring. 80 
Lampson's response was cautious - excessive haste would be harmful and the right 
spirit had to present in all states - but generally approving: if the opportunity arose 
Kennard should always advocate arbitration treaties on the German-Polish model and 
indicate the obvious expediency of preparing the ground for these by settling 
outstanding questions in a conciliatory fashion. In other words, by the end of the year, 
although little concrete progress had been made towards any new pacts, some hopes 
had been raised in the Foreign Office that with a little judicious persuasion 
Yugoslavia might become an advocate of a Balkan Locarno. 81 
There were now signs of some divergence between the views of Britain and France. Z: ) 
This should not be exaggerated: in general terms the French still believed that the way 
forward lay in settling the Greco-Yugoslav quarrel and then constructing, in accord 
with Britain and Italy, 'a strong pacific system which can prevent conflicts' in the 
Balkans. 820n the other hand, there were definite differences of emphasis between the 
British and French approaches. On the railway question, whereas the British were 
hope they will not be such fools as to rise to it'(FO 371/10794 min. by Howard Smith d. 30 
Dec. 1925). 
79 FO 371/10794 Kennard to FO no. 467 d. 16 Dec. 1925, no. 474 d. 23 Dec. 1925; FO 371/10695 min. 
by Lampson d. 22 Dec. 1925. 
80 FO 371/10701 Kennard to Lampson p. l. d. 24 Dec. 1925. 
81 FO 371/10701 Lampson to Kennard p. l. d. 28 Dec. 1925. Lampson was also cautious because 
Chamberlain was on holiday and he did not want to 'risk, queering the pitch' in his absence. 
82 MAE Yougoslavie 53 note for the president of the council d. 25 Dec. 1925. 
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warming to the idea Of a League solution, the French were increasingly sympathetic 
to the Yugoslavs. Thus, in late November, the Quai d'Orsay came to think that 
Yugoslav objections to a purely French private rail company - principally that it 
would have no political clout and would offer no real guarantee against Greek 
interference - seemed 'reasonable', and by the end of December the French were 
considering a renewed attempt to press a mixed Franco-Yugoslav-Greek railway 
company on AthenS. 83There were also wider issues to consider, as a tour d'horizon 
memorandum composed in the Quai d'Orsay on 25 December made clear: France 
might well have interests in all the Balkan states, but these varied greatly in 
importance, and it was incontestable that Yugoslavia'must be the pivot of our Balkan 
policy'. All in all, this indicated that the French might be growing tired of their 
balancing r6le and inclining increasingly towards Belgrade. 84 
The new year seemed to bring a decisive change in Yugoslav policy when, on 8 
January, Gavrilovic told the Greek government that Yugoslavia was willing to settle 
outstanding differences in order to prepare the ground for a Balkan pact. 85The 
reasons for this apparent change of heart were the subject of intense speculation: 
Kennard's subtle propaganda had obviously played its part and fear of Italy was still a 
motive, but it also seemed that as Yugoslavia's relations with both Bulgaria and 
Turkey had recently improved perceptibility Nincic for the first time believed a pact 
was a realistic possibility. 86 At the same time it was hard to tell what the Yugoslav 
proposal meant in practical terms, not least because, although Nincic did not disavow 
it, in fact Gavrilovic's declaration was unauthorised. 87There was certainly doubt as to 
83 MAE Yougoslavie 52 Grenard to QO no. 314 d. 26 Nov. 1925, min. by [? ] nd. [quoted]; MAE 
Yougoslavie 53 QO to Chambrun no. 460 d. 19 Dec. 1925. 
84 MAE Yougoslavie 53 note for the president of the council d. 25 Dec. 1925. 
85FO 371/11239 Cheetharn to FO tel. 4 d. 9 Jan. 1926, min. by Howard Smith d. 11 Jan. 1926; MAE 
You, (), ., oslavie 
53 Blondel (charg6 in Athens) to QO tel. 6 d. 8 Jan. 1926. 
86 FO 371/11239 Kennard to Lampson p. l. d. 7 Jan. 1926, Cheetham to FO tels. 5-7 d. 13 Jan. 1926, 
min. by Bateman d. 15 Jan. 1926, 'Memorandum respecting the Balkan pactby Howard Smith d. 15 
Jan. 1926, Cheetharn to FO tel. 9 d. 16 Jan. 1926, memorandum by Howard S mith d. 25 Jan. 1926; MAE 
You goslavie 53 note for the president of the council d. 25 Dec. 1925, QO to Grenard tel. 3 32 d. 29 g Dec. 1925, Grenard to QO tels. 350-6 d. 30 Dec. 1925. The Turkish foreign minister had visited 0 Belgrade in late December and had cordial talks with Nincic, whilst Yugoslav- Bulgarian relations 
had been improving, for several months. 
87 FO 3371/11239 Kennard to FO tel. 5 d. 14 Jan. 1926. 
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whether anything had changed on the railway question: the Greeks were still adamant 
that the Yugoslavs could not share in running the railway and Nincic, whilst giving 
out somewhat mixed signals, still seemed to favour a joint railway administration and 
to oppose any involvement by the League. " Nor were Greco-Yugoslav relations 
much better in other respects: the minorities question had flared up again, with both 
governments orchestrating demonstrations in their Macedonian territories which in 
turn led to violent exchanges in the Athens and Belgrade presS. 89 In these 
circumstances it was rather hard to divine the exact nature of Yugoslav intentions. 
The Foreign Office nevertheless saw in the Yugoslav move an opportunity to 
progress towards a settlement on the lines envisaged in December. Kennard had 
already expressed his support for the idea of referring the railway question to the 
League, and had suggested joint Anglo-French representations at Belgrade as the best 
way to overcome Yugoslav opposition. 90 The Foreign Office took up this theme after 
Gavrilovic's initiative: the railway question held the key to the realisation of a pact 
(that is, a series of arbitration treaties) but the views of the two sides were 
irreconcilable. Progress was, however, most likely to come if the Yugoslavs could be 
persuaded to abandon their present untenable position- that is, making demands that 
would infringe greek sovereignty - and to allow the administration of the railway to 
be handed over to the League of Nations. Accordingly, Crewe and Graham were 
instructed. to approach the French and Italian governments and to suggest that the best 
means of encouraging the Balkan pact which all three powers desired was for them to 
make joint representations at Athens and Belgrade for the submission of this question 
to the Leacrue without delay. There was no question of a pact being imposed from Zýl 
outside, but this seemed to London to be the best means of encouraging a resumption 
88FO 371/11239 'Memorandum respecting the Balkan pactby Howard Smith d. 15 Jan. 1926, min. by 
Howard Smith d. 21 Jan. 1926, Kennard to FO tel. 5 d. 14 Jan. 1926; MAE Yougoslavie 53 Blondel to 
QO tel. 6 d. 8 Jan. 1926. 
J and mins., 89 FO 371/11337 Kennard to FO no. 488 d. 31 Dec. 1925 and mins., tel 8 d. 16 an. 1926 
Cheetham to FO no. 27 d. 21 Jan. 1926 and mins., 'Memorandum on Serbian "Minorities" in Greek 
Macedonia'by Bateman d. 3 Mar. 1926; FO 371/11343 Cheetharn to FO no. 427 d. 31 Dec. 1925 and 
mins., tel. 8 d. 16 Jan. 1926, tel. 18 00 Jan. 1926. 
90 FO 371/11343 Kennard to Lampson p. l. d. 8 Jan. 1926, mins. by Harvey and Howard Smith d. 13 
Jan. 1926, Tyrrell d. 14 Jan. 1926. 
366 
of talks and thus facilitating a pact. 91 It was also in line with Britain's general policy 
of strengthening 'the influence and prestige of the League in the Balkans'and 
restraining 'Serbia in her more truculent moods 1.92 
Nothing came of this move and this Gavrilovic initiative soon collapsed leaving 
Greco-Yugoslav relations in a worse state than ever. In part this was the fault of the 
French. The Greek foreign minister, Rouf6s, told the French charge in Athens, 
Blondel, that, for the sake of an agreement, he personally favoured accepting 
Yugoslav demands for participation in the railway company and leaving the 
minorities question in the hands of the League. 93 Two important misunderstandings 
now intervened: first, Blondel told Paris that Pangalos would almost certainly accept 
Roufos' advice on these matters, and, second, Paris assumed that the Greeks had 
finally accepted the long-standing Yugoslav demand for the signature of a minorities 
convention on the lines of the Politis-Kalfoff protocol. The Quai d'Orsay passed this 
information on to Grenard, who in turn informed Nincic that an agreement was within 
sight. 94Simultaneously, Briand told Chamberlain, who was visiting Paris, that the 
two sides were on the verge of a direct settlement, whereupon Chamberlain 
abandoned his plan for concerted great power representations. 95 Unfortunately, these 
raised hopes were soon dashed. In early February the Greeks transmitted proposals to 
Belgrade for settling the railway question by the conclusion of a technical treaty that 
would consign the administration of the line to the League of Nations and restated zn 
their view that the welfare of their minorities was adequately safeguarded by the 
91 FO 371/11239 mins. by Howard S mith d. 18 Jan. 1926, Lampson d. 19 Jan. 1926, memorandum by 
Howard Smith d. 22 Jan. 1926, FO to Crewe no. 238 d. 22 Jan. 1926, FO to Graham no. 112 d. 22 
Jan. 1926, FO to Kennard no. 52 d. 22 Jan. 1926. It was always made clear that if either the Yugoslavs, 
French or Italians disliked the proposal then it would be dropped. 
92 FO 371/11337 'Memorandum on Serbian "Minorities" in Greek Macedoniaý by Bateman d-3 
Mar. 1926. 
93 MAE Yougoslavie 53 Blondel to QO tels. 9-10 d. 20 Jan. 1926- 
94 MAE Yougoslavie 53 QO to Grenard tels. 42-4 d. 22 Jan. 1926, Grenard to QO tels. 39-41 d. 26 
Jan-1926; FO 371/11343 Kennard to FO tel. 1 1 d. 25 Jan. 1926, mins. by Harvey and Howard Smith 
d. 26 Jan. 1926. 
95 FO 371/11239 Crewe to FO tel. 42 d. 28 Jan. 1926, Graham to FO tel. 17 d. 29 Jan. 1926; 
DBFPIIaII1419. 
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minorities treaties guaranteed by the League. 91 These proposals, coming in the wake 
of Grenard's optimistic forecasts, made the worst possible impression on Nincic and 
dealt a severe blow to hopes for a pact. 97 
There was continued talk of prospective arbitration treaties between Yugoslavia, 
Greece and Bulgaria, but Belgrade was always adamant that these could only follow 
the settlement of outstanding differences. Moreover, at least some Bulgarians were 
only keen on a treaty with Yugoslavia as the culmination of their improving relations 
because they hoped it would be the prelude to a joint attack on Greece - hardly 
evidence of a 'Loc arno- mentality'. 98 On the railway question, there was no sign of any 
movement. In late February Roufos asked for London's opinion on the idea of 
transferring the railway question to the Yugoslav-Greek mixed technical commission 
established at Salonica to regulate the application of the 1923 convention, but London 
was unwilling to assume responsibility for any such idea, especially as the sittings of 
the commission had recently broken up amidst considerable acrimony. Thus the plan 
foundered, and the only real hope for progress was that Nincic and Roufos might be 
more conciliatory when they met at Geneva in March during the League Council. 99 
The British placed the blame for this setback firmly on the Yugoslavs and the French. 
After Belgrade refused the Greek proposals, Kennard exchanged a series of private 
letters with various members of the Foreign Office in which he tried to put the 
96 FO 371/11343 Cheetham to FO tel. 19 d. 30 Jan. 1926, tels. 22-3 d. 3 Feb. 1926, no. 52 d. 3 Feb. 1926, 
Erskine to Lampson p. l. dA Feb. 1926, FO to Cheetham no. 106 d. 5 Feb. 1926 and encls., min. by 
Howard Smith d. 13 Feb. 1926; FO 371/11239 min. by Tyrrell d. I Feb. 1926; MAE Yougoslavie 53 
Blondel to Paris tels. 14-18 d. 3 Feb. 1926, no. 18 d. 3 Feb. 1926, Grenard to QO tel. 44 d. 5 Feb. 1926. 
97 FO 371/11343 Kennard to FO tels. 16-17 d. 7 Feb. 1926, no. 54 d. 8 Feb. 1926, Kennard to Howard 
Smith p. l. d. II Feb. 1926. 
98 FO 371/11239 Erskine to FO no. 11 d. 20 Jan. 1926 and mins., tel. 8 d. 5 Feb. 1926 and mins., no. 24 
d. 4 Feb. 1926 and mins., Kennard to Howard Smith p. l. d. 12 Feb. 1926, Dering to FO no. 60 d. 8 
Feb. 1926, Erskine to FO no. 43 d. 4 Mar. 1926, min. by Bateman d. 10 Feb. 1926; FO 421/3 10 Dering to 
FO no. 70 d. 133 ) Feb. 1926. 99 FO 371/11343 Cheetham to Lampson p. l. d. 22 Feb. 19216, Cheetharn to FO tel. 45 d. 25 Feb. 1926, 
min. by Bateman d. 27 Feb. 1926, Howard Smith to Kennard p. l. d. 1 Mar. 1926, mins. by Howard 
Smith and Lampson d. 1 Mar. 1926, Chamberlain d. 2 Mar. 1926, Kennard to Howard Smith p. l. d. 5 
Mar. 1926, notes by Howard Smith d. 4 and 8 Mar. 1926, Howard Smith to Lampson p. l. d. 8 Mar. 1926, 
min. by Howard Smith d. 9 Mar. 1926, FO to Cheetharn tel. 31 d. 9 Mar. 1926; FO 371/11351 Crow to 
FO no. 13 d. 4 Mar. 1926 and mins., Kennard to FO tel. 32 d. 5 Mar. 1926, Cheetham, to FO tel. 50 d. 6 
Mar-1926, mins. by Bateman and Howard Smith d. 8 Mar. 1926, Crow to FO no. 14 d. 8 Mar. 1926, 
Cheetham, to FO no. 106 d. II Mar. 1926. 
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Yugoslav case, pointing out that experience had taught the Yugoslavs not to trust in 
mere Greek assurances and to seek practical guarantees for their interests in Greece. 
London, however, was unimpressed: the Greeks had offered all possible guarantees 
for Yugoslavia's legitimate economic needs at Salonica, and Belgrade's refusal to 
accept them (or League involvement) was clearly suspicious; equally, the demand for 
a n-ftorities convention was both legally unjustifiable and incompatible with the 
attitude Belgrade had adopted towards the Politis-Kalfoff protocol. 100 Despite this, 
however, Chamberlain had no desire to press the Yugoslavs: he decided to'leave the 
thing severely alone', 101 and 'not to become sponsor for either party'. If Britain did act 
again it would be as 'moderator between them & with France & Italy'. 102The 
likelihood of this, however, was reduced by British irritation with France. 
Chamberlain certainly was vexed by what he saw as a lack of candour at the Quai 
d'Orsay (insisting at one point that 'France must treat us with confidence'103) and Paris 
was blamed for encouraging Belgrade to reject the Greek proposals in order to gratify 
the French capitalists who would benefit from a share in the international 
administration of the line, and to facilitate the arming of central Europe. 104 
The Quai d'Orsay's view was naturally quite different. The French had throughout 
been genuinely concerned, in their own interests, to influence Yugoslav policy in the 
direction of an arbitration pact: during January they exercised gentle pressure at 
Athens to elicit concessions - for they sympathised with the Yugoslavs over the 
railway and minorities - and urged Belgrade to accelerate moves to come to terms 
IOOFO 371/11343 Kennard to Howard Smith p. l. d. 11 Feb. 1926, min. by Bateman d. 18 Feb. 1926, 
Howard Smith to Kennard p. l. d. 15 Feb. 1926, Kennard to Howard Smith p. l. d. 19 Feb. 1926, 
Lampson to Kennard p. l. d. 22 Feb. 1926, Kennard to Lampson p. l. d. 26 Feb. 1926, Lampson to 
Kennard p. l. d. I Mar. 1926. 
101 FO 371/11343 Lampson to Kennard p. l. d. 22 Feb. 1926. 
102 FO 371/11343 min. by Chamberlain d. 2 Mar. 1926. 
103 FO 371/11343 mins. by Chamberlain d. 8 Feb. 1926. 
104 FO 371/11343 note by Howard Smith d. 6 Feb. 1926, min. by Lampson d. 6 Feb. 1926, Kennard to 
FO tels. 16-17 d. 7 Feb. 1926, no. 54 d. 8 Feb. 1926, mins. by Bateman, Howard Smith and Lampson d-9 
Feb. 1926, Chamberlain d. 10 Feb. 1926, FO to Crewe draft tel., min. by Howard Smith d. 10 Feb. 1926, 
notes by Howard Smith d. 13' Feb. 1926, Lampson d. 15 Feb. 1926, Howard Smith to Kennard p. l. d-15 
Feb. 1926, mins. by Bateman d. 17 Feb. 1926, Howard Smith d. 18 Feb. 1926, Lampson to Kennard p. l. 
d. 22 Feb. 1926, note by Howard Smith dA Mar. 1926; FO 371/11242 mins. by Howard Smith and 
Lampson d. 12 Feb. 1926; DBFPllalll4l8-20. 
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with Athens whilst going slow on the rapprochement with Sofia - otherwise a 
Yugoslav-Bulgarian agreement would appear not as a pacific step but as a means of 
pressunsing Greece. 105 After the shock of Greece's unacceptable proposals, Paris 
became irritated with London. The Quai d'Orsay felt that Chamberlain's scheme for 
joint representations was an attempt to coordinate pressure on Yugoslavia, which 
would be unfair, since the Yugoslavs had already made more concessions, and which 
obstructed a settlement by only encouraging Greek defiance. De Fleuriau raised this 
with Chamberlain, who told him that he had 'certainly given no encouragement to 
Greece to refuse any reasonable settlement or to expect British interference'. 106 
During February one of the recurring themes in French correspondence on the 
question was that the Greeks were proving remarkably intransigent because they were 
relying on support from Britain. This worried the French, because they felt that the 
longer a Greco-Yugoslav settlement was delayed, the more Greece would be drawn 
into Italy's orbit. This in turn was a matter for concern given the remorseless progress 
of Italian diplomacy in the Balkans and the growing intimacy Paris perceived 
between London and Rome. Accordingly, by early March the French were more 
inclined to settle for the idea of neutral or League of Nations control over the railway 
if it would secure a speedy solution. 107 
This difference of opinion between Britain and France was not yet a rift, but the two 
were clearly no longer quite seeing eye to eye. This was also evident on another issue 
that arose in February and which both influenced and was influenced by the Greco- 
Yugoslav question, namely talks concerning a tripartite Franco-Italo-Yugoslav pact. 
In December 1925 the Italians had approached Belgrade and suggested the conclusion 
of a new agreement to supplement the Pact of Rome. Nincic was reluctant to proceed 
105 MAE Yougoslavie 53 Grenard to QO tels. 355-6 d. 30 Dec. 1925, no. 360 d-31 Dec. 1925, tels. 16-17 
d. 12 Jan. 1926, tels. 22-3 d. 16 Jan. 1926, Dard to Q0 tels. 12-15 d. 19 Jan. 1926, Grenard to QO tels-25- 
6 d-21 Jan. 1926, QO to Grenard tels. 42-4 d. 22 Jan. 1926, Grenard to QO tels-39-41 d. 26 Jan. 1926, 
Dard to QO tel. 20 d. 29 Jan. 1926, QO to Blondel tels. 27-8 d. 2 Feb. 1926. 
106DBFpllal, 1419; MAE Yougoslavie 53 Grenard to QO tels. 53-5 d. 7 Feb. 1926, QO to De Fleuriau 
tels. 125-7 d. 8 Feb. 1926, QO to Blondel tel. 32 d. 9 Feb. 1926, De Fleuriau to QO tel. 80 d. 11 Feb. 1926. 
107 MAE Yougoslavie 53 QO to Blondel tels. 35-8 d. II Feb. 1926, tels. 41-3 d. 13 Feb. 1926, note by 
Seydoux d. 18 Feb. 1926, Grenard to QO tels. 63-9 d. 21 Feb. 1926, Besnard (Rome) to QO tels. 164-8 
0 
d. 27 Feb. 1926, note by [? ] d. I Mar. 1926. 
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with this without the French, and at his prompting Paris suggested to Rome that a 
tripartite pact should be concluded. It appeared - although details were rather slow to 
ernerge - that what the French envisaged was a defensive alliance accompanied by 
arbitration treaties and a guarantee of existing frontiers (which would include the 
prohibition of an Austro-German Anschluss). 108 This was a natural move for a France 
worried at the growth of Italian influence in the Balkans and fearful for her position 
in Yugoslavia. 109 It was equally natural that the Italians should respond very 
negatively: Mussolini, posing as a good European, protested that as an alliance of 
victors it would be 'absolutely contrary to the spirit of Locarno', but in reality he was 
simply concerned to exclude French influence from the Balkans. ' 10 The resultant 
Franco-Italian tiff placed Britain in a quandary: Chamberlain was determined to 
preserve good relations with both Paris and Rome and for that reason was determined 
to maintain an attitude of reserve. On the other hand, he could not see how the French 
proposal was 'in consonance with Locamo principles'. ' 11 As Howard Smith put it, the 
French wanted 'to create a system of defensive alliances directed to the preservation 
in their integrity of the peace treaties, while we believe that stable peace can only 
come by mutual agreements between ex-enemies'. 112 
Italian opposition, rather than British disapproval, soon killed the negotiations for a 
tripartite agreement. For some months thereafter there was talk of separate Franco- 
Yugoslav and Italo-Yugoslav agreements being concluded as a substitute, but Italian 
hostility prevented the former (or rather postponed it until 1927) whilst Yugoslav 
108 MAE Yougoslavie 53 Grenard to QO tels. 355-6 d. 30 Dec. 1925; FO 371/11242 Kennard to FO 
tel. 15 V Feb. 1926, no. 53 d. 8 Feb. 1926, tel. 18 d. 9 Feb. 1926, FO to Crewe no. 713 d. 3 Mar. 1926, De 
Fleuriau to Tyrrell unno. l. d. 5 Mar. 1926; DBFP/la/I/418-20,476-7; Carocci, Politica Estera, pp. 49- 
56. 
109 MAE Yougoslavie 53 note by Corbin d. 2 Feb. 1926, note by Seydoux d. 18 Feb. 1926, Besnard to 
QO tels. 164-6 d. 27 Feb. 1926; FO 371/11242 Graham to FO tel. 53 d. 2 Mar. 1926. 
110 DBFP/IaA/461,467-8,476-7; DDI/7/IV/159-60,164,168,172; FO 371/11242 Kennard to Howard 
Smith p. l. d. 25 Feb. 1926, Kennard to FO tels. 28-9 d. 2 Mar. 1926, Graham to FO no-193 d. 3 
Mar. 1926, min. by Howard Smith d. 9 Mar. 1926. 
111 DBFP/la/I/418-20,455-6,461,467-8,476-7. Chamberlain blamed the Quai d'Orsay rather than 
Briand for this attitude: 'it is a terrible pity that M. Briand cannot give more time to foreign affairs' 
TO 371/11242 min. by Chamberlain d. 13 Feb. 1926, Lampson to Kennard p. l. d. I Mar. 1926). 
112 FO 37 1/11142 mIn. by Howard S mith d. 24 Feb. 1926. 
371 
caution (and fear) precluded the latter. 113During 1926 Franco-Italian relations 
deteriorated markedly, as the two states conducted a 'scrap for the hegemony of 
S[outh] E[astern] Europein which the Italians increasingly seemed to be gaining the 
upper hand. The British regretted this conflict, but had no wish to be drawn into it: 
1926 was perhaps the highwater mark of the special relationship between 
Chamberlain and Mussolini and, precisely because he was aware of the possible 
danger from Italian policy, Chamberlain was determined'to keep Italy, a growing 
power, in sympathy with our policy & in cooperation with us'. The net result was a 
prolonged Anglo-French difference of opinion over Italy. 114 In the short term, these 
wider fears affected France's attitude to the Greco-Yugoslav dispute in contradictory 
ways: Paris was determined to cling on to Belgrade, but also aware that Yugoslav 
concessions to Greece could facilitate an agreement that would block the advance of 
Italian influence. 
The tripartite pact episode also illustrated how difficult it was for the 'Locamo-spirit' 
to take root and flourish in the soil of south-eastern Europe: as one British observer 
put it, arbitration treaties and the like were no longer regarded as instruments of 
pacification 'but as pawns in the old contest of political intrigue and international 
jealousies'. There was a danger, in fact, that inattempting to emulate the western 
powers, governments in the east would 'only succeed in replacing the spirit of 
Locarno by that of "Frankenstein"'. ' 15 This seemed to be confirmed by the course of 
Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations later in the spring when, under the guise of attempting 41) - 
to lay the ground for a pact, Nincic tried to force exorbitant concessions from 
113 FO 371/11242-3 file 1618 passim; DDI/7/IV/178-80,186-7,199,203,219-20,234-9,255-6; Orde, 
International Security, pp. 205-6; Shorrock, Ally to Enemy, pp. 47-8. 
114 DBFP/la/I/495-7,608-9,651-3,700-2; DBFP/la/II/125-7,144-5,221-2,425 [quoted] and passim; 
Cassels, Early Diplomacy, 288-376,390-7; FO 371/11242 min. by Lampson d-3 Mar. 1926 [quoted]. 
Lampson concluded that 'we don't want to be drawn in between them. But, to prevent trouble, we 
may have to play our usual r6le of honest broker'. For details of the meetings between Chamberlain 
and Mussolini in these months, the substance of their conversations and the wild runiours they 
engendered (for example, about the possibility of joint Anglo-Italian action against Turkey), see 
Edwards Hi 14 158-64. The entente eventually faltered because for the British it was designed to 
moderate Italian ambitions and not to deliver the gains Mussolini wanted (Cassels, Early Diplomacy, 
pp. 312-4). 
115 F0371/11242 min. by Aveling U Mar. 1926. 
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Sofia. ' 16The Foreign Office was well aware this time that conciliation was far from 
the mind of the cynical Nincic: as Bateman put it, his ignorance was 'becoming 
increasingly dangerous as a factor in European relations. ' 17Taken together, these two 
episodes of pact-making seemed to show that the spirit of pacification was lacking in 
both great and small powers alike, and that in consequence the chances of realising L_ 
any sort of Balkan Locarno in the near future were extremely slim. 
On the other hand, and perhaps paradoxically, as the pact receded from view so a 
Greco-Yugoslav settlement came into sight. At Geneva, where the League Council 
convened in March, Nincic suddenly became much more conciliatory, and agreed 
during conversations with Roufos to drop the claim for a minorities convention and to 
accept a Greek proposal that the railway should be run by a commission consisting of 
a Greek delegate and a Yugoslav delegate with a neutral commissioner as umpire and 
arbiter. This, it seemed, might meet Yugoslavia's economic grievances whilst 
protecting Greece's sovereign rights. " 9 The reasons for Nincic's change of heart are 
obscure. It is possible that Briand had exercised pressure on him to come to terms 
with Greece, ' 19 and it is certain that the British told him frankly that Yugoslavia's 
claims were unjustifiable. 120 Equally, he may have been perturbed by the increasing 
amity between Greece and Italy: Roufos visited Rome before going on to Geneva and 
although he insisted that he had had no secret political conversations, the next few 
months were thick with rurnours of a close Greco-Italian understanding, possibly C) 
aiming at an expedition against Turkey. 121Whatever the cause, March and April saw 
a definite improvement in the relations between Greece and Yugoslavia as the Greeks 
drew up a draft treaty. This was maintained despite the wrigglings of Nincic who'like b 
116 FO 371/11217 file 92 passim. See also above pp. 261-2. 
117 FO 371/11217 min. by Bateman d. 6 Jul. 1926. 
118 FO 421/3 10 Chamberlain (Geneva) to FO no. 19 d. 17 Mar. 1926 and encl.; FO 371/11343 note by 
Howard Smith d. 16 Mar. 1926. 
119 FO 371/11243 SIS Report CX/9557/1 d. 31 Mar. 1926 and min. by Howard Smith d. 3 Apr. 1926, 
but cf. FO 371/11343 note by Howard Smith d. 16 Mar. 1926. 
120 FO 371/11343 Lampson to Howard Smith p. l. d. 9 Mar. 1926, p. l. d. 1 I Mar. 1926. 
121 FO 371/11343 Graham to FO tel. 59 d. 5 Mar. 1926, note by Howard Smith d. 8 Mar. 1926, min. by 
Howard Smith d. 16 Mar. 1926, Lampson to Howard Smith p. l. d. 16 Mar. 1926; DDI/7/IV/183-4. For 
Greco-Italian relations, see FO 4211310passim and pp. 153-7 above. 
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Pharaoh, ... 
hardened his heart when he returned to Belgrade' and began to insist that 
he had not abandoned his claims regarding minorities. 122 
In early May the Greeks communicated their draft treaty to Belgrade. The British felt 
that their proposals met every legitimate Yugoslav need, but Nincic was unhappy 
with them, chiefly because the Yugoslav commissioner was to be subordinate to his 
Greek colleague. Nevertheless by the end of June he grudgingly accepted them as a 
general basis for negotiations. 123 Simultaneously, talks were begun to settle the 
various problems of technical detail arising from the interpretation of the 1923 
convention, 124 and Nincic made it clear that he wanted to conclude a political 
understanding as well. This, he said, would be the first step towards a Balkan 
Locarno, although this was very unconvincing - more probable motives were a desire 
to pressurise Bulgaria and fear of Italy. 125 The great powers on the whole kept in the 
background. The British rather despaired of the haphazard way in which the 
negotiations were conducted and were adamant that they would not be drawn into 
them. 126The French took a rather more active interest and encouraged the 
negotiations, and it was partly due to this that the two sides agreed that the neutral 
arbiter should be a French citizen. 127By the end of June, the improvement in 
Yugoslav-Greek relations was such that the two had become 'thick as thieves', a 
122 FO 371/11343 Kennard to FO no. 96 d. 17 Mar. 1926, mins. by Bateman and Sargent d. 23 
Mar. 1926, Kennard to FO tel. 45 d. 31 Mar. 1926, no. 121 d. 1 Apr. 1926, mins. by Bateman and Howard 
Smith d. I Apr. 1926, Lampson d. d. 7 Apr. 1926, note by Howard Smith d. 22 Apr. 1926 [quoted], 
Kennard to FO no. 160 d. 23 Apr. 1926 and mins.; MAE Yougoslavie 53 aide-m6moire by Karapanos 
d. 25 Mar. 1926, Grenard to QO no. 92 d. 30 Mar. 1926, no. 14 d. 15 Apr. 1926, tel. 127 d. 21 Apr. 1926. 
123 FO 371/11344 Kennard to FO no. 1 71 d. 5 May 1926 and ýencls., min. by Harvey d. 11 May 1926, 
Cheetham to FO no. 184 d. 6 May 1926, mins. by Bateman and Howard Smith d. 18 May 1926, notes 
by Drummond d. 24 and 27 May 1926 and Howard Smith d. 31 May 1926, Ogilvie-Forbes to FO 
no. 253 d. 25 Jun. 1926. 
124 FO 371/11344 Kennard to FO no. 197 d. 20 May 1926, min. by Bateman d. 27 May 1926, Kennard 
to FO no. 207 d. 27 May 1926, no. 218 d. 8 Jun. 1926, Ogilvie-Forbes to FO no-253 d. 25 Jun. 1926; FO 
371/11351 Cheetharn to FO no. 249 d. 24 Jun. 1926. 
125 FO 371/11344 Kennard to FO no. 229 d. 10 Jun. 1926, Kennard to Lampson p. l. d. 11 Jun. 1926, 
Oc", ilvie-Forbes to FO, no. 253 d. 25 Jun. 1926, min. by Bateman d. 30 Jun. 1926, min. by Chamberlain 
d. 2 Jul. 1926; MAE Yougoslavie 53 Grenard to QO tel. 162 d. 24 Jun. 1926, tels. 177-8 d. 2 Jul. 1926. 
126 FO 371/11344 Lampson to Kennard p. l. d. 26 May 1926, mins. by Sargent d. 18 Jun. 1926, 
Chamberlain d. 19 Jun. 1926, FO to Ogilvie-Forbes no. 367 d. 24 Jun. 1926. 127 0 MAE Yougoslavie 53 Chambrun to QO tels. 81-2 d. 6 May 1926, QO to Chambrun tels. 1 17-9 d. 29 
May 1926, Dubail (charg6 in Belgrade) to QO tels. 148-50 d. I Jun. 1926, Chambrun to QO tel. 102 d. 3 
Jun. 1926, tel. 115 d. 26 Jun. 1926, QO to Chambrun tel. 139 d. 26 Jun. 1926, Chambrun to QO tel. 116 
d. 26 Jun. 1926, tel. 122 d. I Jul. 1926, no. 86 d. 7 Jul. 1926, tel. 1' 32 d. 20 Jul. 1926. 
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development that \xas marked by a joint visit by Pall"'alo" and Gavrilovic to thc 
Salonica free 70, )C. 12ý By early ALIL'Ust aureement had almost heen reached on a scrics 
ofconventions to settle the railway and free zone CILICStions. 
The Pangalos government had, unfortUMIM)', failed to tAc GFeek public Opinion 
SLIfficiently into account. True, the slunature of the ALI, (ILISt C011VC1111011S was dclaycd 
whilst a political treaty was drawn Lip which, it was hoped, would make Greek 
concessions over Salonica more palatable to public opinion. 12" But the conce,,, -.,, iOn. 1, 
had already be, "Un to Incite Uneise in Greece") and at the last minute it secins the 
YLIOOSI, JvS tabled a \vhole list of demands, which \vere accepted hy Pangalos only C- I 
because he was desperate for a foreign policy success to shore up his now crLI111hlIII(' 
re-ime. 131 As it turned Out, therefore, the signature oftlic a--rcernents on 17 AU-ILISt Z7 -I 
proved not to be the end of this saga, but merely the beginning of a new chaptcr. '['he 
aoreements unleashed a stomi ot'disapproval within Greece that contributed greatly to 
the Coup of 22 AU. IRISt which toppled Pangalos , in(] brought to power it govermilent 
extremely reluctant to ratify the treatics. 132 
It was not dlffICLIlt to see why the settlement W', 1S SO 1.111POPLIlal' ill Greece. Oil tile 
railway question tile Greeks gained recognition of their sovereignty over the line, bUt 
had to pay 20,000,000 francs for the shares in tile railway company, and soon lost 
confidence in the likely impartiality ofthe French arbiter. At Salonica, they jjjjd, ý 
12ýý FO 171/1 Liý I Crow to FO no. 26d. 1 I Jun. 1926, tL-1.3 (H Ju L 1926, min. 1)), Batcrimn (J. 2 ju L V) 2c 
I (I Lloted], Crow to FO no. 30 d. 5 Jul. 1926; 1,0 371/11343 Cheethan] to FO no. 23 _I (1.8 
Juri. 192(), 
no. 234 d. 9 Jun. 1926. 
129 FO 371/11344 Mic]Killop to FO let. 161 (1.20 Jul. 1926, Kermard to 1-0 let. 112 d. 29 Jul. I (Pti, 
NlacK'Ilop to FO let. 160 d. 2 Aug. 1926, Kennard to F0 let. I 15 d. 3 Aug. 1926, NfacKillop 10 FO 
no. 297 d. 24 Jul. 1920. 
13() FO 371/11344 MacKillop to FO no. 313 (1.9 Atig. 1926, lei. 176 (1.18 Aug, I Q2)6: %j1AF Yout! osljvic 
53 Charnbrun to Q0 lots. 140-1 d. 12 Aug. 1926. 
35 FO 37 1/1134-4 memorandum by Bateman d. 21) Oct. 1926; FO 37 1 /11145 Kennard to FO no. 4 1 
d. 9 Nov. 1926,11jill. I)y Howard Smith (t. 29 Nov. 1920, Chcetham to FO no. 420 (1.20 Nov. 1920; NlAK 
Yougoslavie 53 Chambrun to QO tels. 140-1 (1.12 Aug. 1926, Grenard to QO tel. 20ý d. 1.4 Aug. 192o, 
(10, tel-20S' d. 16 Aug. 19-16. It has. also been argued that R"llgal0s Was eager for all agreement ill or 
clear the decks for a war a, -, ainst 
Turkey: Psomiades Balkan Studiv, s 13 13-14. 
112 FO 371/11344 NlacKillop to FO let. 173 d. 16 Aug. 1926, let,,. 175-6 d. 18 Aug. 1020, note by 
Howard Smith d. 17 Aug. 1926, min. hy Bateman nd., MacKillop it) F0 no. 326 it. 11) Amý,. 1920, lei II 
(1.23 Aug. 1926, Kennard to FO let. 127 (1.23 Aug. 1926. NlacKillop to FO let. IS5 (1.24 Aug. 1026, 
Kennard to FO no. 354 (1.20 Aug. 1920, klacKillop to F0 no. ')37 d. -2 
Scpt. 1926, Clicelharn to f. '() 
no.. )67 d. 7 Oct. I 92o. 
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many concessions that were likely to be very damaging to their economic interests: 
the free zone was enlarged, the Yugoslavs were given the right of cabotage and, 
contrary to all previous objections, they were to be allowed to use their zone as an 
entrepOt for goods destined for countries other than Yugoslavia. On the minorities 
question Pangalos had totally given away the Greek case, which had been 
incontestable, by extending the protection of the Greek minorities treaty to the 'Serb' 
minority in Macedonia (thus conceding that the Macedo-Slavs were effectively 
Serbs). To cap all this, the political treaty that was supposed to compensate for these 
concessions was extremely limited, being simply a defensive alliance without any 
military provisions or arbitration arrangements. The final straw was that whereas the 
technical conventions embodying Greece's concessions were valid for fifty years, this 
political treaty was to last a mere three. 133The inequitable nature of the settlement 
was recognised by the British. Before they had known the details of the ageement 
they had applauded it as 'common sense &a fair compromise'134and 'Pangalos' wisest 
act'135and after the coup advised the Greeks to ratifyit. 136But once the terms of the 
conventions were published, the Foreign Office accepted that its enthusiasm had been 
'ill founded' and instructed Cheetham. to cease recommending ratification since it 
would not contribute to a permanent settlement. 137 
The French, by contrast, were always keen to see the agreements implemented. On 20 
August Chambrun reported that the presence of a French commissioner at Salonica 
could help to secure communications with France's eastern allies and would 
strengthen French influence at a strategically important point in the Near East. 
Moreover, the settlement linked Greece to France's alliance system and consolidated 
133 FO 371/11351 Crow to FO no. 37 d. 24 Aug. 1926, mins. by Bateman and Howard Smith d. 1 
Sept. 1926; FO 371/11344 min. by Bateman d. 19 Aug. 1926, note by Lampson d. 19 Aug. 1926, 
MacKillop to FO no. 337 d. 2 Sept. 1926, Cheetharn to FO no. 367 d. 7 Oct. 1926, memorandum by 
Bateman d. 29 Oct. 1926; FO 371/11345 min. by Bateman d. 2 Nov. 1926. 
134 FO 371/11344 min. by Bateman d. 19 Aug. 1926. 
135 FO 371/11344 min. by Chamberlain d. 24"Aug. 1926. 
136 FO 37 1/113 3 44 Kennard to FO no. 354 d. 26 Aug. 1926, FO to MacKillop no. 596 d. 6 Sept. 1926, Z: ) 
min. by Sargent d. I Nov. 1926. 0 137 FO 371/11344 Cheetham to FO no. 367 d. 7 Oct. 1926, min. by Bateman d. 26 Oct. 1926 [quoted], 
memorandum by Bateman d. 29 Oct. 1926, mins. by Sargent and Tyrrell d. I Nov. 1926, FO to 
Cheetharn tel. 149 d. 3 Nov. 1926. 
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French influence in Athens and Belgrade to the detriment of that of Italy. 138 After the 
Greek coup, the French exerted themselves to try and save the treaty and urged the 
new Greek government to ratifyit. 139When this failed, they pressed for a re- 
negotiation of the treaty within the existing framework; but this too was to no avail, 
and their insistent entreaties only alienated the Greeks. 140 The Italian attitude was the 
reverse of this. At first Rome was dismayed, and needed some convincing that there 
was no secret political or military convention accompanying the published 
agreements. Equally, the fall of Pangalos as a result of the treaty was a blow to Italian 
influence in Greece. 141 In the end, however, as the treaty did not come into force the 
damage to Italian interests was less than it might have been, and soon afterwards 
Mussolini stepped up his drive for predominance in the Balkans: the Italo-Romanian 
treaty of September 1926 was a fine riposte to the Franco-Romanian agreement of 
June, and the treaty of Tirana with Albania in November was a stunning success. This 
accelerated Yugoslavia's alienation from Italy, as did the Italo-Hungaiian treaty of 
April 1927, and this culminated in the Franco-Yugoslav treaty of November 1927.142 
In this situation, therefore, France's efforts to preserve the Greco-Yugoslav settlement 
reflected not so much confidence as anxiety. 
It was quite some time before a final settlement materialised. At the end of 1926 the 
treaty was still in limbo, and it was uncertain whether the Yugoslavs' fear of Italy 
would make them more conciliator .y or more unyielding towards Greece. 143During 
1927 Greek diplomacy was very tentative, partly as a result of recent unhappy 
138 MAE Yougoslavie 53 Chambun to QO no. 99 d. 20 Aug. 1926; FO 371/11344 min. by Howard 
Smith d. 19 Aug. 1926. 
139 MAE Yougoslavie 53 QO to Chambrun tels. 182-3 d. 24 Aulo,,. 1926, Chambrun to QO tels. 150-1 
d. 25 Aug. 1926, tel. 153 d. 27 Aug. 1926; FO 371/11344 note by Tyrrell d. 7 Oct. 1926, mins. by 
Howard Smith nd., Sargent d. 11 Oct. 1926, and Tyrrell and Chamberlain d. 12 Oct. 1926. 
140 FO 371/12166 Loraine to FO tel. 16 d. 15 Jan. 1927; FO 371/13654 Loraine to FO no. 4 d-7 
Jan. 1929. 
141 MAE Yougoslavie 53 Roger (Rome) to QO tels. 486-7 d. 26 Aug. 1926, QO to Roger tel. 702 d. 27 
Aug. 1926, Grenard to [? Rome] tel. 222 d. 28 Auo,. 1926; DDI/7/IV/307,312-3,316-7; FO 371/11344 1 C) 
note by Howard Smith d. 17 Aug. 1926, Wingfield (Rome) to FO no. 725 d. 27 Aug,. 1926, mins. by 
Bateman and Howard Smith d. 30 Aug. 1926, Kennard to Sargent p. l. d. 10 Sept. 1926- 
142 For these general developments, see Marks, Illusion of Peace, pp. 86-9 and Carocci, Politica 
Estera, pp. 57ff. 
143 FO 371/12178 Annual Report, Greece, 1926 pp. 16-17. 
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experiences and partly as a result of domestic instability. Athens was reluctant to 
consider either an agreement with Italy (which would have offended both Yugoslavia 
and France) or renewed political negotiations with Yugoslavia. Belgrade was equally 
cautious, and the most significant event in the year was the Greek assembly's 
unanimous rejection of the Pangalos treaties in August. 144Matters only really began 
to move in July 1928 when Venizelos returned to power, inaugurating a four year 
administration which brought Greece its only real political stability of the inter-war 
period. This administration was also marked by a very active policy of conciliation in 
foreign affairs, the most notable feature of which was the 1930 settlement with 
Turkey. 145Venizelos' first move was to sign a treaty of friendship and arbitration with 
Italy in September 1928, but he was careful to couple this with conciliatory overtures 
to Belgrade. Thus, in October 1928 an agreement was si ned reaffirming the terms of 9 4n 
the 1923 convention which was to be clarified by protocols regulating its 
interpretation in a sense more favourable to Greece than those of 1926.146Finally, in 
March 1929, an agreement along these lines was reached accompanied by a pact of 
friendship and arbitration. This amounted, after years of tension, to a 'pretty complete 
liquidation of outstanding questions' between the two states, achieved where the 
railway question was concerned by reverting to an agreement concluded six years 
previously. 147 
Nothing resembling a Balkan Locarno ever evolved. Chamberlain continued to 
envisage one, expressing the hope that 'there might be found in the Balkans a t-n to 
statesman with the courage and breadth of vision of Dr. Stresemann and the broad 
humanity and devotion to peace of M. Briand'to apply Locarno principles there, but 
the spirit of Locarno proved elusive, intangible and difficult to transplant-148 Balkan 
politicians continued to pay lip service to the idea, and the network of friendship 
144 FO '371/12166-7 file 221 and FO 371/12167 file 228 passim. 
145 Clogg, Concise History, pp. 108-11; Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, pp. 36-4 1; Couloumbis, 
Petropoulos and Psomiades, Foreign Interference, pp. 89-92. 
146 FO 371/12920-1 file 20, FO 371/12921-2 file 45 and FO 371/12923 file 79 passim. 
147 FO 371/13654 min. by Bateman d. 1 I Apr. 1929 and FO 371/13654-5 file 496 passim. 
14S FO 371/12923 FO to Loraine no. 54 d. 27 Jan. 1928, quoting a speech given by Chamberlain in 
November 1927. 
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treaties which proliferated in the region in the later 1920s could perhaps have served 
as the foundations for a comprehensive pact (as the Foreign Office had hoped in 
1925-1926), but the will for a general rapprochement was lacking. The Balkan 
Entente which eventually materialised in the 1930s was certainly not in the style of 
Locarno, since it excluded Bulgaria and was, at bottom, simply anti-revisionist. 119 
During the 1920s conditions in the Balkans were just not conducive to a pact: the 
peace settlement was maintained by a great preponderance of power on the part of the 
victors, who had nothing to gain from making concessions, whilst Bulgaria and 
Hungary simply had no incentive to come to a partial accommodation with the status 
quo along the lines of Stresemann's acceptance of Germany's western border. 150 More 
to the point, as the Greco-Yugoslav dispute showed, the former victor powers were 
by no means a cohesive bloc: they were divided amongst themselves as much as they 
were divided from Bulgaria, and indeed often used improved relations with Sofia to 
put pressure on each other. There was, in short, no consensus about a pact, the more 
so as the great powers of France and Italy were at odds in the region and over this 
question. 
In these circumstances the search for a Balkan Locarno, even in the limited sense of a 
network of complementary arbitration pacts, was doomed to failure. Rivalries and 
conflicting interests in the region were simply too numerous and complex for a pact 
to be feasible. There was also the problem of instability, and not just in the political 
and economic sense: as the Greco-Yugoslav dispute illustrated, few considered the 
post-war territorial settlement to be set in stone, and this naturally bred an insecurity 
which militated against the pursuit of conciliatory policies. The fact that Greece and Zý 
Yugoslavia both used pact proposals for ulterior motives, as new means to pursue old t) 
ends, demonstrated a persistence of realpolitik thinking in the Balkans which shocked 
the Foreign Office. 
149 For an account of the origins of the Balkan Entente and other moves in the inter-war years for 111ý Balkan cooperation and confederation, see P. Papastratis, 'From the "Great Idea" to Balkan Union' in 
Sarafis and Eve (eds. ), Background to Contemporary Greece 11153-179. 
150 Orde, International Security, p. 203. 
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Yet this had in fact also been the spirit in which Stresemann approached Locarno - by 
investing Locarno with such a mythic, transcendental significance the British rather 
obscured the fact that it was essentially a treaty like any other, concluded only 
because of the coincidence at a particular time of several otherwise incompatible or 
divergent national interests. They over-estimated the r6le of will power and 
atmosphere and rather under-estimated that of hard political calculation. 151 In 
pursuing the quest for a Balkan Locarno, the British betrayed this fundamental 
misperception of what Locarno was: the realisa tion of a Balkan pact was not simply a 
matter of importing a new spirit of idealism into the region, or of discovering hitherto 
untapped reserves of courage, vision and humanity - there had also to be a 
coincidence of political interest. Balkan statesmen never really developed a 'Locarno- 
mentality', and continued to pursue their own narrowly defined national interests in 
the Hobbesian confusion of the Balkan political arena. But in that sense, they perhaps 
showed that they perceived the true nature of Locarno rather better than did Austen 
Chamberlain. 
151 This charge is also made by Chamberlain's biographer: Dutton, Chamberlain, p. 259. 4ý 
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The internal situation in Greece in the Z: ) 
inter-war years moved through a period of 
great instability in the aftermath of the Asia Minor disaster, stabilised with the 
Venizelos administration of 1928 -1932, then fragmented once more as the national 
schism resurfaced and led to the Metaxas dictatorship of 1936 - 1941. In this respect 
Greek internal developments followed a pattern similar to that of European 
international relations which also moved through a period of uncertainty to one of 
apparent stability after the Dawes-Locarno settlement, but a stability which ultimately 
proved to be based on unsure foundations. The two processes were not, however, 
synchronised. Whereas 1923 -1926 marked the transition to stability in international 
relations, it was the period of maximum fragmentation, uncertainty and upheaval in 
Greek internal affairs. 
From September 1922 to October 1923 the political struggle in Greece was still to 
some extent between the old factions of Venizelists and royalists. The latter, however, 
were severely weakened by the execution of the six and then by the failure of the 
October 1923 counter-revolution which both discredited the royalist cause with public 
opinion and destroyed its military base. For many years the schism in its old 
configuration was now transcended, and the decisive political struggles henceforth 
took place within the Venizelist bloc which fragmented into a welter of competing 
factions. For six months the struggle centred on the nature of the regime, until in 
March 1924 the extreme republicans triumphed and a republic was established by 
decree. This represented a defeat for Venizelos, who had sought to manage the 
transition to a republic and to endow it with a cloak of legitimacy, in order to guard 
against royalist revanche and to perpetuate the dominance of the Liberal party. The 
brevity of his premiership illustrated the limited influence of his commanding 
presence, given the balance of forces in Greece; but his prophecies of doom about a 
I stillborn republic' were in the long term vindicated. In the short term, on the other 
hand, the creation of a republic seemed to settle the constitutional question and 
encouraged the expression of other differences between the factions: the governments Z: P 
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in power from March 1924 to June 1925 were all plagued by social unrest, economic 
troubles and parliamentary strife. The bickering of the politicians only encouraged the 
leading military figures to consider extra-parliamentary authoritarian measures as a 
means of bringing order to Greece, and this culminated in the Pangalos dictatorship 
established in June 1925. The rather opera bouffe character of this regime, however, 
highlighted the very limited nature of the alternative vision offered by the military in 
Greece. For all his grandiose visions of transcending the schism and destroying the 
old blocs, Pangalos never established autonomy from the political parties or 
superseded them, and ultimately the parties, with the help of another military leader, 
brought him down. The terrible mismanagement of economic and foreign affairs 
perpetrated by Pangalos brought factious Greek opinion to its senses for a time and in 
December 1926 an ecumenical government was formed which helped stabilise Greece 
(for example by finally promulgating a constitution) and this paved the way for the 
later return of Venizelos to power. 
Instability in Greece obviously had many causes. The collapse of Greek irredentism 
in 1922 robbed the Greek people of their previous sense of national purpose, and 
brought to the surface and sharpened the divisions which had originally precipitated 
the schism. True, the schism itself was not apparent for much of the 1920s since 
Venizelism was triumphant, but the divisions within the Venizelist bloc that were 
now brought to the forefront were themselves, in turn, quite sufficient to perpetuate 
instability. The parlous economic situation exacerbated the problem, as did the 
economic and social difficulties inherent in the process of refugee settlement - 
witness, for example, the small scale but persistent communist activity in Greece in 
the 1920s. The contribution of the military to all this was complex but unhelpful - the 
military never supplanted the politicians but their interventions in politics perhaps 
hindered the evolution of a genuine political settlement based on the actual balance of 
Political forces in the country, since, for as long as the army was dominated by 
Venizelists, the military had a professional, political and personal stake in preserving 0 
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the republican status quo by whatever means necessary. Although there was a broad 
consensus within Greece on the primacy of the task of domestic reconstruction, the 
feuding and instability both diverted energy from that task and directly hindered it, by 
deterring external investment and international assistance. The powers - whose 
structural economic influence in Greece was still a salient feature - insisted that the 
advent of stability must precede investment and help, whereas the Greeks claimed 
that only finance could bring stability and were inclined, by force of habit, to seek 
salvation by ingratiating themselves with the powers rather than by putting their own 
house in order. This was a faulty strategy, especially as the powers, now that their 
vital interests were no longer engaged in Greece, were unwilling to become embroiled 
in her affairs. 
Greek foreign policy in these years was essentially reactive, quite naturally given the 
changed priorities of the post- 1922 situation. The Dodecanese - one of the last 
remaining fragments of unredeemed territory - proved unattainable, reinforcing the 
lesson that Greek expansion was impossible in the face of opposition from a great 
power, in this case Italy. The question was in any case really an Anglo-Italian one in 
which the Greeks were only peripherally involved, and Britain's lingering sense of 
obligation towards the Greeks gradually evaporated in the face of more general 
considerations, including an awareness that Greece was now of little importance. The 
Corfu crisis emphasised again the da ngers the Greeks faced as a weak nation with 
powerful neighbours; but although the crisis was an extremely uncomfortable 
experience for them, the intervention of the powers and the League at least ensured 
that their territorial integrity was maintained. Indeed, despite Greek weakness this 
integrity seemed effectively to be guaranteed, as was proved, admittedly in a very 
roundabout fashion, by League intervention to restore the status quo during the 
Greek-Bulgarian incident of October 1925. In fact, the League proved to be a boon 
for the Greeks generally, as a conduit for external assistance that enabled Greece to 
escape the danger of domination by any one power, as a neutral safeguard against Zý 
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foreign interference (as shown in the minorities question) and as a weapon in the 
armoury of diplomacy (as shown over the Salonica railway question and the Balkan 
pact). Towards Bulgaria Greek policy was single-minded: together with other states 
in the region Greece simply opposed all Bulgarian efforts at revisionism, and in this 
relationship alone did she have the whip-hand. Even Greece's conciliatory moves, 
such as the offers made over the Aegean outlet, were probably designed to reduce the 
revisionist threat by removing ostensible grievances. An overall verdict on the 
conduct of Greek policy is therefore bound to be mixed. On some occasions the 
Greeks doggedly defended their position, skilfully manoeuvred and succeeded in 
protecting their interests. On others, they sometimes exacerbated by stubbornness and 
procrastination problems that would otherwise have been susceptible of solution. This 
was perhaps explicable, however, given the unstable conditions, especially the 
precariousness of the new territorial arrangements in the region, which militated 
against the pursuit of generous and conciliatory policies. 
In Greek internal matters, the British wanted to see stability established, yet they were 
unwilling, given the limited nature of their interests in the country, to make any great 
positive effort to achieve this. Indeed, they wished to avoid, if possible, any 
intervention in Greek affairs since, given Greek weakness, it was likely to lead only 
to unprofitable entanglements: although they desired stability in Greece, the existing 
instability was a powerful argument against intervention. They did consider 
occasional acts of interference in contravention of this general rule - such as the 
withdrawal of Lindley in 1922 and the restoration of diplomatic relations in - 1924 - 
but these involved little effort or commitment. On the question of the nature of the 
regime, the British at first deprecated the prospect of a republic, not on principle but 
because they believed it would bring chaos. They were not, however, prepared to 
intervene to avert it and they accepted it pragmatically once it arrived: what they 
wanted was stable government, regardless of its political complexion; and after the 
1924 plebiscite it seemed that this might be achieved by the republic which appeared 
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to reflect the actual will of the people. For the same reason, after an interlude of 
fragile parliamentary rule, they accepted and gradually warmed to the Pangalos 
dictatorship. This illustrated an enduring feature of British Greek policy between the 
wars: in 1938 a senior Foreign Office official writing of Britain's attitude towards the 
Metaxas dictatorship declared that 
though we do not hold a brief for it in so far as it is a dictatorship rather than a 
parliamentary administration, we have had such disappointing experiences of 
the latter in Greece from the point of view of British interests that we are not 
inclined to attach much value to that particular type of parliamentarism which 
is traditional in Greece ... .1 
British policy towards Greece could therefore be seen as prudent, pragmatic and 
calculated, and unencumbered by unnecessary considerations of principle or 
sentiment. Principle was certainly only invoked when it coincided with interest, and 
the sentiment which undoubtedly existed barely affected policy. In part this was 
because the misdeeds of the Greeks were a countervailing factor: as Chamberlain 
once exclaimed, 'why I like the Greek & why I feel sympathy with him, goodness 
only knows! '2Political considerations were always paramount. Thus, in 1924 
Nicolson suggested marking the centenary of the death of Byron by the return of the 
Elgin marbles to Greece; but the idea was rejected because of the likely outcry from 
public opinion. 3 
On the other hand, the verdict on British policy is less favourable if economic 
questions are brought into the equation. There was an almost total lack of 
coordination of political and economic interests, and this was much to the detriment 
of the latter. The Foreign Office in general did not worry if British influence in 
Greece was temporarily eclipsed, believing that the country's geographical position 
and susceptibility to naval pressure meant that it could easily be brought to heel if 
1 FO 37 1/[? ] Sargent to Bessborough p. l. d. 29 Aug. 1938, quoted in Papastratis, Background to 
Contemporary Greece 11175. 
2 FO 371/11344 min. by Chamberlain d-24 Aug. 1926. 
3 FO 371/9892 min. by Nicolson d2 Apr. 1924 and FO 371/9892-3 file 3584 passim. 
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necessary. 4The confident detachment which this attitude bred, however, did not help 
the British in the hunt for contracts in Greece, and consequently these contracts went 
increasingly to the French, Italians and Americans. At the same time, diverse British 
economic interests were in conflict; for example, the desire to see a balanced budget 
in Greece contradicted the wish to sell arms or secure other lucrative contracts there. 
Equally, although the British still had great economic influence in Greece because of 
their dominant position in the international economic system, they were reluctant to 
exercise it (for example over the second refugee loan) to gain satisfaction over 
contracts, outstanding claims or the war debt. Thus Britain's overarching interest in 
the restoration of stability conflicted with narrower and more parochial concerns in 
Greece. This type of conflict may well have been inevitable, but the disjunction 
between political and economic interests often left the British frustrated and 
hampered the overall effectiveness of British policy. 
French policy towards Greek internal affairs was, in essentials, similar to that of 
Britain. On the question of the nature of the regime the French, like the British, 
refrained from intervention in order to avoid entanglements in a region where vital 
interests were not at stake. Despite the antics of renegade French representatives or 
the Paris press, the Quai d'Orsay certainly did not work for or encourage a republic in 
Greece. On the contrary, in order to promote stability it restrained the republican 
extremists and deprecated anything but peaceful, democratic constitutional change - 
in 1923, after all, the French were even prepared to bolster the position of George II 
by recognition. The Machiavellian and selfish motives which the British and French 
imputed to each other at times of crisis in Greece were a reflection not of reality but 
4 This confidence about British influence was the general rule in London even if British diplomats in 
Athens did not always share it. On occasion the British would act positively to maintain their 
influence, but there were usually special reasons for this: thus, London agreed in 1924 to send a naval 
mission to Greece, but only to forestall the despatch of a French mission which might induce the C. 
Greeks to buy naval armaments far in excess of their requirements. 
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of the suspicion pervading the Entente between 1922 and 1924.5True, the French, 
unlike the British, had a political preference for the republicans, but this only 
manifested itself in a vigorous French welcome once the republic had actually been 
established and approved by plebiscite. By the same token, it must be admitted, the 
French were always keen to keep certain royalists, especially Metaxas, out of power, 
and some of their actions designed to promote stability in Greece (such as recognising 
George II) were also intended to perpetuate the exclusion of these elements from 
government. 
The French welcomed the republic in Greece largely because they believed it would 
increase their influence, given the francophile proclivities of most Greek republicans. 
After the republic was established the French definitely stepped up their vigorous 
promotion of their political and economic influence, in the case of the latter by 
dogged pursuit of government contracts and encouragement of Greek arms purchases. 
The intensity and success of these efforts was in marked contrast to the 
ineffectiveness of British policy, and this bred some resentment: the British did not 
fear the growth of French influence in a general political sense, but the continual loss 
of contracts certainly rankled. The British also deprecated French arms sales, which 
seemed to be part of a wider militarist policy in central and eastern Europe that was 
not conducive to the stability both powers sought. The French, for their part, although 
they were rather more ready to use political influence in Greece to further their own 
economic ends, did not see the extension of their influence as inimical to stability, 
and if they were rather more concerned about preserving their influence in Greece 
than the British, this simply reflected a higher level of anxiety about their 
international position and a greater direct interest in the region. Certainly, for the 
French, Greek internal developments were not matters of purely academic concern 
devoid of wider ramifications. In 1925-1926, for example, influence in Greece 
5 There may have been some truth in the British belief that the French were scheming for a republic 
in 1922 before the revolution, but this was certainly not the case after it. 
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became for the French one means of conducting a much wider struggle for influence 
with the Italians in eastern Europe, and this was the root cause of France's 
determination to prevent Pangalos falling in thrall to Rome. Although Greece was not 
one of the small states most important to France, the maintenance of influence there 
had broad implications for the maintenance of France's sphere of influence and, 
indirectly, her great power status. 
Italian policy towards Greek internal affairs though always characterised by a certain 
measure of inconsistency passed through three distinct phases. In the aftermath of the 
1922 revolution it was resolutely hostile: in order to prevent the revival of Greece 
under a Venizelist regime the Italians continually intrigued and interfered to support 
the royalists, which culminated in the support given to the Metaxas coup attempt in 
October 1923. This was coupled with an aggressive policy over the Dodecanese 
question and Corfu, where Greece was seen as a potential source of propaganda 
victories by Mussolini. Although there was a novel tone to this policy - with 
bombastic rhetoric and actual violence over Corfu - the substance was very similar to 
the anti-Greek policy of Mussolini's liberal predecessors. After the failure of the 
Metaxas coup, Italian influence in Greece sank to a new low, and Italian policy 
entered a transitional phase, where continuing hostility mingled With hints of a 
possible rapprochement. It was only in 1925, after the trauma of the Matteotti murder 
had subsided and the fascist regime was consolidated, that this rapprochement - the 
third phase of Italian policy - materialised. 6AIthough the details of Mussolini's policy 
still remain to be filled out by archival research, it is clear that his rapprochement had 
two main aims: first, to prepare the ground for possible future large scale revisionism, 
perhaps through an expedition against Turkey, and second, to usurp France's position 
as the dominant power in south-eastern Europe. Thus for Italy, as for France, the 
6 Another essential precondition for the rapprochement was a willingness on the part of the Greeks to 
consider it. This was only forthcoming because of Yugoslav hostility - further evidence, perhaps, of ID Z: ) 
the limitations of the rapprochement. 
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question of influence in Greece as manifested by the award of contracts and the like 
had a much wider significance than for Britain. The Greco-Italian rapprochement was 
always limited, however, by the problem of the Dodecanese, by the Greeks' 
reluctance to tie themselves too closely to any single power and by its dependence on 
the presence of Pangalos. Thus although the Italians succeeded to an extent in 
establishing their own sphere of influence in the region, these inhibiting factors and 
unfavourable international circumstances precluded the mounting of any expedition to 
Asia Minor and the fruits of the rapprochement were therefore limited. On the other 
hand, the policy of rapprochement with Greece was at least imaginative, and it held 
out the prospect of possible greater rewards than the traditional Italian policy of blunt 
hostility towards Athens. 
A more general verdict on the policy of each of the powers is possible if Greek 
foreign policy and the problems of the whole southern Balkan region are brought into 
consideration. Where the British were concerned, the level of consistent internal 
agreement about the fundamental lines of policy in the area is the most striking 
feature. Although the particular issues at stake changed over time and emphasis 
fluctuated, there was no disagreement about the central imperatives of promoting 
stability and prosperity, avoiding entanglements and pr eserving, if possible, 
unanimity amongst the Allies. This makes it rather difficult to analyse the 
contribution of individual policy-makers, especially as the usual problem - that the 
length of minutes is in inverse proportion to their influence - is intensified in the case 
of questions which are not of central importance: on certain issues weeks could pass 
without any despatches being seen by the foreign secretary. The limited information 
which does emerge tends to confirm existing pictures: Crowe and Tyrrell were 
cautious and sensible permanent under- secretaries, conscious of the limitations of 
British power but not defensive or defeatist; Curzon was consistently irascible and 
almost continuously irritated with the French; Macdonald was always pressed for 
time but not lacking a certain vision; and Chamberlain possessed a dry wit, a 
390 
willingness to listen to expert advice and considerable insight. Nicolson was perhaps 
the most informed and articulate commentator on Balkan affairs, but he was 
sometimes unduly alarmist about possible changes in the region and often imagined 
British interests to be rather more engaged there than was in fact the case. The most 
authentic and representative voice in the Foreign Office was probably that of 
Lampson who as head of the Central Department was also quite influential. Lampson 
was realistic and calculating, and the most consistent advocate of the policy of 'wait- 
and-see' or, as he termed it, 'opportunism'; that is, a policy of avoiding intervention 
until 'our own interests are at stake in some shape or form, e. g. a disturbance of the 
peace of Europe'. This rejection of unnecessary entanglements was also rooted in a 
sound appreciation of British limitations: 'Heaven knows we have quite enough on 
our hands already'. 7 
For the British, relations with France were obviously a central concern throughout the 
period: even at the height of Anglo-French acrimony in 1923, Curzon would never 
abandon the entente with the state that after Britain was the staunchest supporter of 
the international status quo. The British also evinced a persistent desire to work with 
the Italians, increasingly so as Mussolini's authority at home grew and his capacity to 
cause disruption abroad developed. These two tendencies converged under 
Chamberlain who sought by various means to regularise inter-allied co-operation and 
to recreate an informal concert (whether over the Balkans as in the scheme of June 
1925 or in the 'Locarno-cabal') to manage the international system. A further feature 
of British policy was a willingness, whilst upholding the main lines of the peace 
treaties, to consider changes in detail to preserve the stability of the system so long as 
no British interest was affected: British equanimity about the possible eventual 
transfer of Salonica to Yugoslavia or the creation of a Yugoslav-Bulgar confederation zn 
are cases in point here. 
FO 371/10700 min. by Lampson d-23 Jun. 1925. 
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Yet another recurring theme is the British belief in the utility of the League of 
Nations. True, the Corfu crisis demonstrated an unwillingness to face the 
contradictions and difficulties underlying the notion of collective security, and the 
British generally 'used more or less internationall language without commi st itment, 
and in the end got the worst of both worldSI. 8But the British certainly saw 
possibilities for the League in the Balkans. It could be used as an instrument of 
policy, as a means of achieving British goals without drawing undue attention to the 
fact, as in the case of the Politis-Kalfoff protocol. Equally, it could serve as a buffer 
between London and problems in the Balkans and as a means of sharing the burden of 
resolving them. The British even hoped, as the Salonica railway episode showed, that 
the League might be able to solve certain kinds of dispute without the need for any 
direct interference from the powers, who could thus remain at arms length. There 
were hints that the British wanted the League to develop further in this direction: they 
were keen that it should not overstretch itself prematurely and sought continually to 
shore up its influence and moral force so that it could contribute to promoting 
stability in the region. 
British policy-makers were certainly capable of brutally realistic assessments of 
British interests, as was illustrated by the emotive question of international minority 
protection. The British had promoted minority protection at Versailles, not out of 
sympathy for the minorities or a desire to perpetuate their existence, but out of a 
calculation that protection would encourage them to settle down within the new 
boundaries of 1919 and to integrate, thus producing the stability British interests 
required. In other words, for the British, minority protection was a means to an end 
rather than an end in itself, and whenever minority protection looked likely to cause 
international friction or to cast doubt on the territorial settlement they did not support 
it. This was demonstrated over the Politis-Kalfoff protocol: this attempt to make 
Orde, International Security, p. 209. 
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minority protection effective seemed likely to aid revisionism and ferment 
international friction, so the British worked to annul the protocol, and favoured an 
exchange of minorities between Greece and Bulgaria as a better means of bringing 
stability to the area. For a similar reason the British had no intention of interfering in 
Yugoslav Macedonia to prevent the persecution of the Macedo-Slavs there: although 
London deprecated the harsh methods the Yugoslavs were using to assimilate them, 
in the long run their integration was desirable to promote stability. The British never 
intended minority protection to lead to self-determination for minorities; it was only 
meant to protect their liberty to assimilate. The British even became half-hearted 
about protecting minorities from persecution, since often that too was most conducive 
to stability. In 1922 Cadogan opined that, regardless of the contravention of the 
minorities treaties, 
yet more harm would in the end be done by unnecessary interference than, 
even at the risk of a little local suffering, to allow these minorities to settle 
down under their present masters. ... [S]o 
long as these people imagine that 
their grievances can be aired before the League of Nations they will refuse to 
settle down and the present effervescence will continue indefinitely. 9 
This view was echoed by Chamberlain in 1925 when he doubted whether the 
minorities treaties were 'really anything but an evil for all concerned, serving only to 
keep alive differences which might otherwise be healed in time'. 10 
Whether British policy-makers conducted policy effectively and successfully 
protected British interests in this period remains a matter of debate. On the 
Dodecanese question, the eventual British retreat can be seen as either a clear defeat 
or as proof of a laudable flexibility and pragmatism. In the Corfu crisis, British policy 
clearly suffered a rebuff, but it could also be argued that the British did their best, in 
adverse circumstances, to preserve peace, protect Greece, limit Italian gains and 
support the League. On the minorities question, the lack of sympathy evinced by the 
9 DBFP/I/XXIV/'326. 
10 F0371/10701 min. by Chamberlain. d. 11 Nov. 1925. 
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British for oppressed minority groups could be criticised, but they were always 
guided by the lodestar of stability which was their paramount interest. As for their 
attitude towards the League more generally, the British could perhaps be taken to task 
for a certain naivety - an insufficient appreciation of the extent to which it was no 
more than the sum of its parts; at other times, however, they demonstrated an acute 
awareness of its limitations and a consciousness of the need to build up its powers and 
functions gradually. On the Salonica railway question, the British could be censured 
for failure to resolve a highly contentious and inflammatory problem. On the other 
hand, it must be acknowledged that they demonstrated great flexibility and deployed a 
variety of tactics to try and settle the dispute, whether by promoting a League 
solution, attempting to concert great power action, or exercising a pacifying influence 
through informal channels. On this question and more generally, the British did what 
they could, within the limits set by their capabilities and interests, to stabilise the 
Balkans and they enjoyed a reasonable amount of success. 
British policy towards France and Italy can also be interpreted in conflicting ways, 
but overall the verdict must be that Britain managed relations within the Entente 
rather well. The Entente remained the cornerstone of British policy, the central device 
by which Britain sought to marshal the great powers in support of the status quo. In 
the early part of this period, relations with France were tense, but the British managed 
at the time of the Dawes-Locarno settlement to make French policy conform more 
closely to British interests without any excessive British compromises. As for Italy', 
although the Corfu crisis was an ominous portent, the British leamt a useful lesson 
from it, and henceforth, perceiving the possible future strength of a revitalised Italy, 
worked by careful handling to keep Italian policy within bounds and to minimise the 
potential danger to the stability of the system that it posed. Although Chamberlain has 
been criticised for his appeasement of Rome, in reality he contained Mussolini 
without conceding anything of substance. It was no mean feat for Britain to manage Z: 5 Z: 5 C 
this relationship with her partners: at first - particularly in the Corfu crisis - the main 
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danger was that co-operation between France and Italy would frustrate British policv; 
later the difficulty was rivalry and antagonism between the two with Britain placed 
uncomfortably in the middle. Nevertheless, the British succeeded generally in 
maintaining good relations with both powers and preserving, however loosely, the 
triple Entente, without subordinating their own interests to those of their partners. In 
this respect, as more generally, the verdict on British policy must be, on the whole, 
quite favourable. 
The aspects of French policy examined here do not perhaps throw much light on the 
mechanics of policy-making in France, or on the fundamental problem of Franco- 
German relations. On the other-hand, they illuminate the problems and complexity of 
France's alliance policy in eastern Europe and the vexed nature of Franco-Italian 
relations - indeed, the 'Italian problem' seems to lie at the heart of France Is policy in 
the region. The general pattern of the 1920s was of France gradually despairing of the 
attempt to work consistently with Italy and turning instead to the little states of south- 
eastern Europe. During and after the Corfu crisis, France's attempt to ride the two 
horses simultaneously came to grief as a result of its own contradictions, and 
gradually Mussolini's reluctance to compromise with France led to a definite 
estrangement - to the chagrin of the French, who perceived that even the least of the 
great powers was worth several small states. From this point on, the French became 
determined to advance their influence in south-eastem Europe - or rather the protect it 
from the depredations of Italy - and in these circumstances Greece grew in 
importance for France. It was, however, a complex business to make progress in this 
direction when there was such rivalry between the states of the region, and the French 
system emerges as rather less substantial than was once thought: its origins were 
slightly desperately defensive, and it was weakened by a certain lack of focus and the 
refusal of the British to assist French policy in this area. On the other hand, the 
Salonica railway question - which illustrated how the French, unlike the 
British, felt a 
need to intervene actively in the region to protect their interests - demonstrated that 
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the French possessed an impressive tactical flexibility and a willingness to concert 
political and economic policy in order to protect their interests. The overall verdict 
must be, however, that France's position was weakened in the region in these years 
largely because of Italy's policy and France's inability to effectively concert potential 
allies. In the later part of the period, opposition to Italy was the dominant leitmotif of 
French policy because the search for a genuine understanding - always a chimera 
given their conflicting interests and Mussolini's ambitions - had clearly failed. 
Italian policy in this period provides some useful evidence for the debates on 
continuity and coherence. In the immediate aftermath of Mussolini's rise to power, 
Italian policy towards Greece was unchanged, being resolutely hostile though perhaps 
slightly more assertive. On the Dodecanese question the very same claims and 
assertions continued to be made, resulting in a certain measure of success by 1924. 
From 1925 onwards there was a change in policy, with the pursuit of rapprochement 
with Greece: it could be argued, however, that the essential objective of this policy, 
namely the expansion of Italian influence and power in the Mediterranean region, was 
unchanged. As for consistency, it would be fair to say that this lay only in the search 
for advantage, with various means being used to this end. On the other hand, 
revisionism and imperialism - whether in the shape of projected expeditions against 
Turkey or in colonial gains in Africa derived from the Anglo-Italian entente - were 
fairly consistent themes. In broad terms there was certainly continuity with liberal 
Italy in the sense that Mussolini also sought to make Italy a real great power. In this 
he was moderately successful in this period in that Italy expanded her colonial 
possessions and carved out a sphere of influence of sorts in south-eastern Europe. 
This was achieved at the expense of France, and with the help of a certain benevolent 
neutrality from Britain: one further feature of the period was indeed the absence of 
any apparent conflict of interest between Britain and Italy - each respected the other's 
interests and while Mussolini's ambitions remained within bounds there was no real 
clash. 
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The fundamental ýquestion about the international system of the 1920s therefore 
remains. Was it doomed to collapse, or did it have the potential to evolve into some 
sort of stable order? By the mid-1920s the Dawes-Locarno settlement had brought a 
measure of stability to western Europe and there had also been a improvement in the 
south-east of the continent: there was no Balkan Locarno, but through the efforts of 
Britain and the League economic stabilisation and reconstruction had at least begun. 
Greece was a case in point: the disruptive impact of the 1922 disaster had been 
minimised by international assistance with refugee settlement which certainly 
promised increased stability in the long term. The prudent policies of Britain and 
France, coupled with the influence of the League, also helped to contain potential 
disruption to the political status quo in the region, and even Italian mischief-making 
had been kept in check. Contemporaries certainly felt that the situation had improved, 
and there was certainly at least a possibility that it would continue to do so. 
In retrospect, however, there were other, less promising portents. Firstly, the Corfu 
crisis had laid bare the inherent contradictions of collective security, and although the 
Foreign Office had perceived these dimly they were not squarely faced, which made 
the shock when collective security was again found wanting in the 1930s more 
serious than it might otherwise have been. Secondly, British policy on the minorities 
question was flawed: London hoped that minority problems would gradually 
disappear as minorities were assimilated or integrated, one way or another, into the 
states they inhabited; but this never happened. In the case of Greece and Bulgaria this 
was masked by the exchange convention which relieved tension by eliminating the zn 
minorities, but in all other regions the minorities remained in situ, embittered and 
resentful; and minority problems rumbled on into the 1930s when they seriously 
affected the stability of the international system. British policy thus betrayed a grave 
under- estimation of the persistence of nationalist feeling, the corrosive, destabilising 
effect it could have and the temptation and potential it offered for exploitation by 
revisionist powers. Thirdly, although British policy-makers were generally amply 
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endowed with cynicism and realism, the Foreign Office attitude towards a Balkan 
security pact showed a worrying misperception of the nature of the Locamo treaty 
itself that did not bode well for the future. It is not necessary to subscribe to the thesis 
that the later 1920S were mere years of illusion to recognise that these three problems 
constituted serious fault-lines in the international system. 
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